dash/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
Wladimir J. van der Laan cb5d0d8b99 Merge #13454: Make sure LC_ALL=C is set in all shell scripts
47776a958b08382d76d69b5df7beed807af168b3 Add linter: Make sure all shell scripts opt out of locale dependence using "export LC_ALL=C" (practicalswift)
3352da8da1243c03fc83ba678d2f5d193bd5a0c2 Add "export LC_ALL=C" to all shell scripts (practicalswift)

Pull request description:

  ~~Make sure `LC_ALL=C` is set when using `grep` range expressions.~~

  Make sure `LC_ALL=C` is set in all shell scripts.

  From the `grep(1)` documentation:

  > Within a bracket expression, a range expression consists of two characters separated by a hyphen. It matches any single character that sorts between the two characters, inclusive, using the locale's collating sequence and character set. For example, in the default C locale, `[a-d]` is equivalent to `[abcd]`. Many  locales sort characters in dictionary order, and in these locales `[a-d]` is typically not equivalent to `[abcd]`; it might be equivalent to `[aBbCcDd]`, for example. To obtain the traditional interpretation of bracket expressions, you can use the C locale by setting the `LC_ALL` environment variable to the value C.

  Context: [Locale issue found when reviewing #13450](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13450/files#r194877736)

Tree-SHA512: fd74d2612998f9b49ef9be24410e505d8c842716f84d085157fc7f9799d40e8a7b4969de783afcf99b7fae4f91bbb4559651f7dd6578a6a081a50bdea29f0909
2020-07-28 21:35:31 -05:00

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#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (c) 2014-2016 The Bitcoin Core developers
# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
export LC_ALL=C
INPUT=$(cat /dev/stdin)
VALID=false
REVSIG=false
IFS='
'
if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then
GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
else
# Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling
# signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that
# collision attacks shouldn't be an issue as they'd be an attack on yourself,
# in fact because what's being signed is a commit object that's
# semi-deterministically generated by untrusted input (the pull-req) in theory
# an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that
# they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing
# it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure.
GPG_RES=""
for LINE in "$(gpg --version)"; do
case "$LINE" in
"gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.1"*|"gpg (GnuPG) 2.0."*)
echo "Please upgrade to at least gpg 2.1.10 to check for weak signatures" > /dev/stderr
GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
;;
# We assume if you're running 2.1+, you're probably running 2.1.10+
# gpg will fail otherwise
# We assume if you're running 1.X, it is either 1.4.1X or 1.4.20+
# gpg will fail otherwise
esac
done
[ "$GPG_RES" = "" ] && GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
fi
for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do
case "$LINE" in
"[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "*)
while read KEY; do
[ "${LINE#?GNUPG:? VALIDSIG * * * * * * * * * }" = "$KEY" ] && VALID=true
done < ./contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys
;;
"[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG "*)
[ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
REVSIG=true
GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
;;
"[GNUPG:] EXPKEYSIG "*)
[ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
REVSIG=true
GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
;;
esac
done
if ! $VALID; then
exit 1
fi
if $VALID && $REVSIG; then
printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null | grep "^\[GNUPG:\] \(NEWSIG\|SIG_ID\|VALIDSIG\)"
echo "$GOODREVSIG"
else
printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null
fi