be4345ce12
000000035b20402dea3e8168165cd4eefdc97539 Obsolete #!/bin/bash shebang (DesWurstes) Pull request description: > `#!/bin/bash` assumes it is always installed to `/bin/` which can cause issues > `#!/usr/bin/env bash` searches the user's `PATH` to find the `bash` binary Details: https://github.com/dylanaraps/pure-bash-bible#obsolete-syntax I'm open to comments: Should I also fix `#!/bin/sh`? Tree-SHA512: b47bb4828116aa119f1899c68fee081270d51a898535490b9c616bf0f3660ad953f29c361eafc759bc64cdd54ee6eeecb2d79e9fdb5291a996a515c719805476 |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| allow-revsig-commits | ||
| gpg.sh | ||
| pre-push-hook.sh | ||
| README.md | ||
| trusted-git-root | ||
| trusted-keys | ||
| trusted-sha512-root-commit | ||
| verify-commits.sh | ||
Tooling for verification of PGP signed commits
This is an incomplete work in progress, but currently includes a pre-push hook
script (pre-push-hook.sh) for maintainers to ensure that their own commits
are PGP signed (nearly always merge commits), as well as a script to verify
commits against a trusted keys list.
Using verify-commits.sh safely
Remember that you can't use an untrusted script to verify itself. This means
that checking out code, then running verify-commits.sh against HEAD is
not safe, because the version of verify-commits.sh that you just ran could
be backdoored. Instead, you need to use a trusted version of verify-commits
prior to checkout to make sure you're checking out only code signed by trusted
keys:
git fetch origin && \
./contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.sh origin/master && \
git checkout origin/master
Note that the above isn't a good UI/UX yet, and needs significant improvements to make it more convenient and reduce the chance of errors; pull-reqs improving this process would be much appreciated.
Configuration files
trusted-git-root: This file should contain a single git commit hash which is the first unsigned git commit (hence it is the "root of trust").trusted-sha512-root-commit: This file should contain a single git commit hash which is the first commit without a SHA512 root commitment.trusted-keys: This file should contain a \n-delimited list of all PGP fingerprints of authorized commit signers (primary, not subkeys).allow-revsig-commits: This file should contain a \n-delimited list of git commit hashes. See next section for more info.
Key expiry/revocation
When a key (or subkey) which has signed old commits expires or is revoked,
verify-commits will start failing to verify all commits which were signed by
said key. In order to avoid bumping the root-of-trust trusted-git-root
file, individual commits which were signed by such a key can be added to the
allow-revsig-commits file. That way, the PGP signatures are still verified
but no new commits can be signed by any expired/revoked key. To easily build a
list of commits which need to be added, verify-commits.sh can be edited to test
each commit with BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG set to both 1 and 0, and
those which need it set to 1 printed.