From 5b8b387752e8c493a8e87795ae6ddb78b45b1a5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Morcos <morcos@chaincode.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 13:43:47 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix overly eager BIP30 bypass

---
 src/validation.cpp | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 14d60bb269..cf58504eb1 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -1858,12 +1858,65 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
     // before the first had been spent.  Since those coinbases are sufficiently buried its no longer possible to create further
     // duplicate transactions descending from the known pairs either.
     // If we're on the known chain at height greater than where BIP34 activated, we can save the db accesses needed for the BIP30 check.
+
+    // BIP34 requires that a block at height X (block X) has its coinbase
+    // scriptSig start with a CScriptNum of X (indicated height X).  The above
+    // logic of no longer requiring BIP30 once BIP34 activates is flawed in the
+    // case that there is a block X before the BIP34 height of 227,931 which has
+    // an indicated height Y where Y is greater than X.  The coinbase for block
+    // X would also be a valid coinbase for block Y, which could be a BIP30
+    // violation.  An exhaustive search of all mainnet coinbases before the
+    // BIP34 height which have an indicated height greater than the block height
+    // reveals many occurrences. The 3 lowest indicated heights found are
+    // 209,921, 490,897, and 1,983,702 and thus coinbases for blocks at these 3
+    // heights would be the first opportunity for BIP30 to be violated.
+
+    // The search reveals a great many blocks which have an indicated height
+    // greater than 1,983,702, so we simply remove the optimization to skip
+    // BIP30 checking for blocks at height 1,983,702 or higher.  Before we reach
+    // that block in another 25 years or so, we should take advantage of a
+    // future consensus change to do a new and improved version of BIP34 that
+    // will actually prevent ever creating any duplicate coinbases in the
+    // future.
+    static constexpr int BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT = 1983702;
+
+    // There is no potential to create a duplicate coinbase at block 209,921
+    // because this is still before the BIP34 height and so explicit BIP30
+    // checking is still active.
+
+    // The final case is block 176,684 which has an indicated height of
+    // 490,897. Unfortunately, this issue was not discovered until about 2 weeks
+    // before block 490,897 so there was not much opportunity to address this
+    // case other than to carefully analyze it and determine it would not be a
+    // problem. Block 490,897 was, in fact, mined with a different coinbase than
+    // block 176,684, but it is important to note that even if it hadn't been or
+    // is remined on an alternate fork with a duplicate coinbase, we would still
+    // not run into a BIP30 violation.  This is because the coinbase for 176,684
+    // is spent in block 185,956 in transaction
+    // d4f7fbbf92f4a3014a230b2dc70b8058d02eb36ac06b4a0736d9d60eaa9e8781.  This
+    // spending transaction can't be duplicated because it also spends coinbase
+    // 0328dd85c331237f18e781d692c92de57649529bd5edf1d01036daea32ffde29.  This
+    // coinbase has an indicated height of over 4.2 billion, and wouldn't be
+    // duplicatable until that height, and it's currently impossible to create a
+    // chain that long. Nevertheless we may wish to consider a future soft fork
+    // which retroactively prevents block 490,897 from creating a duplicate
+    // coinbase. The two historical BIP30 violations often provide a confusing
+    // edge case when manipulating the UTXO and it would be simpler not to have
+    // another edge case to deal with.
+
+    // testnet3 has no blocks before the BIP34 height with indicated heights
+    // post BIP34 before approximately height 486,000,000 and presumably will
+    // be reset before it reaches block 1,983,702 and starts doing unnecessary
+    // BIP30 checking again.
     assert(pindex->pprev);
     CBlockIndex *pindexBIP34height = pindex->pprev->GetAncestor(chainparams.GetConsensus().BIP34Height);
     //Only continue to enforce if we're below BIP34 activation height or the block hash at that height doesn't correspond.
     fEnforceBIP30 = fEnforceBIP30 && (!pindexBIP34height || !(pindexBIP34height->GetBlockHash() == chainparams.GetConsensus().BIP34Hash));
 
-    if (fEnforceBIP30) {
+    // TODO: Remove BIP30 checking from block height 1,983,702 on, once we have a
+    // consensus change that ensures coinbases at those heights can not
+    // duplicate earlier coinbases.
+    if (fEnforceBIP30 || pindex->nHeight >= BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT) {
         for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
             for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
                 if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) {