Clarify documentation for running a tor node

Previous wording suggested that no additional setup was required for a
tor hidden service to be created.
This commit is contained in:
Nathaniel Mahieu 2016-06-14 17:49:09 -05:00
parent fb0ac482ee
commit 9e3ec74fac

View File

@ -95,12 +95,22 @@ Starting with Tor version 0.2.7.1 it is possible, through Tor's control socket
API, to create and destroy 'ephemeral' hidden services programmatically.
Bitcoin Core has been updated to make use of this.
This means that if Tor is running (and proper authorization is available),
Bitcoin Core automatically creates a hidden service to listen on, without
manual configuration. This will positively affect the number of available
.onion nodes.
This means that if Tor is running (and proper authentication has been configured),
Bitcoin Core automatically creates a hidden service to listen on. This will positively
affect the number of available .onion nodes.
This new feature is enabled by default if Bitcoin Core is listening, and
a connection to Tor can be made. It can be configured with the `-listenonion`,
`-torcontrol` and `-torpassword` settings. To show verbose debugging
information, pass `-debug=tor`.
Connecting to Tor's control socket API requires one of two authentication methods to be
configured. For cookie authentication the user running bitcoind must have write access
to the `CookieAuthFile` specified in Tor configuration. In some cases this is
preconfigured and the creation of a hidden service is automatic. If permission problems
are seen with `-debug=tor` they can be resolved by adding both the user running tor and
the user running bitcoind to the same group and setting permissions appropriately. On
Debian-based systems the user running bitcoind can be added to the debian-tor group,
which has the appropriate permissions. An alternative authentication method is the use
of the `-torpassword` flag and a `hash-password` which can be enabled and specified in
Tor configuration.