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3148450032
67f4e9c522 Include core_io.h from core_read.cpp (practicalswift)
eca9767673 Make reasoning about dependencies easier by not including unused dependencies (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Make reasoning about dependencies easier by not including unused dependencies.
Please note that the removed headers are _not_ "transitively included" by other still included headers. Thus the removals are real.
As an added bonus this change means less work for the preprocessor/compiler. At least 51 393 lines of code no longer needs to be processed:
```
$ git diff -u HEAD~1 | grep -E '^\-#include ' | cut -f2 -d"<" | cut -f1 -d">" | \
sed 's%^%src/%g' | xargs cat | wc -l
51393
```
Note that 51 393 is the lower bound: the real number is likely much higher when taking into account transitively included headers :-)
ACKs for commit 67f4e9:
Tree-SHA512: 0c8868aac59813f099ce53d5307eed7962dd6f2ff3546768ef9e5c4508b87f8210f1a22c7e826c3c06bebbf28bdbfcf1628ed354c2d0fdb9a31a42cefb8fdf13
Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com>
75 lines
3.0 KiB
C++
75 lines
3.0 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2015 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#include <consensus/merkle.h>
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#include <hash.h>
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/* WARNING! If you're reading this because you're learning about crypto
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and/or designing a new system that will use merkle trees, keep in mind
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that the following merkle tree algorithm has a serious flaw related to
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duplicate txids, resulting in a vulnerability (CVE-2012-2459).
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The reason is that if the number of hashes in the list at a given level
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is odd, the last one is duplicated before computing the next level (which
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is unusual in Merkle trees). This results in certain sequences of
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transactions leading to the same merkle root. For example, these two
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trees:
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A A
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/ \ / \
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B C B C
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/ \ | / \ / \
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D E F D E F F
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/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \
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1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 5 6
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for transaction lists [1,2,3,4,5,6] and [1,2,3,4,5,6,5,6] (where 5 and
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6 are repeated) result in the same root hash A (because the hash of both
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of (F) and (F,F) is C).
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The vulnerability results from being able to send a block with such a
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transaction list, with the same merkle root, and the same block hash as
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the original without duplication, resulting in failed validation. If the
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receiving node proceeds to mark that block as permanently invalid
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however, it will fail to accept further unmodified (and thus potentially
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valid) versions of the same block. We defend against this by detecting
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the case where we would hash two identical hashes at the end of the list
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together, and treating that identically to the block having an invalid
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merkle root. Assuming no double-SHA256 collisions, this will detect all
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known ways of changing the transactions without affecting the merkle
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root.
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*/
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uint256 ComputeMerkleRoot(std::vector<uint256> hashes, bool* mutated) {
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bool mutation = false;
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while (hashes.size() > 1) {
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if (mutated) {
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for (size_t pos = 0; pos + 1 < hashes.size(); pos += 2) {
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if (hashes[pos] == hashes[pos + 1]) mutation = true;
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}
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}
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if (hashes.size() & 1) {
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hashes.push_back(hashes.back());
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}
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SHA256D64(hashes[0].begin(), hashes[0].begin(), hashes.size() / 2);
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hashes.resize(hashes.size() / 2);
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}
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if (mutated) *mutated = mutation;
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if (hashes.size() == 0) return uint256();
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return hashes[0];
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}
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uint256 BlockMerkleRoot(const CBlock& block, bool* mutated)
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{
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std::vector<uint256> leaves;
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leaves.resize(block.vtx.size());
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for (size_t s = 0; s < block.vtx.size(); s++) {
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leaves[s] = block.vtx[s]->GetHash();
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}
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return ComputeMerkleRoot(std::move(leaves), mutated);
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}
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