WalletView:
- add new signal showNormalIfMinimized()
- emit the new signal in handleURI() to fix a bug, preventing the main
window to show up when using bitcoin: URIs
WalletStack:
- connect the showNormalIfMinimized() signal from WalletView with the
showNormalIfMinimized() slot in BitcoinGUI
- rework setCurrentWallet() to return a bool
- add check for valid walletModel in addWallet()
- add missing gui attribute initialisation in constructor
WalletFrame:
- remove unused or unneded class attributes gui and clientModel
- add a check for valid clientModel in setClientModel()
General:
- small code formatting changes
Add support for a Payment Protocol to Bitcoin-Qt.
Payment messages are protocol-buffer encoded and communicated over
http(s), so this adds a dependency on the Google protocol buffer
library, and requires Qt with OpenSSL support.
- move SelectParamsFromCommandLine() from init.cpp to bitcoin.cpp to allow
to use TestNet() for Bitcoin-Qt instead of GetBoolArg("-testnet", false)
- change order in bitcoind.cpp to match bitcoin.cpp functionality
- hamonize error message strings for missing datadir and failing
SelectParamsFromCommandLine() in bitcoin.cpp and bitcoind.cpp
- use TestNet() call in splashscreen.cpp
Straight refactor, so mapAddressBook stores a CAddressBookData
(which just contains a std::string) instead of a std::string.
Preparation for payment protocol work, which will add the notion
of refund addresses to the address book.
Replaces the validation check for "amount == 0" with an isDust check,
so very small output amounts are caught before the wallet
is unlocked, a transaction is created, etc.
- update translation master files
- include current translations from Transifex
- add several new languages
- fix a bug in bitcoin.qrc, which prevents some languages from beeing used
(wrong file extension .ts instead of .qm was used)
This reduces a peer's ability to attack network resources by
using a full bloom filter, but without reducing the usability
of bloom filters. It sets a default match everything filter
for peers and it generalizes a prior optimization to
cover more cases.
To fix a minor malleability found by Sergio Lerner (reported here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=8392.msg1245898#msg1245898)
The problem is that if (R,S) is a valid ECDSA signature for a given
message and public key, (R,-S) is also valid. Modulo N (the order
of the secp256k1 curve), this means that both (R,S) and (R,N-S) are
valid. Given that N is odd, S and N-S have a different lowest bit.
We solve the problem by forcing signatures to have an even S value,
excluding one of the alternatives.
This commit just changes the signing code to always produce even S
values, and adds a verification mode to check it. This code is not
enabled anywhere yet. Existing tests in key_tests.cpp verify that
the produced signatures are still valid.
Fixes issue#2838; this is a tweaked version of pull#2845 that
should not leak the length of the password and is more generic,
in case we run into other situations where we need
timing-attack-resistant comparisons.
