725b79a [test] Verify node doesn't send headers that haven't been fully validated (Russell Yanofsky)
3788a84 Do not send (potentially) invalid headers in response to getheaders (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
Nowhere else in the protocol do we send headers which are for
blocks we have not fully validated except in response to getheaders
messages with a null locator. On my public node I have not seen any
such request (whether for an invalid block or not) in at least two
years of debug.log output, indicating that this should have minimal
impact.
Tree-SHA512: c1f6e0cdcdfb78ea577d555f9b3ceb1b4b60eff4f6cf313bfd8b576c9562d797bea73abc23f7011f249ae36dd539c715f3d20487ac03ace60e84e1b77c0c1e1a
eff4bd8 [test] P2P functional test for certain fingerprinting protections (Jim Posen)
a2be3b6 [net] Ignore getheaders requests for very old side blocks (Jim Posen)
Pull request description:
Sending a getheaders message with an empty locator and a stop hash is a request for a single header by hash. The node will respond with headers for blocks not in the main chain as well as those in the main chain. To avoid fingerprinting, the node should, however, ignore requests for headers on side branches that are too old. This replicates the logic that currently exists for `getdata` requests for blocks.
Tree-SHA512: e04ef61e2b73945be6ec5977b3c5680b6dc3667246f8bfb67afae1ecaba900c0b49b18bbbb74869f7a37ef70b6ed99e78ebe0ea0a1569369fad9e447d720ffc4
b49ad44 Add comment about cs_most_recent_block coverage (Matt Corallo)
c47f5b7 Cache witness-enabled state with recent-compact-block-cache (Matt Corallo)
efc135f Use cached [compact] blocks to respond to getdata messages (Matt Corallo)
Tree-SHA512: ffc478bddbf14b8ed304a3041f47746520ce545bdeffa9652eff2ccb25c8b0d5194abe72568c10f9c1b246ee361176ba217767af834752a2ca7263d292005e87
This seems to be backported wrongly. In the Bitcoin code, there is a
condition on requested witness data and we took the other branch which
recreates the compact block. We should have taken the other branch because
we always send with witness data (there is no Segwit in Dash).
It's actually not true that these should always be the same. In case a
quorum is built and the total number of masternodes in the network is below
the quorum size, we might still end up having a valid quorum as long as
the total number of masternodes is >= minSize.
These tend to fail quite often on Travis due to multiple reasons. One
reason is that establishing intra quorum connections take some time and
the tests in dip3-deterministicmns.py did not sleep long enough. Another
reason is that the individual stages were not really checked for completion
but instead just a hardcoded sleep was used. And another reason was that
with a total of 13 MNs, it's not guaranteed that every DKG results in one
MN to be punished.
* Fix remaining `print`s in tests
* use AssertLockHeld(cs) instead of relying on comments
* actually use `clsig` in `EnforceBestChainLock()`
* fix log output in `EnforceBestChainLock()`
* drop comments
* Fix deadlock in CSigSharesManager::SendMessages
Locking "cs" at this location caused a (potential) deadlock due to changed
order of cs and cs_vNodes locking. This changes the method to not require
the session object anymore which removes the need for locking.
* Pass size of LLMQ instead of llmqType into CSigSharesInv::Init
This allows use of sizes which are not supported in chainparams.
