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Merge #19871: doc: Clarify scope of eviction protection of outbound block-relay peers

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d76925478efd35e6fd835370639f2139b28381e4 [doc] Clarify semantic of peer's m_protect w.r.t to outbound eviction logics (Antoine Riard)
ac71fe936da290adf5a3155fe8db5f78b485f1f1 [doc] Clarify scope of eviction protection of outbound block-relay peers (Antoine Riard)

Pull request description:

  Block-relay-only peers were introduced by #15759. According to its
  author, it was intented to make them only immune to outbound peer
  rotation-based eviction and not from all eviction as modified comment
  leans to think of.

  Clearly indicate that outbound block-relay peers aren't protected
  from eviction by the bad/lagging chain logic.

  Fix #19863

ACKs for top commit:
  naumenkogs:
    ACK d76925478efd35e6fd835370639f2139b28381e4
  jonatack:
    ACK d76925478efd35e6fd835370639f2139b28381e4

Tree-SHA512: 597fbd62838a6e39276024165b11514cad20a2e9d33cf9202d261cbadcb62b2df427c858e0cb57e585840d4c1d4600104aa53916bb868541f2580e4eed9b4b52
This commit is contained in:
Wladimir J. van der Laan 2020-10-02 16:36:57 +02:00 committed by PastaPastaPasta
parent 4f3a1effbf
commit 7caec1df14
1 changed files with 19 additions and 9 deletions
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26
src/net_processing.cpp
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@ -563,10 +563,17 @@ struct CNodeState {
*/ */
bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion; bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion;
/** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT /** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT and EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL logic.
* Only in effect for outbound, non-manual, full-relay connections, with *
* m_protect == false * Both are only in effect for outbound, non-manual, non-protected connections.
* Algorithm: if a peer's best known block has less work than our tip, * Any peer protected (m_protect = true) is not chosen for eviction. A peer is
* marked as protected if all of these are true:
* - its connection type is IsBlockOnlyConn() == false
* - it gave us a valid connecting header
* - we haven't reached MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT yet
* - it has a better chain than we have
*
* CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT: if a peer's best known block has less work than our tip,
* set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future: * set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future:
* - If at timeout their best known block now has more work than our tip * - If at timeout their best known block now has more work than our tip
* when the timeout was set, then either reset the timeout or clear it * when the timeout was set, then either reset the timeout or clear it
@ -576,6 +583,9 @@ struct CNodeState {
* and set a shorter timeout, HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds in future. * and set a shorter timeout, HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds in future.
* If their best known block is still behind when that new timeout is * If their best known block is still behind when that new timeout is
* reached, disconnect. * reached, disconnect.
*
* EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL: after each interval, if we have too many outbound peers,
* drop the outbound one that least recently announced us a new block.
*/ */
struct ChainSyncTimeoutState { struct ChainSyncTimeoutState {
//! A timeout used for checking whether our peer has sufficiently synced //! A timeout used for checking whether our peer has sufficiently synced
@ -2466,12 +2476,12 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::vector<CBlo
} }
} }
} }
if (!pfrom.fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && pfrom.IsAddrRelayPeer()) {
// If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect // If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect
// it from the bad/lagging chain logic. // it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
// Note that block-relay-only peers are already implicitly protected, so we // Note that outbound block-relay peers are excluded from this protection, and
// only consider setting m_protect for the full-relay peers. // thus always subject to eviction under the bad/lagging chain logic.
// See ChainSyncTimeoutState.
if (!pfrom.fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && pfrom.IsAddrRelayPeer()) {
if (m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) { if (m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n", pfrom.GetId()); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n", pfrom.GetId());
nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true; nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true;