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87651795d8622d354f8e3c481eb868d9433b841c fuzz: check that ser+unser produces the same AddrMan (Vasil Dimov) 6408b24517f3418e2a408071b4c2ce26571f3167 fuzz: move init code to the CAddrManDeterministic constructor (Vasil Dimov) Pull request description: Add a fuzz test that fills addrman with a pile of randomly generated addresses, serializes it to a stream, unserializes the stream to another addrman object and compares the two. Some discussion of this already happened at https://github.com/jnewbery/bitcoin/pull/18. ACKs for top commit: practicalswift: cr ACK 87651795d8622d354f8e3c481eb868d9433b841c jonatack: ACK 87651795d8622d354f8e3c481eb868d9433b841c rebased to current master, reviewed, fuzz build, ran `FUZZ=addrman_serdeser src/test/fuzz/fuzz` Tree-SHA512: 7eda79279f14f2649840bf752e575d7b02cbaad541f74f7254855ebd4a32da988f042d78aa9228983350283bb74dd0c71f51f04c0846889c3ba2f19f01a0c303
816 lines
30 KiB
C++
816 lines
30 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2012 Pieter Wuille
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// Copyright (c) 2012-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#ifndef BITCOIN_ADDRMAN_H
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#define BITCOIN_ADDRMAN_H
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#include <clientversion.h>
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#include <config/bitcoin-config.h>
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#include <fs.h>
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#include <hash.h>
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#include <netaddress.h>
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#include <protocol.h>
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#include <random.h>
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#include <streams.h>
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#include <sync.h>
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#include <timedata.h>
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#include <tinyformat.h>
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#include <util/system.h>
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#include <ios>
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#include <optional>
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#include <set>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <unordered_map>
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#include <vector>
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/**
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* Extended statistics about a CAddress
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*/
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class CAddrInfo : public CAddress
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{
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public:
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//! last try whatsoever by us (memory only)
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int64_t nLastTry{0};
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//! last counted attempt (memory only)
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int64_t nLastCountAttempt{0};
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private:
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//! where knowledge about this address first came from
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CNetAddr source;
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//! last successful connection by us
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int64_t nLastSuccess{0};
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//! connection attempts since last successful attempt
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int nAttempts{0};
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//! reference count in new sets (memory only)
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int nRefCount{0};
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//! in tried set? (memory only)
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bool fInTried{false};
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//! position in vRandom
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mutable int nRandomPos{-1};
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friend class CAddrMan;
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friend class CAddrManDeterministic;
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public:
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SERIALIZE_METHODS(CAddrInfo, obj)
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{
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READWRITEAS(CAddress, obj);
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READWRITE(obj.source, obj.nLastSuccess, obj.nAttempts);
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}
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CAddrInfo(const CAddress &addrIn, const CNetAddr &addrSource) : CAddress(addrIn), source(addrSource)
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{
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}
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CAddrInfo() : CAddress(), source()
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{
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}
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//! Calculate in which "tried" bucket this entry belongs
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int GetTriedBucket(const uint256 &nKey, const std::vector<bool> &asmap) const;
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//! Calculate in which "new" bucket this entry belongs, given a certain source
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int GetNewBucket(const uint256 &nKey, const CNetAddr& src, const std::vector<bool> &asmap) const;
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//! Calculate in which "new" bucket this entry belongs, using its default source
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int GetNewBucket(const uint256 &nKey, const std::vector<bool> &asmap) const
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{
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return GetNewBucket(nKey, source, asmap);
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}
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//! Calculate in which position of a bucket to store this entry.
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int GetBucketPosition(const uint256 &nKey, bool fNew, int nBucket) const;
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//! Determine whether the statistics about this entry are bad enough so that it can just be deleted
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bool IsTerrible(int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime()) const;
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//! Calculate the relative chance this entry should be given when selecting nodes to connect to
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double GetChance(int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime()) const;
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};
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/** Stochastic address manager
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*
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* Design goals:
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* * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire table to peers.dat.
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* * Make sure no (localized) attacker can fill the entire table with his nodes/addresses.
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*
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* To that end:
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* * Addresses are organized into buckets that can each store up to 64 entries.
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* * Addresses to which our node has not successfully connected go into 1024 "new" buckets.
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* * Based on the address range (/16 for IPv4) of the source of information, or if an asmap is provided,
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* the AS it belongs to (for IPv4/IPv6), 64 buckets are selected at random.
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* * The actual bucket is chosen from one of these, based on the range in which the address itself is located.
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* * The position in the bucket is chosen based on the full address.
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* * One single address can occur in up to 8 different buckets to increase selection chances for addresses that
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* are seen frequently. The chance for increasing this multiplicity decreases exponentially.
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* * When adding a new address to an occupied position of a bucket, it will not replace the existing entry
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* unless that address is also stored in another bucket or it doesn't meet one of several quality criteria
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* (see IsTerrible for exact criteria).
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* * Addresses of nodes that are known to be accessible go into 256 "tried" buckets.
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* * Each address range selects at random 8 of these buckets.
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* * The actual bucket is chosen from one of these, based on the full address.
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* * When adding a new good address to an occupied position of a bucket, a FEELER connection to the
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* old address is attempted. The old entry is only replaced and moved back to the "new" buckets if this
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* attempt was unsuccessful.
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* * Bucket selection is based on cryptographic hashing, using a randomly-generated 256-bit key, which should not
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* be observable by adversaries.
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* * Several indexes are kept for high performance. Defining DEBUG_ADDRMAN will introduce frequent (and expensive)
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* consistency checks for the entire data structure.
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*/
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//! total number of buckets for tried addresses
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#define ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2 8
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//! total number of buckets for new addresses
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#define ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2 10
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//! maximum allowed number of entries in buckets for new and tried addresses
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#define ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE_LOG2 6
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//! over how many buckets entries with tried addresses from a single group (/16 for IPv4) are spread
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#define ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKETS_PER_GROUP 8
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//! over how many buckets entries with new addresses originating from a single group are spread
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#define ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKETS_PER_SOURCE_GROUP 64
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//! in how many buckets for entries with new addresses a single address may occur
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#define ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKETS_PER_ADDRESS 8
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//! how old addresses can maximally be
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#define ADDRMAN_HORIZON_DAYS 30
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//! after how many failed attempts we give up on a new node
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#define ADDRMAN_RETRIES 3
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//! how many successive failures are allowed ...
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#define ADDRMAN_MAX_FAILURES 10
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//! ... in at least this many days
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#define ADDRMAN_MIN_FAIL_DAYS 7
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//! how recent a successful connection should be before we allow an address to be evicted from tried
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#define ADDRMAN_REPLACEMENT_HOURS 4
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//! Convenience
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#define ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT (1 << ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2)
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#define ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT (1 << ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2)
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#define ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE (1 << ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE_LOG2)
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//! the maximum number of tried addr collisions to store
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#define ADDRMAN_SET_TRIED_COLLISION_SIZE 10
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//! the maximum time we'll spend trying to resolve a tried table collision, in seconds
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static const int64_t ADDRMAN_TEST_WINDOW = 40*60; // 40 minutes
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/**
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* Stochastical (IP) address manager
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*/
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class CAddrMan
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{
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public:
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// Compressed IP->ASN mapping, loaded from a file when a node starts.
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// Should be always empty if no file was provided.
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// This mapping is then used for bucketing nodes in Addrman.
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//
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// If asmap is provided, nodes will be bucketed by
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// AS they belong to, in order to make impossible for a node
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// to connect to several nodes hosted in a single AS.
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// This is done in response to Erebus attack, but also to generally
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// diversify the connections every node creates,
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// especially useful when a large fraction of nodes
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// operate under a couple of cloud providers.
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//
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// If a new asmap was provided, the existing records
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// would be re-bucketed accordingly.
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std::vector<bool> m_asmap;
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// Read asmap from provided binary file
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static std::vector<bool> DecodeAsmap(fs::path path);
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/**
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* Serialized format.
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* * format version byte (@see `Format`)
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* * lowest compatible format version byte. This is used to help old software decide
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* whether to parse the file. For example:
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* * Bitcoin Core version N knows how to parse up to format=3. If a new format=4 is
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* introduced in version N+1 that is compatible with format=3 and it is known that
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* version N will be able to parse it, then version N+1 will write
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* (format=4, lowest_compatible=3) in the first two bytes of the file, and so
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* version N will still try to parse it.
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* * Bitcoin Core version N+2 introduces a new incompatible format=5. It will write
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* (format=5, lowest_compatible=5) and so any versions that do not know how to parse
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* format=5 will not try to read the file.
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* * nKey
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* * nNew
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* * nTried
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* * number of "new" buckets XOR 2**30
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* * all new addresses (total count: nNew)
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* * all tried addresses (total count: nTried)
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* * for each new bucket:
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* * number of elements
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* * for each element: index in the serialized "all new addresses"
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* * asmap checksum
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*
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* 2**30 is xorred with the number of buckets to make addrman deserializer v0 detect it
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* as incompatible. This is necessary because it did not check the version number on
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* deserialization.
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*
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* vvNew, vvTried, mapInfo, mapAddr and vRandom are never encoded explicitly;
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* they are instead reconstructed from the other information.
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*
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* This format is more complex, but significantly smaller (at most 1.5 MiB), and supports
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* changes to the ADDRMAN_ parameters without breaking the on-disk structure.
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*
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* We don't use SERIALIZE_METHODS since the serialization and deserialization code has
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* very little in common.
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*/
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template <typename Stream>
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void Serialize(Stream& s_) const
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
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{
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LOCK(cs);
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// Always serialize in the latest version (FILE_FORMAT).
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OverrideStream<Stream> s(&s_, s_.GetType(), s_.GetVersion() | ADDRV2_FORMAT);
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s << static_cast<uint8_t>(FILE_FORMAT);
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// Increment `lowest_compatible` iff a newly introduced format is incompatible with
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// the previous one.
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static constexpr uint8_t lowest_compatible = Format::V3_BIP155;
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s << static_cast<uint8_t>(INCOMPATIBILITY_BASE + lowest_compatible);
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s << nKey;
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s << nNew;
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s << nTried;
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int nUBuckets = ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT ^ (1 << 30);
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s << nUBuckets;
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std::unordered_map<int, int> mapUnkIds;
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int nIds = 0;
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for (const auto& entry : mapInfo) {
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mapUnkIds[entry.first] = nIds;
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const CAddrInfo &info = entry.second;
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if (info.nRefCount) {
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assert(nIds != nNew); // this means nNew was wrong, oh ow
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s << info;
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nIds++;
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}
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}
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nIds = 0;
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for (const auto& entry : mapInfo) {
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const CAddrInfo &info = entry.second;
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if (info.fInTried) {
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assert(nIds != nTried); // this means nTried was wrong, oh ow
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s << info;
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nIds++;
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}
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}
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for (int bucket = 0; bucket < ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT; bucket++) {
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int nSize = 0;
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for (int i = 0; i < ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE; i++) {
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if (vvNew[bucket][i] != -1)
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nSize++;
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}
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s << nSize;
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for (int i = 0; i < ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE; i++) {
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if (vvNew[bucket][i] != -1) {
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int nIndex = mapUnkIds[vvNew[bucket][i]];
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s << nIndex;
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}
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}
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}
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// Store asmap checksum after bucket entries so that it
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// can be ignored by older clients for backward compatibility.
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uint256 asmap_checksum;
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if (m_asmap.size() != 0) {
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asmap_checksum = SerializeHash(m_asmap);
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}
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s << asmap_checksum;
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}
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template <typename Stream>
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void Unserialize(Stream& s_)
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
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{
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LOCK(cs);
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assert(vRandom.empty());
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Format format;
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s_ >> Using<CustomUintFormatter<1>>(format);
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int stream_version = s_.GetVersion();
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if (format >= Format::V3_BIP155) {
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// Add ADDRV2_FORMAT to the version so that the CNetAddr and CAddress
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// unserialize methods know that an address in addrv2 format is coming.
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stream_version |= ADDRV2_FORMAT;
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}
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OverrideStream<Stream> s(&s_, s_.GetType(), stream_version);
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uint8_t compat;
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s >> compat;
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const uint8_t lowest_compatible = compat - INCOMPATIBILITY_BASE;
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if (lowest_compatible > FILE_FORMAT) {
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throw std::ios_base::failure(strprintf(
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"Unsupported format of addrman database: %u. It is compatible with formats >=%u, "
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"but the maximum supported by this version of %s is %u.",
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format, lowest_compatible, PACKAGE_NAME, static_cast<uint8_t>(FILE_FORMAT)));
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}
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s >> nKey;
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s >> nNew;
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s >> nTried;
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int nUBuckets = 0;
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s >> nUBuckets;
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if (format >= Format::V1_DETERMINISTIC) {
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nUBuckets ^= (1 << 30);
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}
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if (nNew > ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT * ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE || nNew < 0) {
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throw std::ios_base::failure(
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strprintf("Corrupt CAddrMan serialization: nNew=%d, should be in [0, %u]",
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nNew,
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ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT * ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE));
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}
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if (nTried > ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT * ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE || nTried < 0) {
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throw std::ios_base::failure(
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strprintf("Corrupt CAddrMan serialization: nTried=%d, should be in [0, %u]",
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nTried,
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ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT * ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE));
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}
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// Deserialize entries from the new table.
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for (int n = 0; n < nNew; n++) {
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CAddrInfo &info = mapInfo[n];
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s >> info;
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mapAddr[info] = n;
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info.nRandomPos = vRandom.size();
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vRandom.push_back(n);
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}
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nIdCount = nNew;
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// Deserialize entries from the tried table.
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int nLost = 0;
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for (int n = 0; n < nTried; n++) {
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CAddrInfo info;
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s >> info;
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int nKBucket = info.GetTriedBucket(nKey, m_asmap);
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int nKBucketPos = info.GetBucketPosition(nKey, false, nKBucket);
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if (vvTried[nKBucket][nKBucketPos] == -1) {
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info.nRandomPos = vRandom.size();
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info.fInTried = true;
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vRandom.push_back(nIdCount);
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mapInfo[nIdCount] = info;
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mapAddr[info] = nIdCount;
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vvTried[nKBucket][nKBucketPos] = nIdCount;
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nIdCount++;
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} else {
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nLost++;
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}
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}
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nTried -= nLost;
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// Store positions in the new table buckets to apply later (if possible).
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// An entry may appear in up to ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKETS_PER_ADDRESS buckets,
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// so we store all bucket-entry_index pairs to iterate through later.
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std::vector<std::pair<int, int>> bucket_entries;
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for (int bucket = 0; bucket < nUBuckets; ++bucket) {
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int num_entries{0};
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s >> num_entries;
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for (int n = 0; n < num_entries; ++n) {
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int entry_index{0};
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s >> entry_index;
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if (entry_index >= 0 && entry_index < nNew) {
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bucket_entries.emplace_back(bucket, entry_index);
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}
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}
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}
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// If the bucket count and asmap checksum haven't changed, then attempt
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// to restore the entries to the buckets/positions they were in before
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// serialization.
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uint256 supplied_asmap_checksum;
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if (m_asmap.size() != 0) {
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supplied_asmap_checksum = SerializeHash(m_asmap);
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}
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uint256 serialized_asmap_checksum;
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if (format >= Format::V2_ASMAP) {
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s >> serialized_asmap_checksum;
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}
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const bool restore_bucketing{nUBuckets == ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT &&
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serialized_asmap_checksum == supplied_asmap_checksum};
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if (!restore_bucketing) {
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LogPrint(BCLog::ADDRMAN, "Bucketing method was updated, re-bucketing addrman entries from disk\n");
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}
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for (auto bucket_entry : bucket_entries) {
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int bucket{bucket_entry.first};
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const int entry_index{bucket_entry.second};
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CAddrInfo& info = mapInfo[entry_index];
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// The entry shouldn't appear in more than
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// ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKETS_PER_ADDRESS. If it has already, just skip
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// this bucket_entry.
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if (info.nRefCount >= ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKETS_PER_ADDRESS) continue;
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int bucket_position = info.GetBucketPosition(nKey, true, bucket);
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if (restore_bucketing && vvNew[bucket][bucket_position] == -1) {
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// Bucketing has not changed, using existing bucket positions for the new table
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vvNew[bucket][bucket_position] = entry_index;
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++info.nRefCount;
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} else {
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// In case the new table data cannot be used (bucket count wrong or new asmap),
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// try to give them a reference based on their primary source address.
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bucket = info.GetNewBucket(nKey, m_asmap);
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bucket_position = info.GetBucketPosition(nKey, true, bucket);
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if (vvNew[bucket][bucket_position] == -1) {
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vvNew[bucket][bucket_position] = entry_index;
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++info.nRefCount;
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}
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}
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}
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// Prune new entries with refcount 0 (as a result of collisions).
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int nLostUnk = 0;
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for (auto it = mapInfo.cbegin(); it != mapInfo.cend(); ) {
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if (it->second.fInTried == false && it->second.nRefCount == 0) {
|
|
const auto itCopy = it++;
|
|
Delete(itCopy->first);
|
|
++nLostUnk;
|
|
} else {
|
|
++it;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (nLost + nLostUnk > 0) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::ADDRMAN, "addrman lost %i new and %i tried addresses due to collisions\n", nLostUnk, nLost);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RemoveInvalid();
|
|
|
|
ResetI2PPorts();
|
|
|
|
Check();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Clear()
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
std::vector<int>().swap(vRandom);
|
|
nKey = insecure_rand.rand256();
|
|
for (size_t bucket = 0; bucket < ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT; bucket++) {
|
|
for (size_t entry = 0; entry < ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE; entry++) {
|
|
vvNew[bucket][entry] = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (size_t bucket = 0; bucket < ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT; bucket++) {
|
|
for (size_t entry = 0; entry < ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE; entry++) {
|
|
vvTried[bucket][entry] = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nIdCount = 0;
|
|
nTried = 0;
|
|
nNew = 0;
|
|
nLastGood = 1; //Initially at 1 so that "never" is strictly worse.
|
|
mapInfo.clear();
|
|
mapAddr.clear();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CAddrMan(bool _discriminatePorts = false) :
|
|
discriminatePorts(_discriminatePorts)
|
|
{
|
|
Clear();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
~CAddrMan()
|
|
{
|
|
nKey.SetNull();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Return the number of (unique) addresses in all tables.
|
|
size_t size() const
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs); // TODO: Cache this in an atomic to avoid this overhead
|
|
return vRandom.size();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Add a single address.
|
|
bool Add(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr& source, int64_t nTimePenalty = 0)
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
bool fRet = false;
|
|
Check();
|
|
fRet |= Add_(addr, source, nTimePenalty);
|
|
Check();
|
|
if (fRet) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::ADDRMAN, "Added %s from %s: %i tried, %i new\n", addr.ToStringIPPort(), source.ToString(), nTried, nNew);
|
|
}
|
|
return fRet;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Add multiple addresses.
|
|
bool Add(const std::vector<CAddress> &vAddr, const CNetAddr& source, int64_t nTimePenalty = 0)
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
int nAdd = 0;
|
|
Check();
|
|
for (std::vector<CAddress>::const_iterator it = vAddr.begin(); it != vAddr.end(); it++)
|
|
nAdd += Add_(*it, source, nTimePenalty) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
Check();
|
|
if (nAdd) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::ADDRMAN, "Added %i addresses from %s: %i tried, %i new\n", nAdd, source.ToString(), nTried, nNew);
|
|
}
|
|
return nAdd > 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Mark an entry as accessible.
|
|
void Good(const CService &addr, int64_t nTime = GetAdjustedTime())
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
Good_(addr, /* test_before_evict */ true, nTime);
|
|
Check();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Mark an entry as connection attempted to.
|
|
void Attempt(const CService &addr, bool fCountFailure, int64_t nTime = GetAdjustedTime())
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
Attempt_(addr, fCountFailure, nTime);
|
|
Check();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! See if any to-be-evicted tried table entries have been tested and if so resolve the collisions.
|
|
void ResolveCollisions()
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
ResolveCollisions_();
|
|
Check();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Randomly select an address in tried that another address is attempting to evict.
|
|
CAddrInfo SelectTriedCollision()
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
const CAddrInfo ret = SelectTriedCollision_();
|
|
Check();
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Choose an address to connect to.
|
|
*/
|
|
CAddrInfo Select(bool newOnly = false) const
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
const CAddrInfo addrRet = Select_(newOnly);
|
|
Check();
|
|
return addrRet;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Return all or many randomly selected addresses, optionally by network.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] max_addresses Maximum number of addresses to return (0 = all).
|
|
* @param[in] max_pct Maximum percentage of addresses to return (0 = all).
|
|
* @param[in] network Select only addresses of this network (nullopt = all).
|
|
*/
|
|
std::vector<CAddress> GetAddr(size_t max_addresses, size_t max_pct, std::optional<Network> network) const
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
std::vector<CAddress> vAddr;
|
|
GetAddr_(vAddr, max_addresses, max_pct, network);
|
|
Check();
|
|
return vAddr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Outer function for Connected_()
|
|
void Connected(const CService &addr, int64_t nTime = GetAdjustedTime())
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
Connected_(addr, nTime);
|
|
Check();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SetServices(const CService &addr, ServiceFlags nServices)
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
SetServices_(addr, nServices);
|
|
Check();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CAddrInfo GetAddressInfo(const CService& addr)
|
|
{
|
|
CAddrInfo addrRet;
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs);
|
|
Check();
|
|
addrRet = GetAddressInfo_(addr);
|
|
Check();
|
|
}
|
|
return addrRet;
|
|
}
|
|
protected:
|
|
//! secret key to randomize bucket select with
|
|
uint256 nKey;
|
|
|
|
//! Source of random numbers for randomization in inner loops
|
|
mutable FastRandomContext insecure_rand GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! A mutex to protect the inner data structures.
|
|
mutable Mutex cs;
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
//! Serialization versions.
|
|
enum Format : uint8_t {
|
|
V0_HISTORICAL = 0, //!< historic format, before commit e6b343d88
|
|
V1_DETERMINISTIC = 1, //!< for pre-asmap files
|
|
V2_ASMAP = 2, //!< for files including asmap version
|
|
V3_BIP155 = 3, //!< same as V2_ASMAP plus addresses are in BIP155 format
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
//! The maximum format this software knows it can unserialize. Also, we always serialize
|
|
//! in this format.
|
|
//! The format (first byte in the serialized stream) can be higher than this and
|
|
//! still this software may be able to unserialize the file - if the second byte
|
|
//! (see `lowest_compatible` in `Unserialize()`) is less or equal to this.
|
|
static constexpr Format FILE_FORMAT = Format::V3_BIP155;
|
|
|
|
//! The initial value of a field that is incremented every time an incompatible format
|
|
//! change is made (such that old software versions would not be able to parse and
|
|
//! understand the new file format). This is 32 because we overtook the "key size"
|
|
//! field which was 32 historically.
|
|
//! @note Don't increment this. Increment `lowest_compatible` in `Serialize()` instead.
|
|
static constexpr uint8_t INCOMPATIBILITY_BASE = 32;
|
|
|
|
//! last used nId
|
|
int nIdCount GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! table with information about all nIds
|
|
std::unordered_map<int, CAddrInfo> mapInfo GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! find an nId based on its network address
|
|
std::unordered_map<CNetAddr, int, CNetAddrHash> mapAddr GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! randomly-ordered vector of all nIds
|
|
//! This is mutable because it is unobservable outside the class, so any
|
|
//! changes to it (even in const methods) are also unobservable.
|
|
mutable std::vector<int> vRandom GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
// number of "tried" entries
|
|
int nTried GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! list of "tried" buckets
|
|
int vvTried[ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! number of (unique) "new" entries
|
|
int nNew GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! list of "new" buckets
|
|
int vvNew[ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! last time Good was called (memory only)
|
|
int64_t nLastGood GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
// discriminate entries based on port. Should be false on mainnet/testnet and can be true on devnet/regtest
|
|
bool discriminatePorts GUARDED_BY(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Holds addrs inserted into tried table that collide with existing entries. Test-before-evict discipline used to resolve these collisions.
|
|
std::set<int> m_tried_collisions;
|
|
|
|
//! Find an entry.
|
|
CAddrInfo* Find(const CService& addr, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Create a new entry and add it to the internal data structures mapInfo, mapAddr and vRandom.
|
|
CAddrInfo* Create(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr &addrSource, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Swap two elements in vRandom.
|
|
void SwapRandom(unsigned int nRandomPos1, unsigned int nRandomPos2) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Move an entry from the "new" table(s) to the "tried" table
|
|
void MakeTried(CAddrInfo& info, int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Delete an entry. It must not be in tried, and have refcount 0.
|
|
void Delete(int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Clear a position in a "new" table. This is the only place where entries are actually deleted.
|
|
void ClearNew(int nUBucket, int nUBucketPos) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Mark an entry "good", possibly moving it from "new" to "tried".
|
|
void Good_(const CService &addr, bool test_before_evict, int64_t time) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Add an entry to the "new" table.
|
|
bool Add_(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr& source, int64_t nTimePenalty) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Mark an entry as attempted to connect.
|
|
void Attempt_(const CService &addr, bool fCountFailure, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Select an address to connect to, if newOnly is set to true, only the new table is selected from.
|
|
CAddrInfo Select_(bool newOnly) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! See if any to-be-evicted tried table entries have been tested and if so resolve the collisions.
|
|
void ResolveCollisions_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Return a random to-be-evicted tried table address.
|
|
CAddrInfo SelectTriedCollision_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Consistency check
|
|
void Check() const
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ADDRMAN
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs);
|
|
const int err = Check_();
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ADDRMAN CONSISTENCY CHECK FAILED!!! err=%i\n", err);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ADDRMAN
|
|
//! Perform consistency check. Returns an error code or zero.
|
|
int Check_() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Return all or many randomly selected addresses, optionally by network.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] vAddr Vector of randomly selected addresses from vRandom.
|
|
* @param[in] max_addresses Maximum number of addresses to return (0 = all).
|
|
* @param[in] max_pct Maximum percentage of addresses to return (0 = all).
|
|
* @param[in] network Select only addresses of this network (nullopt = all).
|
|
*/
|
|
void GetAddr_(std::vector<CAddress>& vAddr, size_t max_addresses, size_t max_pct, std::optional<Network> network) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
/** We have successfully connected to this peer. Calling this function
|
|
* updates the CAddress's nTime, which is used in our IsTerrible()
|
|
* decisions and gossiped to peers. Callers should be careful that updating
|
|
* this information doesn't leak topology information to network spies.
|
|
*
|
|
* net_processing calls this function when it *disconnects* from a peer to
|
|
* not leak information about currently connected peers.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] addr The address of the peer we were connected to
|
|
* @param[in] nTime The time that we were last connected to this peer
|
|
*/
|
|
void Connected_(const CService& addr, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Update an entry's service bits.
|
|
void SetServices_(const CService &addr, ServiceFlags nServices) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Get address info for address
|
|
CAddrInfo GetAddressInfo_(const CService& addr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
//! Remove invalid addresses.
|
|
void RemoveInvalid() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Reset the ports of I2P peers to 0.
|
|
* This is needed as a temporary measure because now we enforce port 0 and
|
|
* only connect to I2P hosts if the port is 0, but in the early days some
|
|
* I2P addresses with port 8333 were rumoured and persisted into addrmans.
|
|
*/
|
|
void ResetI2PPorts() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
|
|
|
|
friend class CAddrManTest;
|
|
friend class CAddrManDeterministic;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif // BITCOIN_ADDRMAN_H
|