c2b8e5f0c9
fdf82ba18 Update all subprocess.check_output functions in CI scripts to be Python 3.4 compatible (Graham Krizek) Pull request description: CI is failing the `lint` stage on every Cron run (regular PR/Push runs still pass). The failure was introduced in 74ce326 and has been broken since. The Python version running in CI was downgraded to 3.4 from 3.6. There were a couple files that were using the `encoding` argument in the `subprocess.check_output` function. This was introduced in Python 3.6 and therefore broke the scripts that were using it. The `universal_newlines` argument was used as well, but in order to use it we must be able to set encoding because of issues on some BSD systems. To get CI to pass, I removed all `universal_newline` and `encoding` args to the `check_ouput` function. Then I decoded all `check_output` return values. This should keep the same behavior but be Python 3.4 compatible. Tree-SHA512: f5e5885e98cf4777be9cc254446a873eedb03bdccbd8e06772a964db95e9fcf46736aa9cdcab1d8f123ea9f4947ed6020679898d8b2f47ffb1d94c21a4b08209 |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| allow-incorrect-sha512-commits | ||
| allow-revsig-commits | ||
| allow-unclean-merge-commits | ||
| gpg.sh | ||
| pre-push-hook.sh | ||
| README.md | ||
| trusted-git-root | ||
| trusted-keys | ||
| trusted-sha512-root-commit | ||
| verify-commits.py | ||
Tooling for verification of PGP signed commits
This is an incomplete work in progress, but currently includes a pre-push hook
script (pre-push-hook.sh) for maintainers to ensure that their own commits
are PGP signed (nearly always merge commits), as well as a Python 3 script to verify
commits against a trusted keys list.
Using verify-commits.py safely
Remember that you can't use an untrusted script to verify itself. This means
that checking out code, then running verify-commits.py against HEAD is
not safe, because the version of verify-commits.py that you just ran could
be backdoored. Instead, you need to use a trusted version of verify-commits
prior to checkout to make sure you're checking out only code signed by trusted
keys:
git fetch origin && \
./contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.py origin/master && \
git checkout origin/master
Note that the above isn't a good UI/UX yet, and needs significant improvements to make it more convenient and reduce the chance of errors; pull-reqs improving this process would be much appreciated.
Configuration files
trusted-git-root: This file should contain a single git commit hash which is the first unsigned git commit (hence it is the "root of trust").trusted-sha512-root-commit: This file should contain a single git commit hash which is the first commit without a SHA512 root commitment.trusted-keys: This file should contain a \n-delimited list of all PGP fingerprints of authorized commit signers (primary, not subkeys).allow-revsig-commits: This file should contain a \n-delimited list of git commit hashes. See next section for more info.
Import trusted keys
In order to check the commit signatures you must add the trusted PGP keys to your machine. This can be done in Linux by running
gpg --recv-keys $(<contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys)
Key expiry/revocation
When a key (or subkey) which has signed old commits expires or is revoked,
verify-commits will start failing to verify all commits which were signed by
said key. In order to avoid bumping the root-of-trust trusted-git-root
file, individual commits which were signed by such a key can be added to the
allow-revsig-commits file. That way, the PGP signatures are still verified
but no new commits can be signed by any expired/revoked key. To easily build a
list of commits which need to be added, verify-commits.py can be edited to test
each commit with BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG set to both 1 and 0, and
those which need it set to 1 printed.