JSON makes no distinction between numbers and reals, and our code
doesn't need to do so either.
This removes VREAL, as well as its specific post-processing in
`UniValue::write`. Non-monetary amounts do not need to be forcibly
formatted with 8 decimals, so the extra roundtrip was unnecessary
(and potentially loses precision).
This is the format that was always returned to JSON clients.
The difference was not noticed before, because VREAL values
are post-processed by univalue.
By implementing the functionality directly it breaks the dependency
of rpcserver on utilmoneystr. FormatMoney is now only used for debugging
purposes.
To test, port over the formatting tests from util_tests.cpp to
rpc_tests.cpp.
When no `-rpcpassword` is specified, use a special 'cookie' file for
authentication. This file is generated with random content when the
daemon starts, and deleted when it exits. Read access to this file
controls who can access through RPC. By default this file is stored in
the data directory but it be overriden with `-rpccookiefile`.
This is similar to Tor CookieAuthentication: see
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en
Alternative to #6258. Like that pull, this allows running bitcoind
without any manual configuration. However, daemons should ideally never write to
their configuration files, so I prefer this solution.
Add a function `ParseFixedPoint` that parses numbers according
to the JSON number specification and returns a 64-bit integer.
Then this in `AmountFromValue`, rather than `ParseMoney`.
Also add lots of tests (thanks to @jonasschnelli for some of them).
Fixes issue #6297.
I've never liked the chain-specific exception to having to set a
password. It gives issues with #6388 which makes it valid to
set no password in every case (as it enables random cookie authentication).
This pull removes the flag, so that all chains are regarded the same.
It also removes the username==password test, which doesn't provide any
substantial extra security.
72b9452 When processing RPC commands during warmup phase, parse the request object before returning an error so that id value can be used in the response. (Forrest Voight)
request object before returning an error so that id value can
be used in the response.
Prior to this commit, RPC commands sent during Bitcoin's
warmup/startup phase were responded to with a JSON-RPC error
with an id of null, which violated the JSON-RPC 2.0 spec:
id: This member is REQUIRED. It MUST be the same as the value
of the id member in the Request Object. If there was an error
in detecting the id in the Request object (e.g. Parse
error/Invalid Request), it MUST be Null.
My prime gripe with JSON spirit was that monetary values still had to be
converted from and to floating point which can cause deviations (see #3759
and https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/22716/bitcoind-sendfrom-round-amount-error).
As UniValue stores internal values as strings, this is no longer
necessary. This avoids risky double-to-integer and integer-to-double
conversions completely, and results in more elegant code to boot.
- implement find_value() function for UniValue
- replace all Array/Value/Object types with UniValues, remove JSON Spirit to UniValue wrapper
- remove JSON Spirit sources
has parts of @mhearn #4351
* allows querying the utxos over REST
* same binary input and outputs as mentioned in Bip64
* input format = output format
* various rpc/rest regtests
Adds a regression test for the wallet's ResendWalletTransactions function, which uses a new, hidden RPC command "resendwallettransactions."
I refactored main's Broadcast signal so it is passed the best-block time, which let me remove a global variable shared between main.cpp and the wallet (nTimeBestReceived).
I also manually tested the "rebroadcast unconfirmed every half hour or so" functionality by:
1. Running bitcoind -connect=0.0.0.0:8333
2. Creating a couple of send-to-self transactions
3. Connect to a peer using -addnode
4. Waited a while, monitoring debug.log, until I see:
```2015-03-23 18:48:10 ResendWalletTransactions: rebroadcast 2 unconfirmed transactions```
One last change: don't bother putting ResendWalletTransactions messages in debug.log unless unconfirmed transactions were actually rebroadcast.
Normally bitcoin core does not display any network originated strings without
sanitizing or hex encoding. This wasn't done for strcommand in many places.
This could be used to play havoc with a terminal displaying the logs,
especially with printtoconsole in use.
Thanks to Evil-Knievel for reporting this issue.
Rebased by @laanwj:
- update for RPC methods added since 84d13ee: setmocktime,
invalidateblock, reconsiderblock. Only the first, setmocktime, required a change,
the other two are thread safe.
This avoids a regression for issues like #334 where high speed
repeated connections eventually run the HTTP client out of
sockets because all of theirs end up in time_wait.
Maybe the trade-off here is suboptimal, but if both choices will
fail then we prefer fewer changes until the root cause is solved.
It turns out that some miners have been staying with old versions of
Bitcoin Core because their software behaves poorly with persistent
connections and the Bitcoin Core thread and connection limits.
What happens is that underlying HTTP libraries leave connections open
invisibly to their users and then the user runs into the default four
thread limit. This looks like Bitcoin Core is unresponsive to RPC.
There are many things that should be improved in Bitcoin Core's behavior
here, e.g. supporting more concurrent connections, not tying up threads
for idle connections, disconnecting kept-alive connections when limits
are reached, etc. All are fairly big, risky changes.
Disabling keep-alive is a simple workaround. It's often not easy to turn
off the keep-alive support in the client where it may be buried in some
platform library.
If you are one of the few who really needs persistent connections you
probably know that you want them and can find a switch; while if you
don't and the misbehavior is hitting you it is hard to discover the
source of your problems is keepalive related. Given that it is best
to default to off until they're handled better.
TLS is subject to downgrade attacks when SSLv3 is available, and
SSLv3 has vulnerabilities.
The popular solution is to disable SSLv3. On the web this breaks
some tiny number of very old clients. While Bitcoin RPC shouldn't
be exposed to the open Internet, it also shouldn't be exposed to
really old SSL implementations, so it shouldn't be a major issue
for us to disable SSLv3.
There is more information on the downgrade attacks and disabling
SSLv3 at https://disablessl3.com/ .
