dash/src/net_processing.h

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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2015 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#ifndef BITCOIN_NET_PROCESSING_H
#define BITCOIN_NET_PROCESSING_H
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <net.h>
#include <validationinterface.h>
#include <consensus/params.h>
/** Default for -maxorphantxsize, maximum size in megabytes the orphan map can grow before entries are removed */
static const unsigned int DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS_SIZE = 10; // this allows around 100 TXs of max size (and many more of normal size)
/** Expiration time for orphan transactions in seconds */
static const int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60;
/** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */
static const int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL = 5 * 60;
/** Default number of orphan+recently-replaced txn to keep around for block reconstruction */
static const unsigned int DEFAULT_BLOCK_RECONSTRUCTION_EXTRA_TXN = 100;
Backport "assumed valid blocks" feature from Bitcoin 0.13 (#1582) * IBD check uses minimumchain work instead of checkpoints. This introduces a 'minimum chain work' chainparam which is intended to be the known amount of work in the chain for the network at the time of software release. If you don't have this much work, you're not yet caught up. This is used instead of the count of blocks test from checkpoints. This criteria is trivial to keep updated as there is no element of subjectivity, trust, or position dependence to it. It is also a more reliable metric of sync status than a block count. * Remove GetTotalBlocksEstimate and checkpoint tests that test nothing. GetTotalBlocksEstimate is no longer used and it was the only thing the checkpoint tests were testing. Since checkpoints are on their way out it makes more sense to remove the test file than to cook up a new pointless test. # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include # src/test/Checkpoints_tests.cpp * IsInitialBlockDownload no longer uses header-only timestamps. This avoids a corner case (mostly visible on testnet) where bogus headers can keep nodes in IsInitialBlockDownload. * Delay parallel block download until chain has sufficient work nMinimumChainWork is an anti-DoS threshold; wait until we have a proposed tip with more work than that before downloading blocks towards that tip. * Add timeout for headers sync At startup, we choose one peer to serve us the headers chain, until our best header is close to caught up. Disconnect this peer if more than 15 minutes + 1ms/expected_header passes and our best header is still more than 1 day away from current time. * Introduce assumevalid setting to skip presumed valid scripts. This disentangles the script validation skipping from checkpoints. A new option is introduced "assumevalid" which specifies a block whos ancestors we assume all have valid scriptsigs and so we do not check them when they are also burried under the best header by two weeks worth of work. Unlike checkpoints this has no influence on consensus unless you set it to a block with an invalid history. Because of this it can be easily be updated without risk of influencing the network consensus. This results in a massive IBD speedup. This approach was independently recommended by Peter Todd and Luke-Jr since POW based signature skipping (see PR#9180) does not have the verifiable properties of a specific hash and may create bad incentives. The downside is that, like checkpoints, the defaults bitrot and older releases will sync slower. On the plus side users can provide their own value here, and if they set it to something crazy all that will happen is more time will be spend validating signatures. Checkblocks and checklevel are also moved to the hidden debug options: Especially now that checkblocks has a low default there is little need to change these settings, and users frequently misunderstand them as influencing security or IBD speed. By hiding them we offset the space added by this new option. * Add consensusParams to FindNextBlocksToDownload * Adjust check in headers timeout logic to align with 144 blocks in Dash
2017-08-23 16:21:08 +02:00
/** Headers download timeout expressed in microseconds
* Timeout = base + per_header * (expected number of headers) */
static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15 * 60 * 1000000; // 15 minutes
static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER = 1000; // 1ms/header
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
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/** Protect at least this many outbound peers from disconnection due to slow/
* behind headers chain.
*/
static constexpr int32_t MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT = 4;
/** Timeout for (unprotected) outbound peers to sync to our chainwork, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT = 20 * 60; // 20 minutes
Backport "assumed valid blocks" feature from Bitcoin 0.13 (#1582) * IBD check uses minimumchain work instead of checkpoints. This introduces a 'minimum chain work' chainparam which is intended to be the known amount of work in the chain for the network at the time of software release. If you don't have this much work, you're not yet caught up. This is used instead of the count of blocks test from checkpoints. This criteria is trivial to keep updated as there is no element of subjectivity, trust, or position dependence to it. It is also a more reliable metric of sync status than a block count. * Remove GetTotalBlocksEstimate and checkpoint tests that test nothing. GetTotalBlocksEstimate is no longer used and it was the only thing the checkpoint tests were testing. Since checkpoints are on their way out it makes more sense to remove the test file than to cook up a new pointless test. # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include # src/test/Checkpoints_tests.cpp * IsInitialBlockDownload no longer uses header-only timestamps. This avoids a corner case (mostly visible on testnet) where bogus headers can keep nodes in IsInitialBlockDownload. * Delay parallel block download until chain has sufficient work nMinimumChainWork is an anti-DoS threshold; wait until we have a proposed tip with more work than that before downloading blocks towards that tip. * Add timeout for headers sync At startup, we choose one peer to serve us the headers chain, until our best header is close to caught up. Disconnect this peer if more than 15 minutes + 1ms/expected_header passes and our best header is still more than 1 day away from current time. * Introduce assumevalid setting to skip presumed valid scripts. This disentangles the script validation skipping from checkpoints. A new option is introduced "assumevalid" which specifies a block whos ancestors we assume all have valid scriptsigs and so we do not check them when they are also burried under the best header by two weeks worth of work. Unlike checkpoints this has no influence on consensus unless you set it to a block with an invalid history. Because of this it can be easily be updated without risk of influencing the network consensus. This results in a massive IBD speedup. This approach was independently recommended by Peter Todd and Luke-Jr since POW based signature skipping (see PR#9180) does not have the verifiable properties of a specific hash and may create bad incentives. The downside is that, like checkpoints, the defaults bitrot and older releases will sync slower. On the plus side users can provide their own value here, and if they set it to something crazy all that will happen is more time will be spend validating signatures. Checkblocks and checklevel are also moved to the hidden debug options: Especially now that checkblocks has a low default there is little need to change these settings, and users frequently misunderstand them as influencing security or IBD speed. By hiding them we offset the space added by this new option. * Add consensusParams to FindNextBlocksToDownload * Adjust check in headers timeout logic to align with 144 blocks in Dash
2017-08-23 16:21:08 +02:00
/** How frequently to check for stale tips, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL = 150; // 2.5 minutes (~block interval)
/** How frequently to check for extra outbound peers and disconnect, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL = 45;
/** Minimum time an outbound-peer-eviction candidate must be connected for, in order to evict, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME = 30;
Merge bitcoin#13134: net: Add option `-enablebip61` to configure sending of BIP61 notifications (#3414) * Merge #13134: net: Add option `-enablebip61` to configure sending of BIP61 notifications 87fe292d897e09e176ac7e254144466c319cc9ac doc: Mention disabling BIP61 in bips.md (Wladimir J. van der Laan) fe16dd8226d924f44432c5b5014aa49ff45c82ff net: Add option `-enablebip61` to configure sending of BIP61 notifications (Wladimir J. van der Laan) Pull request description: This commit adds a boolean option `-peersendreject`, defaulting to `1`, that can be used to disable the sending of [BIP61](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0061.mediawiki) `reject` messages. This functionality has been requested for various reasons: - security (DoS): reject messages can reveal internal state that can be used to target certain resources such as the mempool more easily. - bandwidth: a typical node sends lots of reject messages; this counts against upstream bandwidth. Also the reject messages tend to be larger than the message that was rejected. On the other hand, reject messages can be useful while developing client software (I found them indispensable while creating bitcoin-submittx), as well as for our own test cases, so whatever the default becomes on the long run, IMO the functionality should be retained as option. But that's a discussion for later, for now it's simply a node operator decision. Also adds a RPC test that checks the functionality. Tree-SHA512: 9488cc53e13cd8e5c6f8eb472a44309572673405c1d1438c3488f627fae622c95e2198bde5ed7d29e56b948e2918bf1920239e9f865889f4c37c097c37a4d7a9 * 0.17 -> 0.16 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * tx1 -> base_ tx fixing 13134 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * move added bip61 message checking up Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Dash specific code, only send reject messages if bip61 is enabled Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Fix invalidtxrequest.py Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-04-19 13:04:31 +02:00
/** Default for BIP61 (sending reject messages) */
static constexpr bool DEFAULT_ENABLE_BIP61 = true;
/** Enable BIP61 (sending reject messages) */
extern bool g_enable_bip61;
class PeerLogicValidation : public CValidationInterface, public NetEventsInterface {
private:
CConnman* const connman;
public:
explicit PeerLogicValidation(CConnman* connmanIn, CScheduler &scheduler);
void BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, const CBlockIndex* pindexConnected, const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& vtxConflicted) override;
void UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CBlockIndex *pindexFork, bool fInitialDownload) override;
void BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationState& state) override;
void NewPoWValidBlock(const CBlockIndex *pindex, const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock) override;
void InitializeNode(CNode* pnode) override;
void FinalizeNode(NodeId nodeid, bool& fUpdateConnectionTime) override;
/** Process protocol messages received from a given node */
bool ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& interrupt, bool &fRetDidWork) override;
/**
* Send queued protocol messages to be sent to a give node.
*
* @param[in] pto The node which we are sending messages to.
* @param[in] interrupt Interrupt condition for processing threads
* @return True if there is more work to be done
*/
bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, std::atomic<bool>& interrupt) override;
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
void ConsiderEviction(CNode *pto, int64_t time_in_seconds);
void CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers(const Consensus::Params &consensusParams);
void EvictExtraOutboundPeers(int64_t time_in_seconds);
private:
int64_t m_stale_tip_check_time; //! Next time to check for stale tip
};
struct CNodeStateStats {
int nMisbehavior;
int nSyncHeight;
int nCommonHeight;
std::vector<int> vHeightInFlight;
};
/** Get statistics from node state */
bool GetNodeStateStats(NodeId nodeid, CNodeStateStats &stats);
/** Increase a node's misbehavior score. */
void Misbehaving(NodeId nodeid, int howmuch, const std::string& message="");
bool IsBanned(NodeId nodeid);
void EraseObjectRequest(NodeId nodeId, const CInv& inv);
2020-04-08 14:55:27 +02:00
void RequestObject(NodeId nodeId, const CInv& inv, std::chrono::microseconds current_time, bool fForce=false);
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size_t GetRequestedObjectCount(NodeId nodeId);
2020-04-06 13:25:38 +02:00
#endif // BITCOIN_NET_PROCESSING_H