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Merge #7287: Consensus: Remove calls to error() and FormatStateMessage()

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93fc58c Consensus: Remove calls to error() and FormatStateMessage() from some consensus code in main (Jorge Timón)
This commit is contained in:
Wladimir J. van der Laan 2016-02-01 10:21:27 +01:00 committed by Alexander Block
parent 3cd83db0dc
commit 6789bf6e13
1 changed files with 40 additions and 59 deletions
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99
src/validation.cpp
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@ -558,12 +558,16 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C
bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, bool fRejectAbsurdFee,
std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache, bool fDryRun)
{
const uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (pfMissingInputs)
*pfMissingInputs = false;
if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state) || !ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainActive.Tip()))
return false;
if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state))
return error("%s: CheckTransaction: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
if (!ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainActive.Tip()))
return error("%s: ContextualCheckTransaction: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
@ -589,7 +593,6 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");
// is it already in the memory pool?
uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
if (pool.exists(hash))
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_ALREADY_KNOWN, "txn-already-in-mempool");
@ -964,7 +967,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C
// Check against previous transactions
// This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, true, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS, true))
return false;
return error("%s: CheckInputs: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
// Check again against just the consensus-critical mandatory script
// verification flags, in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause
@ -1963,7 +1966,7 @@ static bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockInd
// Check it again in case a previous version let a bad block in
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, !fJustCheck, !fJustCheck))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
// verify that the view's current state corresponds to the previous block
uint256 hashPrevBlock = pindex->pprev == NULL ? uint256() : pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash();
@ -3111,13 +3114,11 @@ bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state, bool f
{
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, Params().GetConsensus()))
return state.DoS(50, error("CheckBlockHeader(): proof of work failed"),
REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash");
return state.DoS(50, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed");
// Check timestamp
if (block.GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() + 2 * 60 * 60)
return state.Invalid(error("CheckBlockHeader(): block timestamp too far in the future"),
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new");
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
return true;
}
@ -3139,15 +3140,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo
bool mutated;
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): hashMerkleRoot mismatch"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true);
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
// while still invalidating it.
if (mutated)
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): duplicate transaction"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true);
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction");
}
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
@ -3156,17 +3155,14 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo
// Size limits (relaxed)
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() > MaxBlockSize(true) || ::GetSerializeSize(block, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION) > MaxBlockSize(true))
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: size limits failed", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed");
// First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0].IsCoinBase())
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): first tx is not coinbase"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase");
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
if (block.vtx[i].IsCoinBase())
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): more than one coinbase"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase");
// DASH : CHECK TRANSACTIONS FOR INSTANTSEND
@ -3186,9 +3182,8 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo
// relaying instantsend data won't help it.
LOCK(cs_main);
mapRejectedBlocks.insert(make_pair(block.GetHash(), GetTime()));
return state.DoS(0, error("CheckBlock(DASH): transaction %s conflicts with transaction lock %s",
tx.GetHash().ToString(), hashLocked.ToString()),
REJECT_INVALID, "conflict-tx-lock");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "conflict-tx-lock", false,
strprintf("transaction %s conflicts with transaction lock %s", tx.GetHash().ToString(), hashLocked.ToString()));
}
}
}
@ -3201,9 +3196,8 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo
// Check transactions
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx)
if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state))
return error("CheckBlock(): CheckTransaction of %s failed with %s",
tx.GetHash().ToString(),
FormatStateMessage(state));
return state.Invalid(false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),
strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx.GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage()));
unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx)
@ -3212,8 +3206,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo
}
// sigops limits (relaxed)
if (nSigOps > MaxBlockSigOps(true))
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): out-of-bounds SigOpCount"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
block.fChecked = true;
@ -3251,29 +3244,18 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& sta
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits");
} else {
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
return state.DoS(100, error("%s : incorrect proof of work at %d", __func__, nHeight),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, strprintf("incorrect proof of work at %d", nHeight));
}
// Check timestamp against prev
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block's timestamp is too early", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old");
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
// Reject block.nVersion=1 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
if (block.nVersion < 2 && IsSuperMajority(2, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(error("%s: rejected nVersion=1 block", __func__),
REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version");
// Reject block.nVersion=2 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
if (block.nVersion < 3 && IsSuperMajority(3, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(error("%s: rejected nVersion=2 block", __func__),
REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version");
// Reject block.nVersion=3 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
if (block.nVersion < 4 && IsSuperMajority(4, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(error("%s : rejected nVersion=3 block", __func__),
REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version");
// Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
for (int32_t version = 2; version < 5; ++version) // check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades
if (block.nVersion < version && IsSuperMajority(version, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams))
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(v%d)", version - 1),
strprintf("rejected nVersion=%d block", version - 1));
return true;
}
@ -3298,26 +3280,24 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIn
// Size limits
unsigned int nMaxBlockSize = MaxBlockSize(fDIP0001Active_context);
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() > nMaxBlockSize || ::GetSerializeSize(block, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION) > nMaxBlockSize)
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: size limits failed", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length");
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed");
// Check that all transactions are finalized and not over-sized
// Also count sigops
unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx) {
if (!IsFinalTx(tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
return state.DoS(10, error("%s: contains a non-final transaction", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction");
}
if (fDIP0001Active_context && ::GetSerializeSize(tx, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION) > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIZE) {
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: contains an over-sized transaction", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversized");
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversized", false, "contains an over-sized transaction");
}
nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(tx);
}
// Check sigops
if (nSigOps > MaxBlockSigOps(fDIP0001Active_context))
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: out-of-bounds SigOpCount", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops");
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
// Enforce block.nVersion=2 rule that the coinbase starts with serialized block height
// if 750 of the last 1,000 blocks are version 2 or greater (51/100 if testnet):
@ -3326,7 +3306,7 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIn
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
if (block.vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: block height mismatch in coinbase", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase");
}
}
@ -3355,7 +3335,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state
}
if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
// Get prev block index
CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = NULL;
@ -3371,7 +3351,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state
return error("%s: CheckIndexAgainstCheckpoint(): %s", __func__, state.GetRejectReason().c_str());
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, pindexPrev))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
if (pindex == NULL)
pindex = AddToBlockIndex(block);
@ -3446,7 +3426,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const CCha
pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(pindex);
}
return false;
return error("%s: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
}
int nHeight = pindex->nHeight;
@ -3528,11 +3508,11 @@ bool TestBlockValidity(CValidationState& state, const CChainParams& chainparams,
// NOTE: CheckBlockHeader is called by CheckBlock
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, pindexPrev))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, fCheckPOW, fCheckMerkleRoot))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
if (!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, pindexPrev))
return false;
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state));
if (!ConnectBlock(block, state, &indexDummy, viewNew, true))
return false;
assert(state.IsValid());
@ -3874,7 +3854,8 @@ bool CVerifyDB::VerifyDB(const CChainParams& chainparams, CCoinsView *coinsview,
return error("VerifyDB(): *** ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
// check level 1: verify block validity
if (nCheckLevel >= 1 && !CheckBlock(block, state))
return error("VerifyDB(): *** found bad block at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return error("%s: *** found bad block at %d, hash=%s (%s)\n", __func__,
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
// check level 2: verify undo validity
if (nCheckLevel >= 2 && pindex) {
CBlockUndo undo;