The -debug tarballs/zips contain detached debugging symbols. To use them, place
in the same dir as the target binary, and invoke gdb as usual.
Also, because the debug symbols add a substantial space requirement, the build
dirs are now deleted when they're no longer needed.
This removes the following executables from the binary gitian release:
- test_bitcoin-qt[.exe]
- bench_bitcoin[.exe]
@jonasschnelli and me discussed this on IRC a few days ago - unlike the
normal `bitcoin_tests` which is useful to see if it is safe to run
bitcoin on a certain OS/environment combination, there is no good reason
to include these. Better to leave them out to reduce the download
size.
Sizes from the 0.12 release:
```
2.4M bitcoin-0.12.0/bin/bench_bitcoin.exe
22M bitcoin-0.12.0/bin/test_bitcoin-qt.exe
```
Common sentiment is that the miniupnpc codebase likely contains further
vulnerabilities.
I'd prefer to get rid of the dependency completely, but a compromise for
now is to at least disable it by default.
Rather than fetching a signature.tar.gz from somewhere on the net, instruct
Gitian to use a signature from a tag in the bitcoin-detached-sigs repository
which corresponds to the tag of the release being built.
This changes detached-sig-apply.sh to take a dirname rather than a tarball as
an argument, though detached-sig-create.sh still outputs a tarball for
convenience.
For Gitian releases:
- Windows builds remain unchanged. libstdc++ was already linked statically.
- OSX builds remain unchanged. libstdc++ is tied to the SDK and not worth
messing with.
- Linux builds now statically link libstdc++.
For Travis:
- Match the previous behavior by adding --enable-reduce-exports as
necessary.
- Use static libstdc++ for the full Linux build.
Since permissions and timestamps are changed for the sake of determinism,
. must not be added to the archive. Otherwise, tar may try to modify pwd when
extracting.
Descriptors now make use of the dependencies builder, so results are cached.
A very new version (>= e9741525c) of Gitian should be used in order to take
advantage of caching.
Upgrade for https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
Just in case - there is no vulnerability that affects ecdsa signing or
verification.
The MITM attack vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224) may have some effect on
our usage of SSL/TLS.
As long as payment requests are signed (which is the common case), usage
of the payment protocol should also not be affected.
The TLS usage in RPC may be at risk for MITM attacks. If you have
`-rpcssl` enabled, be sure to update OpenSSL as soon as possible.
