dash/contrib/verify-commits
Wladimir J. van der Laan 568b7e1c0c
Merge #12822: Revert 7deba93bdc and fix expired-key-sigs properly
9471576 [verify-commits] Add some additional useful documentation. (Matt Corallo)
de7e931 Add Marco-expired-key-signed-commits to allow-revsig-commits (Matt Corallo)
99f6d48 Revert "test: Update trust git root". (Matt Corallo)

Pull request description:

  7deba93bdc was took the wrong approach to updating verify-commits for a key expiration. Namely, adding each commit to allow-revsig-commits should have been done instead, allowing them to still be validated, but with the expired key.

Tree-SHA512: 9fdc67eda8f6daa95082f6c1a2af81beb730a9ff3f8cf930bb2311fe29b5f05e1f89259aba5f112153ca2e9c62577cf60d31b4c8e9ac1bf3f5506e78f8401378
Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>

# Conflicts:
#	contrib/verify-commits/allow-revsig-commits
2020-10-22 11:36:39 -04:00
..
allow-revsig-commits
gpg.sh Merge #13454: Make sure LC_ALL=C is set in all shell scripts 2020-07-28 21:35:31 -05:00
pre-push-hook.sh Merge #13454: Make sure LC_ALL=C is set in all shell scripts 2020-07-28 21:35:31 -05:00
README.md Merge #12822: Revert 7deba93bdc and fix expired-key-sigs properly 2020-10-22 11:36:39 -04:00
trusted-git-root
trusted-keys Merge #9880: Verify Tree-SHA512s in merge commits, enforce sigs are not SHA1 2019-02-04 19:58:07 -06:00
trusted-sha512-root-commit Merge #9940: Fix verify-commits on OSX, update for new bad Tree-SHA512, point travis to different keyservers 2019-02-26 16:41:05 -06:00
verify-commits.sh Make shellcheck happy 2020-07-29 11:20:12 -05:00

Tooling for verification of PGP signed commits

This is an incomplete work in progress, but currently includes a pre-push hook script (pre-push-hook.sh) for maintainers to ensure that their own commits are PGP signed (nearly always merge commits), as well as a script to verify commits against a trusted keys list.

Using verify-commits.sh safely

Remember that you can't use an untrusted script to verify itself. This means that checking out code, then running verify-commits.sh against HEAD is not safe, because the version of verify-commits.sh that you just ran could be backdoored. Instead, you need to use a trusted version of verify-commits prior to checkout to make sure you're checking out only code signed by trusted keys:

git fetch origin && \
  ./contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.sh origin/master && \
  git checkout origin/master

Note that the above isn't a good UI/UX yet, and needs significant improvements to make it more convenient and reduce the chance of errors; pull-reqs improving this process would be much appreciated.

Configuration files

  • trusted-git-root: This file should contain a single git commit hash which is the first unsigned git commit (hence it is the "root of trust").
  • trusted-sha512-root-commit: This file should contain a single git commit hash which is the first commit without a SHA512 root commitment.
  • trusted-keys: This file should contain a \n-delimited list of all PGP fingerprints of authorized commit signers (primary, not subkeys).
  • allow-revsig-commits: This file should contain a \n-delimited list of git commit hashes. See next section for more info.

Key expiry/revocation

When a key (or subkey) which has signed old commits expires or is revoked, verify-commits will start failing to verify all commits which were signed by said key. In order to avoid bumping the root-of-trust trusted-git-root file, individual commits which were signed by such a key can be added to the allow-revsig-commits file. That way, the PGP signatures are still verified but no new commits can be signed by any expired/revoked key. To easily build a list of commits which need to be added, verify-commits.sh can be edited to test each commit with BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG set to both 1 and 0, and those which need it set to 1 printed.