2015-12-13 14:51:43 +01:00
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// Copyright (c) 2011-2015 The Bitcoin Core developers
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2014-12-13 05:09:33 +01:00
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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2014-03-18 10:11:00 +01:00
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
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// Unit tests for denial-of-service detection/prevention code
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2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
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2015-07-05 14:17:46 +02:00
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#include "chainparams.h"
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2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
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#include "keystore.h"
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2011-10-12 01:50:06 +02:00
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#include "net.h"
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2017-08-09 02:19:06 +02:00
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#include "net_processing.h"
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2014-03-10 16:46:53 +01:00
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#include "pow.h"
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2014-08-27 17:22:33 +02:00
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#include "script/sign.h"
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2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
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#include "serialize.h"
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Split up util.cpp/h
Split up util.cpp/h into:
- string utilities (hex, base32, base64): no internal dependencies, no dependency on boost (apart from foreach)
- money utilities (parsesmoney, formatmoney)
- time utilities (gettime*, sleep, format date):
- and the rest (logging, argument parsing, config file parsing)
The latter is basically the environment and OS handling,
and is stripped of all utility functions, so we may want to
rename it to something else than util.cpp/h for clarity (Matt suggested
osinterface).
Breaks dependency of sha256.cpp on all the things pulled in by util.
2014-08-21 16:11:09 +02:00
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#include "util.h"
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2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
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2016-03-03 20:20:32 +01:00
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#include "test/test_dash.h"
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2015-03-03 16:49:12 +01:00
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2012-01-03 23:33:31 +01:00
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#include <stdint.h>
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2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
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#include <boost/assign/list_of.hpp> // for 'map_list_of()'
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#include <boost/date_time/posix_time/posix_time_types.hpp>
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#include <boost/foreach.hpp>
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#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
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2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
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// Tests this internal-to-main.cpp method:
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2014-08-28 19:23:24 +02:00
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extern bool AddOrphanTx(const CTransaction& tx, NodeId peer);
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extern void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer);
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2012-04-23 20:14:03 +02:00
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extern unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize(unsigned int nMaxOrphans);
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2014-09-20 09:53:50 +02:00
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struct COrphanTx {
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CTransaction tx;
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NodeId fromPeer;
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};
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extern std::map<uint256, COrphanTx> mapOrphanTransactions;
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2013-08-02 07:14:44 +02:00
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extern std::map<uint256, std::set<uint256> > mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev;
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2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
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2012-01-03 23:33:31 +01:00
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CService ip(uint32_t i)
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{
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struct in_addr s;
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s.s_addr = i;
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2013-05-07 15:16:25 +02:00
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return CService(CNetAddr(s), Params().GetDefaultPort());
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2012-01-03 23:33:31 +01:00
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}
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2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
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Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
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static NodeId id = 0;
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2015-03-03 16:49:12 +01:00
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BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_SUITE(DoS_tests, TestingSetup)
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2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_banning)
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{
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2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
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std::atomic<bool> interruptDummy(false);
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Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
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connman->ClearBanned();
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2017-07-05 05:45:23 +02:00
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CAddress addr1(ip(0xa0b0c001), NODE_NONE);
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2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
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CNode dummyNode1(id++, NODE_NETWORK, 0, INVALID_SOCKET, addr1, 0, 0, "", true);
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2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
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dummyNode1.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
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GetNodeSignals().InitializeNode(&dummyNode1, *connman);
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2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
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dummyNode1.nVersion = 1;
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2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
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dummyNode1.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
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2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
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Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 100); // Should get banned
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2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
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SendMessages(&dummyNode1, *connman, interruptDummy);
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Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
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BOOST_CHECK(connman->IsBanned(addr1));
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BOOST_CHECK(!connman->IsBanned(ip(0xa0b0c001|0x0000ff00))); // Different IP, not banned
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2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
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2017-07-05 05:45:23 +02:00
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CAddress addr2(ip(0xa0b0c002), NODE_NONE);
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2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
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CNode dummyNode2(id++, NODE_NETWORK, 0, INVALID_SOCKET, addr2, 1, 1, "", true);
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2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
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dummyNode2.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
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GetNodeSignals().InitializeNode(&dummyNode2, *connman);
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2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
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dummyNode2.nVersion = 1;
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2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
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dummyNode2.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
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2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
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Misbehaving(dummyNode2.GetId(), 50);
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2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
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SendMessages(&dummyNode2, *connman, interruptDummy);
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Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
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BOOST_CHECK(!connman->IsBanned(addr2)); // 2 not banned yet...
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BOOST_CHECK(connman->IsBanned(addr1)); // ... but 1 still should be
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2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
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Misbehaving(dummyNode2.GetId(), 50);
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2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
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SendMessages(&dummyNode2, *connman, interruptDummy);
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Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
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BOOST_CHECK(connman->IsBanned(addr2));
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2012-10-05 19:22:21 +02:00
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}
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2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_banscore)
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{
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2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
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std::atomic<bool> interruptDummy(false);
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Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
connman->ClearBanned();
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
mapArgs["-banscore"] = "111"; // because 11 is my favorite number
|
2017-07-05 05:45:23 +02:00
|
|
|
CAddress addr1(ip(0xa0b0c001), NODE_NONE);
|
2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
|
|
|
CNode dummyNode1(id++, NODE_NETWORK, 0, INVALID_SOCKET, addr1, 3, 1, "", true);
|
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
|
|
|
dummyNode1.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
GetNodeSignals().InitializeNode(&dummyNode1, *connman);
|
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
|
|
|
dummyNode1.nVersion = 1;
|
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
|
|
|
dummyNode1.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
|
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 100);
|
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
|
|
|
SendMessages(&dummyNode1, *connman, interruptDummy);
|
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(!connman->IsBanned(addr1));
|
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 10);
|
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
|
|
|
SendMessages(&dummyNode1, *connman, interruptDummy);
|
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(!connman->IsBanned(addr1));
|
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 1);
|
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
|
|
|
SendMessages(&dummyNode1, *connman, interruptDummy);
|
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(connman->IsBanned(addr1));
|
2012-05-16 21:57:04 +02:00
|
|
|
mapArgs.erase("-banscore");
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_bantime)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
|
|
|
std::atomic<bool> interruptDummy(false);
|
|
|
|
|
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
connman->ClearBanned();
|
2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
|
|
|
int64_t nStartTime = GetTime();
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
SetMockTime(nStartTime); // Overrides future calls to GetTime()
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-05 05:45:23 +02:00
|
|
|
CAddress addr(ip(0xa0b0c001), NODE_NONE);
|
2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
|
|
|
CNode dummyNode(id++, NODE_NETWORK, 0, INVALID_SOCKET, addr, 4, 4, "", true);
|
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
|
|
|
dummyNode.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
GetNodeSignals().InitializeNode(&dummyNode, *connman);
|
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
|
|
|
dummyNode.nVersion = 1;
|
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
|
|
|
dummyNode.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Misbehaving(dummyNode.GetId(), 100);
|
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
|
|
|
SendMessages(&dummyNode, *connman, interruptDummy);
|
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(connman->IsBanned(addr));
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SetMockTime(nStartTime+60*60);
|
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(connman->IsBanned(addr));
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SetMockTime(nStartTime+60*60*24+1);
|
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(!connman->IsBanned(addr));
|
2012-01-03 23:33:31 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
CTransaction RandomOrphan()
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-09-20 09:53:50 +02:00
|
|
|
std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator it;
|
2012-05-17 18:13:14 +02:00
|
|
|
it = mapOrphanTransactions.lower_bound(GetRandHash());
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (it == mapOrphanTransactions.end())
|
|
|
|
it = mapOrphanTransactions.begin();
|
2014-09-20 09:53:50 +02:00
|
|
|
return it->second.tx;
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_mapOrphans)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CKey key;
|
|
|
|
key.MakeNewKey(true);
|
|
|
|
CBasicKeyStore keystore;
|
|
|
|
keystore.AddKey(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// 50 orphan transactions:
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < 50; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-07 13:53:27 +02:00
|
|
|
CMutableTransaction tx;
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
tx.vin.resize(1);
|
|
|
|
tx.vin[0].prevout.n = 0;
|
2012-05-17 18:13:14 +02:00
|
|
|
tx.vin[0].prevout.hash = GetRandHash();
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
tx.vin[0].scriptSig << OP_1;
|
|
|
|
tx.vout.resize(1);
|
|
|
|
tx.vout[0].nValue = 1*CENT;
|
2014-09-11 19:15:29 +02:00
|
|
|
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = GetScriptForDestination(key.GetPubKey().GetID());
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-28 19:23:24 +02:00
|
|
|
AddOrphanTx(tx, i);
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ... and 50 that depend on other orphans:
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < 50; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CTransaction txPrev = RandomOrphan();
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-07 13:53:27 +02:00
|
|
|
CMutableTransaction tx;
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
tx.vin.resize(1);
|
|
|
|
tx.vin[0].prevout.n = 0;
|
|
|
|
tx.vin[0].prevout.hash = txPrev.GetHash();
|
|
|
|
tx.vout.resize(1);
|
|
|
|
tx.vout[0].nValue = 1*CENT;
|
2014-09-11 19:15:29 +02:00
|
|
|
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = GetScriptForDestination(key.GetPubKey().GetID());
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
SignSignature(keystore, txPrev, tx, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-28 19:23:24 +02:00
|
|
|
AddOrphanTx(tx, i);
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-15 21:53:30 +02:00
|
|
|
// This really-big orphan should be ignored:
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CTransaction txPrev = RandomOrphan();
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-07 13:53:27 +02:00
|
|
|
CMutableTransaction tx;
|
2012-05-15 21:53:30 +02:00
|
|
|
tx.vout.resize(1);
|
|
|
|
tx.vout[0].nValue = 1*CENT;
|
2014-09-11 19:15:29 +02:00
|
|
|
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = GetScriptForDestination(key.GetPubKey().GetID());
|
2016-06-20 14:45:34 +02:00
|
|
|
tx.vin.resize(2777);
|
2012-05-24 18:18:50 +02:00
|
|
|
for (unsigned int j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++)
|
2012-05-15 21:53:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tx.vin[j].prevout.n = j;
|
|
|
|
tx.vin[j].prevout.hash = txPrev.GetHash();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SignSignature(keystore, txPrev, tx, 0);
|
|
|
|
// Re-use same signature for other inputs
|
|
|
|
// (they don't have to be valid for this test)
|
2012-05-24 18:18:50 +02:00
|
|
|
for (unsigned int j = 1; j < tx.vin.size(); j++)
|
2012-05-15 21:53:30 +02:00
|
|
|
tx.vin[j].scriptSig = tx.vin[0].scriptSig;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-28 19:23:24 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(!AddOrphanTx(tx, i));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Test EraseOrphansFor:
|
|
|
|
for (NodeId i = 0; i < 3; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t sizeBefore = mapOrphanTransactions.size();
|
|
|
|
EraseOrphansFor(i);
|
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.size() < sizeBefore);
|
2012-05-15 21:53:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
|
|
|
// Test LimitOrphanTxSize() function:
|
|
|
|
LimitOrphanTxSize(40);
|
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.size() <= 40);
|
|
|
|
LimitOrphanTxSize(10);
|
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.size() <= 10);
|
|
|
|
LimitOrphanTxSize(0);
|
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.empty());
|
|
|
|
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.empty());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()
|