* Implement proposal validation
Includes commits:
Implemented CProposalValidator
Use CProposalValidator to check proposals at prepare and submit stages
Modify proposal validator to support numerical data in string format
Multiple bug fixes in governance-validators.cpp
Fixed bug in CheckURL
Fixed stream state check
Increase strictness of payment address validation for compatibility with sentinel
Improved error reporting
Implemented "check" rpc command to validate proposals
Fixes to RPC check command
Fix error message
Unit test and data files for proposal validator
Added test cases
Removed debugging code
* Fix name validation
* Changes to address code review comments
* HD wallet
Minimal set of changes (no refactoring) backported from Bitcoin upstream to make HD wallets work in Dash 0.12.1.x+
* minimal bip44 (hardcoded account and change)
* minimal bip39
Additional cmd-line options for new wallet:
-mnemonic
-mnemonicpassphrase
* Do not recreate HD wallet on encryption
Adjusted keypool.py test
* Do not store any private keys for hd wallet besides the master one
Derive all keys on the fly.
Original idea/implementation - btc PR9298, backported and improved
* actually use bip39
* pbkdf2 test
* backport wallet-hd.py test
* Allow specifying hd seed, add dumphdseed rpc, fix bugs
- -hdseed cmd-line param to specify HD seed on wallet creation
- dumphdseed rpc to dump HD seed
- allow seed of any size
- fix dumpwallet rpc bug (wasn't decrypting HD seed)
- print HD seed and extended public masterkey on dumpwallet
* top up keypool on HD wallet encryption
* split HD chain: external/internal
* add missing cs_wallet lock in init.cpp
* fix `const char *` issues (use strings)
* default mnemonic passphrase is an empty string in all cases
* store mnemonic/mnemonicpassphrase
replace dumphdseed with dumphdinfo
* Add fCrypted flag to CHDChain
* prepare internal structures for multiple HD accounts
(plus some code cleanup)
* use secure allocator for storing sensitive HD data
* use secure strings for mnemonic(passphrase)
* small fix in GenerateNewHDChain
* use 24 words for mnemonic by default
* make sure mnemonic passphrase provided by user does not exceed 256 symbols
* more usage of secure allocators and memory_cleanse
* code cleanup
* rename: CSecureVector -> SecureVector
* add missing include
* fix warning in rpcdump.cpp
* refactor mnemonic_check (also fix a bug)
* move bip39 functions to CMnemonic
* Few fixes for CMnemonic:
- use `SecureVector` for data, bits, seed
- `Check` should return bool
* init vectors with desired size where possible
- Replace NOP3 with CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY (BIP112)
<nSequence> CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY -> <nSequence>
- Fails if txin.nSequence < nSequence, allowing funds of a txout to be locked for a number of blocks or a duration of time after its inclusion in a block.
- Pull most of CheckLockTime() out into VerifyLockTime(), a local function that will be reused for CheckSequence()
- Add bitwise AND operator to CScriptNum
- Enable CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY as a standard script verify flag
- Transactions that fail CSV verification will be rejected from the mempool, making it easy to test the feature. However blocks containing "invalid" CSV-using transactions will still be accepted; this is *not* the soft-fork required to actually enable CSV for production use.
Update the unittest that is meant to catch a transaction that is invalid
because it has a null input. The old test failed not because of that
but because it was considered a coinbase with too large script. This is
already checked with a different test, though.
The new test is *not* a coinbase since it has two inputs, but one of
them is null. This really checks the corresponding code path in
CheckTransaction.
c5c1edf Fix spelling mistake in -> if. (Mark Friedenbach)
e846b2a Correct a possibly intentional pun that is nevertheless hard to read: "two times of nLockTime." What is meant is that there are two kinds, or categories of nLockTime. (Mark Friedenbach)
Four cases included:
* The CLTV operand type mismatches the tx locktime. In the script it is
1 (interpreted as block height), but in the tx is 500000000
(interpreted as date)
* The stack is empty when executing OP_CLTV
* The tx is final by having only one input with MAX_INT sequence number
* The operand for CLTV is negative (after OP_0 OP_1 OP_SUB)
<nLockTime> CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY -> <nLockTime>
Fails if tx.nLockTime < nLockTime, allowing the funds in a txout to be
locked until some block height or block time in the future is reached.
Only the logic and unittests are implemented; this commit does not have
any actual soft-fork logic in it.
Thanks to Pieter Wuille for rebase.
Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for the suggestion of comparing the
argument against the transaction nLockTime rather than the current
time/blockheight directly.
This commit adds several tests to the script_invalid.json data which
exercise some edge conditions that are not currently being tested.
These are mainly being added to cover several cases a branch coverage
analysis of btcd showed are not already being covered, but given more
tests of edge conditions are always a good thing, I'm contributing
them upstream.
The test which is intended to prove that the script engine is properly
rejecting non-minimally encoded PUSHDATA4 data is using the wrong
opcode and value. The test is using 0x4f, which is OP_1NEGATE instead
of the desired 0x4e, which is OP_PUSHDATA4. Further, the push of data
is intended to be 256 bytes, but the value the test is using is
0x00100000 (4096), instead of the desired 0x00010000 (256).
This commit fixes both issues.
This was found while examining the branch coverage in btcd against only
these tests to help find missing branch coverage.
The fix to NegateSignatureS caused a test which had been failing
in IsValidSignatureEncoding to then fail in IsLowDERSignature.
Add new test so the original check remains exercised.
NegateSignatureS is called with a signature without a hashtype, so
do not save the last byte and append it after S negation.
Updates the two tests which were affected by this bug.
Makes it possible to compactly provide a delibrately invalid signature
for use with CHECK(MULTI)SIG. For instance with BIP19 if m != n invalid
signatures need to be provided in the scriptSig; prior to this change
those invalid signatures would need to be large DER-encoded signatures.
Note that we may want to further expand on this change in the future by
saying that only OP_0 is a "valid" invalid signature; BIP19 even with
this change is inherently malleable as the invalid signatures can be any
validly encoded DER signature.
Rebased-From: 2fa9a8ec86
Github-Pull: #5627
Makes it possible to compactly provide a delibrately invalid signature
for use with CHECK(MULTI)SIG. For instance with BIP19 if m != n invalid
signatures need to be provided in the scriptSig; prior to this change
those invalid signatures would need to be large DER-encoded signatures.
Note that we may want to further expand on this change in the future by
saying that only OP_0 is a "valid" invalid signature; BIP19 even with
this change is inherently malleable as the invalid signatures can be any
validly encoded DER signature.
