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[wallet] Indent only change of CWallet::AvailableCoins

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This commit is contained in:
João Barbosa 2018-02-08 18:18:51 +00:00
parent 1beea7af92
commit 2f960b5070
1 changed files with 77 additions and 80 deletions
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157
src/wallet/wallet.cpp
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@ -2202,108 +2202,105 @@ void CWallet::AvailableCoins(std::vector<COutput> &vCoins, bool fOnlySafe, const
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
vCoins.clear(); vCoins.clear();
CAmount nTotal = 0;
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{ {
CAmount nTotal = 0; const uint256& wtxid = entry.first;
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet) if (!CheckFinalTx(*pcoin->tx))
{ continue;
const uint256& wtxid = entry.first;
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
if (!CheckFinalTx(*pcoin->tx)) if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth < 0)
continue;
// We should not consider coins which aren't at least in our mempool
// It's possible for these to be conflicted via ancestors which we may never be able to detect
if (nDepth == 0 && !pcoin->InMempool())
continue;
bool safeTx = pcoin->IsTrusted();
// We should not consider coins from transactions that are replacing
// other transactions.
//
// Example: There is a transaction A which is replaced by bumpfee
// transaction B. In this case, we want to prevent creation of
// a transaction B' which spends an output of B.
//
// Reason: If transaction A were initially confirmed, transactions B
// and B' would no longer be valid, so the user would have to create
// a new transaction C to replace B'. However, in the case of a
// one-block reorg, transactions B' and C might BOTH be accepted,
// when the user only wanted one of them. Specifically, there could
// be a 1-block reorg away from the chain where transactions A and C
// were accepted to another chain where B, B', and C were all
// accepted.
if (nDepth == 0 && pcoin->mapValue.count("replaces_txid")) {
safeTx = false;
}
// Similarly, we should not consider coins from transactions that
// have been replaced. In the example above, we would want to prevent
// creation of a transaction A' spending an output of A, because if
// transaction B were initially confirmed, conflicting with A and
// A', we wouldn't want to the user to create a transaction D
// intending to replace A', but potentially resulting in a scenario
// where A, A', and D could all be accepted (instead of just B and
// D, or just A and A' like the user would want).
if (nDepth == 0 && pcoin->mapValue.count("replaced_by_txid")) {
safeTx = false;
}
if (fOnlySafe && !safeTx) {
continue;
}
if (nDepth < nMinDepth || nDepth > nMaxDepth)
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->tx->vout.size(); i++) {
if (pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue < nMinimumAmount || pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue > nMaximumAmount)
continue; continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0) if (coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected() && !coinControl->fAllowOtherInputs && !coinControl->IsSelected(COutPoint(entry.first, i)))
continue; continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain(); if (IsLockedCoin(entry.first, i))
if (nDepth < 0)
continue; continue;
// We should not consider coins which aren't at least in our mempool if (IsSpent(wtxid, i))
// It's possible for these to be conflicted via ancestors which we may never be able to detect
if (nDepth == 0 && !pcoin->InMempool())
continue; continue;
bool safeTx = pcoin->IsTrusted(); isminetype mine = IsMine(pcoin->tx->vout[i]);
// We should not consider coins from transactions that are replacing if (mine == ISMINE_NO) {
// other transactions.
//
// Example: There is a transaction A which is replaced by bumpfee
// transaction B. In this case, we want to prevent creation of
// a transaction B' which spends an output of B.
//
// Reason: If transaction A were initially confirmed, transactions B
// and B' would no longer be valid, so the user would have to create
// a new transaction C to replace B'. However, in the case of a
// one-block reorg, transactions B' and C might BOTH be accepted,
// when the user only wanted one of them. Specifically, there could
// be a 1-block reorg away from the chain where transactions A and C
// were accepted to another chain where B, B', and C were all
// accepted.
if (nDepth == 0 && pcoin->mapValue.count("replaces_txid")) {
safeTx = false;
}
// Similarly, we should not consider coins from transactions that
// have been replaced. In the example above, we would want to prevent
// creation of a transaction A' spending an output of A, because if
// transaction B were initially confirmed, conflicting with A and
// A', we wouldn't want to the user to create a transaction D
// intending to replace A', but potentially resulting in a scenario
// where A, A', and D could all be accepted (instead of just B and
// D, or just A and A' like the user would want).
if (nDepth == 0 && pcoin->mapValue.count("replaced_by_txid")) {
safeTx = false;
}
if (fOnlySafe && !safeTx) {
continue; continue;
} }
if (nDepth < nMinDepth || nDepth > nMaxDepth) bool fSpendableIn = ((mine & ISMINE_SPENDABLE) != ISMINE_NO) || (coinControl && coinControl->fAllowWatchOnly && (mine & ISMINE_WATCH_SOLVABLE) != ISMINE_NO);
continue; bool fSolvableIn = (mine & (ISMINE_SPENDABLE | ISMINE_WATCH_SOLVABLE)) != ISMINE_NO;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->tx->vout.size(); i++) { vCoins.push_back(COutput(pcoin, i, nDepth, fSpendableIn, fSolvableIn, safeTx));
if (pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue < nMinimumAmount || pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue > nMaximumAmount)
continue;
if (coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected() && !coinControl->fAllowOtherInputs && !coinControl->IsSelected(COutPoint(entry.first, i))) // Checks the sum amount of all UTXO's.
continue; if (nMinimumSumAmount != MAX_MONEY) {
nTotal += pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue;
if (IsLockedCoin(entry.first, i)) if (nTotal >= nMinimumSumAmount) {
continue;
if (IsSpent(wtxid, i))
continue;
isminetype mine = IsMine(pcoin->tx->vout[i]);
if (mine == ISMINE_NO) {
continue;
}
bool fSpendableIn = ((mine & ISMINE_SPENDABLE) != ISMINE_NO) || (coinControl && coinControl->fAllowWatchOnly && (mine & ISMINE_WATCH_SOLVABLE) != ISMINE_NO);
bool fSolvableIn = (mine & (ISMINE_SPENDABLE | ISMINE_WATCH_SOLVABLE)) != ISMINE_NO;
vCoins.push_back(COutput(pcoin, i, nDepth, fSpendableIn, fSolvableIn, safeTx));
// Checks the sum amount of all UTXO's.
if (nMinimumSumAmount != MAX_MONEY) {
nTotal += pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue;
if (nTotal >= nMinimumSumAmount) {
return;
}
}
// Checks the maximum number of UTXO's.
if (nMaximumCount > 0 && vCoins.size() >= nMaximumCount) {
return; return;
} }
} }
// Checks the maximum number of UTXO's.
if (nMaximumCount > 0 && vCoins.size() >= nMaximumCount) {
return;
}
} }
} }
} }