* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
* fix vulnerability with mapMasternodeOrphanObjects
The vulnerability is that a malicious node can send a lot of NetMsgType::MNGOVERNANCEOBJECT messages which refer to many arbitrary MN's. In this case, mapMasternodeOrphanObjects will grow unrestrictedly.
* MN collateral moved to governance-object.cpp; ban score applied to misbehaving nodes
* recursive locks removed
* check for the mn collateral code segregated to a separate function
* CheckCollateral implementation moved to cpp
* fix issues with mapSeenGovernanceObjects
Removed seen-governance-objects optimization except for deleted objects. Otherwise some nodes can permanently lost proposals if they received them too early.
Beside of that there is a vulnerability with seen-governance-objects mechanism if malicious node send us a lot of invalid governance objects.
* mapSeenGovernanceObjects renamed to mapErasedGovernanceObjects
* current fixes
* use int64_t for expiration timestamp
* process governance objects in CheckMasternodeOrphanObjects as usual
* code refactoring: SetRateChecksHelper class added
* fixed race condition issues with propagation of governance objects
* change GetCollateralConfirmations signature
* code refactoring
* reduced minimum number of collateral confirmations required for relaying proposals
* bug fixes and improvements
* Implement RequestOrphanObjects
* Ensure governance objects are only requested from peers once per call
* Add gobject log messages
* Implemented CleanOrphanObjects
* Move governance maintenance functions from NewBlock to a time-based function
* Remove unused delcaration for mapAskedForGovernanceObject
* Only accept wd's that are more recent or have a higher hash than the current best
* Fix whitespace typo
* Relay current watchdog when lower priority ones are received
* Fix nHashWatchdogCurrent reset conditions
* expire previous current wd when a new one is found in UpdateCurrentWatchdog
* fail to process votes for expired or deleted object
* Add "enough data" stop conditions for gov sync
* fix:
- make sure condition is checked only once per tick
- let condition be fully used on resync (reset nTimeNoObjectsLeft)
* fix watchdogs:
- do not accept if CreationTime is out of bounds (using CreationTime, not local time now)
- do not sync expired
- fix disk serialization
* drop watchdogs early, avoid adding//removing
* clean mapWatchdogObjects when object is deleted via votes
* Few networking fixes:
- skip "masternode"/inbound connections for sync related processes
- do not sync gov data to other nodes until fully synced ourselves
- do not accept incoming connections until fully synced
* inbound connections could be harmful only if our node is a masternode
* same for CGovernanceManager::Sync
* Adjust gov sync:
- simulate mainnet gov obj sync conditions on testnet
- add redundancy: ask up to 3 peers for the same obj
* stop loop if max number of peers per obj was asked
* Remove vote count check from IsValidLocally
* Do not check voted validity flag when syncing
* Do not send objects marked for deletion during syncing
* Remove node penalty for unrequested objects.
We should remove hash from setAskFor when the message corresponding to previous inv arrives, otherwise it's stays there forever and setAskFor overflows (i.e. AskFor returns immediately without processing).
* On gov sync first sync objs, then ask for votes on per-obj basis from different peers.
This should help to sync obj list initially and split the load among many peers. Also adds ability to catch up votes later after the sync.
* ask for all objects, do this in cycles
* Fix Sync() code, better readability
* ask multiple nodes at once when possible, perf boost for large numper of objs
* Addressed comments: pass reference, more peer version check
* Store time we saw mnb last time, bump sync timeout
if we received seen mnb but we are too close to MASTERNODE_NEW_START_REQUIRED_SECONDS
* Reset blockchain sync status if new blocks were accepted during sync
* Add some debug log output
* wait for at least one new block to be accepted
* bump CGovernanceManager-Version
- some were not used, some were included twice, some were in the wrong place, some were missing (but it compiled because some were in the wrong place)
- organized a bit better, grouped dash specific includes in original bitcoin files, should save some time solving conflicts when/if merging patches later
- added description for 'deserialize'
- added 'type' filter to 'list'
- added 'count' command (changed CGovernanceManager::ToString to output a bit more detailed info)
* Change rate check logic to avoid DoS attacks
* Convert rate check to use object timestamp instead of arrival time
* Update cached variables before checking for superblocks
* Ensure that last times are monotonically non-decreasing
* Bump governance manager serialization format
* Improved rate check error reporting
* Vote relaying changes
- Remove vote relaying from ProcessVote
- Remove vote relaying from orphan vote processing
- Relay vote in ProcessMessages (only)
* Do not relay governance objects during orphan processing
* Restore relaying of local votes
* Changed overloaded function name: ProcessVote->ProcessVoteAndRelay
* Added logging to PushInventory
* Fix LogPrint format
* Log errors found during governance syncing
* Turn off rate checks during syncing
* Turn off rate check during maintenance
* locks in PS
* lock in governance
* locks in IS
* lock in ProcessGetData
* locks in CMasternodeSync
* centralize mnodeman.Check call
* locks order in mnpayments
* use current block chainTip when possible (less locks)
* add missing lock in CountInputsWithAmount
* fix deadlock RequestLowDataPaymentBlocks/IsTransactionValid
* LOCK2 in CheckMnbAndUpdateMasternodeList, CheckAndUpdate, SendVerifyRequest
* LOCK(cs) is not needed here
* Decouple governance init actions from serialization
Should fix this:
```
Assertion failed: lock governance.cs not held in governance-classes.cpp:117; locks held:
cs_Shutdown init.cpp:200 (TRY)
cs ./governance.h:195
cs governance.cpp:835
Abort trap: 6
```
* Increase quorum for object deletion to 2/3 of MN network
* Implement expiration of watchdog objects
* Remove objects from the watchdog map itself
* Message fix for invalid objects
