fbf327b Minimal code changes to allow msvc compilation. (Aaron Clauson)
Pull request description:
These changes are required to allow the Bitcoin source to build with Microsoft's C++ compiler (#11562 is also required).
I looked around for a better place for the typedef of ssize_t which is in random.h. The best candidate looks like src/compat.h but I figured including that header in random.h is a bigger change than the typedef. Note that the same typedef is in at least two other places including the OpenSSL and Berkeley DB headers so some of the Bitcoin code already picks it up.
Tree-SHA512: aa6cc6283015e08ab074641f9abdc116c4dc58574dc90f75e7a5af4cc82946d3052370e5cbe855fb6180c00f8dc66997d3724ff0412e4b7417e51b6602154825
de74c62 [Doc] Update bip.md, add support for BIP 159 (Jonas Schnelli)
e054d0e [QA] Add node_network_limited test (Jonas Schnelli)
bd09416 Avoid leaking the prune height through getdata (fingerprinting countermeasure) (Jonas Schnelli)
27df193 Always set NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED bit (Jonas Schnelli)
7caba38 Add NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED flags and min block amount constants (Jonas Schnelli)
Pull request description:
Extracted from #10387.
Does implement BIP159, but only the signalling part. No connections are made to NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED in this PR.
The address relay and connection work (the more complicated part) can then be separated (probably in #10387).
Tree-SHA512: e3218eb4789a9320b0f42dc10f62d30c13c49bdef00443fbe653bee22933477adcfc1cf8f6a95269324560b5721203ed41f3c5e2dd8a98ec2791f6a9d8346b1a
We could be reading multiple messages from a socket buffer at once _without actually processing them yet_ which means that `fSuccessfullyConnected` might not be switched to `true` at the time we already parsed `VERACK` message and started to parse the next one. This is basically a false positive and we drop a legit node as a result even though the order of messages sent by this node was completely fine. To fix this I partially reverted #2790 (where the issue was initially introduced) and moved the logic for tracking the first message into ProcessMessage instead.
63c2d83 Explicitly state assumption that state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr in ConsiderEviction (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Explicitly state assumption that `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr` in `ConsiderEviction(…)`.
Static analyzer (and humans!) will see the null-check in ...
```
else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout == 0 || (state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr && ...
```
... and infer that `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header` might be set to `nullptr` when reaching `else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout > 0 && time_in_seconds > state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout)` and thus flag `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->GetBlockHash().ToString()` as a potential null pointer dereference.
This commit makes the tacit assumption of `state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr` explicit.
Code introduced in 5a6d00c6de ("Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains") which was merged into master four days ago.
Friendly ping @sdaftuar :-)
Tree-SHA512: 32e5631025b7ba7556a02c89d040fbe339c482a03f28d0dbc9871c699e1f8ac867619b89c5fd41fdcfcf0dc4d7c859295b26ccd988572145cc244261aec18ce9
fad63eb [logging] Don't incorrectly log that REJECT messages are unknown. (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
Reject messages are logged to debug.log if NET debug logging is enabled.
Because of the way the `ProcessMessages()` function is structured,
processing for REJECT messages will also drop through to the default
branch and incorrectly log `Unknown command "reject" from peer-?`. Fix
that by exiting from `ProcessMessages()` early.
without this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930600Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930620Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
2018-05-03T17:37:00.930656Z Unknown command "reject" from peer=0
```
with this PR:
```
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751246Z received: reject (21 bytes) peer=0
2018-05-03T17:35:04.751274Z Reject message code 16: spammy spam
```
Tree-SHA512: 5c84c98433ab99e0db2dd481f9c2db6f87ff0d39022ff317a791737e918714bbcb4a23e81118212ed8e594ebcf098ab7f52f7fd5e21ebc3f07b1efb279b9b30b
d3a185a net: Move misbehaving logging to net logging category (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
Pull request description:
This moves the error messages for misbehavior (when available) into the line that reports the misbehavior, as well as moves the logging to the `net` category.
This is a continuation of #11583 and avoids serious-looking errors due to misbehaving peers. As it is impossible to correlate the `peer=X` numbers to specific incoming connections now without enabling the `net` category, it doesn't really help to see these messages by default.
To do this, Misbehaving() gains an optional `message` argument.
E.g. change:
2018-01-18 16:02:27 Misbehaving: x.x.x.x:62174 peer=164603 (80 -> 100) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED
2018-01-18 16:02:27 ERROR: non-continuous headers sequence
to
2018-01-18 16:02:27 Misbehaving: x.x.x.x:62174 peer=164603 (80 -> 100) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED: non-continuous headers sequence
When there is a category for "important" net messages (see #12219 ), we should move it there.
Tree-SHA512: 51c97e9a649bf5409f2fd4625fa1243a036e9c9de6037bb064244207408c2e0eb025e3af80866df673cdc006b8f35dc4078d074033f0d4c6a73bbb03949a269f
be9f38c Do not make it trivial for inbound peers to generate log entries (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
Based on #11580 because I'm lazy.
We should generally avoid writing to debug.log unconditionally for
inbound peers which misbehave (the peer being about to be banned
being an exception, since they cannot do this twice).
Tree-SHA512: 8e59c8d08d00b1527951b30f4842d010a4c2fc440503ade112baa2c1b9afd0e0d1c5c2df83dde25183a242af45089cf9b9f873b71796771232ffb6c5fc6cc0cc
fa6c3dea420b6c50c164ccc34f4e9e8a7d9a8022 p2p: Clarify control flow in ProcessMessage() (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
`ProcessMessage` is effectively a massive switch case construct. In the past there were attempts to clarify the control flow in `ProcessMessage()` by moving each case into a separate static function (see #9608). It was closed because it wasn't clear if moving each case into a function was the right approach.
Though, we can quasi treat each case as a function by adding a return statement to each case. (Can be seen as a continuation of bugfix #13162)
This patch does exactly that.
Also note that this patch is a subset of previous approaches such as #9608 and #10145.
Review suggestion: `git diff HEAD~ --function-context`
Tree-SHA512: 91f6106840de2f29bb4f10d27bae0616b03a91126e6c6013479e1dd79bee53f22a78902b631fe85517dd5dc0fa7239939b4fefc231851a13c819458559f6c201
* Check MNs up to 24 blocks deep when verifying `dstx`
* Handle DSTX-es more like regular txes and not like "other" invs
* Try asking for a DSTX too when trying to find missing tx parents
* Check DSTX-es when chainlock arrives
`HasChainLock` was always `false` in `IsExpired` because tip is updated before the corresponding chainlock is received
* Apply `Handle DSTX-es more like regular txes` idea to `AlreadyHave()`
* Alternative handling of DSTX+recentRejects
Co-authored-by: Alexander Block <ablock84@gmail.com>
* [tests] Change feature_block.py to use BitcoinTestFramework
* [tests] Fix flake8 warnings in feature_block.py
* [tests] Tidy up feature_block.py
- move all helper methods to the end
- remove block, create_tx and create_and_sign_tx shortcuts
- remove --runbarelyexpensive option, since it defaults to True and it's
unlikely that anyone ever runs the test with this option set to false.
* [tests] Add logging to feature_block.py
* [tests] Improve assert message when wait_until() fails
* Merge #13048: [tests] Fix feature_block flakiness
c1d742025c [tests] Fix feature_block flakiness (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
feature_block.py occasionally fails on Travis. I believe this is due to
a a race condition when reconnecting to bitcoind after a subtest that
expects disconnection. If the test runs ahead and sends the INV for the
subsequent test before we've received the initial sync getheaders, then
we may end up sending two headers messages - one as a response to the
initial sync getheaders and one in response to the INV getheaders. If
both of those headers fail validation with a DoS score of 50 or higher,
then we'll unexpectedly be disconnected.
There is only one validation failure that has a DoS score bewteen 50 and
100, which is high-hash. That's why the test is failing immediately
after the "Reject a block with invalid work" subtest.
Fix is to wait for the initial getheaders from the peer before we
start populating our blockstore. That way we won't have any invalid
headers to respond to it with.
Tree-SHA512: dc17d795fcfaf0f8c0bf1e9732b5e11fbc8febbfafba4c231b7c13a5404a2c297dcd703a7a75bc7f353c893e12efc87f424f2201abd47ba5268af32d4d2e841f
* Temporarely rename MAX_BLOCK_SIZE -> MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE
We'll undo this after the next commit. This avoids merge many conflicts and
makes reviewing easier.
* Rename MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE back to MAX_BLOCK_SIZE
* Use DoS score of 100 for bad-blk-sigops
This was accidently changed to 10 while backporting bitcoin#7287 and causes
test failures in p2p-fullblocktest.py
* Use allowOptimisticSend=true when sending reject messages
This fixes test failures in p2p-fullblocktest.py which expects reject
messages to be sent/received before connections get closed.
* Fix p2p-fullblocktest.py
- CBlock and friends are still in test_framework.mininode
- "-whitelist" causes connections to not be dropped, which in turn causes
sync_blocks with reconnect=True to fail
- "bad-cb-amount" does not cause a ban in Dash, so reconnect must be False
- Dash already bans when a header is received which is a child of an invalid
header, causing block requests to never happen
* Backport missing changes from bitcoin#13003
bitcoin#13003 was backported out of order which causes missed changes.
* Bump p2p-fullblocktest timeouts
* Increase RPC timeout in p2p-fullblocktest.py
Co-authored-by: John Newbery <jonnynewbs@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com>
c00199244 Fix potential null dereferences (MeshCollider)
Pull request description:
Picked up by the static analyzer [Facebook Infer](http://fbinfer.com/) which I was playing around with for another research project. Just adding some asserts before dereferencing potentially null pointers.
Tree-SHA512: 9c01dab2d21bce75c7c7ef867236654ab538318a1fb39f96f09cdd2382a05be1a6b2db0a1169a94168864e82ffeae0686a383db6eba799742bdd89c37ac74397
64fb0ac Declare single-argument (non-converting) constructors "explicit" (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Declare single-argument (non-converting) constructors `explicit`.
In order to avoid unintended implicit conversions.
For a more thorough discussion, see ["C.46: By default, declare single-argument constructors explicit"](http://isocpp.github.io/CppCoreGuidelines/CppCoreGuidelines#c46-by-default-declare-single-argument-constructors-explicit) in the C++ Core Guidelines (Stroustrup & Sutter).
Tree-SHA512: e0c6922e56b11fa402621a38656d8b1122d16dd8f160e78626385373cf184ac7f26cb4c1851eca47e9b0dbd5e924e39a85c3cbdcb627a05ee3a655ecf5f7a0f1
c4af738 Fix ignoring tx data requests when fPauseSend is set on a peer (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
This resolves a bug introduced in
66aa1d58a1 where, if when responding
to a series of transaction requests in a getdata we hit the send
buffer limit and set fPauseSend, we will skip one transaction per
call to ProcessGetData.
Bug found by Cory Fields (@theuni).
Probably worth slipping into 0.16 :/.
Tree-SHA512: a9313cef8ac6da31eb099c9925c8401a638220cf7bc9b7b7b83151ecae4b02630f2db45ef6668302b9bb0f38571afbd764993427f1ec9e4d74d9a3be6647d299
This avoids sorting before looping through it to figure out what to
request. The assumption that sorting would be cheap when vecAskFor is
already mostly sorted (only unsorted at the end) turned out to be false.
In reality, ~50% of CPU time was consumed by the sort when a lot of traffic
(thousands of TXs) happen.
This makes orphan processing work like handling getdata messages:
After every actual transaction validation attempt, interrupt
processing to deal with messages arriving from other peers.
* Ignore recent rejects filter for locked txes
If we had a conflicting tx in the mempool before the locked tx arrived and the locked one arrived before the corresponding islock (i.e. we don't really know it's the one that should be included yet), the locked one is going to be rejected due to a mempool conflict. The old tx is going to be removed from the mempool by an incoming islock a bit later, however, we won't be able to re-request the locked tx until the tip changes because of the recentRejects filter. This patch fixes it.
* Add some explanation
6262915 Add unit test for stale tip checking (Suhas Daftuar)
83df257 Add CConnmanTest to mutate g_connman in tests (João Barbosa)
ac7b37c Connect to an extra outbound peer if our tip is stale (Suhas Daftuar)
db32a65 Track tip update time and last new block announcement from each peer (Suhas Daftuar)
2d4327d net: Allow connecting to extra outbound peers (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
This is an alternative approach to #11534. Rather than disconnect an outbound peer when our tip looks stale, instead try to connect to an additional outbound peer.
Periodically, check to see if we have more outbound peers than we target (ie if any extra peers are in use), and if so, disconnect the one that least recently announced a new block (breaking ties by choosing the newest peer that we connected to).
Tree-SHA512: 8f19e910e0bb36867f81783e020af225f356451899adfc7ade1895d6d3bd5afe51c83759610dfd10c62090c4fe404efa0283b2f63fde0bd7da898a1aaa7fb281
f3d4adf Make p2p-acceptablock not an extended test (Matt Corallo)
00dcda6 [qa] test that invalid blocks on an invalid chain get a disconnect (Matt Corallo)
015a525 Reject headers building on invalid chains by tracking invalidity (Matt Corallo)
932f118 Accept unrequested blocks with work equal to our tip (Matt Corallo)
3d9c70c Stop always storing blocks from whitelisted peers (Matt Corallo)
3b4ac43 Rewrite p2p-acceptblock in preparation for slight behavior changes (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
@sdaftuar pointed out that the version in #11487 was somewhat DoS-able as someone could feed you a valid chain that forked off the the last checkpoint block and force you to do lots of work just walking backwards across blocks for each new block they gave you. We came up with a few proposals but settled on the one implemented here as likely the simplest without obvious DoS issues. It uses our existing on-load mapBlockIndex walk to make sure everything that descends from an invalid block is marked as such, and then simply caches blocks which we attempted to connect but which were found to be invalid. To avoid DoS issues during IBD, this will need to depend on #11458.
Includes tests from #11487.
Tree-SHA512: 46aff8332908e122dae72ceb5fe8cd241902c2281a87f58a5fb486bf69d46458d84a096fdcb5f3e8e07fbcf7466232b10c429f4d67855425f11b38ac0bf612e1
2530bf2 net: Add missing lock in ProcessHeadersMessage(...) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Add missing lock in `ProcessHeadersMessage(...)`.
Reading the variable `mapBlockIndex` requires holding the mutex `cs_main`.
The new "Disconnect outbound peers relaying invalid headers" code added in commit 37886d5e2f and merged as part of #11568 two days ago did not lock `cs_main` prior to accessing `mapBlockIndex`.
Tree-SHA512: b799c234be8043d036183a00bc7867bbf3bd7ffe3baa94c88529da3b3cd0571c31ed11dadfaf29c5b8498341d6d0a3c928029a43b69f3267ef263682c91563a3
37886d5e2 Disconnect outbound peers relaying invalid headers (Suhas Daftuar)
4637f1852 moveonly: factor out headers processing into separate function (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
Alternate to #11446.
Disconnect outbound (non-manual) peers that serve us block headers that are already known to be invalid, but exempt compact block announcements from such disconnects.
We restrict disconnection to outbound peers that are using up an outbound connection slot, because we rely on those peers to give us connectivity to the honest network (our inbound peers are not chosen by us and hence could all be from an attacker/sybil). Maintaining connectivity to peers that serve us invalid headers is sometimes desirable, eg after a soft-fork, to protect unupgraded software from being partitioned off the honest network, so we prefer to only disconnect when necessary.
Compact block announcements are exempted from this logic to comply with BIP 152, which explicitly permits nodes to relay compact blocks before fully validating them.
Tree-SHA512: 3ea88e4ccc1184f292a85b17f800d401d2c3806fefc7ad5429d05d6872c53acfa5751e3df83ce6b9c0060ab289511ed70ae1323d140ccc5b12e3c8da6de49936
e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar)
5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar)
c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD.
The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours:
For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer.
We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains.
We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate.
Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2525b972a net: stop both net/net_processing before destroying them (Cory Fields)
80e2e9d0c net: drop unused connman param (Cory Fields)
8ad663c1f net: use an interface class rather than signals for message processing (Cory Fields)
28f11e940 net: pass CConnman via pointer rather than reference (Cory Fields)
Pull request description:
See individual commits.
Benefits:
- Allows us to begin moving stuff out of CNode and into CNodeState (after #10652 and follow-ups)
- Drops boost dependency and overhead
- Drops global signal registration
- Friendlier backtraces
Tree-SHA512: af2038c959dbec25f0c90c74c88dc6a630e6b9e984adf52aceadd6954aa463b6aadfccf979c2459a9f3354326b5077ee02048128eda2a649236fadb595b66ee3
15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo)
5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo)
57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo)
44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman.
Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check
for NETWORK|WITNESS.
This changes the following:
* Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit
more from protocol-level logic.
* Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with
simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler
connections (feelers still only require NETWORK).
* This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from
CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message
handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices.
* This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a
significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because
we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to
continue using our valuable outbound slots on them.
* In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to
-connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now
given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections
to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true
of addnodes).
* Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the
eviction metrics from the same
sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring
HasRelevantServices.
This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement.
Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
01b52ce Add comment explaining forced processing of compact blocks (Suhas Daftuar)
08fd822 qa: add test for minchainwork use in acceptblock (Suhas Daftuar)
ce8cd7a Don't process unrequested, low-work blocks (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
A peer could try to waste our resources by sending us unrequested blocks with
low work (eg to fill up our disk). Since e265200 we no longer request blocks until we
know we're on a chain with more than nMinimumChainWork (our anti-DoS
threshold), but we would still process unrequested blocks that had more work
than our tip (which generally has low-work during IBD), even though we may not
yet have found a headers chain with sufficient work.
Fix this and add a test.
Tree-SHA512: 1a4fb0bbd78054b84683f995c8c3194dd44fa914dc351ae4379c7c1a6f83224f609f8b9c2d9dde28741426c6af008ffffea836d21aa31a5ebaa00f8e0f81229e
eac64bb7a [qa] Test nMinimumChainWork (Suhas Daftuar)
0311836f6 Allow setting nMinimumChainWork on command line (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
As discussed briefly here: https://botbot.me/freenode/bitcoin-core-dev/2017-02-28/?msg=81712308&page=4
This adds a hidden command line option for setting `nMinimumChainWork`, which allows us to test this parameter in our functional tests, as well as allowing for niche use cases like syncing nodes that are otherwise disconnected from the network.
See also #10345, which proposes a new use of `nMinimumChainWork`.
Tree-SHA512: fe4d8f4f289697615c98d8760f1cc74c076110310ea0b5b875fcab78c127da9195b4eb84148aebacc7606c246e5773d3f13bd5d9559d0a8bffac20a3a28c62df
3f8fa7f Make sure to clean up mapBlockSource if we've already seen the block (Cory Fields)
Pull request description:
Otherwise we may leave them dangling.
Credit TheBlueMatt.
Tree-SHA512: 8be77e08ebfc4f5b206d5ee7cfbe87f92c1eb5bc2b412471993658fe210306789aaf0f3d1454c635508a7d8effede2cf5ac144d622b0157b872733d9661d65c3
176c021 [qa] Test non-atomic chainstate writes (Suhas Daftuar)
d6af06d Dont create pcoinsTip until after ReplayBlocks. (Matt Corallo)
eaca1b7 Random db flush crash simulator (Pieter Wuille)
0580ee0 Adapt memory usage estimation for flushing (Pieter Wuille)
013a56a Non-atomic flushing using the blockchain as replay journal (Pieter Wuille)
b3a279c [MOVEONLY] Move LastCommonAncestor to chain (Pieter Wuille)
Tree-SHA512: 47ccc62303f9075c44d2a914be75bd6969ff881a857a2ff1227f05ec7def6f4c71c46680c5a28cb150c814999526797dc05cf2701fde1369c06169f46eccddee
5a9b508 [trivial] Add end of namespace comments (practicalswift)
Tree-SHA512: 92b0fcae4d1d3f4da9e97569ae84ef2d6e09625a5815cd0e5f0eb6dd2ecba9852fa85c184c5ae9de5117050330ce995e9867b451fa8cd5512169025990541a2b
