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7e6dcd9995
If the code was compiled with newer (>=3.17) kernel headers but executed on a system without the system call, every use of random would crash the program. Add a fallback for that case.
291 lines
8.0 KiB
C++
291 lines
8.0 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
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// Copyright (c) 2009-2016 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#include "random.h"
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#include "crypto/sha512.h"
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#include "support/cleanse.h"
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#ifdef WIN32
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#include "compat.h" // for Windows API
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#include <wincrypt.h>
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#endif
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#include "util.h" // for LogPrint()
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#include "utilstrencodings.h" // for GetTime()
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <limits>
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#ifndef WIN32
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_GETRANDOM
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY
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#include <unistd.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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static void RandFailure()
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{
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LogPrintf("Failed to read randomness, aborting\n");
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abort();
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}
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static inline int64_t GetPerformanceCounter()
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{
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int64_t nCounter = 0;
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#ifdef WIN32
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QueryPerformanceCounter((LARGE_INTEGER*)&nCounter);
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#else
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timeval t;
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gettimeofday(&t, NULL);
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nCounter = (int64_t)(t.tv_sec * 1000000 + t.tv_usec);
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#endif
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return nCounter;
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}
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void RandAddSeed()
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{
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// Seed with CPU performance counter
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int64_t nCounter = GetPerformanceCounter();
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RAND_add(&nCounter, sizeof(nCounter), 1.5);
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memory_cleanse((void*)&nCounter, sizeof(nCounter));
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}
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static void RandAddSeedPerfmon()
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{
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RandAddSeed();
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#ifdef WIN32
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// Don't need this on Linux, OpenSSL automatically uses /dev/urandom
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// Seed with the entire set of perfmon data
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// This can take up to 2 seconds, so only do it every 10 minutes
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static int64_t nLastPerfmon;
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if (GetTime() < nLastPerfmon + 10 * 60)
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return;
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nLastPerfmon = GetTime();
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std::vector<unsigned char> vData(250000, 0);
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long ret = 0;
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unsigned long nSize = 0;
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const size_t nMaxSize = 10000000; // Bail out at more than 10MB of performance data
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while (true) {
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nSize = vData.size();
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ret = RegQueryValueExA(HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA, "Global", NULL, NULL, vData.data(), &nSize);
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if (ret != ERROR_MORE_DATA || vData.size() >= nMaxSize)
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break;
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vData.resize(std::max((vData.size() * 3) / 2, nMaxSize)); // Grow size of buffer exponentially
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}
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RegCloseKey(HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA);
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if (ret == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
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RAND_add(vData.data(), nSize, nSize / 100.0);
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memory_cleanse(vData.data(), nSize);
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LogPrint("rand", "%s: %lu bytes\n", __func__, nSize);
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} else {
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static bool warned = false; // Warn only once
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if (!warned) {
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LogPrintf("%s: Warning: RegQueryValueExA(HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA) failed with code %i\n", __func__, ret);
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warned = true;
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}
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}
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#endif
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}
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#ifndef WIN32
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/** Fallback: get 32 bytes of system entropy from /dev/urandom. The most
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* compatible way to get cryptographic randomness on UNIX-ish platforms.
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*/
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void GetDevURandom(unsigned char *ent32)
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{
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int f = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
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if (f == -1) {
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RandFailure();
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}
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int have = 0;
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do {
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ssize_t n = read(f, ent32 + have, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES - have);
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if (n <= 0 || n + have > NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) {
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RandFailure();
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}
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have += n;
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} while (have < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES);
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close(f);
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}
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#endif
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/** Get 32 bytes of system entropy. */
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void GetOSRand(unsigned char *ent32)
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{
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#if defined(WIN32)
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HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
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int ret = CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT);
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if (!ret) {
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RandFailure();
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}
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ret = CryptGenRandom(hProvider, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES, ent32);
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if (!ret) {
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RandFailure();
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}
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CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
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#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_GETRANDOM)
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/* Linux. From the getrandom(2) man page:
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* "If the urandom source has been initialized, reads of up to 256 bytes
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* will always return as many bytes as requested and will not be
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* interrupted by signals."
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*/
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int rv = syscall(SYS_getrandom, ent32, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES, 0);
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if (rv != NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) {
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if (rv < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) {
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/* Fallback for kernel <3.17: the return value will be -1 and errno
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* ENOSYS if the syscall is not available, in that case fall back
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* to /dev/urandom.
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*/
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GetDevURandom(ent32);
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} else {
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RandFailure();
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}
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}
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#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY)
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/* On OpenBSD this can return up to 256 bytes of entropy, will return an
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* error if more are requested.
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* The call cannot return less than the requested number of bytes.
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*/
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if (getentropy(ent32, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) != 0) {
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RandFailure();
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}
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#elif defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND)
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/* FreeBSD and similar. It is possible for the call to return less
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* bytes than requested, so need to read in a loop.
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*/
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static const int name[2] = {CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND};
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int have = 0;
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do {
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size_t len = NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES - have;
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if (sysctl(name, ARRAYLEN(name), ent32 + have, &len, NULL, 0) != 0) {
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RandFailure();
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}
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have += len;
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} while (have < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES);
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#else
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/* Fall back to /dev/urandom if there is no specific method implemented to
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* get system entropy for this OS.
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*/
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GetDevURandom(ent32);
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#endif
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}
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void GetRandBytes(unsigned char* buf, int num)
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{
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if (RAND_bytes(buf, num) != 1) {
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RandFailure();
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}
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}
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void GetStrongRandBytes(unsigned char* out, int num)
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{
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assert(num <= 32);
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CSHA512 hasher;
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unsigned char buf[64];
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// First source: OpenSSL's RNG
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RandAddSeedPerfmon();
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GetRandBytes(buf, 32);
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hasher.Write(buf, 32);
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// Second source: OS RNG
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GetOSRand(buf);
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hasher.Write(buf, 32);
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// Produce output
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hasher.Finalize(buf);
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memcpy(out, buf, num);
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memory_cleanse(buf, 64);
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}
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uint64_t GetRand(uint64_t nMax)
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{
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if (nMax == 0)
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return 0;
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// The range of the random source must be a multiple of the modulus
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// to give every possible output value an equal possibility
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uint64_t nRange = (std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max() / nMax) * nMax;
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uint64_t nRand = 0;
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do {
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GetRandBytes((unsigned char*)&nRand, sizeof(nRand));
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} while (nRand >= nRange);
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return (nRand % nMax);
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}
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int GetRandInt(int nMax)
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{
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return GetRand(nMax);
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}
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uint256 GetRandHash()
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{
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uint256 hash;
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GetRandBytes((unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash));
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return hash;
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}
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FastRandomContext::FastRandomContext(bool fDeterministic)
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{
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// The seed values have some unlikely fixed points which we avoid.
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if (fDeterministic) {
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Rz = Rw = 11;
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} else {
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uint32_t tmp;
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do {
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GetRandBytes((unsigned char*)&tmp, 4);
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} while (tmp == 0 || tmp == 0x9068ffffU);
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Rz = tmp;
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do {
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GetRandBytes((unsigned char*)&tmp, 4);
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} while (tmp == 0 || tmp == 0x464fffffU);
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Rw = tmp;
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}
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}
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bool Random_SanityCheck()
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{
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/* This does not measure the quality of randomness, but it does test that
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* OSRandom() overwrites all 32 bytes of the output given a maximum
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* number of tries.
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*/
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static const ssize_t MAX_TRIES = 1024;
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uint8_t data[NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES];
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bool overwritten[NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES] = {}; /* Tracks which bytes have been overwritten at least once */
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int num_overwritten;
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int tries = 0;
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/* Loop until all bytes have been overwritten at least once, or max number tries reached */
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do {
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memset(data, 0, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES);
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GetOSRand(data);
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for (int x=0; x < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES; ++x) {
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overwritten[x] |= (data[x] != 0);
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}
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num_overwritten = 0;
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for (int x=0; x < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES; ++x) {
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if (overwritten[x]) {
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num_overwritten += 1;
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}
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}
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tries += 1;
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} while (num_overwritten < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES && tries < MAX_TRIES);
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return (num_overwritten == NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES); /* If this failed, bailed out after too many tries */
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}
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