dash/src/wallet.cpp

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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2014 The Bitcoin developers
2015-03-18 00:06:58 +01:00
// Copyright (c) 2014-2015 The Dash developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include "wallet.h"
#include "base58.h"
#include "checkpoints.h"
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#include "coincontrol.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "masternode-budget.h"
#include "darksend.h"
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
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#include "keepass.h"
#include "instantx.h"
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#include "script/script.h"
#include "script/sign.h"
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#include "spork.h"
#include "timedata.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "utilmoneystr.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/replace.hpp>
#include <boost/thread.hpp>
using namespace std;
/**
* Settings
*/
CFeeRate payTxFee(DEFAULT_TRANSACTION_FEE);
CAmount maxTxFee = DEFAULT_TRANSACTION_MAXFEE;
unsigned int nTxConfirmTarget = 1;
bool bSpendZeroConfChange = true;
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bool fSendFreeTransactions = false;
bool fPayAtLeastCustomFee = true;
/**
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* Fees smaller than this (in duffs) are considered zero fee (for transaction creation)
* We are ~100 times smaller then bitcoin now (2015-06-23), set minTxFee 10 times higher
* so it's still 10 times lower comparing to bitcoin.
* Override with -mintxfee
*/
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CFeeRate CWallet::minTxFee = CFeeRate(10000);
/** @defgroup mapWallet
*
* @{
*/
struct CompareValueOnly
{
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bool operator()(const pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*, unsigned int> >& t1,
const pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*, unsigned int> >& t2) const
{
return t1.first < t2.first;
}
};
std::string COutput::ToString() const
{
return strprintf("COutput(%s, %d, %d) [%s]", tx->GetHash().ToString(), i, nDepth, FormatMoney(tx->vout[i].nValue));
}
const CWalletTx* CWallet::GetWalletTx(const uint256& hash) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(hash);
if (it == mapWallet.end())
return NULL;
return &(it->second);
}
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CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewKey()
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{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
bool fCompressed = CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY); // default to compressed public keys if we want 0.6.0 wallets
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RandAddSeedPerfmon();
CKey secret;
secret.MakeNewKey(fCompressed);
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// Compressed public keys were introduced in version 0.6.0
if (fCompressed)
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY);
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CPubKey pubkey = secret.GetPubKey();
assert(secret.VerifyPubKey(pubkey));
// Create new metadata
int64_t nCreationTime = GetTime();
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = CKeyMetadata(nCreationTime);
if (!nTimeFirstKey || nCreationTime < nTimeFirstKey)
nTimeFirstKey = nCreationTime;
if (!AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey))
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throw std::runtime_error("CWallet::GenerateNewKey() : AddKey failed");
return pubkey;
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}
bool CWallet::AddKeyPubKey(const CKey& secret, const CPubKey &pubkey)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey))
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return false;
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// check if we need to remove from watch-only
CScript script;
script = GetScriptForDestination(pubkey.GetID());
if (HaveWatchOnly(script))
RemoveWatchOnly(script);
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
if (!IsCrypted()) {
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteKey(pubkey,
secret.GetPrivKey(),
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()]);
}
return true;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
}
bool CWallet::AddCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey,
const vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
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{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (pwalletdbEncryption)
return pwalletdbEncryption->WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
else
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
}
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
}
bool CWallet::LoadKeyMetadata(const CPubKey &pubkey, const CKeyMetadata &meta)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
if (meta.nCreateTime && (!nTimeFirstKey || meta.nCreateTime < nTimeFirstKey))
nTimeFirstKey = meta.nCreateTime;
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = meta;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
{
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret);
}
bool CWallet::AddCScript(const CScript& redeemScript)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteCScript(Hash160(redeemScript), redeemScript);
}
bool CWallet::LoadCScript(const CScript& redeemScript)
{
/* A sanity check was added in pull #3843 to avoid adding redeemScripts
* that never can be redeemed. However, old wallets may still contain
* these. Do not add them to the wallet and warn. */
if (redeemScript.size() > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE)
{
std::string strAddr = CBitcoinAddress(CScriptID(redeemScript)).ToString();
LogPrintf("%s: Warning: This wallet contains a redeemScript of size %i which exceeds maximum size %i thus can never be redeemed. Do not use address %s.\n",
__func__, redeemScript.size(), MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE, strAddr);
return true;
}
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript);
}
bool CWallet::AddWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
nTimeFirstKey = 1; // No birthday information for watch-only keys.
NotifyWatchonlyChanged(true);
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteWatchOnly(dest);
}
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bool CWallet::RemoveWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::RemoveWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
if (!HaveWatchOnly())
NotifyWatchonlyChanged(false);
if (fFileBacked)
if (!CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddWatchOnly(dest);
}
bool CWallet::Unlock(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase, bool anonymizeOnly)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
{
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
2014-12-26 12:53:29 +01:00
SecureString strWalletPassphraseFinal;
if (!IsLocked())
{
fWalletUnlockAnonymizeOnly = anonymizeOnly;
return true;
}
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
2014-12-26 12:53:29 +01:00
// Verify KeePassIntegration
if(strWalletPassphrase == "keepass" && GetBoolArg("-keepass", false)) {
try {
strWalletPassphraseFinal = keePassInt.retrievePassphrase();
} catch (std::exception& e) {
LogPrintf("CWallet::Unlock could not retrieve passphrase from KeePass: Error: %s\n", e.what());
return false;
}
} else {
strWalletPassphraseFinal = strWalletPassphrase;
}
CCrypter crypter;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
BOOST_FOREACH(const MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey, mapMasterKeys)
{
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
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if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphraseFinal, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
return false;
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, vMasterKey))
continue; // try another master key
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(vMasterKey))
{
fWalletUnlockAnonymizeOnly = anonymizeOnly;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
return true;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
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return false;
}
bool CWallet::ChangeWalletPassphrase(const SecureString& strOldWalletPassphrase, const SecureString& strNewWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
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{
bool fWasLocked = IsLocked();
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
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bool bUseKeePass = false;
SecureString strOldWalletPassphraseFinal;
// Verify KeePassIntegration
if(strOldWalletPassphrase == "keepass" && GetBoolArg("-keepass", false)) {
bUseKeePass = true;
try {
strOldWalletPassphraseFinal = keePassInt.retrievePassphrase();
} catch (std::exception& e) {
LogPrintf("CWallet::ChangeWalletPassphrase could not retrieve passphrase from KeePass: Error: %s\n", e.what());
return false;
}
} else {
strOldWalletPassphraseFinal = strOldWalletPassphrase;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
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{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
Lock();
CCrypter crypter;
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
BOOST_FOREACH(MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey, mapMasterKeys)
{
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
2014-12-26 12:53:29 +01:00
if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strOldWalletPassphraseFinal, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
return false;
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, vMasterKey))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
return false;
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(vMasterKey))
{
int64_t nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * (100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime)));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations + pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime))) / 2;
if (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
LogPrintf("Wallet passphrase changed to an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Encrypt(vMasterKey, pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey))
return false;
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteMasterKey(pMasterKey.first, pMasterKey.second);
if (fWasLocked)
Lock();
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
2014-12-26 12:53:29 +01:00
// Update KeePass if necessary
if(bUseKeePass) {
LogPrintf("CWallet::ChangeWalletPassphrase - Updating KeePass with new passphrase");
try {
keePassInt.updatePassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase);
} catch (std::exception& e) {
LogPrintf("CWallet::ChangeWalletPassphrase - could not update passphrase in KeePass: Error: %s\n", e.what());
return false;
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
return true;
}
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
return false;
}
2012-04-15 22:10:54 +02:00
void CWallet::SetBestChain(const CBlockLocator& loc)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
walletdb.WriteBestBlock(loc);
}
bool CWallet::SetMinVersion(enum WalletFeature nVersion, CWalletDB* pwalletdbIn, bool fExplicit)
2012-02-18 14:55:02 +01:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // nWalletVersion
2012-02-18 14:55:02 +01:00
if (nWalletVersion >= nVersion)
return true;
// when doing an explicit upgrade, if we pass the max version permitted, upgrade all the way
if (fExplicit && nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nVersion = FEATURE_LATEST;
2012-02-18 14:55:02 +01:00
nWalletVersion = nVersion;
if (nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
2012-02-18 14:55:02 +01:00
if (fFileBacked)
{
CWalletDB* pwalletdb = pwalletdbIn ? pwalletdbIn : new CWalletDB(strWalletFile);
if (nWalletVersion > 40000)
pwalletdb->WriteMinVersion(nWalletVersion);
if (!pwalletdbIn)
delete pwalletdb;
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SetMaxVersion(int nVersion)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // nWalletVersion, nWalletMaxVersion
// cannot downgrade below current version
if (nWalletVersion > nVersion)
return false;
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
return true;
}
set<uint256> CWallet::GetConflicts(const uint256& txid) const
{
set<uint256> result;
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(txid);
if (it == mapWallet.end())
return result;
const CWalletTx& wtx = it->second;
std::pair<TxSpends::const_iterator, TxSpends::const_iterator> range;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, wtx.vin)
{
if (mapTxSpends.count(txin.prevout) <= 1)
continue; // No conflict if zero or one spends
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(txin.prevout);
for (TxSpends::const_iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
result.insert(it->second);
}
return result;
}
void CWallet::SyncMetaData(pair<TxSpends::iterator, TxSpends::iterator> range)
{
// We want all the wallet transactions in range to have the same metadata as
// the oldest (smallest nOrderPos).
// So: find smallest nOrderPos:
int nMinOrderPos = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
const CWalletTx* copyFrom = NULL;
for (TxSpends::iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& hash = it->second;
int n = mapWallet[hash].nOrderPos;
if (n < nMinOrderPos)
{
nMinOrderPos = n;
copyFrom = &mapWallet[hash];
}
}
// Now copy data from copyFrom to rest:
for (TxSpends::iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& hash = it->second;
CWalletTx* copyTo = &mapWallet[hash];
if (copyFrom == copyTo) continue;
copyTo->mapValue = copyFrom->mapValue;
copyTo->vOrderForm = copyFrom->vOrderForm;
// fTimeReceivedIsTxTime not copied on purpose
// nTimeReceived not copied on purpose
copyTo->nTimeSmart = copyFrom->nTimeSmart;
copyTo->fFromMe = copyFrom->fFromMe;
copyTo->strFromAccount = copyFrom->strFromAccount;
// nOrderPos not copied on purpose
// cached members not copied on purpose
}
}
/**
* Outpoint is spent if any non-conflicted transaction
* spends it:
*/
bool CWallet::IsSpent(const uint256& hash, unsigned int n) const
{
const COutPoint outpoint(hash, n);
pair<TxSpends::const_iterator, TxSpends::const_iterator> range;
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(outpoint);
for (TxSpends::const_iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& wtxid = it->second;
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mit = mapWallet.find(wtxid);
if (mit != mapWallet.end() && mit->second.GetDepthInMainChain() >= 0)
return true; // Spent
}
return false;
}
void CWallet::AddToSpends(const COutPoint& outpoint, const uint256& wtxid)
{
mapTxSpends.insert(make_pair(outpoint, wtxid));
pair<TxSpends::iterator, TxSpends::iterator> range;
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(outpoint);
SyncMetaData(range);
}
void CWallet::AddToSpends(const uint256& wtxid)
{
assert(mapWallet.count(wtxid));
CWalletTx& thisTx = mapWallet[wtxid];
if (thisTx.IsCoinBase()) // Coinbases don't spend anything!
return;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, thisTx.vin)
AddToSpends(txin.prevout, wtxid);
}
bool CWallet::EncryptWallet(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
{
if (IsCrypted())
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
RandAddSeedPerfmon();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
vMasterKey.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
GetRandBytes(&vMasterKey[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
CMasterKey kMasterKey;
RandAddSeedPerfmon();
kMasterKey.vchSalt.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
GetRandBytes(&kMasterKey.vchSalt[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
CCrypter crypter;
int64_t nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, 25000, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = 2500000 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations + kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime))) / 2;
if (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
LogPrintf("Encrypting Wallet with an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations);
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
if (!crypter.Encrypt(vMasterKey, kMasterKey.vchCryptedKey))
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
mapMasterKeys[++nMasterKeyMaxID] = kMasterKey;
if (fFileBacked)
{
assert(!pwalletdbEncryption);
pwalletdbEncryption = new CWalletDB(strWalletFile);
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnBegin()) {
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL;
return false;
}
pwalletdbEncryption->WriteMasterKey(nMasterKeyMaxID, kMasterKey);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
}
if (!EncryptKeys(vMasterKey))
{
if (fFileBacked) {
pwalletdbEncryption->TxnAbort();
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
}
// We now probably have half of our keys encrypted in memory, and half not...
// die and let the user reload their unencrypted wallet.
assert(false);
}
2012-02-18 14:55:02 +01:00
// Encryption was introduced in version 0.4.0
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_WALLETCRYPT, pwalletdbEncryption, true);
2012-02-18 14:55:02 +01:00
if (fFileBacked)
{
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnCommit()) {
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
// We now have keys encrypted in memory, but not on disk...
// die to avoid confusion and let the user reload their unencrypted wallet.
assert(false);
}
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
pwalletdbEncryption = NULL;
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
Lock();
Unlock(strWalletPassphrase);
NewKeyPool();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
Lock();
// Need to completely rewrite the wallet file; if we don't, bdb might keep
// bits of the unencrypted private key in slack space in the database file.
CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile);
Implemented KeePass Integration More info regarding KeePass: http://keepass.info/ KeePass integration will use KeePassHttp (https://github.com/pfn/keepasshttp/) to facilitate communications between the client and KeePass. KeePassHttp is a plugin for KeePass 2.x and provides a secure means of exposing KeePass entries via HTTP for clients to consume. The implementation is dependent on the following: - crypter.h for AES encryption helper functions. - rpcprotocol.h for handling RPC communications. Could only be used partially however due some static values in the code. - OpenSSL for base64 encoding. regular util.h libraries were not used for base64 encoding/decoding since they do not use secure allocation. - JSON Spirit for reading / writing RPC communications The following changes were made: - Added CLI options in help - Added RPC commands: keepass <genkey|init|setpassphrase> - Added keepass.h and keepass.cpp which hold the integration routines - Modified rpcwallet.cpp to support RPC commands The following new options are available for darkcoind and darkcoin-qt: -keepass Use KeePass 2 integration using KeePassHttp plugin (default: 0) -keepassport=<port> Connect to KeePassHttp on port <port> (default: 19455) -keepasskey=<key> KeePassHttp key for AES encrypted communication with KeePass -keepassid=<name> KeePassHttp id for the established association -keepassname=<name> Name to construct url for KeePass entry that stores the wallet passphrase The following rpc commands are available: - keepass genkey: generates a base64 encoded 256 bit AES key that can be used for the communication with KeePassHttp. Only necessary for manual configuration. Use init for automatic configuration. - keepass init: sets up the association between darkcoind and keepass by generating an AES key and sending an association message to KeePassHttp. This will trigger KeePass to ask for an Id for the association. Returns the association and the base64 encoded string for the AES key. - keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>: updates the passphrase in KeePassHttp to a new value. This should match the passphrase you intend to use for the wallet. Please note that the standard RPC commands walletpassphrasechange and the wallet encrption from the QT GUI already send the updates to KeePassHttp, so this is only necessary for manual manipulation of the password. Sample initialization flow from darkcoin-qt console (this needs to be done only once to set up the association): - Have KeePass running with an open database - Start darkcoin-qt - Open console - type: "keepass init" in darkcoin-qt console - (keepass pops up and asks for an association id, fill that in). Example: mydrkwallet - response: Association successful. Id: mydrkwalletdarkcoin - Key: AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= - Edit darkcoin.conf and fill in these values keepass=1 keepasskey=AgQkcs6cI7v9tlSYKjG/+s8wJrGALHl3jLosJpPLzUE= keepassid=mydrkwallet keepassname=testwallet - Restart darkcoin-qt At this point, the association is made. The next action depends on your particular situation: - current wallet is not yet encrypted. Encrypting the wallet will trigger the integration and stores the password in KeePass (Under the 'KeePassHttp Passwords' group, named after keepassname. - current wallet is already encrypted: use "keepass setpassphrase <passphrase>" to store the passphrase in KeePass. At this point, the passphrase is stored in KeePassHttp. When Unlocking the wallet, one can use keepass as the passphrase to trigger retrieval of the password. This works from the RPC commands as well as the GUI.
2014-12-26 12:53:29 +01:00
// Update KeePass if necessary
if(GetBoolArg("-keepass", false)) {
LogPrintf("CWallet::EncryptWallet - Updating KeePass with new passphrase");
try {
keePassInt.updatePassphrase(strWalletPassphrase);
} catch (std::exception& e) {
LogPrintf("CWallet::EncryptWallet - could not update passphrase in KeePass: Error: %s\n", e.what());
}
}
}
NotifyStatusChanged(this);
2011-11-10 21:29:23 +01:00
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
return true;
}
int64_t CWallet::IncOrderPosNext(CWalletDB *pwalletdb)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // nOrderPosNext
int64_t nRet = nOrderPosNext++;
if (pwalletdb) {
pwalletdb->WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
} else {
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
}
return nRet;
}
CWallet::TxItems CWallet::OrderedTxItems(std::list<CAccountingEntry>& acentries, std::string strAccount)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapWallet
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
// First: get all CWalletTx and CAccountingEntry into a sorted-by-order multimap.
TxItems txOrdered;
// Note: maintaining indices in the database of (account,time) --> txid and (account, time) --> acentry
// would make this much faster for applications that do this a lot.
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx* wtx = &((*it).second);
txOrdered.insert(make_pair(wtx->nOrderPos, TxPair(wtx, (CAccountingEntry*)0)));
}
acentries.clear();
walletdb.ListAccountCreditDebit(strAccount, acentries);
BOOST_FOREACH(CAccountingEntry& entry, acentries)
{
txOrdered.insert(make_pair(entry.nOrderPos, TxPair((CWalletTx*)0, &entry)));
}
return txOrdered;
}
void CWallet::MarkDirty()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
item.second.MarkDirty();
}
}
bool CWallet::AddToWallet(const CWalletTx& wtxIn, bool fFromLoadWallet)
{
uint256 hash = wtxIn.GetHash();
if (fFromLoadWallet)
{
mapWallet[hash] = wtxIn;
mapWallet[hash].BindWallet(this);
AddToSpends(hash);
}
else
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Inserts only if not already there, returns tx inserted or tx found
pair<map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator, bool> ret = mapWallet.insert(make_pair(hash, wtxIn));
CWalletTx& wtx = (*ret.first).second;
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wtx.BindWallet(this);
bool fInsertedNew = ret.second;
if (fInsertedNew)
{
wtx.nTimeReceived = GetAdjustedTime();
wtx.nOrderPos = IncOrderPosNext();
wtx.nTimeSmart = wtx.nTimeReceived;
if (wtxIn.hashBlock != 0)
{
if (mapBlockIndex.count(wtxIn.hashBlock))
{
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int64_t latestNow = wtx.nTimeReceived;
int64_t latestEntry = 0;
{
// Tolerate times up to the last timestamp in the wallet not more than 5 minutes into the future
int64_t latestTolerated = latestNow + 300;
std::list<CAccountingEntry> acentries;
TxItems txOrdered = OrderedTxItems(acentries);
for (TxItems::reverse_iterator it = txOrdered.rbegin(); it != txOrdered.rend(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx *const pwtx = (*it).second.first;
if (pwtx == &wtx)
continue;
CAccountingEntry *const pacentry = (*it).second.second;
int64_t nSmartTime;
if (pwtx)
{
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeSmart;
if (!nSmartTime)
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeReceived;
}
else
nSmartTime = pacentry->nTime;
if (nSmartTime <= latestTolerated)
{
latestEntry = nSmartTime;
if (nSmartTime > latestNow)
latestNow = nSmartTime;
break;
}
}
}
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int64_t blocktime = mapBlockIndex[wtxIn.hashBlock]->GetBlockTime();
wtx.nTimeSmart = std::max(latestEntry, std::min(blocktime, latestNow));
}
else
LogPrintf("AddToWallet() : found %s in block %s not in index\n",
wtxIn.GetHash().ToString(),
wtxIn.hashBlock.ToString());
}
AddToSpends(hash);
}
bool fUpdated = false;
if (!fInsertedNew)
{
// Merge
if (wtxIn.hashBlock != 0 && wtxIn.hashBlock != wtx.hashBlock)
{
wtx.hashBlock = wtxIn.hashBlock;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.nIndex != -1 && (wtxIn.vMerkleBranch != wtx.vMerkleBranch || wtxIn.nIndex != wtx.nIndex))
{
wtx.vMerkleBranch = wtxIn.vMerkleBranch;
wtx.nIndex = wtxIn.nIndex;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.fFromMe && wtxIn.fFromMe != wtx.fFromMe)
{
wtx.fFromMe = wtxIn.fFromMe;
fUpdated = true;
}
}
//// debug print
LogPrintf("AddToWallet %s %s%s\n", wtxIn.GetHash().ToString(), (fInsertedNew ? "new" : ""), (fUpdated ? "update" : ""));
// Write to disk
if (fInsertedNew || fUpdated)
if (!wtx.WriteToDisk())
return false;
// Break debit/credit balance caches:
wtx.MarkDirty();
// Notify UI of new or updated transaction
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, hash, fInsertedNew ? CT_NEW : CT_UPDATED);
// notify an external script when a wallet transaction comes in or is updated
std::string strCmd = GetArg("-walletnotify", "");
if ( !strCmd.empty())
{
boost::replace_all(strCmd, "%s", wtxIn.GetHash().GetHex());
boost::thread t(runCommand, strCmd); // thread runs free
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* Add a transaction to the wallet, or update it.
* pblock is optional, but should be provided if the transaction is known to be in a block.
* If fUpdate is true, existing transactions will be updated.
*/
bool CWallet::AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(const CTransaction& tx, const CBlock* pblock, bool fUpdate)
{
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
bool fExisted = mapWallet.count(tx.GetHash()) != 0;
if (fExisted && !fUpdate) return false;
if (fExisted || IsMine(tx) || IsFromMe(tx))
{
CWalletTx wtx(this,tx);
// Get merkle branch if transaction was found in a block
if (pblock)
wtx.SetMerkleBranch(*pblock);
return AddToWallet(wtx);
}
}
return false;
}
void CWallet::SyncTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, const CBlock* pblock)
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
if (!AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(tx, pblock, true))
return; // Not one of ours
// If a transaction changes 'conflicted' state, that changes the balance
// available of the outputs it spends. So force those to be
// recomputed, also:
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
{
if (mapWallet.count(txin.prevout.hash))
mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash].MarkDirty();
}
}
void CWallet::EraseFromWallet(const uint256 &hash)
{
if (!fFileBacked)
return;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (mapWallet.erase(hash))
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseTx(hash);
}
return;
}
isminetype CWallet::IsMine(const CTxIn &txin) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.vout.size())
return IsMine(prev.vout[txin.prevout.n]);
}
}
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return ISMINE_NO;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetDebit(const CTxIn &txin, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.vout.size())
if (IsMine(prev.vout[txin.prevout.n]) & filter)
return prev.vout[txin.prevout.n].nValue;
}
}
return 0;
}
bool CWallet::IsDenominated(const CTxIn &txin) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.vout.size()) return IsDenominatedAmount(prev.vout[txin.prevout.n].nValue);
}
}
return false;
}
bool CWallet::IsDenominatedAmount(int64_t nInputAmount) const
{
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t d, darkSendDenominations)
if(nInputAmount == d)
return true;
return false;
}
bool CWallet::IsChange(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
// TODO: fix handling of 'change' outputs. The assumption is that any
// payment to a script that is ours, but is not in the address book
// is change. That assumption is likely to break when we implement multisignature
// wallets that return change back into a multi-signature-protected address;
// a better way of identifying which outputs are 'the send' and which are
// 'the change' will need to be implemented (maybe extend CWalletTx to remember
// which output, if any, was change).
if (::IsMine(*this, txout.scriptPubKey))
{
CTxDestination address;
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address))
return true;
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (!mapAddressBook.count(address))
return true;
}
return false;
}
int64_t CWalletTx::GetTxTime() const
{
int64_t n = nTimeSmart;
return n ? n : nTimeReceived;
}
int CWalletTx::GetRequestCount() const
{
// Returns -1 if it wasn't being tracked
int nRequests = -1;
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
if (IsCoinBase())
{
// Generated block
if (hashBlock != 0)
{
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*mi).second;
}
}
else
{
// Did anyone request this transaction?
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(GetHash());
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
{
nRequests = (*mi).second;
// How about the block it's in?
if (nRequests == 0 && hashBlock != 0)
{
map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*mi).second;
else
nRequests = 1; // If it's in someone else's block it must have got out
}
}
}
}
return nRequests;
}
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void CWalletTx::GetAmounts(list<COutputEntry>& listReceived,
2014-04-23 00:46:19 +02:00
list<COutputEntry>& listSent, CAmount& nFee, string& strSentAccount, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
nFee = 0;
listReceived.clear();
listSent.clear();
strSentAccount = strFromAccount;
// Compute fee:
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CAmount nDebit = GetDebit(filter);
if (nDebit > 0) // debit>0 means we signed/sent this transaction
{
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CAmount nValueOut = GetValueOut();
nFee = nDebit - nValueOut;
}
// Sent/received.
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vout.size(); ++i)
{
2014-05-30 00:54:00 +02:00
const CTxOut& txout = vout[i];
isminetype fIsMine = pwallet->IsMine(txout);
// Only need to handle txouts if AT LEAST one of these is true:
// 1) they debit from us (sent)
// 2) the output is to us (received)
if (nDebit > 0)
{
// Don't report 'change' txouts
if (pwallet->IsChange(txout))
continue;
}
else if (!(fIsMine & filter))
continue;
// In either case, we need to get the destination address
CTxDestination address;
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address))
{
LogPrintf("CWalletTx::GetAmounts: Unknown transaction type found, txid %s\n",
this->GetHash().ToString());
address = CNoDestination();
}
COutputEntry output = {address, txout.nValue, (int)i};
2014-05-30 00:54:00 +02:00
// If we are debited by the transaction, add the output as a "sent" entry
if (nDebit > 0)
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listSent.push_back(output);
// If we are receiving the output, add it as a "received" entry
if (fIsMine & filter)
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listReceived.push_back(output);
}
}
2014-04-23 00:46:19 +02:00
void CWalletTx::GetAccountAmounts(const string& strAccount, CAmount& nReceived,
CAmount& nSent, CAmount& nFee, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
nReceived = nSent = nFee = 0;
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CAmount allFee;
string strSentAccount;
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list<COutputEntry> listReceived;
list<COutputEntry> listSent;
GetAmounts(listReceived, listSent, allFee, strSentAccount, filter);
if (strAccount == strSentAccount)
{
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BOOST_FOREACH(const COutputEntry& s, listSent)
nSent += s.amount;
nFee = allFee;
}
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
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BOOST_FOREACH(const COutputEntry& r, listReceived)
{
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if (pwallet->mapAddressBook.count(r.destination))
{
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map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapAddressBook.find(r.destination);
if (mi != pwallet->mapAddressBook.end() && (*mi).second.name == strAccount)
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nReceived += r.amount;
}
else if (strAccount.empty())
{
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nReceived += r.amount;
}
}
}
}
bool CWalletTx::WriteToDisk()
{
return CWalletDB(pwallet->strWalletFile).WriteTx(GetHash(), *this);
}
/**
* Scan the block chain (starting in pindexStart) for transactions
* from or to us. If fUpdate is true, found transactions that already
* exist in the wallet will be updated.
*/
int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
{
int ret = 0;
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int64_t nNow = GetTime();
CBlockIndex* pindex = pindexStart;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
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// no need to read and scan block, if block was created before
// our wallet birthday (as adjusted for block time variability)
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while (pindex && nTimeFirstKey && (pindex->GetBlockTime() < (nTimeFirstKey - 7200)))
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pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex);
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 0); // show rescan progress in GUI as dialog or on splashscreen, if -rescan on startup
double dProgressStart = Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(pindex, false);
double dProgressTip = Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainActive.Tip(), false);
while (pindex)
{
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if (pindex->nHeight % 100 == 0 && dProgressTip - dProgressStart > 0.0)
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), std::max(1, std::min(99, (int)((Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(pindex, false) - dProgressStart) / (dProgressTip - dProgressStart) * 100))));
CBlock block;
ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pindex);
BOOST_FOREACH(CTransaction& tx, block.vtx)
{
if (AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(tx, &block, fUpdate))
ret++;
}
pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex);
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if (GetTime() >= nNow + 60) {
nNow = GetTime();
LogPrintf("Still rescanning. At block %d. Progress=%f\n", pindex->nHeight, Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(pindex));
}
}
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ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 100); // hide progress dialog in GUI
}
return ret;
}
void CWallet::ReacceptWalletTransactions()
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
{
const uint256& wtxid = item.first;
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
assert(wtx.GetHash() == wtxid);
int nDepth = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (!wtx.IsCoinBase() && nDepth < 0)
{
// Try to add to memory pool
LOCK(mempool.cs);
wtx.AcceptToMemoryPool(false);
}
}
}
void CWalletTx::RelayWalletTransaction(std::string strCommand)
{
if (!IsCoinBase())
{
if (GetDepthInMainChain() == 0) {
uint256 hash = GetHash();
LogPrintf("Relaying wtx %s\n", hash.ToString());
if(strCommand == "ix"){
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mapTxLockReq.insert(make_pair(hash, (CTransaction)*this));
CreateNewLock(((CTransaction)*this));
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RelayTransactionLockReq((CTransaction)*this, true);
} else {
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RelayTransaction((CTransaction)*this);
}
}
}
}
set<uint256> CWalletTx::GetConflicts() const
{
set<uint256> result;
if (pwallet != NULL)
{
uint256 myHash = GetHash();
result = pwallet->GetConflicts(myHash);
result.erase(myHash);
}
return result;
}
void CWallet::ResendWalletTransactions()
{
// Do this infrequently and randomly to avoid giving away
// that these are our transactions.
if (GetTime() < nNextResend)
return;
bool fFirst = (nNextResend == 0);
nNextResend = GetTime() + GetRand(30 * 60);
if (fFirst)
return;
// Only do it if there's been a new block since last time
if (nTimeBestReceived < nLastResend)
return;
nLastResend = GetTime();
// Rebroadcast any of our txes that aren't in a block yet
LogPrintf("ResendWalletTransactions()\n");
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Sort them in chronological order
multimap<unsigned int, CWalletTx*> mapSorted;
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const uint256, CWalletTx)& item, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
// Don't rebroadcast until it's had plenty of time that
// it should have gotten in already by now.
if (nTimeBestReceived - (int64_t)wtx.nTimeReceived > 5 * 60)
mapSorted.insert(make_pair(wtx.nTimeReceived, &wtx));
}
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const unsigned int, CWalletTx*)& item, mapSorted)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = *item.second;
wtx.RelayWalletTransaction();
}
}
}
/** @} */ // end of mapWallet
/** @defgroup Actions
*
* @{
*/
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CAmount CWallet::GetBalance() const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetAnonymizableBalance(bool includeAlreadyAnonymized) const
{
if(fLiteMode) return 0;
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
{
uint256 hash = (*it).first;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
{
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(hash, i);
if(IsSpent(hash, i) || !IsMine(pcoin->vout[i])) continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0) continue; // do not count immature
if(pcoin->vout[i].nValue == 1000*COIN) continue; // do not count MN-like outputs
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
if(rounds >=-2 && (rounds < nDarksendRounds || (includeAlreadyAnonymized && rounds >= nDarksendRounds))) {
nTotal += pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
}
}
}
}
}
return nTotal;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetAnonymizedBalance() const
{
if(fLiteMode) return 0;
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
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LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
{
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uint256 hash = (*it).first;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
{
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(hash, i);
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if(IsSpent(hash, i) || !IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]) || !IsDenominated(vin)) continue;
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
if(rounds >= nDarksendRounds){
nTotal += pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
}
}
}
}
}
return nTotal;
}
// Note: calculated including unconfirmed,
// that's ok as long as we use it for informational purposes only
double CWallet::GetAverageAnonymizedRounds() const
{
double fTotal = 0;
double fCount = 0;
{
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LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
uint256 hash = (*it).first;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++) {
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(hash, i);
if(IsSpent(hash, i) || !IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]) || !IsDenominated(vin)) continue;
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
fTotal += (float)rounds;
fCount += 1;
}
}
}
if(fCount == 0) return 0;
return fTotal/fCount;
}
// Note: calculated including unconfirmed,
// that's ok as long as we use it for informational purposes only
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CAmount CWallet::GetNormalizedAnonymizedBalance() const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
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LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
uint256 hash = (*it).first;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++) {
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(hash, i);
if(IsSpent(hash, i) || !IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]) || !IsDenominated(vin)) continue;
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
nTotal += pcoin->vout[i].nValue * rounds / nDarksendRounds;
}
}
}
return nTotal;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetDenominatedBalance(bool denom, bool unconfirmed, bool includeAlreadyAnonymized) const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
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LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain(false);
// skip conflicted
if(nDepth < 0) continue;
bool isUnconfirmed = (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin) || (!pcoin->IsTrusted() && nDepth == 0));
if(unconfirmed != isUnconfirmed) continue;
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uint256 hash = (*it).first;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
{
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if(IsSpent(hash, i)) continue;
if(!IsMine(pcoin->vout[i])) continue;
if(denom != IsDenominatedAmount(pcoin->vout[i].nValue)) continue;
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(hash, i);
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
if(!includeAlreadyAnonymized && rounds >= nDarksendRounds) continue;
nTotal += pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
}
}
}
return nTotal;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetUnconfirmedBalance() const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin) || (!pcoin->IsTrusted() && pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain() == 0))
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetImmatureBalance() const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
nTotal += pcoin->GetImmatureCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
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LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetUnconfirmedWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
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LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin) || (!pcoin->IsTrusted() && pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain() == 0))
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetImmatureWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
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LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
nTotal += pcoin->GetImmatureWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
/**
* populate vCoins with vector of available COutputs.
*/
void CWallet::AvailableCoins(vector<COutput>& vCoins, bool fOnlyConfirmed, const CCoinControl *coinControl, AvailableCoinsType coin_type, bool useIX) const
{
vCoins.clear();
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const uint256& wtxid = it->first;
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin))
continue;
if (fOnlyConfirmed && !pcoin->IsTrusted())
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain(false);
// do not use IX for inputs that have less then 6 blockchain confirmations
if (useIX && nDepth < 6)
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++) {
bool found = false;
if(coin_type == ONLY_DENOMINATED) {
//should make this a vector
found = IsDenominatedAmount(pcoin->vout[i].nValue);
} else if(coin_type == ONLY_NONDENOMINATED || coin_type == ONLY_NONDENOMINATED_NOTMN) {
found = true;
if (IsCollateralAmount(pcoin->vout[i].nValue)) continue; // do not use collateral amounts
found = !IsDenominatedAmount(pcoin->vout[i].nValue);
if(found && coin_type == ONLY_NONDENOMINATED_NOTMN) found = (pcoin->vout[i].nValue != 1000*COIN); // do not use MN funds
} else {
found = true;
}
if(!found) continue;
isminetype mine = IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]);
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if (!(IsSpent(wtxid, i)) && mine != ISMINE_NO &&
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!IsLockedCoin((*it).first, i) && pcoin->vout[i].nValue > 0 &&
(!coinControl || !coinControl->HasSelected() || coinControl->IsSelected((*it).first, i)))
vCoins.push_back(COutput(pcoin, i, nDepth, (mine & ISMINE_SPENDABLE) != ISMINE_NO));
}
}
}
}
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static void ApproximateBestSubset(vector<pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > >vValue, const CAmount& nTotalLower, const CAmount& nTargetValue,
vector<char>& vfBest, CAmount& nBest, int iterations = 1000)
{
vector<char> vfIncluded;
vfBest.assign(vValue.size(), true);
nBest = nTotalLower;
seed_insecure_rand();
for (int nRep = 0; nRep < iterations && nBest != nTargetValue; nRep++)
{
vfIncluded.assign(vValue.size(), false);
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CAmount nTotal = 0;
bool fReachedTarget = false;
for (int nPass = 0; nPass < 2 && !fReachedTarget; nPass++)
{
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
{
//The solver here uses a randomized algorithm,
//the randomness serves no real security purpose but is just
//needed to prevent degenerate behavior and it is important
//that the rng is fast. We do not use a constant random sequence,
//because there may be some privacy improvement by making
//the selection random.
if (nPass == 0 ? insecure_rand()&1 : !vfIncluded[i])
{
nTotal += vValue[i].first;
vfIncluded[i] = true;
if (nTotal >= nTargetValue)
{
fReachedTarget = true;
if (nTotal < nBest)
{
nBest = nTotal;
vfBest = vfIncluded;
}
nTotal -= vValue[i].first;
vfIncluded[i] = false;
}
}
}
}
}
}
// TODO: find appropriate place for this sort function
// move denoms down
bool less_then_denom (const COutput& out1, const COutput& out2)
{
const CWalletTx *pcoin1 = out1.tx;
const CWalletTx *pcoin2 = out2.tx;
bool found1 = false;
bool found2 = false;
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t d, darkSendDenominations) // loop through predefined denoms
{
if(pcoin1->vout[out1.i].nValue == d) found1 = true;
if(pcoin2->vout[out2.i].nValue == d) found2 = true;
}
return (!found1 && found2);
}
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bool CWallet::SelectCoinsMinConf(const CAmount& nTargetValue, int nConfMine, int nConfTheirs, vector<COutput> vCoins,
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, CAmount& nValueRet) const
{
setCoinsRet.clear();
nValueRet = 0;
// List of values less than target
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pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > coinLowestLarger;
coinLowestLarger.first = std::numeric_limits<CAmount>::max();
coinLowestLarger.second.first = NULL;
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vector<pair<CAmount, pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > > vValue;
CAmount nTotalLower = 0;
random_shuffle(vCoins.begin(), vCoins.end(), GetRandInt);
// move denoms down on the list
sort(vCoins.begin(), vCoins.end(), less_then_denom);
// try to find nondenom first to prevent unneeded spending of mixed coins
for (unsigned int tryDenom = 0; tryDenom < 2; tryDenom++)
{
if (fDebug) LogPrint("selectcoins", "tryDenom: %d\n", tryDenom);
vValue.clear();
nTotalLower = 0;
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BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput &output, vCoins)
{
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if (!output.fSpendable)
continue;
const CWalletTx *pcoin = output.tx;
// if (fDebug) LogPrint("selectcoins", "value %s confirms %d\n", FormatMoney(pcoin->vout[output.i].nValue), output.nDepth);
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if (output.nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL) ? nConfMine : nConfTheirs))
continue;
int i = output.i;
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CAmount n = pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
if (tryDenom == 0 && IsDenominatedAmount(n)) continue; // we don't want denom values on first run
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pair<CAmount,pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > coin = make_pair(n,make_pair(pcoin, i));
if (n == nTargetValue)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coin.second);
nValueRet += coin.first;
return true;
}
else if (n < nTargetValue + CENT)
{
vValue.push_back(coin);
nTotalLower += n;
}
else if (n < coinLowestLarger.first)
{
coinLowestLarger = coin;
}
}
if (nTotalLower == nTargetValue)
{
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); ++i)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(vValue[i].second);
nValueRet += vValue[i].first;
}
return true;
}
if (nTotalLower < nTargetValue)
{
if (coinLowestLarger.second.first == NULL) // there is no input larger than nTargetValue
{
if (tryDenom == 0)
// we didn't look at denom yet, let's do it
continue;
else
// we looked at everything possible and didn't find anything, no luck
return false;
}
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.second);
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger.first;
return true;
}
// nTotalLower > nTargetValue
break;
}
// Solve subset sum by stochastic approximation
sort(vValue.rbegin(), vValue.rend(), CompareValueOnly());
vector<char> vfBest;
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CAmount nBest;
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue, vfBest, nBest, 1000);
if (nBest != nTargetValue && nTotalLower >= nTargetValue + CENT)
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue + CENT, vfBest, nBest, 1000);
// If we have a bigger coin and (either the stochastic approximation didn't find a good solution,
// or the next bigger coin is closer), return the bigger coin
if (coinLowestLarger.second.first &&
((nBest != nTargetValue && nBest < nTargetValue + CENT) || coinLowestLarger.first <= nBest))
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.second);
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger.first;
}
else {
2015-02-07 06:19:02 +01:00
string s = "CWallet::SelectCoinsMinConf best subset: ";
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
{
if (vfBest[i])
{
setCoinsRet.insert(vValue[i].second);
nValueRet += vValue[i].first;
2015-06-23 22:44:20 +02:00
s += FormatMoney(vValue[i].first) + " ";
}
}
LogPrintf("%s - total %s\n", s, FormatMoney(nBest));
}
return true;
}
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bool CWallet::SelectCoins(const CAmount& nTargetValue, set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, CAmount& nValueRet, const CCoinControl* coinControl, AvailableCoinsType coin_type, bool useIX) const
{
// Note: this function should never be used for "always free" tx types like dstx
vector<COutput> vCoins;
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AvailableCoins(vCoins, true, coinControl, coin_type, useIX);
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// coin control -> return all selected outputs (we want all selected to go into the transaction for sure)
if (coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected())
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
{
if(!out.fSpendable)
continue;
if(coin_type == ONLY_DENOMINATED) {
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(out.tx->GetHash(),out.i);
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
// make sure it's actually anonymized
if(rounds < nDarksendRounds) continue;
}
nValueRet += out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
setCoinsRet.insert(make_pair(out.tx, out.i));
}
return (nValueRet >= nTargetValue);
}
//if we're doing only denominated, we need to round up to the nearest .1DRK
if(coin_type == ONLY_DENOMINATED) {
// Make outputs by looping through denominations, from large to small
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t v, darkSendDenominations)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
{
if(out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == v //make sure it's the denom we're looking for
&& nValueRet + out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue < nTargetValue + (0.1*COIN)+100 //round the amount up to .1DRK over
){
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(out.tx->GetHash(),out.i);
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
// make sure it's actually anonymized
if(rounds < nDarksendRounds) continue;
nValueRet += out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
setCoinsRet.insert(make_pair(out.tx, out.i));
}
}
}
return (nValueRet >= nTargetValue);
}
return (SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue, 1, 6, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue, 1, 1, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
(bSpendZeroConfChange && SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue, 0, 1, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet)));
}
struct CompareByPriority
{
bool operator()(const COutput& t1,
const COutput& t2) const
{
return t1.Priority() > t2.Priority();
}
};
bool CWallet::SelectCoinsByDenominations(int nDenom, int64_t nValueMin, int64_t nValueMax, std::vector<CTxIn>& vCoinsRet, std::vector<COutput>& vCoinsRet2, int64_t& nValueRet, int nDarksendRoundsMin, int nDarksendRoundsMax)
{
vCoinsRet.clear();
nValueRet = 0;
vCoinsRet2.clear();
vector<COutput> vCoins;
AvailableCoins(vCoins, true, NULL, ONLY_DENOMINATED);
std::random_shuffle(vCoins.rbegin(), vCoins.rend());
//keep track of each denomination that we have
bool fFound100 = false;
bool fFound10 = false;
bool fFound1 = false;
bool fFoundDot1 = false;
//Check to see if any of the denomination are off, in that case mark them as fulfilled
if(!(nDenom & (1 << 0))) fFound100 = true;
if(!(nDenom & (1 << 1))) fFound10 = true;
if(!(nDenom & (1 << 2))) fFound1 = true;
if(!(nDenom & (1 << 3))) fFoundDot1 = true;
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
{
// masternode-like input should not be selected by AvailableCoins now anyway
//if(out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == 1000*COIN) continue;
if(nValueRet + out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue <= nValueMax){
bool fAccepted = false;
// Function returns as follows:
//
// bit 0 - 100DRK+1 ( bit on if present )
// bit 1 - 10DRK+1
// bit 2 - 1DRK+1
// bit 3 - .1DRK+1
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(out.tx->GetHash(),out.i);
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
if(rounds >= nDarksendRoundsMax) continue;
if(rounds < nDarksendRoundsMin) continue;
if(fFound100 && fFound10 && fFound1 && fFoundDot1){ //if fulfilled
//we can return this for submission
if(nValueRet >= nValueMin){
//random reduce the max amount we'll submit for anonymity
nValueMax -= (rand() % (nValueMax/5));
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//on average use 50% of the inputs or less
int r = (rand() % (int)vCoins.size());
if((int)vCoinsRet.size() > r) return true;
}
//Denomination criterion has been met, we can take any matching denominations
if((nDenom & (1 << 0)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((100*COIN) +100000)) {fAccepted = true;}
else if((nDenom & (1 << 1)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((10*COIN)+10000)) {fAccepted = true;}
else if((nDenom & (1 << 2)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((1*COIN) +1000)) {fAccepted = true;}
else if((nDenom & (1 << 3)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((.1*COIN)+100)) {fAccepted = true;}
} else {
//Criterion has not been satisfied, we will only take 1 of each until it is.
if((nDenom & (1 << 0)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((100*COIN) +100000)) {fAccepted = true; fFound100 = true;}
else if((nDenom & (1 << 1)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((10*COIN)+10000)) {fAccepted = true; fFound10 = true;}
else if((nDenom & (1 << 2)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((1*COIN) +1000)) {fAccepted = true; fFound1 = true;}
else if((nDenom & (1 << 3)) && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == ((.1*COIN)+100)) {fAccepted = true; fFoundDot1 = true;}
}
if(!fAccepted) continue;
vin.prevPubKey = out.tx->vout[out.i].scriptPubKey; // the inputs PubKey
nValueRet += out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
vCoinsRet.push_back(vin);
vCoinsRet2.push_back(out);
}
}
return (nValueRet >= nValueMin && fFound100 && fFound10 && fFound1 && fFoundDot1);
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoinsDark(CAmount nValueMin, CAmount nValueMax, std::vector<CTxIn>& setCoinsRet, CAmount& nValueRet, int nDarksendRoundsMin, int nDarksendRoundsMax) const
{
CCoinControl *coinControl=NULL;
setCoinsRet.clear();
nValueRet = 0;
vector<COutput> vCoins;
AvailableCoins(vCoins, true, coinControl, nDarksendRoundsMin < 0 ? ONLY_NONDENOMINATED_NOTMN : ONLY_DENOMINATED);
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > setCoinsRet2;
2015-02-18 13:31:40 +01:00
//order the array so largest nondenom are first, then denominations, then very small inputs.
sort(vCoins.rbegin(), vCoins.rend(), CompareByPriority());
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
{
//do not allow inputs less than 1 CENT
if(out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue < CENT) continue;
//do not allow collaterals to be selected
if(IsCollateralAmount(out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue)) continue;
if(fMasterNode && out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue == 1000*COIN) continue; //masternode input
if(nValueRet + out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue <= nValueMax){
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(out.tx->GetHash(),out.i);
int rounds = GetInputDarksendRounds(vin);
if(rounds >= nDarksendRoundsMax) continue;
if(rounds < nDarksendRoundsMin) continue;
vin.prevPubKey = out.tx->vout[out.i].scriptPubKey; // the inputs PubKey
nValueRet += out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
setCoinsRet.push_back(vin);
setCoinsRet2.insert(make_pair(out.tx, out.i));
}
}
// if it's more than min, we're good to return
if(nValueRet >= nValueMin) return true;
return false;
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoinsCollateral(std::vector<CTxIn>& setCoinsRet, int64_t& nValueRet) const
{
vector<COutput> vCoins;
//printf(" selecting coins for collateral\n");
AvailableCoins(vCoins);
//printf("found coins %d\n", (int)vCoins.size());
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > setCoinsRet2;
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
{
// collateral inputs will always be a multiple of DARSEND_COLLATERAL, up to five
if(IsCollateralAmount(out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue))
{
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(out.tx->GetHash(),out.i);
vin.prevPubKey = out.tx->vout[out.i].scriptPubKey; // the inputs PubKey
nValueRet += out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
setCoinsRet.push_back(vin);
setCoinsRet2.insert(make_pair(out.tx, out.i));
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
int CWallet::CountInputsWithAmount(int64_t nInputAmount)
{
int64_t nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); ++it)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &(*it).second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted()){
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain(false);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++) {
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COutput out = COutput(pcoin, i, nDepth, true);
CTxIn vin = CTxIn(out.tx->GetHash(), out.i);
if(out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue != nInputAmount) continue;
if(!IsDenominatedAmount(pcoin->vout[i].nValue)) continue;
if(IsSpent(out.tx->GetHash(), i) || !IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]) || !IsDenominated(vin)) continue;
nTotal++;
}
}
}
}
return nTotal;
}
bool CWallet::HasCollateralInputs() const
{
vector<COutput> vCoins;
AvailableCoins(vCoins);
int nFound = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
if(IsCollateralAmount(out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue)) nFound++;
return nFound > 0;
}
bool CWallet::IsCollateralAmount(int64_t nInputAmount) const
{
return nInputAmount != 0 && nInputAmount % DARKSEND_COLLATERAL == 0 && nInputAmount < DARKSEND_COLLATERAL * 5 && nInputAmount > DARKSEND_COLLATERAL;
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoinsWithoutDenomination(int64_t nTargetValue, set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> >& setCoinsRet, int64_t& nValueRet) const
{
CCoinControl *coinControl=NULL;
vector<COutput> vCoins;
AvailableCoins(vCoins, true, coinControl, ONLY_NONDENOMINATED);
BOOST_FOREACH(const COutput& out, vCoins)
{
nValueRet += out.tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
setCoinsRet.insert(make_pair(out.tx, out.i));
}
return (nValueRet >= nTargetValue);
}
bool CWallet::CreateCollateralTransaction(CMutableTransaction& txCollateral, std::string& strReason)
{
/*
To doublespend a collateral transaction, it will require a fee higher than this. So there's
still a significant cost.
*/
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CAmount nFeeRet = 0.001*COIN;
txCollateral.vin.clear();
txCollateral.vout.clear();
CReserveKey reservekey(this);
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CAmount nValueIn2 = 0;
std::vector<CTxIn> vCoinsCollateral;
if (!SelectCoinsCollateral(vCoinsCollateral, nValueIn2))
{
strReason = "Error: Darksend requires a collateral transaction and could not locate an acceptable input!";
return false;
}
// make our change address
CScript scriptChange;
CPubKey vchPubKey;
assert(reservekey.GetReservedKey(vchPubKey)); // should never fail, as we just unlocked
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scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(vchPubKey.GetID());
reservekey.KeepKey();
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn v, vCoinsCollateral)
txCollateral.vin.push_back(v);
if(nValueIn2 - DARKSEND_COLLATERAL - nFeeRet > 0) {
//pay collateral charge in fees
CTxOut vout3 = CTxOut(nValueIn2 - DARKSEND_COLLATERAL, scriptChange);
txCollateral.vout.push_back(vout3);
}
int vinNumber = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn v, txCollateral.vin) {
if(!SignSignature(*this, v.prevPubKey, txCollateral, vinNumber, int(SIGHASH_ALL|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY))) {
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn v, vCoinsCollateral)
UnlockCoin(v.prevout);
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strReason = "CDarksendPool::Sign - Unable to sign collateral transaction! \n";
return false;
}
vinNumber++;
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::GetBudgetSystemCollateralTX(CTransaction& tx, uint256 hash, bool useIX)
{
CWalletTx wtx;
if(GetBudgetSystemCollateralTX(wtx, hash, useIX)){
tx = (CTransaction)wtx;
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool CWallet::GetBudgetSystemCollateralTX(CWalletTx& tx, uint256 hash, bool useIX)
{
// make our change address
CReserveKey reservekey(pwalletMain);
CScript scriptChange;
scriptChange << OP_RETURN << ToByteVector(hash);
int64_t nFeeRet = 0;
std::string strFail = "";
vector< pair<CScript, int64_t> > vecSend;
vecSend.push_back(make_pair(scriptChange, CENT));
CCoinControl *coinControl=NULL;
bool success = CreateTransaction(vecSend, tx, reservekey, nFeeRet, strFail, coinControl, ALL_COINS, useIX, (CAmount)BUDGET_FEE_TX);
if(!success){
LogPrintf("GetBudgetSystemCollateralTX: Error - %s\n", strFail.c_str());
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::ConvertList(std::vector<CTxIn> vCoins, std::vector<int64_t>& vecAmounts)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn i, vCoins){
if (mapWallet.count(i.prevout.hash))
{
CWalletTx& wtx = mapWallet[i.prevout.hash];
if(i.prevout.n < wtx.vout.size()){
vecAmounts.push_back(wtx.vout[i.prevout.n].nValue);
}
} else {
LogPrintf("ConvertList -- Couldn't find transaction\n");
}
}
return true;
}
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bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(const vector<pair<CScript, CAmount> >& vecSend,
CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, CAmount& nFeeRet, std::string& strFailReason, const CCoinControl* coinControl, AvailableCoinsType coin_type, bool useIX, CAmount nPayFee)
{
if(useIX && nPayFee < CENT) nPayFee = CENT;
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CAmount nValue = 0;
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CAmount nFeeDelta = 0;
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BOOST_FOREACH (const PAIRTYPE(CScript, CAmount)& s, vecSend)
{
if (nValue < 0)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amounts must be positive");
return false;
}
nValue += s.second;
}
if (vecSend.empty() || nValue < 0)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amounts must be positive");
return false;
}
wtxNew.fTimeReceivedIsTxTime = true;
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wtxNew.BindWallet(this);
CMutableTransaction txNew;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
{
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nFeeRet = 0;
if(nPayFee!=0) nFeeRet = nPayFee;
while (true)
{
txNew.vin.clear();
txNew.vout.clear();
wtxNew.fFromMe = true;
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CAmount nTotalValue = nValue + nFeeRet + nFeeDelta;
double dPriority = 0;
// vouts to the payees
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BOOST_FOREACH (const PAIRTYPE(CScript, CAmount)& s, vecSend)
{
CTxOut txout(s.second, s.first);
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if (txout.IsDust(::minRelayTxFee))
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction amount too small");
return false;
}
txNew.vout.push_back(txout);
}
// Choose coins to use
set<pair<const CWalletTx*,unsigned int> > setCoins;
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CAmount nValueIn = 0;
if (!SelectCoins(nTotalValue, setCoins, nValueIn, coinControl, coin_type, useIX))
{
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if(coin_type == ALL_COINS) {
strFailReason = _("Insufficient funds.");
} else if (coin_type == ONLY_NONDENOMINATED) {
strFailReason = _("Unable to locate enough Darksend non-denominated funds for this transaction.");
} else if (coin_type == ONLY_NONDENOMINATED_NOTMN) {
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strFailReason = _("Unable to locate enough Darksend non-denominated funds for this transaction that are not equal 1000 DASH.");
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} else {
strFailReason = _("Unable to locate enough Darksend denominated funds for this transaction.");
strFailReason += _("Darksend uses exact denominated amounts to send funds, you might simply need to anonymize some more coins.");
}
if(useIX){
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strFailReason += _("InstantX requires inputs with at least 6 confirmations, you might need to wait a few minutes and try again.");
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}
return false;
}
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*, unsigned int) pcoin, setCoins)
{
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CAmount nCredit = pcoin.first->vout[pcoin.second].nValue;
//The coin age after the next block (depth+1) is used instead of the current,
//reflecting an assumption the user would accept a bit more delay for
//a chance at a free transaction.
//But mempool inputs might still be in the mempool, so their age stays 0
int age = pcoin.first->GetDepthInMainChain();
if (age != 0)
age += 1;
dPriority += (double)nCredit * age;
}
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CAmount nChange = nValueIn - nValue - nFeeRet;
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//over pay for denominated transactions
if(coin_type == ONLY_DENOMINATED) {
nFeeRet += nChange;
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nChange = 0;
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wtxNew.mapValue["DS"] = "1";
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}
if (nChange > 0)
{
// Fill a vout to ourself
// TODO: pass in scriptChange instead of reservekey so
// change transaction isn't always pay-to-dash-address
CScript scriptChange;
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// coin control: send change to custom address
if (coinControl && !boost::get<CNoDestination>(&coinControl->destChange))
scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(coinControl->destChange);
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// no coin control: send change to newly generated address
else
{
// Note: We use a new key here to keep it from being obvious which side is the change.
// The drawback is that by not reusing a previous key, the change may be lost if a
// backup is restored, if the backup doesn't have the new private key for the change.
// If we reused the old key, it would be possible to add code to look for and
// rediscover unknown transactions that were written with keys of ours to recover
// post-backup change.
// Reserve a new key pair from key pool
CPubKey vchPubKey;
bool ret;
ret = reservekey.GetReservedKey(vchPubKey);
assert(ret); // should never fail, as we just unlocked
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scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(vchPubKey.GetID());
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}
CTxOut newTxOut(nChange, scriptChange);
// Never create dust outputs; if we would, just
// add the dust to the fee.
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if (newTxOut.IsDust(::minRelayTxFee))
{
nFeeRet += nChange;
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nChange = 0;
reservekey.ReturnKey();
}
else
{
// Insert change txn at random position:
vector<CTxOut>::iterator position = txNew.vout.begin()+GetRandInt(txNew.vout.size()+1);
txNew.vout.insert(position, newTxOut);
}
}
else
reservekey.ReturnKey();
// Fill vin
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*,unsigned int)& coin, setCoins)
txNew.vin.push_back(CTxIn(coin.first->GetHash(),coin.second));
// Sign
int nIn = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(const CWalletTx*,unsigned int)& coin, setCoins)
if (!SignSignature(*this, *coin.first, txNew, nIn++))
{
strFailReason = _("Signing transaction failed");
return false;
}
// Embed the constructed transaction data in wtxNew.
*static_cast<CTransaction*>(&wtxNew) = CTransaction(txNew);
// Limit size
unsigned int nBytes = ::GetSerializeSize(*(CTransaction*)&wtxNew, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
if (nBytes >= MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIZE)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction too large");
return false;
}
dPriority = wtxNew.ComputePriority(dPriority, nBytes);
// Can we complete this as a free transaction?
if (fSendFreeTransactions && nBytes <= MAX_FREE_TRANSACTION_CREATE_SIZE)
{
// Not enough fee: enough priority?
double dPriorityNeeded = mempool.estimatePriority(nTxConfirmTarget);
// Not enough mempool history to estimate: use hard-coded AllowFree.
if (dPriorityNeeded <= 0 && AllowFree(dPriority))
break;
// Small enough, and priority high enough, to send for free
if (dPriorityNeeded > 0 && dPriority >= dPriorityNeeded)
break;
}
CAmount nFeeNeeded = GetMinimumFee(nBytes, nTxConfirmTarget, mempool);
// If we made it here and we aren't even able to meet the relay fee on the next pass, give up
// because we must be at the maximum allowed fee.
if (nFeeNeeded < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nBytes))
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction too large for fee policy");
return false;
}
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if (nFeeRet == nFeeNeeded || (nFeeRet > nFeeNeeded && (nFeeDelta > 0 || useIX || coin_type == ONLY_DENOMINATED)))
break; // Done, enough fee included.
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if (nFeeRet > nFeeNeeded)
nFeeDelta = nFeeRet - nFeeNeeded + 1; // Try to lower fee
// Include more fee and try again.
nFeeRet = nFeeNeeded;
continue;
}
}
}
return true;
}
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bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(CScript scriptPubKey, const CAmount& nValue,
CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, CAmount& nFeeRet, std::string& strFailReason, const CCoinControl* coinControl, AvailableCoinsType coin_type, bool useIX, CAmount nPayFee)
{
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vector< pair<CScript, CAmount> > vecSend;
vecSend.push_back(make_pair(scriptPubKey, nValue));
return CreateTransaction(vecSend, wtxNew, reservekey, nFeeRet, strFailReason, coinControl, coin_type, useIX, nPayFee);
}
/**
* Call after CreateTransaction unless you want to abort
*/
bool CWallet::CommitTransaction(CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, std::string strCommand)
{
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
LogPrintf("CommitTransaction:\n%s", wtxNew.ToString());
{
// This is only to keep the database open to defeat the auto-flush for the
// duration of this scope. This is the only place where this optimization
// maybe makes sense; please don't do it anywhere else.
CWalletDB* pwalletdb = fFileBacked ? new CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"r") : NULL;
// Take key pair from key pool so it won't be used again
reservekey.KeepKey();
// Add tx to wallet, because if it has change it's also ours,
// otherwise just for transaction history.
AddToWallet(wtxNew);
// Notify that old coins are spent
set<uint256> updated_hahes;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, wtxNew.vin)
{
// notify only once
if(updated_hahes.find(txin.prevout.hash) != updated_hahes.end()) continue;
CWalletTx &coin = mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash];
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coin.BindWallet(this);
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, txin.prevout.hash, CT_UPDATED);
updated_hahes.insert(txin.prevout.hash);
}
if (fFileBacked)
delete pwalletdb;
}
// Track how many getdata requests our transaction gets
mapRequestCount[wtxNew.GetHash()] = 0;
// Broadcast
if (!wtxNew.AcceptToMemoryPool(false))
{
// This must not fail. The transaction has already been signed and recorded.
LogPrintf("CommitTransaction() : Error: Transaction not valid\n");
return false;
}
wtxNew.RelayWalletTransaction(strCommand);
}
return true;
}
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CAmount CWallet::GetMinimumFee(unsigned int nTxBytes, unsigned int nConfirmTarget, const CTxMemPool& pool)
{
// payTxFee is user-set "I want to pay this much"
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CAmount nFeeNeeded = payTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes);
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// user selected total at least (default=true)
if (fPayAtLeastCustomFee && nFeeNeeded > 0 && nFeeNeeded < payTxFee.GetFeePerK())
nFeeNeeded = payTxFee.GetFeePerK();
// User didn't set: use -txconfirmtarget to estimate...
if (nFeeNeeded == 0)
nFeeNeeded = pool.estimateFee(nConfirmTarget).GetFee(nTxBytes);
// ... unless we don't have enough mempool data, in which case fall
// back to a hard-coded fee
if (nFeeNeeded == 0)
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nFeeNeeded = minTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes);
// prevent user from paying a non-sense fee (like 1 satoshi): 0 < fee < minRelayFee
if (nFeeNeeded < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes))
nFeeNeeded = ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nTxBytes);
// But always obey the maximum
if (nFeeNeeded > maxTxFee)
nFeeNeeded = maxTxFee;
return nFeeNeeded;
}
int64_t CWallet::GetTotalValue(std::vector<CTxIn> vCoins) {
int64_t nTotalValue = 0;
CWalletTx wtx;
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn i, vCoins){
if (mapWallet.count(i.prevout.hash))
{
CWalletTx& wtx = mapWallet[i.prevout.hash];
if(i.prevout.n < wtx.vout.size()){
nTotalValue += wtx.vout[i.prevout.n].nValue;
}
} else {
LogPrintf("GetTotalValue -- Couldn't find transaction\n");
}
}
return nTotalValue;
}
string CWallet::PrepareDarksendDenominate(int minRounds, int maxRounds)
{
if (IsLocked())
return _("Error: Wallet locked, unable to create transaction!");
if(darkSendPool.GetState() != POOL_STATUS_ERROR && darkSendPool.GetState() != POOL_STATUS_SUCCESS)
if(darkSendPool.GetMyTransactionCount() > 0)
return _("Error: You already have pending entries in the Darksend pool");
// ** find the coins we'll use
std::vector<CTxIn> vCoins;
std::vector<CTxIn> vCoinsResult;
std::vector<COutput> vCoins2;
int64_t nValueIn = 0;
CReserveKey reservekey(this);
/*
Select the coins we'll use
if minRounds >= 0 it means only denominated inputs are going in and coming out
*/
if(minRounds >= 0){
if (!SelectCoinsByDenominations(darkSendPool.sessionDenom, 0.1*COIN, DARKSEND_POOL_MAX, vCoins, vCoins2, nValueIn, minRounds, maxRounds))
return _("Error: can't select current denominated inputs");
}
LogPrintf("PrepareDarksendDenominate - preparing darksend denominate . Got: %d \n", nValueIn);
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BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn v, vCoins)
LockCoin(v.prevout);
int64_t nValueLeft = nValueIn;
std::vector<CTxOut> vOut;
/*
TODO: Front load with needed denominations (e.g. .1, 1 )
*/
// Make outputs by looping through denominations: try to add every needed denomination, repeat up to 5-10 times.
// This way we can be pretty sure that it should have at least one of each needed denomination.
// NOTE: No need to randomize order of inputs because they were
// initially shuffled in CWallet::SelectCoinsByDenominations already.
int nStep = 0;
int nStepsMax = 5 + GetRandInt(5);
while(nStep < nStepsMax) {
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t v, darkSendDenominations){
// only use the ones that are approved
bool fAccepted = false;
if((darkSendPool.sessionDenom & (1 << 0)) && v == ((100*COIN) +100000)) {fAccepted = true;}
else if((darkSendPool.sessionDenom & (1 << 1)) && v == ((10*COIN) +10000)) {fAccepted = true;}
else if((darkSendPool.sessionDenom & (1 << 2)) && v == ((1*COIN) +1000)) {fAccepted = true;}
else if((darkSendPool.sessionDenom & (1 << 3)) && v == ((.1*COIN) +100)) {fAccepted = true;}
if(!fAccepted) continue;
// try to add it
if(nValueLeft - v >= 0) {
// Note: this relies on a fact that both vectors MUST have same size
std::vector<CTxIn>::iterator it = vCoins.begin();
std::vector<COutput>::iterator it2 = vCoins2.begin();
while(it2 != vCoins2.end()) {
// we have matching inputs
if((*it2).tx->vout[(*it2).i].nValue == v) {
// add new input in resulting vector
vCoinsResult.push_back(*it);
// remove corresponting items from initial vectors
vCoins.erase(it);
vCoins2.erase(it2);
CScript scriptChange;
CPubKey vchPubKey;
// use a unique change address
assert(reservekey.GetReservedKey(vchPubKey)); // should never fail, as we just unlocked
scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(vchPubKey.GetID());
reservekey.KeepKey();
// add new output
CTxOut o(v, scriptChange);
vOut.push_back(o);
// subtract denomination amount
nValueLeft -= v;
break;
}
++it;
++it2;
}
}
}
nStep++;
if(nValueLeft == 0) break;
}
// unlock unused coins
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn v, vCoins)
UnlockCoin(v.prevout);
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if(darkSendPool.GetDenominations(vOut) != darkSendPool.sessionDenom) {
// unlock used coins on failure
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn v, vCoinsResult)
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UnlockCoin(v.prevout);
return "Error: can't make current denominated outputs";
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}
// randomize the output order
std::random_shuffle (vOut.begin(), vOut.end());
// We also do not care about full amount as long as we have right denominations, just pass what we found
darkSendPool.SendDarksendDenominate(vCoinsResult, vOut, nValueIn - nValueLeft);
return "";
}
DBErrors CWallet::LoadWallet(bool& fFirstRunRet)
{
if (!fFileBacked)
return DB_LOAD_OK;
fFirstRunRet = false;
DBErrors nLoadWalletRet = CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"cr+").LoadWallet(this);
if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
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{
if (CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile, "\x04pool"))
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setKeyPool.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// the requires a new key.
}
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}
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if (nLoadWalletRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nLoadWalletRet;
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fFirstRunRet = !vchDefaultKey.IsValid();
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uiInterface.LoadWallet(this);
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
DBErrors CWallet::ZapWalletTx(std::vector<CWalletTx>& vWtx)
{
if (!fFileBacked)
return DB_LOAD_OK;
DBErrors nZapWalletTxRet = CWalletDB(strWalletFile,"cr+").ZapWalletTx(this, vWtx);
if (nZapWalletTxRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
{
if (CDB::Rewrite(strWalletFile, "\x04pool"))
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setKeyPool.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// that requires a new key.
}
}
if (nZapWalletTxRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nZapWalletTxRet;
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
bool CWallet::SetAddressBook(const CTxDestination& address, const string& strName, const string& strPurpose)
{
bool fUpdated = false;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // mapAddressBook
std::map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::iterator mi = mapAddressBook.find(address);
fUpdated = mi != mapAddressBook.end();
mapAddressBook[address].name = strName;
if (!strPurpose.empty()) /* update purpose only if requested */
mapAddressBook[address].purpose = strPurpose;
}
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, strName, ::IsMine(*this, address) != ISMINE_NO,
strPurpose, (fUpdated ? CT_UPDATED : CT_NEW) );
if (!fFileBacked)
return false;
if (!strPurpose.empty() && !CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WritePurpose(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString(), strPurpose))
return false;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteName(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString(), strName);
}
bool CWallet::DelAddressBook(const CTxDestination& address)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // mapAddressBook
if(fFileBacked)
{
// Delete destdata tuples associated with address
std::string strAddress = CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString();
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(string, string) &item, mapAddressBook[address].destdata)
{
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseDestData(strAddress, item.first);
}
}
mapAddressBook.erase(address);
}
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, "", ::IsMine(*this, address) != ISMINE_NO, "", CT_DELETED);
if (!fFileBacked)
return false;
CWalletDB(strWalletFile).ErasePurpose(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString());
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseName(CBitcoinAddress(address).ToString());
}
bool CWallet::GetTransaction(const uint256 &hashTx, CWalletTx& wtx)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator mi = mapWallet.find(hashTx);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
wtx = (*mi).second;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
2012-05-14 19:07:52 +02:00
bool CWallet::SetDefaultKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey)
{
if (fFileBacked)
{
if (!CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteDefaultKey(vchPubKey))
return false;
}
vchDefaultKey = vchPubKey;
return true;
}
/**
* Mark old keypool keys as used,
* and generate all new keys
*/
bool CWallet::NewKeyPool()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
BOOST_FOREACH(int64_t nIndex, setKeyPool)
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
setKeyPool.clear();
if (IsLocked())
return false;
2014-12-02 09:48:47 +01:00
int64_t nKeys = max(GetArg("-keypool", 1000), (int64_t) 0);
for (int i = 0; i < nKeys; i++)
{
int64_t nIndex = i+1;
walletdb.WritePool(nIndex, CKeyPool(GenerateNewKey()));
setKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
LogPrintf("CWallet::NewKeyPool wrote %d new keys\n", nKeys);
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::TopUpKeyPool(unsigned int kpSize)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
if (IsLocked())
return false;
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
// Top up key pool
unsigned int nTargetSize;
if (kpSize > 0)
nTargetSize = kpSize;
else
2014-12-02 09:48:47 +01:00
nTargetSize = max(GetArg("-keypool", 1000), (int64_t) 0);
while (setKeyPool.size() < (nTargetSize + 1))
{
int64_t nEnd = 1;
if (!setKeyPool.empty())
nEnd = *(--setKeyPool.end()) + 1;
if (!walletdb.WritePool(nEnd, CKeyPool(GenerateNewKey())))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
throw runtime_error("TopUpKeyPool() : writing generated key failed");
setKeyPool.insert(nEnd);
LogPrintf("keypool added key %d, size=%u\n", nEnd, setKeyPool.size());
double dProgress = 100.f * nEnd / (nTargetSize + 1);
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std::string strMsg = strprintf(_("Loading wallet... (%3.2f %%)"), dProgress);
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uiInterface.InitMessage(strMsg);
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
}
return true;
}
void CWallet::ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(int64_t& nIndex, CKeyPool& keypool)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
{
nIndex = -1;
2012-05-14 19:07:52 +02:00
keypool.vchPubKey = CPubKey();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
if (!IsLocked())
TopUpKeyPool();
// Get the oldest key
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
if(setKeyPool.empty())
return;
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
nIndex = *(setKeyPool.begin());
setKeyPool.erase(setKeyPool.begin());
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(nIndex, keypool))
throw runtime_error("ReserveKeyFromKeyPool() : read failed");
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if (!HaveKey(keypool.vchPubKey.GetID()))
throw runtime_error("ReserveKeyFromKeyPool() : unknown key in key pool");
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assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
LogPrintf("keypool reserve %d\n", nIndex);
}
}
void CWallet::KeepKey(int64_t nIndex)
{
// Remove from key pool
if (fFileBacked)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
}
LogPrintf("keypool keep %d\n", nIndex);
}
void CWallet::ReturnKey(int64_t nIndex)
{
// Return to key pool
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
LogPrintf("keypool return %d\n", nIndex);
}
bool CWallet::GetKeyFromPool(CPubKey& result)
{
int64_t nIndex = 0;
CKeyPool keypool;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
if (nIndex == -1)
{
if (IsLocked()) return false;
result = GenerateNewKey();
return true;
}
KeepKey(nIndex);
result = keypool.vchPubKey;
}
return true;
}
int64_t CWallet::GetOldestKeyPoolTime()
{
int64_t nIndex = 0;
CKeyPool keypool;
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 15:47:35 +02:00
if (nIndex == -1)
return GetTime();
ReturnKey(nIndex);
return keypool.nTime;
}
2014-04-23 00:46:19 +02:00
std::map<CTxDestination, CAmount> CWallet::GetAddressBalances()
{
2014-04-23 00:46:19 +02:00
map<CTxDestination, CAmount> balances;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(uint256, CWalletTx) walletEntry, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (!IsFinalTx(*pcoin) || !pcoin->IsTrusted())
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain();
2014-07-01 11:00:22 +02:00
if (nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL) ? 0 : 1))
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
{
CTxDestination addr;
if (!IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]))
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(pcoin->vout[i].scriptPubKey, addr))
continue;
2014-04-23 00:46:19 +02:00
CAmount n = IsSpent(walletEntry.first, i) ? 0 : pcoin->vout[i].nValue;
if (!balances.count(addr))
balances[addr] = 0;
balances[addr] += n;
}
}
}
return balances;
}
set< set<CTxDestination> > CWallet::GetAddressGroupings()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapWallet
set< set<CTxDestination> > groupings;
set<CTxDestination> grouping;
BOOST_FOREACH(PAIRTYPE(uint256, CWalletTx) walletEntry, mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (pcoin->vin.size() > 0)
{
bool any_mine = false;
// group all input addresses with each other
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxIn txin, pcoin->vin)
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!IsMine(txin)) /* If this input isn't mine, ignore it */
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash].vout[txin.prevout.n].scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
any_mine = true;
}
// group change with input addresses
if (any_mine)
{
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxOut txout, pcoin->vout)
if (IsChange(txout))
{
CTxDestination txoutAddr;
if(!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, txoutAddr))
continue;
grouping.insert(txoutAddr);
}
}
if (grouping.size() > 0)
{
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
// group lone addrs by themselves
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->vout.size(); i++)
if (IsMine(pcoin->vout[i]))
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!ExtractDestination(pcoin->vout[i].scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
set< set<CTxDestination>* > uniqueGroupings; // a set of pointers to groups of addresses
map< CTxDestination, set<CTxDestination>* > setmap; // map addresses to the unique group containing it
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination> grouping, groupings)
{
// make a set of all the groups hit by this new group
set< set<CTxDestination>* > hits;
map< CTxDestination, set<CTxDestination>* >::iterator it;
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxDestination address, grouping)
if ((it = setmap.find(address)) != setmap.end())
hits.insert((*it).second);
// merge all hit groups into a new single group and delete old groups
set<CTxDestination>* merged = new set<CTxDestination>(grouping);
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination>* hit, hits)
{
merged->insert(hit->begin(), hit->end());
uniqueGroupings.erase(hit);
delete hit;
}
uniqueGroupings.insert(merged);
// update setmap
BOOST_FOREACH(CTxDestination element, *merged)
setmap[element] = merged;
}
set< set<CTxDestination> > ret;
BOOST_FOREACH(set<CTxDestination>* uniqueGrouping, uniqueGroupings)
{
ret.insert(*uniqueGrouping);
delete uniqueGrouping;
}
return ret;
}
set<CTxDestination> CWallet::GetAccountAddresses(string strAccount) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
set<CTxDestination> result;
BOOST_FOREACH(const PAIRTYPE(CTxDestination, CAddressBookData)& item, mapAddressBook)
{
const CTxDestination& address = item.first;
const string& strName = item.second.name;
if (strName == strAccount)
result.insert(address);
}
return result;
}
bool CReserveKey::GetReservedKey(CPubKey& pubkey)
{
if (nIndex == -1)
{
CKeyPool keypool;
pwallet->ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool);
if (nIndex != -1)
vchPubKey = keypool.vchPubKey;
else {
return false;
}
}
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assert(vchPubKey.IsValid());
pubkey = vchPubKey;
return true;
}
void CReserveKey::KeepKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1)
pwallet->KeepKey(nIndex);
nIndex = -1;
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vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CReserveKey::ReturnKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1)
pwallet->ReturnKey(nIndex);
nIndex = -1;
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vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CWallet::GetAllReserveKeys(set<CKeyID>& setAddress) const
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{
setAddress.clear();
CWalletDB walletdb(strWalletFile);
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
BOOST_FOREACH(const int64_t& id, setKeyPool)
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{
CKeyPool keypool;
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(id, keypool))
throw runtime_error("GetAllReserveKeyHashes() : read failed");
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assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
CKeyID keyID = keypool.vchPubKey.GetID();
if (!HaveKey(keyID))
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throw runtime_error("GetAllReserveKeyHashes() : unknown key in key pool");
setAddress.insert(keyID);
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}
}
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bool CWallet::UpdatedTransaction(const uint256 &hashTx)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Only notify UI if this transaction is in this wallet
map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(hashTx);
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if (mi != mapWallet.end()){
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, hashTx, CT_UPDATED);
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return true;
}
}
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return false;
}
void CWallet::LockCoin(COutPoint& output)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.insert(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockCoin(COutPoint& output)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.erase(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockAllCoins()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.clear();
}
bool CWallet::IsLockedCoin(uint256 hash, unsigned int n) const
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
COutPoint outpt(hash, n);
return (setLockedCoins.count(outpt) > 0);
}
void CWallet::ListLockedCoins(std::vector<COutPoint>& vOutpts)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
for (std::set<COutPoint>::iterator it = setLockedCoins.begin();
it != setLockedCoins.end(); it++) {
COutPoint outpt = (*it);
vOutpts.push_back(outpt);
}
}
/** @} */ // end of Actions
class CAffectedKeysVisitor : public boost::static_visitor<void> {
private:
const CKeyStore &keystore;
std::vector<CKeyID> &vKeys;
public:
CAffectedKeysVisitor(const CKeyStore &keystoreIn, std::vector<CKeyID> &vKeysIn) : keystore(keystoreIn), vKeys(vKeysIn) {}
void Process(const CScript &script) {
txnouttype type;
std::vector<CTxDestination> vDest;
int nRequired;
if (ExtractDestinations(script, type, vDest, nRequired)) {
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxDestination &dest, vDest)
boost::apply_visitor(*this, dest);
}
}
void operator()(const CKeyID &keyId) {
if (keystore.HaveKey(keyId))
vKeys.push_back(keyId);
}
void operator()(const CScriptID &scriptId) {
CScript script;
if (keystore.GetCScript(scriptId, script))
Process(script);
}
void operator()(const CNoDestination &none) {}
};
void CWallet::GetKeyBirthTimes(std::map<CKeyID, int64_t> &mapKeyBirth) const {
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
mapKeyBirth.clear();
// get birth times for keys with metadata
for (std::map<CKeyID, CKeyMetadata>::const_iterator it = mapKeyMetadata.begin(); it != mapKeyMetadata.end(); it++)
if (it->second.nCreateTime)
mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second.nCreateTime;
// map in which we'll infer heights of other keys
CBlockIndex *pindexMax = chainActive[std::max(0, chainActive.Height() - 144)]; // the tip can be reorganised; use a 144-block safety margin
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*> mapKeyFirstBlock;
std::set<CKeyID> setKeys;
GetKeys(setKeys);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CKeyID &keyid, setKeys) {
if (mapKeyBirth.count(keyid) == 0)
mapKeyFirstBlock[keyid] = pindexMax;
}
setKeys.clear();
// if there are no such keys, we're done
if (mapKeyFirstBlock.empty())
return;
// find first block that affects those keys, if there are any left
std::vector<CKeyID> vAffected;
for (std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.begin(); it != mapWallet.end(); it++) {
// iterate over all wallet transactions...
const CWalletTx &wtx = (*it).second;
BlockMap::const_iterator blit = mapBlockIndex.find(wtx.hashBlock);
if (blit != mapBlockIndex.end() && chainActive.Contains(blit->second)) {
// ... which are already in a block
int nHeight = blit->second->nHeight;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxOut &txout, wtx.vout) {
// iterate over all their outputs
CAffectedKeysVisitor(*this, vAffected).Process(txout.scriptPubKey);
BOOST_FOREACH(const CKeyID &keyid, vAffected) {
// ... and all their affected keys
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::iterator rit = mapKeyFirstBlock.find(keyid);
if (rit != mapKeyFirstBlock.end() && nHeight < rit->second->nHeight)
rit->second = blit->second;
}
vAffected.clear();
}
}
}
// Extract block timestamps for those keys
for (std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::const_iterator it = mapKeyFirstBlock.begin(); it != mapKeyFirstBlock.end(); it++)
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mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second->GetBlockTime() - 7200; // block times can be 2h off
}
bool CWallet::AddDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
{
if (boost::get<CNoDestination>(&dest))
return false;
mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.insert(std::make_pair(key, value));
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).WriteDestData(CBitcoinAddress(dest).ToString(), key, value);
}
bool CWallet::EraseDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key)
{
if (!mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.erase(key))
return false;
if (!fFileBacked)
return true;
return CWalletDB(strWalletFile).EraseDestData(CBitcoinAddress(dest).ToString(), key);
}
bool CWallet::LoadDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
{
mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.insert(std::make_pair(key, value));
return true;
}
bool CWallet::GetDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, std::string *value) const
{
std::map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::const_iterator i = mapAddressBook.find(dest);
if(i != mapAddressBook.end())
{
CAddressBookData::StringMap::const_iterator j = i->second.destdata.find(key);
if(j != i->second.destdata.end())
{
if(value)
*value = j->second;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
CKeyPool::CKeyPool()
{
nTime = GetTime();
}
CKeyPool::CKeyPool(const CPubKey& vchPubKeyIn)
{
nTime = GetTime();
vchPubKey = vchPubKeyIn;
}
CWalletKey::CWalletKey(int64_t nExpires)
{
nTimeCreated = (nExpires ? GetTime() : 0);
nTimeExpires = nExpires;
}
int CMerkleTx::SetMerkleBranch(const CBlock& block)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
CBlock blockTmp;
// Update the tx's hashBlock
hashBlock = block.GetHash();
// Locate the transaction
for (nIndex = 0; nIndex < (int)block.vtx.size(); nIndex++)
if (block.vtx[nIndex] == *(CTransaction*)this)
break;
if (nIndex == (int)block.vtx.size())
{
vMerkleBranch.clear();
nIndex = -1;
LogPrintf("ERROR: SetMerkleBranch() : couldn't find tx in block\n");
return 0;
}
// Fill in merkle branch
vMerkleBranch = block.GetMerkleBranch(nIndex);
// Is the tx in a block that's in the main chain
BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(hashBlock);
if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end())
return 0;
const CBlockIndex* pindex = (*mi).second;
if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex))
return 0;
return chainActive.Height() - pindex->nHeight + 1;
}
int CMerkleTx::GetDepthInMainChainINTERNAL(const CBlockIndex* &pindexRet) const
{
if (hashBlock == 0 || nIndex == -1)
return 0;
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Find the block it claims to be in
BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(hashBlock);
if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end())
return 0;
CBlockIndex* pindex = (*mi).second;
if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex))
return 0;
// Make sure the merkle branch connects to this block
if (!fMerkleVerified)
{
if (CBlock::CheckMerkleBranch(GetHash(), vMerkleBranch, nIndex) != pindex->hashMerkleRoot)
return 0;
fMerkleVerified = true;
}
pindexRet = pindex;
return chainActive.Height() - pindex->nHeight + 1;
}
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int CMerkleTx::GetDepthInMainChain(const CBlockIndex* &pindexRet, bool enableIX) const
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
int nResult = GetDepthInMainChainINTERNAL(pindexRet);
if (nResult == 0 && !mempool.exists(GetHash()))
return -1; // Not in chain, not in mempool
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if(enableIX){
if (nResult < 6){
int signatures = GetTransactionLockSignatures();
if(signatures >= INSTANTX_SIGNATURES_REQUIRED){
return nInstantXDepth+nResult;
}
}
}
return nResult;
}
int CMerkleTx::GetBlocksToMaturity() const
{
if (!IsCoinBase())
return 0;
return max(0, (COINBASE_MATURITY+1) - GetDepthInMainChain());
}
bool CMerkleTx::AcceptToMemoryPool(bool fLimitFree, bool fRejectInsaneFee, bool ignoreFees)
{
CValidationState state;
return ::AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, *this, fLimitFree, NULL, fRejectInsaneFee, ignoreFees);
}
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int CMerkleTx::GetTransactionLockSignatures() const
{
if(fLargeWorkForkFound || fLargeWorkInvalidChainFound) return -2;
if(!IsSporkActive(SPORK_2_INSTANTX)) return -3;
if(nInstantXDepth == 0) return -1;
//compile consessus vote
std::map<uint256, CTransactionLock>::iterator i = mapTxLocks.find(GetHash());
if (i != mapTxLocks.end()){
return (*i).second.CountSignatures();
}
return -1;
}
bool CMerkleTx::IsTransactionLockTimedOut() const
{
if(nInstantXDepth == 0) return 0;
//compile consessus vote
std::map<uint256, CTransactionLock>::iterator i = mapTxLocks.find(GetHash());
if (i != mapTxLocks.end()){
return GetTime() > (*i).second.nTimeout;
}
return false;
}