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a52460d709
5a1f57646b qa: clean up assert_memory_usage_stable utility (James O'Beirne) 0cf1632f03 qa: fix p2p_invalid_messages on macOS (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: Infinite mea culpa for the number of problems with this test. This change bumps the acceptable RSS increase threshold from 3% to 50% when spamming the test node with junk 4MB messages. On [@MarcoFalke's macOS test build](https://travis-ci.org/MarcoFalke/btc_nightly) we see RSS grow ~14% from ~71MB to 81MB, so a 50% increase threshold should be more than sufficient to avoid spurious failures. Tree-SHA512: 150a7b88080fd883c7a5d0b9ffa470f61a97c4885fccc1a06fde6260aaef15640a7c1de7e89c581b245df7807d617ec3d86775330386ec5149ad567492fc5d31
176 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
Executable File
176 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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# Copyright (c) 2015-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers
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# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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"""Test node responses to invalid network messages."""
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import struct
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from test_framework import messages
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from test_framework.mininode import P2PDataStore
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from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework
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class msg_unrecognized:
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"""Nonsensical message. Modeled after similar types in test_framework.messages."""
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command = b'badmsg'
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def __init__(self, str_data):
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self.str_data = str_data.encode() if not isinstance(str_data, bytes) else str_data
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def serialize(self):
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return messages.ser_string(self.str_data)
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def __repr__(self):
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return "{}(data={})".format(self.command, self.str_data)
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class msg_nametoolong(msg_unrecognized):
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command = b'thisnameiswayyyyyyyyytoolong'
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class InvalidMessagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
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def set_test_params(self):
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self.num_nodes = 1
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self.setup_clean_chain = True
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def run_test(self):
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"""
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0. Send a bunch of large (3MB) messages of an unrecognized type. Check to see
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that it isn't an effective DoS against the node.
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1. Send an oversized (3MB+) message and check that we're disconnected.
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2. Send a few messages with an incorrect data size in the header, ensure the
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messages are ignored.
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3. Send an unrecognized message with a command name longer than 12 characters.
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"""
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node = self.nodes[0]
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self.node = node
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node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
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conn2 = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
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msg_limit = 3 * 1024 * 1024 # 3MB, per MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH
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valid_data_limit = msg_limit - 5 # Account for the 4-byte length prefix
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#
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# 0.
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#
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# Send as large a message as is valid, ensure we aren't disconnected but
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# also can't exhaust resources.
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#
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msg_at_size = msg_unrecognized("b" * valid_data_limit)
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assert len(msg_at_size.serialize()) == msg_limit
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with node.assert_memory_usage_stable(increase_allowed=0.5):
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self.log.info(
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"Sending a bunch of large, junk messages to test "
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"memory exhaustion. May take a bit...")
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# Run a bunch of times to test for memory exhaustion.
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for _ in range(80):
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node.p2p.send_message(msg_at_size)
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# Check that, even though the node is being hammered by nonsense from one
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# connection, it can still service other peers in a timely way.
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for _ in range(20):
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conn2.sync_with_ping(timeout=2)
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# Peer 1, despite serving up a bunch of nonsense, should still be connected.
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self.log.info("Waiting for node to drop junk messages.")
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node.p2p.sync_with_ping(timeout=30)
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assert node.p2p.is_connected
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#
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# 1.
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#
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# Send an oversized message, ensure we're disconnected.
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#
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msg_over_size = msg_unrecognized("b" * (valid_data_limit + 1))
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assert len(msg_over_size.serialize()) == (msg_limit + 1)
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with node.assert_debug_log(["Oversized message from peer=0, disconnecting"]):
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# An unknown message type (or *any* message type) over
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# MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH should result in a disconnect.
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node.p2p.send_message(msg_over_size)
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node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=4)
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node.disconnect_p2ps()
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conn = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
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conn.wait_for_verack()
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#
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# 2.
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#
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# Send messages with an incorrect data size in the header.
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#
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actual_size = 100
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msg = msg_unrecognized("b" * actual_size)
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# TODO: handle larger-than cases. I haven't been able to pin down what behavior to expect.
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for wrong_size in (2, 77, 78, 79):
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self.log.info("Sending a message with incorrect size of {}".format(wrong_size))
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# Unmodified message should submit okay.
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node.p2p.send_and_ping(msg)
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# A message lying about its data size results in a disconnect when the incorrect
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# data size is less than the actual size.
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#
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# TODO: why does behavior change at 78 bytes?
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#
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node.p2p.send_raw_message(self._tweak_msg_data_size(msg, wrong_size))
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# For some reason unknown to me, we sometimes have to push additional data to the
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# peer in order for it to realize a disconnect.
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try:
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node.p2p.send_message(messages.msg_ping(nonce=123123))
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except IOError:
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pass
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node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=10)
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node.disconnect_p2ps()
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node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
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#
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# 3.
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#
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# Send a message with a too-long command name.
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#
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node.p2p.send_message(msg_nametoolong("foobar"))
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node.p2p.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=4)
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# Node is still up.
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conn = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
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conn.sync_with_ping()
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def _tweak_msg_data_size(self, message, wrong_size):
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"""
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Return a raw message based on another message but with an incorrect data size in
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the message header.
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"""
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raw_msg = self.node.p2p.build_message(message)
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bad_size_bytes = struct.pack("<I", wrong_size)
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num_header_bytes_before_size = 4 + 12
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# Replace the correct data size in the message with an incorrect one.
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raw_msg_with_wrong_size = (
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raw_msg[:num_header_bytes_before_size] +
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bad_size_bytes +
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raw_msg[(num_header_bytes_before_size + len(bad_size_bytes)):]
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)
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assert len(raw_msg) == len(raw_msg_with_wrong_size)
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return raw_msg_with_wrong_size
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if __name__ == '__main__':
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InvalidMessagesTest().main()
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