dash/test/functional/p2p_blocksonly.py

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (c) 2019 The Bitcoin Core developers
# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
"""Test p2p blocksonly"""
from test_framework.messages import msg_tx, CTransaction, FromHex
from test_framework.mininode import P2PInterface
from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework
from test_framework.util import assert_equal
class P2PBlocksOnly(BitcoinTestFramework):
def set_test_params(self):
self.num_nodes = 1
self.extra_args = [["-blocksonly"]]
def run_test(self):
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
self.log.info('Check that txs from p2p are rejected and result in disconnect')
prevtx = self.nodes[0].getblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(1), 2)['tx'][0]
rawtx = self.nodes[0].createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0
}],
outputs=[{
self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key()[0]: 500 - 0.00125
}],
)
sigtx = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithkey(
hexstring=rawtx,
privkeys=[self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key()[1]],
prevtxs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0,
'scriptPubKey': prevtx['vout'][0]['scriptPubKey']['hex'],
}],
)['hex']
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getnetworkinfo()['localrelay'], False)
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(['tx sent in violation of protocol peer=0']):
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_message(msg_tx(FromHex(CTransaction(), sigtx)))
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_disconnect()
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 0)
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
# Remove the disconnected peer and add a new one.
del self.nodes[0].p2ps[0]
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
self.log.info('Check that txs from rpc are not rejected and relayed to other peers')
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[0]['relaytxes'], True)
txid = self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['txid']
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(['received getdata for: tx {} peer=1'.format(txid)]):
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(sigtx)
self.bump_mocktime(60)
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_tx(txid)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 1)
self.log.info('Check that txs from forcerelay peers are not rejected and relayed to others')
self.log.info("Restarting node 0 with forcerelay permission and blocksonly")
self.restart_node(0, ["-persistmempool=0", "-whitelist=127.0.0.1", "-whitelistforcerelay", "-blocksonly"])
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getrawmempool(), [])
first_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
second_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
peer_1_info = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[0]
assert_equal(peer_1_info['whitelisted'], True)
assert_equal(peer_1_info['permissions'], ['noban', 'forcerelay', 'relay', 'mempool', 'download'])
peer_2_info = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[1]
assert_equal(peer_2_info['whitelisted'], True)
assert_equal(peer_2_info['permissions'], ['noban', 'forcerelay', 'relay', 'mempool', 'download'])
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['allowed'], True)
txid = self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['txid']
self.log.info('Check that the tx from forcerelay first_peer is relayed to others (ie.second_peer)')
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(["received getdata"]):
first_peer.send_message(msg_tx(FromHex(CTransaction(), sigtx)))
self.log.info('Check that the forcerelay peer is still connected after sending the transaction')
assert_equal(first_peer.is_connected, True)
second_peer.wait_for_tx(txid)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 1)
self.log.info("Forcerelay peer's transaction is accepted and relayed")
if __name__ == '__main__':
P2PBlocksOnly().main()