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324 lines
14 KiB
Python
324 lines
14 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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# Copyright (c) 2022 The Bitcoin Core developers
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# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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"""Class for v2 P2P protocol (see BIP 324)"""
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import random
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from .crypto.bip324_cipher import FSChaCha20Poly1305
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from .crypto.chacha20 import FSChaCha20
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from .crypto.ellswift import ellswift_create, ellswift_ecdh_xonly
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from .crypto.hkdf import hkdf_sha256
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from .key import TaggedHash
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from .messages import MAGIC_BYTES
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from .util import random_bytes
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CHACHA20POLY1305_EXPANSION = 16
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HEADER_LEN = 1
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IGNORE_BIT_POS = 7
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LENGTH_FIELD_LEN = 3
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MAX_GARBAGE_LEN = 4095
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SHORTID = {
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1: b"addr",
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2: b"block",
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3: b"blocktxn",
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4: b"cmpctblock",
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5: b"", # Dash does not support "feefilter"
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6: b"filteradd",
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7: b"filterclear",
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8: b"filterload",
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9: b"getblocks",
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10: b"getblocktxn",
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11: b"getdata",
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12: b"getheaders",
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13: b"headers",
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14: b"inv",
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15: b"mempool",
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16: b"merkleblock",
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17: b"notfound",
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18: b"ping",
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19: b"pong",
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20: b"sendcmpct",
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21: b"tx",
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22: b"getcfilters",
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23: b"cfilter",
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24: b"getcfheaders",
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25: b"cfheaders",
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26: b"getcfcheckpt",
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27: b"cfcheckpt",
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28: b"addrv2",
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128: b"spork", # Dash short IDs start from 128 onwards
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129: b"getsporks",
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130: b"senddsq",
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131: b"dsa",
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132: b"dsi",
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133: b"dsf",
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134: b"dss",
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135: b"dsc",
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136: b"dssu",
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137: b"dstx",
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138: b"dsq",
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139: b"ssc",
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140: b"govsync",
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141: b"govobj",
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142: b"govobjvote",
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143: b"getmnlistd",
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144: b"mnlistdiff",
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145: b"qsendrecsigs",
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146: b"qfcommit",
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147: b"qcontrib",
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148: b"qcomplaint",
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149: b"qjustify",
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150: b"qpcommit",
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151: b"qwatch",
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152: b"qsigsesann",
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153: b"qsigsinv",
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154: b"qgetsigs",
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155: b"qbsigs",
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156: b"qsigrec",
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157: b"qsigshare",
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158: b"qgetdata",
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159: b"qdata",
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160: b"clsig",
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161: b"isdlock",
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162: b"mnauth",
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163: b"getheaders2",
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164: b"sendheaders2",
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165: b"headers2",
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166: b"getqrinfo",
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167: b"qrinfo",
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}
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# Dictionary which contains short message type ID for the P2P message
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MSGTYPE_TO_SHORTID = {msgtype: shortid for shortid, msgtype in SHORTID.items()}
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class EncryptedP2PState:
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"""A class for managing the state when v2 P2P protocol is used. Performs initial v2 handshake and encrypts/decrypts
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P2P messages. P2PConnection uses an object of this class.
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Args:
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initiating (bool): defines whether the P2PConnection is an initiator or responder.
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- initiating = True for inbound connections in the test framework [TestNode <------- P2PConnection]
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- initiating = False for outbound connections in the test framework [TestNode -------> P2PConnection]
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net (string): chain used (regtest, signet etc..)
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Methods:
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perform an advanced form of diffie-hellman handshake to instantiate the encrypted transport. before exchanging
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any P2P messages, 2 nodes perform this handshake in order to determine a shared secret that is unique to both
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of them and use it to derive keys to encrypt/decrypt P2P messages.
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- initial v2 handshakes is performed by: (see BIP324 section #overall-handshake-pseudocode)
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1. initiator using initiate_v2_handshake(), complete_handshake() and authenticate_handshake()
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2. responder using respond_v2_handshake(), complete_handshake() and authenticate_handshake()
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- initialize_v2_transport() sets various BIP324 derived keys and ciphers.
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encrypt/decrypt v2 P2P messages using v2_enc_packet() and v2_receive_packet().
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"""
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def __init__(self, *, initiating, net):
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self.initiating = initiating # True if initiator
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self.net = net
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self.peer = {} # object with various BIP324 derived keys and ciphers
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self.privkey_ours = None
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self.ellswift_ours = None
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self.sent_garbage = b""
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self.received_garbage = b""
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self.received_prefix = b"" # received ellswift bytes till the first mismatch from 16 bytes v1_prefix
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self.tried_v2_handshake = False # True when the initial handshake is over
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# stores length of packet contents to detect whether first 3 bytes (which contains length of packet contents)
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# has been decrypted. set to -1 if decryption hasn't been done yet.
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self.contents_len = -1
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self.found_garbage_terminator = False
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self.transport_version = b''
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@staticmethod
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def v2_ecdh(priv, ellswift_theirs, ellswift_ours, initiating):
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"""Compute BIP324 shared secret.
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Returns:
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bytes - BIP324 shared secret
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"""
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ecdh_point_x32 = ellswift_ecdh_xonly(ellswift_theirs, priv)
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if initiating:
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# Initiating, place our public key encoding first.
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return TaggedHash("bip324_ellswift_xonly_ecdh", ellswift_ours + ellswift_theirs + ecdh_point_x32)
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else:
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# Responding, place their public key encoding first.
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return TaggedHash("bip324_ellswift_xonly_ecdh", ellswift_theirs + ellswift_ours + ecdh_point_x32)
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def generate_keypair_and_garbage(self, garbage_len=None):
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"""Generates ellswift keypair and 4095 bytes garbage at max"""
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self.privkey_ours, self.ellswift_ours = ellswift_create()
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if garbage_len is None:
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garbage_len = random.randrange(MAX_GARBAGE_LEN + 1)
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self.sent_garbage = random_bytes(garbage_len)
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return self.ellswift_ours + self.sent_garbage
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def initiate_v2_handshake(self):
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"""Initiator begins the v2 handshake by sending its ellswift bytes and garbage
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Returns:
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bytes - bytes to be sent to the peer when starting the v2 handshake as an initiator
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"""
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return self.generate_keypair_and_garbage()
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def respond_v2_handshake(self, response):
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"""Responder begins the v2 handshake by sending its ellswift bytes and garbage. However, the responder
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sends this after having received at least one byte that mismatches 16-byte v1_prefix.
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Returns:
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1. int - length of bytes that were consumed so that recvbuf can be updated
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2. bytes - bytes to be sent to the peer when starting the v2 handshake as a responder.
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- returns b"" if more bytes need to be received before we can respond and start the v2 handshake.
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- returns -1 to downgrade the connection to v1 P2P.
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"""
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v1_prefix = MAGIC_BYTES[self.net] + b'version\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
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while len(self.received_prefix) < 16:
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byte = response.read(1)
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# return b"" if we need to receive more bytes
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if not byte:
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return len(self.received_prefix), b""
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self.received_prefix += byte
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if self.received_prefix[-1] != v1_prefix[len(self.received_prefix) - 1]:
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return len(self.received_prefix), self.generate_keypair_and_garbage()
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# return -1 to decide v1 only after all 16 bytes processed
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return len(self.received_prefix), -1
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def complete_handshake(self, response):
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""" Instantiates the encrypted transport and
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sends garbage terminator + optional decoy packets + transport version packet.
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Done by both initiator and responder.
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Returns:
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1. int - length of bytes that were consumed. returns 0 if all 64 bytes from ellswift haven't been received yet.
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2. bytes - bytes to be sent to the peer when completing the v2 handshake
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"""
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ellswift_theirs = self.received_prefix + response.read(64 - len(self.received_prefix))
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# return b"" if we need to receive more bytes
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if len(ellswift_theirs) != 64:
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return 0, b""
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ecdh_secret = self.v2_ecdh(self.privkey_ours, ellswift_theirs, self.ellswift_ours, self.initiating)
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self.initialize_v2_transport(ecdh_secret)
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# Send garbage terminator
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msg_to_send = self.peer['send_garbage_terminator']
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# Optionally send decoy packets after garbage terminator.
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aad = self.sent_garbage
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for decoy_content_len in [random.randint(1, 100) for _ in range(random.randint(0, 10))]:
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msg_to_send += self.v2_enc_packet(decoy_content_len * b'\x00', aad=aad, ignore=True)
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aad = b''
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# Send version packet.
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msg_to_send += self.v2_enc_packet(self.transport_version, aad=aad)
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return 64 - len(self.received_prefix), msg_to_send
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def authenticate_handshake(self, response):
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""" Ensures that the received optional decoy packets and transport version packet are authenticated.
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Marks the v2 handshake as complete. Done by both initiator and responder.
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Returns:
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1. int - length of bytes that were processed so that recvbuf can be updated
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2. bool - True if the authentication was successful/more bytes need to be received and False otherwise
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"""
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processed_length = 0
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# Detect garbage terminator in the received bytes
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if not self.found_garbage_terminator:
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received_garbage = response[:16]
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response = response[16:]
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processed_length = len(received_garbage)
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for i in range(MAX_GARBAGE_LEN + 1):
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if received_garbage[-16:] == self.peer['recv_garbage_terminator']:
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# Receive, decode, and ignore version packet.
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# This includes skipping decoys and authenticating the received garbage.
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self.found_garbage_terminator = True
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self.received_garbage = received_garbage[:-16]
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break
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else:
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# don't update recvbuf since more bytes need to be received
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if len(response) == 0:
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return 0, True
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received_garbage += response[:1]
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processed_length += 1
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response = response[1:]
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else:
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# disconnect since garbage terminator was not seen after 4 KiB of garbage.
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return processed_length, False
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# Process optional decoy packets and transport version packet
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while not self.tried_v2_handshake:
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length, contents = self.v2_receive_packet(response, aad=self.received_garbage)
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if length == -1:
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return processed_length, False
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elif length == 0:
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return processed_length, True
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processed_length += length
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self.received_garbage = b""
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# decoy packets have contents = None. v2 handshake is complete only when version packet
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# (can be empty with contents = b"") with contents != None is received.
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if contents is not None:
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self.tried_v2_handshake = True
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return processed_length, True
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response = response[length:]
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def initialize_v2_transport(self, ecdh_secret):
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"""Sets the peer object with various BIP324 derived keys and ciphers."""
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peer = {}
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salt = b'bitcoin_v2_shared_secret' + MAGIC_BYTES[self.net]
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for name in ('initiator_L', 'initiator_P', 'responder_L', 'responder_P', 'garbage_terminators', 'session_id'):
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peer[name] = hkdf_sha256(salt=salt, ikm=ecdh_secret, info=name.encode('utf-8'), length=32)
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if self.initiating:
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self.peer['send_L'] = FSChaCha20(peer['initiator_L'])
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self.peer['send_P'] = FSChaCha20Poly1305(peer['initiator_P'])
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self.peer['send_garbage_terminator'] = peer['garbage_terminators'][:16]
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self.peer['recv_L'] = FSChaCha20(peer['responder_L'])
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self.peer['recv_P'] = FSChaCha20Poly1305(peer['responder_P'])
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self.peer['recv_garbage_terminator'] = peer['garbage_terminators'][16:]
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else:
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self.peer['send_L'] = FSChaCha20(peer['responder_L'])
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self.peer['send_P'] = FSChaCha20Poly1305(peer['responder_P'])
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self.peer['send_garbage_terminator'] = peer['garbage_terminators'][16:]
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self.peer['recv_L'] = FSChaCha20(peer['initiator_L'])
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self.peer['recv_P'] = FSChaCha20Poly1305(peer['initiator_P'])
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self.peer['recv_garbage_terminator'] = peer['garbage_terminators'][:16]
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self.peer['session_id'] = peer['session_id']
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def v2_enc_packet(self, contents, aad=b'', ignore=False):
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"""Encrypt a BIP324 packet.
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Returns:
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bytes - encrypted packet contents
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"""
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assert len(contents) <= 2**24 - 1
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header = (ignore << IGNORE_BIT_POS).to_bytes(HEADER_LEN, 'little')
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plaintext = header + contents
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aead_ciphertext = self.peer['send_P'].encrypt(aad, plaintext)
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enc_plaintext_len = self.peer['send_L'].crypt(len(contents).to_bytes(LENGTH_FIELD_LEN, 'little'))
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return enc_plaintext_len + aead_ciphertext
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def v2_receive_packet(self, response, aad=b''):
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"""Decrypt a BIP324 packet
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Returns:
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1. int - number of bytes consumed (or -1 if error)
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2. bytes - contents of decrypted non-decoy packet if any (or None otherwise)
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"""
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if self.contents_len == -1:
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if len(response) < LENGTH_FIELD_LEN:
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return 0, None
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enc_contents_len = response[:LENGTH_FIELD_LEN]
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self.contents_len = int.from_bytes(self.peer['recv_L'].crypt(enc_contents_len), 'little')
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response = response[LENGTH_FIELD_LEN:]
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if len(response) < HEADER_LEN + self.contents_len + CHACHA20POLY1305_EXPANSION:
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return 0, None
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aead_ciphertext = response[:HEADER_LEN + self.contents_len + CHACHA20POLY1305_EXPANSION]
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plaintext = self.peer['recv_P'].decrypt(aad, aead_ciphertext)
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if plaintext is None:
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return -1, None # disconnect
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header = plaintext[:HEADER_LEN]
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length = LENGTH_FIELD_LEN + HEADER_LEN + self.contents_len + CHACHA20POLY1305_EXPANSION
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self.contents_len = -1
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return length, None if (header[0] & (1 << IGNORE_BIT_POS)) else plaintext[HEADER_LEN:]
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