dash/contrib/devtools/security-check.py

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (c) 2015-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
'''
Perform basic security checks on a series of executables.
Exit status will be 0 if successful, and the program will be silent.
Otherwise the exit status will be 1 and it will log which executables failed which checks.
'''
import sys
from typing import List
import lief #type:ignore
def check_ELF_RELRO(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for read-only relocations.
GNU_RELRO program header must exist
Dynamic section must have BIND_NOW flag
'''
have_gnu_relro = False
for segment in binary.segments:
# Note: not checking p_flags == PF_R: here as linkers set the permission differently
# This does not affect security: the permission flags of the GNU_RELRO program
# header are ignored, the PT_LOAD header determines the effective permissions.
# However, the dynamic linker need to write to this area so these are RW.
# Glibc itself takes care of mprotecting this area R after relocations are finished.
# See also https://marc.info/?l=binutils&m=1498883354122353
if segment.type == lief.ELF.SEGMENT_TYPES.GNU_RELRO:
have_gnu_relro = True
have_bindnow = False
try:
flags = binary.get(lief.ELF.DYNAMIC_TAGS.FLAGS)
if flags.value & lief.ELF.DYNAMIC_FLAGS.BIND_NOW:
have_bindnow = True
except:
have_bindnow = False
return have_gnu_relro and have_bindnow
def check_ELF_Canary(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for use of stack canary
'''
return binary.has_symbol('__stack_chk_fail')
def check_ELF_separate_code(binary):
'''
Check that sections are appropriately separated in virtual memory,
based on their permissions. This checks for missing -Wl,-z,separate-code
and potentially other problems.
'''
R = lief.ELF.SEGMENT_FLAGS.R
W = lief.ELF.SEGMENT_FLAGS.W
E = lief.ELF.SEGMENT_FLAGS.X
EXPECTED_FLAGS = {
# Read + execute
'.init': R | E,
'.plt': R | E,
'.plt.got': R | E,
'.plt.sec': R | E,
'.text': R | E,
'.fini': R | E,
# Read-only data
'.interp': R,
'.note.gnu.property': R,
'.note.gnu.build-id': R,
'.note.ABI-tag': R,
'.gnu.hash': R,
'.dynsym': R,
'.dynstr': R,
'.gnu.version': R,
'.gnu.version_r': R,
'.rela.dyn': R,
'.rela.plt': R,
'.rodata': R,
'.eh_frame_hdr': R,
'.eh_frame': R,
'.qtmetadata': R,
'.gcc_except_table': R,
'.stapsdt.base': R,
# Writable data
'.init_array': R | W,
'.fini_array': R | W,
'.dynamic': R | W,
'.got': R | W,
'.data': R | W,
'.bss': R | W,
}
if binary.header.machine_type == lief.ELF.ARCH.PPC64:
# .plt is RW on ppc64 even with separate-code
EXPECTED_FLAGS['.plt'] = R | W
# For all LOAD program headers get mapping to the list of sections,
# and for each section, remember the flags of the associated program header.
flags_per_section = {}
for segment in binary.segments:
if segment.type == lief.ELF.SEGMENT_TYPES.LOAD:
for section in segment.sections:
flags_per_section[section.name] = segment.flags
# Spot-check ELF LOAD program header flags per section
# If these sections exist, check them against the expected R/W/E flags
for (section, flags) in flags_per_section.items():
if section in EXPECTED_FLAGS:
if int(EXPECTED_FLAGS[section]) != int(flags):
return False
return True
def check_ELF_control_flow(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for control flow instrumentation
'''
main = binary.get_function_address('main')
content = binary.get_content_from_virtual_address(main, 4, lief.Binary.VA_TYPES.AUTO)
if content.tolist() == [243, 15, 30, 250]: # endbr64
return True
return False
def check_PE_DYNAMIC_BASE(binary) -> bool:
'''PIE: DllCharacteristics bit 0x40 signifies dynamicbase (ASLR)'''
return lief.PE.DLL_CHARACTERISTICS.DYNAMIC_BASE in binary.optional_header.dll_characteristics_lists
# Must support high-entropy 64-bit address space layout randomization
# in addition to DYNAMIC_BASE to have secure ASLR.
def check_PE_HIGH_ENTROPY_VA(binary) -> bool:
'''PIE: DllCharacteristics bit 0x20 signifies high-entropy ASLR'''
return lief.PE.DLL_CHARACTERISTICS.HIGH_ENTROPY_VA in binary.optional_header.dll_characteristics_lists
def check_PE_RELOC_SECTION(binary) -> bool:
Merge #18629: scripts: add PE .reloc section check to security-check.py 3e38023af724a76972d39cbccfb0bba4c54a0323 scripts: add PE .reloc section check to security-check.py (fanquake) Pull request description: The `ld` in binutils has historically had a few issues with PE binaries, there's a good summary in this [thread](https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=19011). One issue in particular was `ld` stripping the `.reloc` section out of PE binaries, even though it's required for functioning ASLR. This was [reported by a Tor developer in 2014](https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17321) and they have been patching their [own binutils](https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-build.git/tree/projects/binutils) ever since. However their patch only made it into binutils at the [start of this year](https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=dc9bd8c92af67947db44b3cb428c050259b15cd0). It adds an `--enable-reloc-section` flag, which is turned on by default if you are using `--dynamic-base`. In the mean time this issue has also been worked around by other projects, such as FFmpeg, see [this commit](https://github.com/TheRyuu/FFmpeg/commit/91b668acd6decec0a6f8d20bf56e2644f96adcb9). I have checked our recent supported Windows release binaries, and they do contain a `.reloc` section. From what I understand, we are using all the right compile/linker flags, including `-pie` & `-fPIE`, and have never run into the crashing/entrypoint issues that other projects might have seen. One other thing worth noting here, it how Debian/Ubuntu patch the binutils that they distribute, because that's what we end up using in our gitian builds. In the binutils-mingw-w64 in Bionic (18.04), which we currently use in gitian, PE hardening options/security flags are enabled by default. See the [changelog](https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/changelogs/pool/universe/b/binutils-mingw-w64/binutils-mingw-w64_8ubuntu1/changelog) and the [relevant commit](https://salsa.debian.org/mingw-w64-team/binutils-mingw-w64/-/commit/452b3013b8280cbe35eaeb166a43621b88d5f8b7). However in Focal (20.04), this has now been reversed. PE hardening options are no-longer the default. See the [changelog](https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/changelogs/pool/universe/b/binutils-mingw-w64/binutils-mingw-w64_8.8/changelog) and [relevant commit](https://salsa.debian.org/mingw-w64-team/binutils-mingw-w64/-/commit/7bd8b2fbc242a8c2fc2217f29fd61f94d3babf6f), which cites same .reloc issue mentioned here. Given that we explicitly specify/opt-in to everything that we want to use, the defaults aren't necessarily an issue for us. However I think it highlights the importance of continuing to be explicit about what we want, and not falling-back or relying on upstream. This was also prompted by the possibility of us doing link time garbage collection, see #18579 & #18605. It seemed some sanity checks would be worthwhile in-case the linker goes haywire while garbage collecting. I think Guix is going to bring great benefits when dealing with these kinds of issues. Carl you might have something to say in that regard. ACKs for top commit: dongcarl: ACK 3e38023af724a76972d39cbccfb0bba4c54a0323 Tree-SHA512: af14d63bdb334bde548dd7de3e0946556b7e2598d817b56eb4e75b3f56c705c26aa85dd9783134c4b6a7aeb7cb4de567eed996e94d533d31511f57ed332287da
2020-04-28 07:08:19 +02:00
'''Check for a reloc section. This is required for functional ASLR.'''
return binary.has_relocations
def check_PE_control_flow(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for control flow instrumentation
'''
main = binary.get_symbol('main').value
section_addr = binary.section_from_rva(main).virtual_address
virtual_address = binary.optional_header.imagebase + section_addr + main
content = binary.get_content_from_virtual_address(virtual_address, 4, lief.Binary.VA_TYPES.VA)
if content.tolist() == [243, 15, 30, 250]: # endbr64
return True
return False
def check_PE_Canary(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for use of stack canary
'''
return binary.has_symbol('__stack_chk_fail')
def check_MACHO_NOUNDEFS(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for no undefined references.
'''
return binary.header.has(lief.MachO.HEADER_FLAGS.NOUNDEFS)
def check_MACHO_FIXUP_CHAINS(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for use of chained fixups.
'''
return binary.has_dyld_chained_fixups
def check_MACHO_Canary(binary) -> bool:
Merge #18713: scripts: Add MACHO stack canary check to security-check.py 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe scripts: add MACHO LAZY_BINDINGS test to test-security-check.py (fanquake) 7b99c7454cdb74cd9cd7a5eedc2fb9d0a19df456 scripts: add MACHO Canary check to security-check.py (fanquake) Pull request description: 7b99c7454cdb74cd9cd7a5eedc2fb9d0a19df456 uses `otool -Iv` to check for `___stack_chk_fail` in the macOS binaries. Similar to the [ELF check](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/contrib/devtools/security-check.py#L105). Note that looking for a triple underscore prefixed function (as opposed to two for ELF) is correct for the macOS binaries. i.e: ```bash otool -Iv bitcoind | grep chk 0x00000001006715b8 509 ___memcpy_chk 0x00000001006715be 510 ___snprintf_chk 0x00000001006715c4 511 ___sprintf_chk 0x00000001006715ca 512 ___stack_chk_fail 0x00000001006715d6 517 ___vsnprintf_chk 0x0000000100787898 513 ___stack_chk_guard ``` 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe is a follow up to #18295 and adds test cases to `test-security-check.py` that for some reason I didn't add at the time. I'll sort out #18434 so that we can run these tests in the CI. ACKs for top commit: practicalswift: ACK 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe: Mitigations are important. Important things are worth asserting :) jonasschnelli: utACK 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe. Tree-SHA512: 1aa5ded34bbd187eddb112b27278deb328bfc21ac82316b20fab6ad894f223b239a76b53dab0ac1770d194c1760fcc40d4da91ec09959ba4fc8eadedb173936a
2020-04-22 10:19:51 +02:00
'''
Check for use of stack canary
'''
return binary.has_symbol('___stack_chk_fail')
def check_PIE(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for position independent executable (PIE),
allowing for address space randomization.
'''
return binary.is_pie
def check_NX(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for no stack execution
'''
return binary.has_nx
Merge #18713: scripts: Add MACHO stack canary check to security-check.py 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe scripts: add MACHO LAZY_BINDINGS test to test-security-check.py (fanquake) 7b99c7454cdb74cd9cd7a5eedc2fb9d0a19df456 scripts: add MACHO Canary check to security-check.py (fanquake) Pull request description: 7b99c7454cdb74cd9cd7a5eedc2fb9d0a19df456 uses `otool -Iv` to check for `___stack_chk_fail` in the macOS binaries. Similar to the [ELF check](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/contrib/devtools/security-check.py#L105). Note that looking for a triple underscore prefixed function (as opposed to two for ELF) is correct for the macOS binaries. i.e: ```bash otool -Iv bitcoind | grep chk 0x00000001006715b8 509 ___memcpy_chk 0x00000001006715be 510 ___snprintf_chk 0x00000001006715c4 511 ___sprintf_chk 0x00000001006715ca 512 ___stack_chk_fail 0x00000001006715d6 517 ___vsnprintf_chk 0x0000000100787898 513 ___stack_chk_guard ``` 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe is a follow up to #18295 and adds test cases to `test-security-check.py` that for some reason I didn't add at the time. I'll sort out #18434 so that we can run these tests in the CI. ACKs for top commit: practicalswift: ACK 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe: Mitigations are important. Important things are worth asserting :) jonasschnelli: utACK 8334ee31f868f0f9baf0920d14d20174ed889dbe. Tree-SHA512: 1aa5ded34bbd187eddb112b27278deb328bfc21ac82316b20fab6ad894f223b239a76b53dab0ac1770d194c1760fcc40d4da91ec09959ba4fc8eadedb173936a
2020-04-22 10:19:51 +02:00
def check_MACHO_control_flow(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for control flow instrumentation
'''
content = binary.get_content_from_virtual_address(binary.entrypoint, 4, lief.Binary.VA_TYPES.AUTO)
if content.tolist() == [243, 15, 30, 250]: # endbr64
return True
return False
def check_MACHO_branch_protection(binary) -> bool:
'''
Check for branch protection instrumentation
'''
content = binary.get_content_from_virtual_address(binary.entrypoint, 4, lief.Binary.VA_TYPES.AUTO)
if content.tolist() == [95, 36, 3, 213]: # bti
return True
return False
BASE_ELF = [
('PIE', check_PIE),
('NX', check_NX),
('RELRO', check_ELF_RELRO),
('Canary', check_ELF_Canary),
('separate_code', check_ELF_separate_code),
]
BASE_PE = [
('PIE', check_PIE),
('DYNAMIC_BASE', check_PE_DYNAMIC_BASE),
('HIGH_ENTROPY_VA', check_PE_HIGH_ENTROPY_VA),
('NX', check_NX),
('RELOC_SECTION', check_PE_RELOC_SECTION),
('CONTROL_FLOW', check_PE_control_flow),
('Canary', check_PE_Canary),
]
BASE_MACHO = [
('NOUNDEFS', check_MACHO_NOUNDEFS),
('Canary', check_MACHO_Canary),
('FIXUP_CHAINS', check_MACHO_FIXUP_CHAINS),
]
CHECKS = {
lief.EXE_FORMATS.ELF: {
lief.ARCHITECTURES.X86: BASE_ELF + [('CONTROL_FLOW', check_ELF_control_flow)],
lief.ARCHITECTURES.ARM: BASE_ELF,
lief.ARCHITECTURES.ARM64: BASE_ELF,
lief.ARCHITECTURES.PPC: BASE_ELF,
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lief.ARCHITECTURES.RISCV: BASE_ELF,
},
lief.EXE_FORMATS.PE: {
lief.ARCHITECTURES.X86: BASE_PE,
},
lief.EXE_FORMATS.MACHO: {
lief.ARCHITECTURES.X86: BASE_MACHO + [('PIE', check_PIE),
('NX', check_NX),
('CONTROL_FLOW', check_MACHO_control_flow)],
lief.ARCHITECTURES.ARM64: BASE_MACHO + [('BRANCH_PROTECTION', check_MACHO_branch_protection)],
}
}
if __name__ == '__main__':
retval: int = 0
for filename in sys.argv[1:]:
try:
binary = lief.parse(filename)
etype = binary.format
arch = binary.abstract.header.architecture
binary.concrete
if etype == lief.EXE_FORMATS.UNKNOWN:
print(f'{filename}: unknown executable format')
retval = 1
continue
if arch == lief.ARCHITECTURES.NONE:
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print(f'{filename}: unknown architecture')
retval = 1
continue
failed: List[str] = []
for (name, func) in CHECKS[etype][arch]:
if not func(binary):
failed.append(name)
if failed:
print(f'{filename}: failed {" ".join(failed)}')
retval = 1
except IOError:
print(f'{filename}: cannot open')
retval = 1
sys.exit(retval)