308b76732f Fix bug around transaction requests (Suhas Daftuar)
f635a3ba11 Expire old entries from the in-flight tx map (Suhas Daftuar)
e32e08407e Remove NOTFOUND transactions from in-flight data structures (Suhas Daftuar)
23163b7593 Add an explicit memory bound to m_tx_process_time (Suhas Daftuar)
218697b645 Improve NOTFOUND comment (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
#14897 introduced several bugs that could lead to a node no longer requesting transactions from one or more of its peers. Credit to ajtowns for originally reporting many of these bugs along with an originally proposed fix in #15776.
This PR does a few things:
- Fix a bug in NOTFOUND processing, where the in-flight map for a peer was keeping transactions it shouldn't
- Eliminate the possibility of a memory attack on the CNodeState `m_tx_process_time` data structure by explicitly bounding its size
- Remove entries from a peer's in-flight map after 10 minutes, so that we should always eventually resume transaction requests even if there are other bugs like the NOTFOUND one
- Fix a bug relating to the coordination of request times when multiple peers announce the same transaction
The expiry mechanism added here is something we'll likely want to remove in the future, but is belt-and-suspenders for now to try to ensure we don't have other bugs that could lead to transaction relay failing due to some unforeseen conditions.
ACKs for commit 308b76:
ajtowns:
utACK 308b76732f97020c86977e29c854e8e27262cf7c
morcos:
light ACK 308b767
laanwj:
Code review ACK 308b76732f97020c86977e29c854e8e27262cf7c
jonatack:
Light ACK 308b76732f97020c86977e29c854e8e27262cf7c.
jamesob:
ACK 308b76732f
MarcoFalke:
ACK 308b76732f97020c86977e29c854e8e27262cf7c (Tested two of the three bugs this pull fixes, see comment above)
jamesob:
Concept ACK 308b76732f
MarcoFalke:
ACK 308b76732f
Tree-SHA512: 8865dca5294447859d95655e8699085643db60c22f0719e76e961651a1398251bc932494b68932e33f68d4f6084579ab3bed7d0e7dd4ac6c362590eaf9414eda
1cff3d6cb0 Change in transaction pull scheduling to prevent InvBlock-related attacks (Gleb Naumenko)
Pull request description:
This code makes executing two particular (and potentially other) attacks harder.
### InvBlock
This behavior was described well [here](https://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/coinscope/coinscope.pdf) (page 11).
Per current implementation, if node A receives _INV_ (tx) from node B, node A sends _GETDATA_ to B and waits for _TX_ message back.
Node A is likely to receive more _INVs_ (regarding the same tx) from other peers. But node A would not send another _GETDATA_ unless it does not hear _TX_ back from node B for next 2 minutes (to save bandwidth)
Thus, if B is a malicious node, it can prevent node A from getting the transaction (even if all A’s peers have it) for 2 minutes.
This behavior seems to be an inherent limitation of the current P2P relay protocol, and I don’t see how it can be fundamentally changed (I can see workarounds which involve rewriting a lot of P2P code though).
### What does this PR fix?
The attacks I’m looking at involve preventing A from learning the transaction for 2*N minutes. To do that, an attacker has to spin up N nodes and send N _INVs_ simultaneously to node A (then InvBlocks will be queued with an interval of 2 minutes according to current implementation)
More precisely, 2 scenarios I’m looking at are:
1. An attacker censors a particular transaction. By performing InvBlock from different nodes, an attacker can execute a network-wide censorship of a particular transaction (or all transactions). The earlier an attacker founds the transaction he wants to censor, the easier it is to perform an attack. As it was pointed out by @gwillen, this is even more dangerous in the case of lightning, where transactions are known in advance.
2. Topology inference described in papers [1](https://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/coinscope/coinscope.pdf), [2](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.00942.pdf) involve network-wide InvBlock. This fix would not mitigate this type of inference, but I believe it will make it more expensive to perform (an attacker would have to create more transactions and perform more rounds to learn the topology, the second paper itself notes that InvBlock isolation is important for the attack).
### How does it work
This PR introduces bias toward outbound connections (they have higher priority when a node chooses from whom it should request a transaction) and randomizes the order.
As per @gmaxwell suggestion, GETDATA requests queue is created after processing all incoming messages from all nodes.
After this fix, if the incoming messages were [I1, I2, I3, O1, O2, O3, O4], the queue for _GETDATA_ may look like [O2, O1, O3, O4, I1, I3, I2, ….].
If {I1, I2, I3} were significantly earlier (but the difference is less than TX_TIMEOUT=60 s) than others, the queue for _GETDATA_ may look like [I2, O2, O1, O3, O4, I1, I3, ….].
### Other comments:
1. This mitigation works better if the connectivity is higher (especially outbound, because it would be less likely that 2 _GETDATAs_ for inbound malicious nodes queued together)
Tree-SHA512: 2ad1e80c3c7e16ff0f2d1160aa7d9a5eaae88baa88467f156b987fe2a387f767a41e11507d7f99ea02ab75e89ab93b6a278d138cb1054f1aaa2df336e9b2ca6a
a720b92 Remove includes in .cpp files for things the corresponding .h file already included (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Remove includes in .cpp files for things the corresponding .h file already included.
Example case:
* `addrdb.cpp` includes `addrdb.h` and `fs.h`
* `addrdb.h` includes `fs.h`
Then remove the direct inclusion of `fs.h` in `addrman.cpp` and rely on the indirect inclusion of `fs.h` via the included `addrdb.h`.
In line with the header include guideline (see #10575).
Tree-SHA512: 8704b9de3011a4c234db336a39f7d2c139e741cf0f7aef08a5d3e05197e1e18286b863fdab25ae9638af4ff86b3d52e5cab9eed66bfa2476063aa5c79f9b0346
* scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky)
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
for f in \
src/*.cpp \
src/*.h \
src/bench/*.cpp \
src/bench/*.h \
src/compat/*.cpp \
src/compat/*.h \
src/consensus/*.cpp \
src/consensus/*.h \
src/crypto/*.cpp \
src/crypto/*.h \
src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \
src/policy/*.cpp \
src/policy/*.h \
src/primitives/*.cpp \
src/primitives/*.h \
src/qt/*.cpp \
src/qt/*.h \
src/qt/test/*.cpp \
src/qt/test/*.h \
src/rpc/*.cpp \
src/rpc/*.h \
src/script/*.cpp \
src/script/*.h \
src/support/*.cpp \
src/support/*.h \
src/support/allocators/*.h \
src/test/*.cpp \
src/test/*.h \
src/wallet/*.cpp \
src/wallet/*.h \
src/wallet/test/*.cpp \
src/wallet/test/*.h \
src/zmq/*.cpp \
src/zmq/*.h
do
base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f
done
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
* scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific)
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
for f in \
src/bls/*.cpp \
src/bls/*.h \
src/evo/*.cpp \
src/evo/*.h \
src/governance/*.cpp \
src/governance/*.h \
src/llmq/*.cpp \
src/llmq/*.h \
src/masternode/*.cpp \
src/masternode/*.h \
src/privatesend/*.cpp \
src/privatesend/*.h
do
base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f
done
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
* build: Remove -I for everything but project root
Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root,
and built-in dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
# Conflicts:
# src/Makefile.test.include
* qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files
* qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute
This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute.
Many changes are involved as every single source file in
src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes.
Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
# Conflicts:
# src/qt/dash.cpp
# src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp
# src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp
* test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files
* Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes
* refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h
* END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure
* fix backport 11651
Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
* More of 11651
* fix blockchain.cpp
Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
* Add missing "qt/" in includes
* Add missing "test/" in includes
* Fix trailing whitespaces
Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org>
Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
bf64c3cb3 Ignore transactions added to mempool during a reorg for fee estimation purposes. (Alex Morcos)
04f78ab5b Do not reject based on mempool min fee when bypass_limits is set. (Alex Morcos)
fd849e1b0 Change AcceptToMemoryPool function signature (Alex Morcos)
Pull request description:
First commit just removes default arguments from `AcceptToMemoryPool` and consolidates two arguments, it does not change behavior.
Second commit finally fixes the fact that we're not meant to reject based on mempool min fee when adding a transaction from a disconnected block during a reorg as mentioned [here](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/9602#issue-202197849)
Third commit makes fee estimation ignore transactions added from a disconnected block during a reorg. I think this was another source of fee estimates returning estimates below 1000 sat/kB as in #11303.
Tree-SHA512: 30925ca8b341915bb214f1d2590b36b7931f2e125b7660150e38ae70338f00db5aa7f1608546dddb181446924177eb7cf62ea8bd2583068acc074d6c3f86bc0c
fix 11309
Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
fix &
Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
a357293 Use MakeUnique<Db>(...) (practicalswift)
3e09b39 Use MakeUnique<T>(...) instead of std::unique_ptr<T>(new T(...)) (practicalswift)
8617989 Add MakeUnique (substitute for C++14 std::make_unique) (practicalswift)
d223bc9 Use unique_ptr for pcoinscatcher/pcoinsdbview/pcoinsTip/pblocktree (practicalswift)
b45c597 Use unique_ptr for pdbCopy (Db) and fix potential memory leak (practicalswift)
29ab96d Use unique_ptr for dbenv (DbEnv) (practicalswift)
f72cbf9 Use unique_ptr for pfilter (CBloomFilter) (practicalswift)
8ccf1bb Use unique_ptr for sem{Addnode,Outbound} (CSemaphore) (practicalswift)
73db063 Use unique_ptr for upnp_thread (boost::thread) (practicalswift)
0024531 Use unique_ptr for dbw (CDBWrapper) (practicalswift)
fa6d122 Use unique_ptr:s for {fee,short,long}Stats (TxConfirmStats) (practicalswift)
5a6f768 Use unique_ptr for httpRPCTimerInterface (HTTPRPCTimerInterface) (practicalswift)
860e912 Use unique_ptr for pwalletMain (CWallet) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Use `std::unique_ptr` (C++11) where possible.
Rationale:
1. Avoid resource leaks (specifically: forgetting to `delete` an object created using `new`)
2. Avoid undefined behaviour (specifically: double `delete`:s)
**Note to reviewers:** Please let me know if I've missed any obvious `std::unique_ptr` candidates. Hopefully this PR should cover all the trivial cases.
Tree-SHA512: 9fbeb47b800ab8ff4e0be9f2a22ab63c23d5c613a0c6716d9183db8d22ddbbce592fb8384a8b7874bf7375c8161efb13ca2197ad6f24b75967148037f0f7b20c
fbf327b Minimal code changes to allow msvc compilation. (Aaron Clauson)
Pull request description:
These changes are required to allow the Bitcoin source to build with Microsoft's C++ compiler (#11562 is also required).
I looked around for a better place for the typedef of ssize_t which is in random.h. The best candidate looks like src/compat.h but I figured including that header in random.h is a bigger change than the typedef. Note that the same typedef is in at least two other places including the OpenSSL and Berkeley DB headers so some of the Bitcoin code already picks it up.
Tree-SHA512: aa6cc6283015e08ab074641f9abdc116c4dc58574dc90f75e7a5af4cc82946d3052370e5cbe855fb6180c00f8dc66997d3724ff0412e4b7417e51b6602154825
de74c62 [Doc] Update bip.md, add support for BIP 159 (Jonas Schnelli)
e054d0e [QA] Add node_network_limited test (Jonas Schnelli)
bd09416 Avoid leaking the prune height through getdata (fingerprinting countermeasure) (Jonas Schnelli)
27df193 Always set NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED bit (Jonas Schnelli)
7caba38 Add NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED flags and min block amount constants (Jonas Schnelli)
Pull request description:
Extracted from #10387.
Does implement BIP159, but only the signalling part. No connections are made to NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED in this PR.
The address relay and connection work (the more complicated part) can then be separated (probably in #10387).
Tree-SHA512: e3218eb4789a9320b0f42dc10f62d30c13c49bdef00443fbe653bee22933477adcfc1cf8f6a95269324560b5721203ed41f3c5e2dd8a98ec2791f6a9d8346b1a
We could be reading multiple messages from a socket buffer at once _without actually processing them yet_ which means that `fSuccessfullyConnected` might not be switched to `true` at the time we already parsed `VERACK` message and started to parse the next one. This is basically a false positive and we drop a legit node as a result even though the order of messages sent by this node was completely fine. To fix this I partially reverted #2790 (where the issue was initially introduced) and moved the logic for tracking the first message into ProcessMessage instead.
63c2d83 Explicitly state assumption that state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr in ConsiderEviction (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Explicitly state assumption that `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr` in `ConsiderEviction(…)`.
Static analyzer (and humans!) will see the null-check in ...
```
else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout == 0 || (state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr && ...
```
... and infer that `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header` might be set to `nullptr` when reaching `else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout > 0 && time_in_seconds > state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout)` and thus flag `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->GetBlockHash().ToString()` as a potential null pointer dereference.
This commit makes the tacit assumption of `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr` explicit.
Code introduced in 5a6d00c6de ("Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains") which was merged into master four days ago.
Friendly ping @sdaftuar :-)
Tree-SHA512: 32e5631025b7ba7556a02c89d040fbe339c482a03f28d0dbc9871c699e1f8ac867619b89c5fd41fdcfcf0dc4d7c859295b26ccd988572145cc244261aec18ce9
fad63eb [logging] Don't incorrectly log that REJECT messages are unknown. (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
Reject messages are logged to debug.log if NET debug logging is enabled.
Because of the way the `ProcessMessages()` function is structured,
processing for REJECT messages will also drop through to the default
branch and incorrectly log `Unknown command "reject" from peer-?`. Fix
that by exiting from `ProcessMessages()` early.
without this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930600Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930620Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930656Z Unknown command "reject" from peer=0
```
with this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751246Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751274Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
```
Tree-SHA512: 5c84c98433ab99e0db2dd481f9c2db6f87ff0d39022ff317a791737e918714bbcb4a23e81118212ed8e594ebcf098ab7f52f7fd5e21ebc3f07b1efb279b9b30b
d3a185a net: Move misbehaving logging to net logging category (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
Pull request description:
This moves the error messages for misbehavior (when available) into the line that reports the misbehavior, as well as moves the logging to the `net` category.
This is a continuation of #11583 and avoids serious-looking errors due to misbehaving peers. As it is impossible to correlate the `peer=X` numbers to specific incoming connections now without enabling the `net` category, it doesn't really help to see these messages by default.
To do this, Misbehaving() gains an optional `message` argument.
E.g. change:
2018-01-18 16:02:27 Misbehaving: x.x.x.x:62174 peer=164603 (80 -> 100) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED
2018-01-18 16:02:27 ERROR: non-continuous headers sequence
to
2018-01-18 16:02:27 Misbehaving: x.x.x.x:62174 peer=164603 (80 -> 100) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED: non-continuous headers sequence
When there is a category for "important" net messages (see #12219 ), we should move it there.
Tree-SHA512: 51c97e9a649bf5409f2fd4625fa1243a036e9c9de6037bb064244207408c2e0eb025e3af80866df673cdc006b8f35dc4078d074033f0d4c6a73bbb03949a269f
be9f38c Do not make it trivial for inbound peers to generate log entries (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
Based on #11580 because I'm lazy.
We should generally avoid writing to debug.log unconditionally for
inbound peers which misbehave (the peer being about to be banned
being an exception, since they cannot do this twice).
Tree-SHA512: 8e59c8d08d00b1527951b30f4842d010a4c2fc440503ade112baa2c1b9afd0e0d1c5c2df83dde25183a242af45089cf9b9f873b71796771232ffb6c5fc6cc0cc
fa6c3dea420b6c50c164ccc34f4e9e8a7d9a8022 p2p: Clarify control flow in ProcessMessage() (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
`ProcessMessage` is effectively a massive switch case construct. In the past there were attempts to clarify the control flow in `ProcessMessage()` by moving each case into a separate static function (see #9608). It was closed because it wasn't clear if moving each case into a function was the right approach.
Though, we can quasi treat each case as a function by adding a return statement to each case. (Can be seen as a continuation of bugfix #13162)
This patch does exactly that.
Also note that this patch is a subset of previous approaches such as #9608 and #10145.
Review suggestion: `git diff HEAD~ --function-context`
Tree-SHA512: 91f6106840de2f29bb4f10d27bae0616b03a91126e6c6013479e1dd79bee53f22a78902b631fe85517dd5dc0fa7239939b4fefc231851a13c819458559f6c201
* Check MNs up to 24 blocks deep when verifying `dstx`
* Handle DSTX-es more like regular txes and not like "other" invs
* Try asking for a DSTX too when trying to find missing tx parents
* Check DSTX-es when chainlock arrives
`HasChainLock` was always `false` in `IsExpired` because tip is updated before the corresponding chainlock is received
* Apply `Handle DSTX-es more like regular txes` idea to `AlreadyHave()`
* Alternative handling of DSTX+recentRejects
Co-authored-by: Alexander Block <ablock84@gmail.com>
* [tests] Change feature_block.py to use BitcoinTestFramework
* [tests] Fix flake8 warnings in feature_block.py
* [tests] Tidy up feature_block.py
- move all helper methods to the end
- remove block, create_tx and create_and_sign_tx shortcuts
- remove --runbarelyexpensive option, since it defaults to True and it's
unlikely that anyone ever runs the test with this option set to false.
* [tests] Add logging to feature_block.py
* [tests] Improve assert message when wait_until() fails
* Merge #13048: [tests] Fix feature_block flakiness
c1d742025c [tests] Fix feature_block flakiness (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
feature_block.py occasionally fails on Travis. I believe this is due to
a a race condition when reconnecting to bitcoind after a subtest that
expects disconnection. If the test runs ahead and sends the INV for the
subsequent test before we've received the initial sync getheaders, then
we may end up sending two headers messages - one as a response to the
initial sync getheaders and one in response to the INV getheaders. If
both of those headers fail validation with a DoS score of 50 or higher,
then we'll unexpectedly be disconnected.
There is only one validation failure that has a DoS score bewteen 50 and
100, which is high-hash. That's why the test is failing immediately
after the "Reject a block with invalid work" subtest.
Fix is to wait for the initial getheaders from the peer before we
start populating our blockstore. That way we won't have any invalid
headers to respond to it with.
Tree-SHA512: dc17d795fcfaf0f8c0bf1e9732b5e11fbc8febbfafba4c231b7c13a5404a2c297dcd703a7a75bc7f353c893e12efc87f424f2201abd47ba5268af32d4d2e841f
* Temporarely rename MAX_BLOCK_SIZE -> MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE
We'll undo this after the next commit. This avoids merge many conflicts and
makes reviewing easier.
* Rename MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE back to MAX_BLOCK_SIZE
* Use DoS score of 100 for bad-blk-sigops
This was accidently changed to 10 while backporting bitcoin#7287 and causes
test failures in p2p-fullblocktest.py
* Use allowOptimisticSend=true when sending reject messages
This fixes test failures in p2p-fullblocktest.py which expects reject
messages to be sent/received before connections get closed.
* Fix p2p-fullblocktest.py
- CBlock and friends are still in test_framework.mininode
- "-whitelist" causes connections to not be dropped, which in turn causes
sync_blocks with reconnect=True to fail
- "bad-cb-amount" does not cause a ban in Dash, so reconnect must be False
- Dash already bans when a header is received which is a child of an invalid
header, causing block requests to never happen
* Backport missing changes from bitcoin#13003
bitcoin#13003 was backported out of order which causes missed changes.
* Bump p2p-fullblocktest timeouts
* Increase RPC timeout in p2p-fullblocktest.py
Co-authored-by: John Newbery <jonnynewbs@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com>
c00199244 Fix potential null dereferences (MeshCollider)
Pull request description:
Picked up by the static analyzer [Facebook Infer](http://fbinfer.com/) which I was playing around with for another research project. Just adding some asserts before dereferencing potentially null pointers.
Tree-SHA512: 9c01dab2d21bce75c7c7ef867236654ab538318a1fb39f96f09cdd2382a05be1a6b2db0a1169a94168864e82ffeae0686a383db6eba799742bdd89c37ac74397
64fb0ac Declare single-argument (non-converting) constructors "explicit" (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Declare single-argument (non-converting) constructors `explicit`.
In order to avoid unintended implicit conversions.
For a more thorough discussion, see ["C.46: By default, declare single-argument constructors explicit"](http://isocpp.github.io/CppCoreGuidelines/CppCoreGuidelines#c46-by-default-declare-single-argument-constructors-explicit) in the C++ Core Guidelines (Stroustrup & Sutter).
Tree-SHA512: e0c6922e56b11fa402621a38656d8b1122d16dd8f160e78626385373cf184ac7f26cb4c1851eca47e9b0dbd5e924e39a85c3cbdcb627a05ee3a655ecf5f7a0f1
c4af738 Fix ignoring tx data requests when fPauseSend is set on a peer (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
This resolves a bug introduced in
66aa1d58a1 where, if when responding
to a series of transaction requests in a getdata we hit the send
buffer limit and set fPauseSend, we will skip one transaction per
call to ProcessGetData.
Bug found by Cory Fields (@theuni).
Probably worth slipping into 0.16 :/.
Tree-SHA512: a9313cef8ac6da31eb099c9925c8401a638220cf7bc9b7b7b83151ecae4b02630f2db45ef6668302b9bb0f38571afbd764993427f1ec9e4d74d9a3be6647d299
This avoids sorting before looping through it to figure out what to
request. The assumption that sorting would be cheap when vecAskFor is
already mostly sorted (only unsorted at the end) turned out to be false.
In reality, ~50% of CPU time was consumed by the sort when a lot of traffic
(thousands of TXs) happen.
This makes orphan processing work like handling getdata messages:
After every actual transaction validation attempt, interrupt
processing to deal with messages arriving from other peers.
* Ignore recent rejects filter for locked txes
If we had a conflicting tx in the mempool before the locked tx arrived and the locked one arrived before the corresponding islock (i.e. we don't really know it's the one that should be included yet), the locked one is going to be rejected due to a mempool conflict. The old tx is going to be removed from the mempool by an incoming islock a bit later, however, we won't be able to re-request the locked tx until the tip changes because of the recentRejects filter. This patch fixes it.
* Add some explanation
