90df92206cfce4e61eff9d584112643512f6b91c test: Change filemode of rpc_whitelist.py (Emil Engler)
Pull request description:
All python tests have the file mode `755`.
Probably due to a mistake `rpc_whitelist.py` is the only test with the permission `644`.
This PR makes it coherent with the other tests and updates it to `755` as well.
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
ACK 90df92206cfce4e61eff9d584112643512f6b91c -- all tests should be executable
Tree-SHA512: b9e69cb5184a3bbee4c7b14ac35985145a9fd3403d0e449d79f15c18e9660cafec495d639f5f730e0c69dde5f4a3d7590b4e42d385e794cd02add1f4e3b785e7
2081442c421cc4376e5d7839f68fbe7630e89103 test: Add test for rpc_whitelist (Emil Engler)
7414d3820c833566b4f48c6c120a18bf53978c55 Add RPC Whitelist Feature from #12248 (Jeremy Rubin)
Pull request description:
Summary
====
This patch adds the RPC whitelisting feature requested in #12248. RPC Whitelists help enforce application policies for services being built on top of Bitcoin Core (e.g., your Lightning Node maybe shouldn't be adding new peers). The aim of this PR is not to make it advisable to connect your Bitcoin node to arbitrary services, but to reduce risk and prevent unintended access.
Using RPC Whitelists
====
The way it works is you specify (in your bitcoin.conf) configurations such as
```
rpcauth=user1:4cc74397d6e9972e5ee7671fd241$11849357f26a5be7809c68a032bc2b16ab5dcf6348ef3ed1cf30dae47b8bcc71
rpcauth=user2:181b4a25317bff60f3749adee7d6bca0$d9c331474f1322975fa170a2ffbcb176ba11644211746b27c1d317f265dd4ada
rpcauth=user3:a6c8a511b53b1edcf69c36984985e$13cfba0e626db19061c9d61fa58e712d0319c11db97ad845fa84517f454f6675
rpcwhitelist=user1:getnetworkinfo
rpcwhitelist=user2:getnetworkinfo,getwalletinfo, getbestblockhash
rpcwhitelistdefault=0
```
Now user1 can only call getnetworkinfo, user2 can only call getnetworkinfo or getwalletinfo, while user3 can still call all RPCs.
If any rpcwhitelist is set, act as if all users are subject to whitelists unless rpcwhitelistdefault is set to 0. If rpcwhitelistdefault is set to 1 and no rpcwhitelist is set, act as if all users are subject to whitelists.
Review Request
=====
In addition to normal review, would love specific review from someone working on LN (e.g., @ roasbeef) and someone working on an infrastructure team at an exchange (e.g., @ jimpo) to check that this works well with their system.
Notes
=====
The rpc list is spelling sensitive -- whitespace is stripped though. Spelling errors fail towards the RPC call being blocked, which is safer.
It was unclear to me if HTTPReq_JSONRPC is the best function to patch this functionality into, or if it would be better to place it in exec or somewhere else.
It was also unclear to me if it would be preferred to cache the whitelists on startup or parse them on every RPC as is done with multiUserAuthorized. I opted for the cached approach as I thought it was a bit cleaner.
Future Work
=====
In a future PR, I would like to add an inheritance scheme. This seemed more controversial so I didn't want to include that here. Inheritance semantics are tricky, but it would also make these whitelists easier to read.
It also might be good to add a `getrpcwhitelist` command to facilitate permission discovery.
Tests
=====
Thanks to @ emilengler for adding tests for this feature. The tests cover all cases except for where `rpcwhitelistdefault=1` is used, given difficulties around testing with the current test framework.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK 2081442c421cc4376e5d7839f68fbe7630e89103
Tree-SHA512: 0dc1ac6a6f2f4b0be9c9054d495dd17752fe7b3589aeab2c6ac4e1f91cf4e7e355deedcb5d76d707cbb5a949c2f989c871b74d6bf129351f429569a701adbcbf
