dash/src/rpc/protocol.h

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// Copyright (c) 2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2015 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#ifndef BITCOIN_RPC_PROTOCOL_H
#define BITCOIN_RPC_PROTOCOL_H
//! HTTP status codes
enum HTTPStatusCode
{
HTTP_OK = 200,
HTTP_BAD_REQUEST = 400,
HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED = 401,
HTTP_FORBIDDEN = 403,
HTTP_NOT_FOUND = 404,
evhttpd implementation - *Replace usage of boost::asio with [libevent2](http://libevent.org/)*. boost::asio is not part of C++11, so unlike other boost there is no forwards-compatibility reason to stick with it. Together with #4738 (convert json_spirit to UniValue), this rids Bitcoin Core of the worst offenders with regard to compile-time slowness. - *Replace spit-and-duct-tape http server with evhttp*. Front-end http handling is handled by libevent, a work queue (with configurable depth and parallelism) is used to handle application requests. - *Wrap HTTP request in C++ class*; this makes the application code mostly HTTP-server-neutral - *Refactor RPC to move all http-specific code to a separate file*. Theoreticaly this can allow building without HTTP server but with another RPC backend, e.g. Qt's debug console (currently not implemented) or future RPC mechanisms people may want to use. - *HTTP dispatch mechanism*; services (e.g., RPC, REST) register which URL paths they want to handle. By using a proven, high-performance asynchronous networking library (also used by Tor) and HTTP server, problems such as #5674, #5655, #344 should be avoided. What works? bitcoind, bitcoin-cli, bitcoin-qt. Unit tests and RPC/REST tests pass. The aim for now is everything but SSL support. Configuration options: - `-rpcthreads`: repurposed as "number of work handler threads". Still defaults to 4. - `-rpcworkqueue`: maximum depth of work queue. When this is reached, new requests will return a 500 Internal Error. - `-rpctimeout`: inactivity time, in seconds, after which to disconnect a client. - `-debug=http`: low-level http activity logging
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HTTP_BAD_METHOD = 405,
HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR = 500,
HTTP_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE = 503,
};
//! Dash Core RPC error codes
enum RPCErrorCode
{
//! Standard JSON-RPC 2.0 errors
// RPC_INVALID_REQUEST is internally mapped to HTTP_BAD_REQUEST (400).
// It should not be used for application-layer errors.
RPC_INVALID_REQUEST = -32600,
// RPC_METHOD_NOT_FOUND is internally mapped to HTTP_NOT_FOUND (404).
// It should not be used for application-layer errors.
RPC_METHOD_NOT_FOUND = -32601,
RPC_INVALID_PARAMS = -32602,
// RPC_INTERNAL_ERROR should only be used for genuine errors in dashd
// (for example datadir corruption).
RPC_INTERNAL_ERROR = -32603,
RPC_PARSE_ERROR = -32700,
//! General application defined errors
RPC_MISC_ERROR = -1, //!< std::exception thrown in command handling
RPC_TYPE_ERROR = -3, //!< Unexpected type was passed as parameter
RPC_INVALID_ADDRESS_OR_KEY = -5, //!< Invalid address or key
RPC_OUT_OF_MEMORY = -7, //!< Ran out of memory during operation
RPC_INVALID_PARAMETER = -8, //!< Invalid, missing or duplicate parameter
RPC_DATABASE_ERROR = -20, //!< Database error
RPC_DESERIALIZATION_ERROR = -22, //!< Error parsing or validating structure in raw format
RPC_VERIFY_ERROR = -25, //!< General error during transaction or block submission
RPC_VERIFY_REJECTED = -26, //!< Transaction or block was rejected by network rules
RPC_VERIFY_ALREADY_IN_CHAIN = -27, //!< Transaction already in chain
RPC_IN_WARMUP = -28, //!< Client still warming up
RPC_METHOD_DEPRECATED = -32, //!< RPC method is deprecated
RPC_PLATFORM_RESTRICTION = -33, //!< This RPC command cannot be run by platform-user
//! Aliases for backward compatibility
RPC_TRANSACTION_ERROR = RPC_VERIFY_ERROR,
RPC_TRANSACTION_REJECTED = RPC_VERIFY_REJECTED,
RPC_TRANSACTION_ALREADY_IN_CHAIN= RPC_VERIFY_ALREADY_IN_CHAIN,
//! P2P client errors
RPC_CLIENT_NOT_CONNECTED = -9, //!< Dash is not connected
RPC_CLIENT_IN_INITIAL_DOWNLOAD = -10, //!< Still downloading initial blocks
RPC_CLIENT_NODE_ALREADY_ADDED = -23, //!< Node is already added
RPC_CLIENT_NODE_NOT_ADDED = -24, //!< Node has not been added before
RPC_CLIENT_NODE_NOT_CONNECTED = -29, //!< Node to disconnect not found in connected nodes
RPC_CLIENT_INVALID_IP_OR_SUBNET = -30, //!< Invalid IP/Subnet
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
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RPC_CLIENT_P2P_DISABLED = -31, //!< No valid connection manager instance found
//! Wallet errors
RPC_WALLET_ERROR = -4, //!< Unspecified problem with wallet (key not found etc.)
RPC_WALLET_INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS = -6, //!< Not enough funds in wallet or account
RPC_WALLET_INVALID_LABEL_NAME = -11, //!< Invalid label name
RPC_WALLET_KEYPOOL_RAN_OUT = -12, //!< Keypool ran out, call keypoolrefill first
RPC_WALLET_UNLOCK_NEEDED = -13, //!< Enter the wallet passphrase with walletpassphrase first
RPC_WALLET_PASSPHRASE_INCORRECT = -14, //!< The wallet passphrase entered was incorrect
RPC_WALLET_WRONG_ENC_STATE = -15, //!< Command given in wrong wallet encryption state (encrypting an encrypted wallet etc.)
RPC_WALLET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED = -16, //!< Failed to encrypt the wallet
RPC_WALLET_ALREADY_UNLOCKED = -17, //!< Wallet is already unlocked
RPC_WALLET_NOT_FOUND = -18, //!< Invalid wallet specified
RPC_WALLET_NOT_SPECIFIED = -19, //!< No wallet specified (error when there are multiple wallets loaded)
Merge #13090: Remove Safe mode (achow101) d8e9a2a Remove "rpc" category from GetWarnings (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 7da3b0a rpc: Move RPC_FORBIDDEN_BY_SAFE_MODE code to reserved section (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 2ae705d Remove Safe mode (Andrew Chow) Pull request description: Rebase of #10563. Safe mode was [disabled by default and deprecated in 0.16](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/release-notes/release-notes-0.16.0.md#safe-mode-disabled-by-default), so probably should be removed for 0.17. > Rationale: > > Safe mode is useless. It only disables some RPC commands when large work forks are detected. Nothing else is affected by safe mode. It seems that very few people would be affected by safe mode. The people who use Core as a wallet are primarily using it through the GUI, which safe mode does not effect. In the GUI, transactions will still be made as normal; only a warning is displayed. > > I also don't think that we should be disabling RPC commands or any functionality in general. If we do, it should be done consistently, which safe mode is not. If we want to keep the idea of a safe mode around, I think that the current system needs to go first before a new system can be implemented. Tree-SHA512: 067938f47ca6e879fb6c3c4e21f9946fd7c5da3cde67ef436f1666798c78d049225b9111dc97064f42b3bc549d3915229fa19ad5a634588f381e34fc65d64044 Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.am # src/rpc/protocol.h # src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp # src/wallet/rpcdump.cpp # src/wallet/rpcwallet.cpp # test/functional/pruning.py
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//! Backwards compatible aliases
RPC_WALLET_INVALID_ACCOUNT_NAME = RPC_WALLET_INVALID_LABEL_NAME,
Merge #13090: Remove Safe mode (achow101) d8e9a2a Remove "rpc" category from GetWarnings (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 7da3b0a rpc: Move RPC_FORBIDDEN_BY_SAFE_MODE code to reserved section (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 2ae705d Remove Safe mode (Andrew Chow) Pull request description: Rebase of #10563. Safe mode was [disabled by default and deprecated in 0.16](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/release-notes/release-notes-0.16.0.md#safe-mode-disabled-by-default), so probably should be removed for 0.17. > Rationale: > > Safe mode is useless. It only disables some RPC commands when large work forks are detected. Nothing else is affected by safe mode. It seems that very few people would be affected by safe mode. The people who use Core as a wallet are primarily using it through the GUI, which safe mode does not effect. In the GUI, transactions will still be made as normal; only a warning is displayed. > > I also don't think that we should be disabling RPC commands or any functionality in general. If we do, it should be done consistently, which safe mode is not. If we want to keep the idea of a safe mode around, I think that the current system needs to go first before a new system can be implemented. Tree-SHA512: 067938f47ca6e879fb6c3c4e21f9946fd7c5da3cde67ef436f1666798c78d049225b9111dc97064f42b3bc549d3915229fa19ad5a634588f381e34fc65d64044 Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.am # src/rpc/protocol.h # src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp # src/wallet/rpcdump.cpp # src/wallet/rpcwallet.cpp # test/functional/pruning.py
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//! Unused reserved codes, kept around for backwards compatibility. Do not reuse.
RPC_FORBIDDEN_BY_SAFE_MODE = -2, //!< Server is in safe mode, and command is not allowed in safe mode
};
#endif // BITCOIN_RPC_PROTOCOL_H