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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
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// Copyright (c) 2009-2015 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Copyright (c) 2014-2019 The Dash Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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# if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
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# include "config/dash-config.h"
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# endif
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# include "net.h"
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# include "netmessagemaker.h"
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# include "addrman.h"
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# include "chainparams.h"
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# include "clientversion.h"
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# include "consensus/consensus.h"
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# include "crypto/common.h"
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# include "crypto/sha256.h"
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# include "hash.h"
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# include "primitives/transaction.h"
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# include "netbase.h"
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# include "scheduler.h"
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# include "ui_interface.h"
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# include "utilstrencodings.h"
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# include "validation.h"
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# include "masternode/masternode-sync.h"
# include "privatesend/privatesend.h"
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# include "evo/deterministicmns.h"
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# ifdef WIN32
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# include <string.h>
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# else
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# include <fcntl.h>
# endif
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# ifdef USE_UPNP
# include <miniupnpc/miniupnpc.h>
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# include <miniupnpc/miniwget.h>
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# include <miniupnpc/upnpcommands.h>
# include <miniupnpc/upnperrors.h>
# endif
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# include <math.h>
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// Dump addresses to peers.dat and banlist.dat every 15 minutes (900s)
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# define DUMP_ADDRESSES_INTERVAL 900
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// We add a random period time (0 to 1 seconds) to feeler connections to prevent synchronization.
# define FEELER_SLEEP_WINDOW 1
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# if !defined(HAVE_MSG_NOSIGNAL)
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# define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0
# endif
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// MSG_DONTWAIT is not available on some platforms, if it doesn't exist define it as 0
# if !defined(HAVE_MSG_DONTWAIT)
# define MSG_DONTWAIT 0
# endif
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// Fix for ancient MinGW versions, that don't have defined these in ws2tcpip.h.
// Todo: Can be removed when our pull-tester is upgraded to a modern MinGW version.
# ifdef WIN32
# ifndef PROTECTION_LEVEL_UNRESTRICTED
# define PROTECTION_LEVEL_UNRESTRICTED 10
# endif
# ifndef IPV6_PROTECTION_LEVEL
# define IPV6_PROTECTION_LEVEL 23
# endif
# endif
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/** Used to pass flags to the Bind() function */
enum BindFlags {
BF_NONE = 0 ,
BF_EXPLICIT = ( 1U < < 0 ) ,
BF_REPORT_ERROR = ( 1U < < 1 ) ,
BF_WHITELIST = ( 1U < < 2 ) ,
} ;
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const static std : : string NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER = " *other* " ;
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constexpr const CConnman : : CFullyConnectedOnly CConnman : : FullyConnectedOnly ;
constexpr const CConnman : : CAllNodes CConnman : : AllNodes ;
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static const uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_NETGROUP = 0x6c0edd8036ef4036ULL ; // SHA256("netgroup")[0:8]
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static const uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_LOCALHOSTNONCE = 0xd93e69e2bbfa5735ULL ; // SHA256("localhostnonce")[0:8]
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//
// Global state variables
//
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bool fDiscover = true ;
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bool fListen = true ;
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bool fRelayTxes = true ;
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CCriticalSection cs_mapLocalHost ;
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std : : map < CNetAddr , LocalServiceInfo > mapLocalHost ;
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static bool vfLimited [ NET_MAX ] = { } ;
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std : : string strSubVersion ;
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unordered_limitedmap < uint256 , int64_t , StaticSaltedHasher > mapAlreadyAskedFor ( MAX_INV_SZ , MAX_INV_SZ * 2 ) ;
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Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
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void CConnman : : AddOneShot ( const std : : string & strDest )
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{
LOCK ( cs_vOneShots ) ;
vOneShots . push_back ( strDest ) ;
}
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unsigned short GetListenPort ( )
{
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return ( unsigned short ) ( gArgs . GetArg ( " -port " , Params ( ) . GetDefaultPort ( ) ) ) ;
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}
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// find 'best' local address for a particular peer
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bool GetLocal ( CService & addr , const CNetAddr * paddrPeer )
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{
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if ( ! fListen )
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return false ;
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int nBestScore = - 1 ;
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int nBestReachability = - 1 ;
{
LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
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for ( std : : map < CNetAddr , LocalServiceInfo > : : iterator it = mapLocalHost . begin ( ) ; it ! = mapLocalHost . end ( ) ; it + + )
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{
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int nScore = ( * it ) . second . nScore ;
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int nReachability = ( * it ) . first . GetReachabilityFrom ( paddrPeer ) ;
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if ( nReachability > nBestReachability | | ( nReachability = = nBestReachability & & nScore > nBestScore ) )
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{
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addr = CService ( ( * it ) . first , ( * it ) . second . nPort ) ;
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nBestReachability = nReachability ;
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nBestScore = nScore ;
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}
}
}
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return nBestScore > = 0 ;
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}
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//! Convert the pnSeeds6 array into usable address objects.
static std : : vector < CAddress > convertSeed6 ( const std : : vector < SeedSpec6 > & vSeedsIn )
{
// It'll only connect to one or two seed nodes because once it connects,
// it'll get a pile of addresses with newer timestamps.
// Seed nodes are given a random 'last seen time' of between one and two
// weeks ago.
const int64_t nOneWeek = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 ;
std : : vector < CAddress > vSeedsOut ;
vSeedsOut . reserve ( vSeedsIn . size ( ) ) ;
for ( std : : vector < SeedSpec6 > : : const_iterator i ( vSeedsIn . begin ( ) ) ; i ! = vSeedsIn . end ( ) ; + + i )
{
struct in6_addr ip ;
memcpy ( & ip , i - > addr , sizeof ( ip ) ) ;
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CAddress addr ( CService ( ip , i - > port ) , NODE_NETWORK ) ;
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addr . nTime = GetTime ( ) - GetRand ( nOneWeek ) - nOneWeek ;
vSeedsOut . push_back ( addr ) ;
}
return vSeedsOut ;
}
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// get best local address for a particular peer as a CAddress
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// Otherwise, return the unroutable 0.0.0.0 but filled in with
// the normal parameters, since the IP may be changed to a useful
// one by discovery.
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
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CAddress GetLocalAddress ( const CNetAddr * paddrPeer , ServiceFlags nLocalServices )
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{
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CAddress ret ( CService ( CNetAddr ( ) , GetListenPort ( ) ) , nLocalServices ) ;
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CService addr ;
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if ( GetLocal ( addr , paddrPeer ) )
{
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ret = CAddress ( addr , nLocalServices ) ;
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}
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ret . nTime = GetAdjustedTime ( ) ;
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return ret ;
}
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int GetnScore ( const CService & addr )
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{
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LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
if ( mapLocalHost . count ( addr ) = = LOCAL_NONE )
return 0 ;
return mapLocalHost [ addr ] . nScore ;
}
// Is our peer's addrLocal potentially useful as an external IP source?
bool IsPeerAddrLocalGood ( CNode * pnode )
{
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CService addrLocal = pnode - > GetAddrLocal ( ) ;
return fDiscover & & pnode - > addr . IsRoutable ( ) & & addrLocal . IsRoutable ( ) & &
! IsLimited ( addrLocal . GetNetwork ( ) ) ;
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}
// pushes our own address to a peer
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void AdvertiseLocal ( CNode * pnode )
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{
if ( fListen & & pnode - > fSuccessfullyConnected )
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{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
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CAddress addrLocal = GetLocalAddress ( & pnode - > addr , pnode - > GetLocalServices ( ) ) ;
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// If discovery is enabled, sometimes give our peer the address it
// tells us that it sees us as in case it has a better idea of our
// address than we do.
if ( IsPeerAddrLocalGood ( pnode ) & & ( ! addrLocal . IsRoutable ( ) | |
GetRand ( ( GetnScore ( addrLocal ) > LOCAL_MANUAL ) ? 8 : 2 ) = = 0 ) )
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{
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addrLocal . SetIP ( pnode - > GetAddrLocal ( ) ) ;
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}
if ( addrLocal . IsRoutable ( ) )
{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " AdvertiseLocal: advertising address %s \n " , addrLocal . ToString ( ) ) ;
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FastRandomContext insecure_rand ;
pnode - > PushAddress ( addrLocal , insecure_rand ) ;
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}
}
}
// learn a new local address
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bool AddLocal ( const CService & addr , int nScore )
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{
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if ( ! addr . IsRoutable ( ) & & Params ( ) . RequireRoutableExternalIP ( ) )
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return false ;
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if ( ! fDiscover & & nScore < LOCAL_MANUAL )
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return false ;
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if ( IsLimited ( addr ) )
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return false ;
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LogPrintf ( " AddLocal(%s,%i) \n " , addr . ToString ( ) , nScore ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
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bool fAlready = mapLocalHost . count ( addr ) > 0 ;
LocalServiceInfo & info = mapLocalHost [ addr ] ;
if ( ! fAlready | | nScore > = info . nScore ) {
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info . nScore = nScore + ( fAlready ? 1 : 0 ) ;
info . nPort = addr . GetPort ( ) ;
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}
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}
return true ;
}
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bool AddLocal ( const CNetAddr & addr , int nScore )
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{
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return AddLocal ( CService ( addr , GetListenPort ( ) ) , nScore ) ;
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}
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bool RemoveLocal ( const CService & addr )
{
LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
LogPrintf ( " RemoveLocal(%s) \n " , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
mapLocalHost . erase ( addr ) ;
return true ;
}
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/** Make a particular network entirely off-limits (no automatic connects to it) */
void SetLimited ( enum Network net , bool fLimited )
{
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if ( net = = NET_UNROUTABLE | | net = = NET_INTERNAL )
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return ;
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LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
vfLimited [ net ] = fLimited ;
}
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bool IsLimited ( enum Network net )
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{
LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
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return vfLimited [ net ] ;
}
bool IsLimited ( const CNetAddr & addr )
{
return IsLimited ( addr . GetNetwork ( ) ) ;
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}
/** vote for a local address */
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bool SeenLocal ( const CService & addr )
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{
{
LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
if ( mapLocalHost . count ( addr ) = = 0 )
return false ;
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mapLocalHost [ addr ] . nScore + + ;
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}
return true ;
}
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/** check whether a given address is potentially local */
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bool IsLocal ( const CService & addr )
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{
LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
return mapLocalHost . count ( addr ) > 0 ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2014-07-30 15:31:36 +02:00
/** check whether a given network is one we can probably connect to */
bool IsReachable ( enum Network net )
2012-04-10 20:22:04 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_mapLocalHost ) ;
2016-02-18 07:44:32 +01:00
return ! vfLimited [ net ] ;
2012-04-10 20:22:04 +02:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2012-05-04 16:46:22 +02:00
/** check whether a given address is in a network we can probably connect to */
2012-04-10 20:22:04 +02:00
bool IsReachable ( const CNetAddr & addr )
2010-12-15 23:43:51 +01:00
{
2012-05-04 16:46:22 +02:00
enum Network net = addr . GetNetwork ( ) ;
2014-07-30 15:31:36 +02:00
return IsReachable ( net ) ;
2010-12-15 23:43:51 +01:00
}
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode * CConnman : : FindNode ( const CNetAddr & ip )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2013-04-04 11:30:55 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes )
2013-04-04 11:30:55 +02:00
if ( ( CNetAddr ) pnode - > addr = = ip )
return ( pnode ) ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode * CConnman : : FindNode ( const CSubNet & subNet )
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes )
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
if ( subNet . Match ( ( CNetAddr ) pnode - > addr ) )
return ( pnode ) ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode * CConnman : : FindNode ( const std : : string & addrName )
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
if ( pnode - > GetAddrName ( ) = = addrName ) {
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
return ( pnode ) ;
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
}
}
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode * CConnman : : FindNode ( const CService & addr )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2013-04-04 11:30:55 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes )
2017-07-13 08:07:50 +02:00
if ( ( CService ) pnode - > addr = = addr )
return ( pnode ) ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : CheckIncomingNonce ( uint64_t nonce )
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( ! pnode - > fSuccessfullyConnected & & ! pnode - > fInbound & & pnode - > GetLocalNonce ( ) = = nonce )
return false ;
}
return true ;
}
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
/** Get the bind address for a socket as CAddress */
static CAddress GetBindAddress ( SOCKET sock )
{
CAddress addr_bind ;
struct sockaddr_storage sockaddr_bind ;
socklen_t sockaddr_bind_len = sizeof ( sockaddr_bind ) ;
if ( sock ! = INVALID_SOCKET ) {
if ( ! getsockname ( sock , ( struct sockaddr * ) & sockaddr_bind , & sockaddr_bind_len ) ) {
addr_bind . SetSockAddr ( ( const struct sockaddr * ) & sockaddr_bind ) ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Warning: getsockname failed \n " ) ;
}
}
return addr_bind ;
}
2018-01-17 16:09:08 +01:00
CNode * CConnman : : ConnectNode ( CAddress addrConnect , const char * pszDest , bool fCountFailure )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
if ( pszDest = = nullptr ) {
2018-07-07 23:19:33 +02:00
bool fAllowLocal = Params ( ) . AllowMultiplePorts ( ) & & addrConnect . GetPort ( ) ! = GetListenPort ( ) ;
if ( ! fAllowLocal & & IsLocal ( addrConnect ) ) {
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2018-07-07 23:19:33 +02:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
// Look for an existing connection
CNode * pnode = FindNode ( ( CService ) addrConnect ) ;
if ( pnode )
{
2017-01-24 22:51:22 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " Failed to open new connection, already connected \n " ) ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
/// debug print
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
if ( fLogIPs ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " trying connection %s lastseen=%.1fhrs \n " ,
pszDest ? pszDest : addrConnect . ToString ( ) ,
pszDest ? 0.0 : ( double ) ( GetAdjustedTime ( ) - addrConnect . nTime ) / 3600.0 ) ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " trying connection lastseen=%.1fhrs \n " ,
pszDest ? 0.0 : ( double ) ( GetAdjustedTime ( ) - addrConnect . nTime ) / 3600.0 ) ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Connect
SOCKET hSocket ;
2014-12-02 17:43:42 +01:00
bool proxyConnectionFailed = false ;
if ( pszDest ? ConnectSocketByName ( addrConnect , hSocket , pszDest , Params ( ) . GetDefaultPort ( ) , nConnectTimeout , & proxyConnectionFailed ) :
ConnectSocket ( addrConnect , hSocket , nConnectTimeout , & proxyConnectionFailed ) )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2015-07-10 00:23:27 +02:00
if ( ! IsSelectableSocket ( hSocket ) ) {
LogPrintf ( " Cannot create connection: non-selectable socket created (fd >= FD_SETSIZE ?) \n " ) ;
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2015-07-10 00:23:27 +02:00
}
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
if ( pszDest & & addrConnect . IsValid ( ) ) {
// It is possible that we already have a connection to the IP/port pszDest resolved to.
// In that case, drop the connection that was just created, and return the existing CNode instead.
// Also store the name we used to connect in that CNode, so that future FindNode() calls to that
// name catch this early.
2017-08-29 01:51:56 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
CNode * pnode = FindNode ( ( CService ) addrConnect ) ;
if ( pnode )
{
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
pnode - > MaybeSetAddrName ( std : : string ( pszDest ) ) ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
2017-01-24 22:51:22 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " Failed to open new connection, already connected \n " ) ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
}
}
2016-06-08 12:58:21 +02:00
addrman . Attempt ( addrConnect , fCountFailure ) ;
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Add node
2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
NodeId id = GetNewNodeId ( ) ;
uint64_t nonce = GetDeterministicRandomizer ( RANDOMIZER_ID_LOCALHOSTNONCE ) . Write ( id ) . Finalize ( ) ;
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
CAddress addr_bind = GetBindAddress ( hSocket ) ;
CNode * pnode = new CNode ( id , nLocalServices , GetBestHeight ( ) , hSocket , addrConnect , CalculateKeyedNetGroup ( addrConnect ) , nonce , addr_bind , pszDest ? pszDest : " " , false ) ;
2018-01-17 16:09:08 +01:00
pnode - > AddRef ( ) ;
2014-02-27 02:55:04 +01:00
2017-02-02 09:22:47 +01:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return pnode ;
2014-12-02 17:43:42 +01:00
} else if ( ! proxyConnectionFailed ) {
// If connecting to the node failed, and failure is not caused by a problem connecting to
// the proxy, mark this as an attempt.
2016-06-08 12:58:21 +02:00
addrman . Attempt ( addrConnect , fCountFailure ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
2014-05-24 11:14:52 +02:00
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return nullptr ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : DumpBanlist ( )
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
SweepBanned ( ) ; // clean unused entries (if bantime has expired)
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( ! BannedSetIsDirty ( ) )
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
return ;
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
CBanDB bandb ;
banmap_t banmap ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
GetBanned ( banmap ) ;
2017-05-02 17:09:25 +02:00
if ( bandb . Write ( banmap ) ) {
SetBannedSetDirty ( false ) ;
}
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Flushed %d banned node ips/subnets to banlist.dat %dms \n " ,
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
banmap . size ( ) , GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStart ) ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
void CNode : : CloseSocketDisconnect ( )
{
fDisconnect = true ;
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
LOCK ( cs_hSocket ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
if ( hSocket ! = INVALID_SOCKET )
{
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " disconnecting peer=%d \n " , id ) ;
2014-07-10 12:13:03 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : ClearBanned ( )
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
{
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
setBanned . clear ( ) ;
setBannedIsDirty = true ;
}
DumpBanlist ( ) ; //store banlist to disk
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( clientInterface )
clientInterface - > BannedListChanged ( ) ;
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : IsBanned ( CNetAddr ip )
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
{
2017-06-13 00:40:18 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
for ( banmap_t : : iterator it = setBanned . begin ( ) ; it ! = setBanned . end ( ) ; it + + )
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
{
2017-06-13 00:40:18 +02:00
CSubNet subNet = ( * it ) . first ;
CBanEntry banEntry = ( * it ) . second ;
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
2017-06-13 00:40:18 +02:00
if ( subNet . Match ( ip ) & & GetTime ( ) < banEntry . nBanUntil ) {
return true ;
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
}
}
2017-06-13 00:40:18 +02:00
return false ;
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : IsBanned ( CSubNet subnet )
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
{
2017-06-13 00:40:18 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
banmap_t : : iterator i = setBanned . find ( subnet ) ;
if ( i ! = setBanned . end ( ) )
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
{
2017-06-13 00:40:18 +02:00
CBanEntry banEntry = ( * i ) . second ;
if ( GetTime ( ) < banEntry . nBanUntil ) {
return true ;
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
}
}
2017-06-13 00:40:18 +02:00
return false ;
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : Ban ( const CNetAddr & addr , const BanReason & banReason , int64_t bantimeoffset , bool sinceUnixEpoch ) {
2015-06-29 20:37:22 +02:00
CSubNet subNet ( addr ) ;
2015-06-26 21:38:33 +02:00
Ban ( subNet , banReason , bantimeoffset , sinceUnixEpoch ) ;
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : Ban ( const CSubNet & subNet , const BanReason & banReason , int64_t bantimeoffset , bool sinceUnixEpoch ) {
2015-06-26 21:38:33 +02:00
CBanEntry banEntry ( GetTime ( ) ) ;
banEntry . banReason = banReason ;
if ( bantimeoffset < = 0 )
{
2019-06-24 18:44:27 +02:00
bantimeoffset = gArgs . GetArg ( " -bantime " , DEFAULT_MISBEHAVING_BANTIME ) ;
2015-06-26 21:38:33 +02:00
sinceUnixEpoch = false ;
}
banEntry . nBanUntil = ( sinceUnixEpoch ? 0 : GetTime ( ) ) + bantimeoffset ;
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
if ( setBanned [ subNet ] . nBanUntil < banEntry . nBanUntil ) {
setBanned [ subNet ] = banEntry ;
setBannedIsDirty = true ;
}
else
return ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( clientInterface )
clientInterface - > BannedListChanged ( ) ;
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
if ( subNet . Match ( ( CNetAddr ) pnode - > addr ) )
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
}
if ( banReason = = BanReasonManuallyAdded )
DumpBanlist ( ) ; //store banlist to disk immediately if user requested ban
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : Unban ( const CNetAddr & addr ) {
2015-06-29 20:37:22 +02:00
CSubNet subNet ( addr ) ;
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
return Unban ( subNet ) ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : Unban ( const CSubNet & subNet ) {
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
if ( ! setBanned . erase ( subNet ) )
return false ;
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
setBannedIsDirty = true ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( clientInterface )
clientInterface - > BannedListChanged ( ) ;
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
DumpBanlist ( ) ; //store banlist to disk immediately
return true ;
2015-05-19 10:07:23 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : GetBanned ( banmap_t & banMap )
2015-05-19 10:07:23 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
2017-05-02 17:09:25 +02:00
// Sweep the banlist so expired bans are not returned
SweepBanned ( ) ;
2015-05-19 10:07:23 +02:00
banMap = setBanned ; //create a thread safe copy
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : SetBanned ( const banmap_t & banMap )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
setBanned = banMap ;
setBannedIsDirty = true ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : SweepBanned ( )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
int64_t now = GetTime ( ) ;
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
2015-06-26 21:38:33 +02:00
banmap_t : : iterator it = setBanned . begin ( ) ;
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
while ( it ! = setBanned . end ( ) )
{
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
CSubNet subNet = ( * it ) . first ;
2015-06-26 21:38:33 +02:00
CBanEntry banEntry = ( * it ) . second ;
if ( now > banEntry . nBanUntil )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
setBanned . erase ( it + + ) ;
setBannedIsDirty = true ;
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: Removed banned node ip/subnet from banlist.dat: %s \n " , __func__ , subNet . ToString ( ) ) ;
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
else
+ + it ;
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : BannedSetIsDirty ( )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ;
return setBannedIsDirty ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : SetBannedSetDirty ( bool dirty )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_setBanned ) ; //reuse setBanned lock for the isDirty flag
setBannedIsDirty = dirty ;
2011-09-06 22:09:04 +02:00
}
2014-06-21 13:34:36 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : IsWhitelistedRange ( const CNetAddr & addr ) {
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const CSubNet & subnet : vWhitelistedRange ) {
2014-06-21 13:34:36 +02:00
if ( subnet . Match ( addr ) )
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
std : : string CNode : : GetAddrName ( ) const {
LOCK ( cs_addrName ) ;
return addrName ;
}
void CNode : : MaybeSetAddrName ( const std : : string & addrNameIn ) {
LOCK ( cs_addrName ) ;
if ( addrName . empty ( ) ) {
addrName = addrNameIn ;
}
}
CService CNode : : GetAddrLocal ( ) const {
LOCK ( cs_addrLocal ) ;
return addrLocal ;
}
void CNode : : SetAddrLocal ( const CService & addrLocalIn ) {
LOCK ( cs_addrLocal ) ;
if ( addrLocal . IsValid ( ) ) {
error ( " Addr local already set for node: %i. Refusing to change from %s to %s " , id , addrLocal . ToString ( ) , addrLocalIn . ToString ( ) ) ;
} else {
addrLocal = addrLocalIn ;
}
}
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
std : : string CNode : : GetLogString ( ) const
{
return fLogIPs ? addr . ToString ( ) : strprintf ( " %d " , id ) ;
}
2012-06-29 23:24:53 +02:00
# undef X
# define X(name) stats.name = name
void CNode : : copyStats ( CNodeStats & stats )
{
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
stats . nodeid = this - > GetId ( ) ;
2012-06-29 23:24:53 +02:00
X ( nServices ) ;
2017-09-09 09:04:02 +02:00
X ( addr ) ;
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
X ( addrBind ) ;
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
{
LOCK ( cs_filter ) ;
X ( fRelayTxes ) ;
}
2012-06-29 23:24:53 +02:00
X ( nLastSend ) ;
X ( nLastRecv ) ;
X ( nTimeConnected ) ;
2014-12-15 11:06:15 +01:00
X ( nTimeOffset ) ;
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
stats . addrName = GetAddrName ( ) ;
2012-06-29 23:24:53 +02:00
X ( nVersion ) ;
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
{
LOCK ( cs_SubVer ) ;
X ( cleanSubVer ) ;
}
2012-06-29 23:24:53 +02:00
X ( fInbound ) ;
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
X ( m_manual_connection ) ;
2012-06-29 23:24:53 +02:00
X ( nStartingHeight ) ;
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vSend ) ;
X ( mapSendBytesPerMsgCmd ) ;
X ( nSendBytes ) ;
}
{
LOCK ( cs_vRecv ) ;
X ( mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd ) ;
X ( nRecvBytes ) ;
}
2014-06-21 13:34:36 +02:00
X ( fWhitelisted ) ;
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
2013-08-22 13:34:33 +02:00
// It is common for nodes with good ping times to suddenly become lagged,
// due to a new block arriving or other large transfer.
// Merely reporting pingtime might fool the caller into thinking the node was still responsive,
// since pingtime does not update until the ping is complete, which might take a while.
// So, if a ping is taking an unusually long time in flight,
// the caller can immediately detect that this is happening.
2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
int64_t nPingUsecWait = 0 ;
2013-08-22 13:34:33 +02:00
if ( ( 0 ! = nPingNonceSent ) & & ( 0 ! = nPingUsecStart ) ) {
nPingUsecWait = GetTimeMicros ( ) - nPingUsecStart ;
}
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
2015-03-18 00:06:58 +01:00
// Raw ping time is in microseconds, but show it to user as whole seconds (Dash users should be well used to small numbers with many decimal places by now :)
2013-08-22 13:34:33 +02:00
stats . dPingTime = ( ( ( double ) nPingUsecTime ) / 1e6 ) ;
2017-09-09 09:04:02 +02:00
stats . dMinPing = ( ( ( double ) nMinPingUsecTime ) / 1e6 ) ;
2013-08-22 13:34:33 +02:00
stats . dPingWait = ( ( ( double ) nPingUsecWait ) / 1e6 ) ;
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
2013-08-22 07:50:19 +02:00
// Leave string empty if addrLocal invalid (not filled in yet)
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
CService addrLocalUnlocked = GetAddrLocal ( ) ;
stats . addrLocal = addrLocalUnlocked . IsValid ( ) ? addrLocalUnlocked . ToString ( ) : " " ;
2019-12-06 10:05:58 +01:00
{
LOCK ( cs_mnauth ) ;
X ( verifiedProRegTxHash ) ;
}
2012-06-29 23:24:53 +02:00
}
# undef X
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CNode : : ReceiveMsgBytes ( const char * pch , unsigned int nBytes , bool & complete )
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
complete = false ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
int64_t nTimeMicros = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
LOCK ( cs_vRecv ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
nLastRecv = nTimeMicros / 1000000 ;
nRecvBytes + = nBytes ;
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
while ( nBytes > 0 ) {
// get current incomplete message, or create a new one
2013-03-01 01:41:28 +01:00
if ( vRecvMsg . empty ( ) | |
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
vRecvMsg . back ( ) . complete ( ) )
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
vRecvMsg . push_back ( CNetMessage ( Params ( ) . MessageStart ( ) , SER_NETWORK , INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) ) ;
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
CNetMessage & msg = vRecvMsg . back ( ) ;
// absorb network data
int handled ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
if ( ! msg . in_data ) {
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
handled = msg . readHeader ( pch , nBytes ) ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
if ( msg . in_data & & nTimeFirstMessageReceived = = 0 ) {
if ( fSuccessfullyConnected ) {
// First message after VERSION/VERACK.
// We record the time when the header is fully received and not when the full message is received.
// otherwise a peer might send us a very large message as first message after VERSION/VERACK and fill
// up our memory with multiple parallel connections doing this.
nTimeFirstMessageReceived = nTimeMicros ;
fFirstMessageIsMNAUTH = msg . hdr . GetCommand ( ) = = NetMsgType : : MNAUTH ;
} else {
// We're still in the VERSION/VERACK handshake process, so any message received in this state is
// expected to be very small. This protects against attackers filling up memory by sending oversized
// VERSION messages while the incoming connection is still protected against eviction
if ( msg . hdr . nMessageSize > 1024 ) {
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Oversized VERSION/VERACK message from peer=%i, disconnecting \n " , GetId ( ) ) ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
return false ;
}
}
}
} else {
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
handled = msg . readData ( pch , nBytes ) ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
}
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
if ( handled < 0 )
2017-04-26 08:49:22 +02:00
return false ;
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
2015-03-05 13:01:22 +01:00
if ( msg . in_data & & msg . hdr . nMessageSize > MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) {
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Oversized message from peer=%i, disconnecting \n " , GetId ( ) ) ;
2015-03-05 13:01:22 +01:00
return false ;
}
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
pch + = handled ;
nBytes - = handled ;
2014-07-06 16:06:46 +02:00
2015-04-05 11:35:37 +02:00
if ( msg . complete ( ) ) {
2017-06-29 03:51:10 +02:00
//store received bytes per message command
//to prevent a memory DOS, only allow valid commands
mapMsgCmdSize : : iterator i = mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd . find ( msg . hdr . pchCommand ) ;
if ( i = = mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd . end ( ) )
i = mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd . find ( NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER ) ;
assert ( i ! = mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd . end ( ) ) ;
i - > second + = msg . hdr . nMessageSize + CMessageHeader : : HEADER_SIZE ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
msg . nTime = nTimeMicros ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
complete = true ;
2015-04-05 11:35:37 +02:00
}
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
}
return true ;
}
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
void CNode : : SetSendVersion ( int nVersionIn )
{
// Send version may only be changed in the version message, and
// only one version message is allowed per session. We can therefore
// treat this value as const and even atomic as long as it's only used
// once a version message has been successfully processed. Any attempt to
// set this twice is an error.
if ( nSendVersion ! = 0 ) {
error ( " Send version already set for node: %i. Refusing to change from %i to %i " , id , nSendVersion , nVersionIn ) ;
} else {
nSendVersion = nVersionIn ;
}
}
int CNode : : GetSendVersion ( ) const
{
// The send version should always be explicitly set to
// INIT_PROTO_VERSION rather than using this value until SetSendVersion
// has been called.
if ( nSendVersion = = 0 ) {
error ( " Requesting unset send version for node: %i. Using %i " , id , INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) ;
return INIT_PROTO_VERSION ;
}
return nSendVersion ;
}
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
int CNetMessage : : readHeader ( const char * pch , unsigned int nBytes )
{
// copy data to temporary parsing buffer
unsigned int nRemaining = 24 - nHdrPos ;
unsigned int nCopy = std : : min ( nRemaining , nBytes ) ;
memcpy ( & hdrbuf [ nHdrPos ] , pch , nCopy ) ;
nHdrPos + = nCopy ;
// if header incomplete, exit
if ( nHdrPos < 24 )
return nCopy ;
// deserialize to CMessageHeader
try {
hdrbuf > > hdr ;
}
2014-12-07 13:29:06 +01:00
catch ( const std : : exception & ) {
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
return - 1 ;
}
// reject messages larger than MAX_SIZE
if ( hdr . nMessageSize > MAX_SIZE )
2017-04-26 08:49:22 +02:00
return - 1 ;
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
// switch state to reading message data
in_data = true ;
return nCopy ;
}
int CNetMessage : : readData ( const char * pch , unsigned int nBytes )
{
unsigned int nRemaining = hdr . nMessageSize - nDataPos ;
unsigned int nCopy = std : : min ( nRemaining , nBytes ) ;
2014-06-21 17:00:38 +02:00
if ( vRecv . size ( ) < nDataPos + nCopy ) {
// Allocate up to 256 KiB ahead, but never more than the total message size.
vRecv . resize ( std : : min ( hdr . nMessageSize , nDataPos + nCopy + 256 * 1024 ) ) ;
}
2016-11-07 23:12:26 +01:00
hasher . Write ( ( const unsigned char * ) pch , nCopy ) ;
2012-11-16 01:41:12 +01:00
memcpy ( & vRecv [ nDataPos ] , pch , nCopy ) ;
nDataPos + = nCopy ;
return nCopy ;
}
2016-11-07 23:12:26 +01:00
const uint256 & CNetMessage : : GetMessageHash ( ) const
{
assert ( complete ( ) ) ;
if ( data_hash . IsNull ( ) )
hasher . Finalize ( data_hash . begin ( ) ) ;
return data_hash ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2012-11-16 00:04:52 +01:00
// requires LOCK(cs_vSend)
2017-02-06 14:31:37 +01:00
size_t CConnman : : SocketSendData ( CNode * pnode ) const
2012-11-16 00:04:52 +01:00
{
2016-11-25 20:01:56 +01:00
auto it = pnode - > vSendMsg . begin ( ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
size_t nSentSize = 0 ;
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
while ( it ! = pnode - > vSendMsg . end ( ) ) {
2016-11-25 20:01:56 +01:00
const auto & data = * it ;
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
assert ( data . size ( ) > pnode - > nSendOffset ) ;
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
int nBytes = 0 ;
{
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_hSocket ) ;
if ( pnode - > hSocket = = INVALID_SOCKET )
break ;
nBytes = send ( pnode - > hSocket , reinterpret_cast < const char * > ( data . data ( ) ) + pnode - > nSendOffset , data . size ( ) - pnode - > nSendOffset , MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT ) ;
}
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
if ( nBytes > 0 ) {
2017-08-24 01:38:29 +02:00
pnode - > nLastSend = GetSystemTimeInSeconds ( ) ;
2013-04-07 19:31:13 +02:00
pnode - > nSendBytes + = nBytes ;
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
pnode - > nSendOffset + = nBytes ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
nSentSize + = nBytes ;
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
if ( pnode - > nSendOffset = = data . size ( ) ) {
pnode - > nSendOffset = 0 ;
pnode - > nSendSize - = data . size ( ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
pnode - > fPauseSend = pnode - > nSendSize > nSendBufferMaxSize ;
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
it + + ;
} else {
// could not send full message; stop sending more
break ;
}
} else {
if ( nBytes < 0 ) {
// error
int nErr = WSAGetLastError ( ) ;
if ( nErr ! = WSAEWOULDBLOCK & & nErr ! = WSAEMSGSIZE & & nErr ! = WSAEINTR & & nErr ! = WSAEINPROGRESS )
{
2014-05-08 14:15:19 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " socket send error %s \n " , NetworkErrorString ( nErr ) ) ;
2017-01-19 20:02:57 +01:00
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
}
}
// couldn't send anything at all
break ;
2012-11-16 00:04:52 +01:00
}
}
2013-03-24 16:52:24 +01:00
if ( it = = pnode - > vSendMsg . end ( ) ) {
assert ( pnode - > nSendOffset = = 0 ) ;
assert ( pnode - > nSendSize = = 0 ) ;
}
pnode - > vSendMsg . erase ( pnode - > vSendMsg . begin ( ) , it ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
return nSentSize ;
2012-11-16 00:04:52 +01:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
struct NodeEvictionCandidate
{
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
NodeId id ;
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
int64_t nTimeConnected ;
int64_t nMinPingUsecTime ;
2017-07-12 13:13:38 +02:00
int64_t nLastBlockTime ;
int64_t nLastTXTime ;
2016-11-07 13:13:29 +01:00
bool fRelevantServices ;
2017-07-12 13:13:38 +02:00
bool fRelayTxes ;
bool fBloomFilter ;
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
uint64_t nKeyedNetGroup ;
2015-08-21 02:29:04 +02:00
} ;
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
static bool ReverseCompareNodeMinPingTime ( const NodeEvictionCandidate & a , const NodeEvictionCandidate & b )
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
{
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
return a . nMinPingUsecTime > b . nMinPingUsecTime ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
static bool ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected ( const NodeEvictionCandidate & a , const NodeEvictionCandidate & b )
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
{
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
return a . nTimeConnected > b . nTimeConnected ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
static bool CompareNetGroupKeyed ( const NodeEvictionCandidate & a , const NodeEvictionCandidate & b ) {
return a . nKeyedNetGroup < b . nKeyedNetGroup ;
2018-02-08 06:44:07 +01:00
}
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
2017-07-12 13:13:38 +02:00
static bool CompareNodeBlockTime ( const NodeEvictionCandidate & a , const NodeEvictionCandidate & b )
{
// There is a fall-through here because it is common for a node to have many peers which have not yet relayed a block.
if ( a . nLastBlockTime ! = b . nLastBlockTime ) return a . nLastBlockTime < b . nLastBlockTime ;
2016-11-07 13:13:29 +01:00
if ( a . fRelevantServices ! = b . fRelevantServices ) return b . fRelevantServices ;
2017-07-12 13:13:38 +02:00
return a . nTimeConnected > b . nTimeConnected ;
}
static bool CompareNodeTXTime ( const NodeEvictionCandidate & a , const NodeEvictionCandidate & b )
{
// There is a fall-through here because it is common for a node to have more than a few peers that have not yet relayed txn.
if ( a . nLastTXTime ! = b . nLastTXTime ) return a . nLastTXTime < b . nLastTXTime ;
if ( a . fRelayTxes ! = b . fRelayTxes ) return b . fRelayTxes ;
if ( a . fBloomFilter ! = b . fBloomFilter ) return a . fBloomFilter ;
return a . nTimeConnected > b . nTimeConnected ;
}
/** Try to find a connection to evict when the node is full.
* Extreme care must be taken to avoid opening the node to attacker
* triggered network partitioning .
* The strategy used here is to protect a small number of peers
* for each of several distinct characteristics which are difficult
* to forge . In order to partition a node the attacker must be
* simultaneously better at all of them than honest peers .
*/
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : AttemptToEvictConnection ( )
{
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
std : : vector < NodeEvictionCandidate > vEvictionCandidates ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * node : vNodes ) {
2017-09-19 16:52:27 +02:00
if ( node - > fWhitelisted )
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
continue ;
2017-09-19 16:52:27 +02:00
if ( ! node - > fInbound )
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
continue ;
2017-09-19 16:52:27 +02:00
if ( node - > fDisconnect )
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
continue ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
if ( fMasternodeMode ) {
// This handles eviction protected nodes. Nodes are always protected for a short time after the connection
// was accepted. This short time is meant for the VERSION/VERACK exchange and the possible MNAUTH that might
// follow when the incoming connection is from another masternode. When another message then MNAUTH
// is received after VERSION/VERACK, the protection is lifted immediately.
bool isProtected = GetSystemTimeInSeconds ( ) - node - > nTimeConnected < INBOUND_EVICTION_PROTECTION_TIME ;
if ( node - > nTimeFirstMessageReceived ! = 0 & & ! node - > fFirstMessageIsMNAUTH ) {
isProtected = false ;
}
// if MNAUTH was valid, the node is always protected (and at the same time not accounted when
// checking incoming connection limits)
if ( ! node - > verifiedProRegTxHash . IsNull ( ) ) {
isProtected = true ;
}
if ( isProtected ) {
continue ;
}
}
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
NodeEvictionCandidate candidate = { node - > GetId ( ) , node - > nTimeConnected , node - > nMinPingUsecTime ,
2016-11-07 13:13:29 +01:00
node - > nLastBlockTime , node - > nLastTXTime ,
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
HasAllDesirableServiceFlags ( node - > nServices ) ,
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
node - > fRelayTxes , node - > pfilter ! = nullptr , node - > nKeyedNetGroup } ;
2017-09-19 16:52:27 +02:00
vEvictionCandidates . push_back ( candidate ) ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
}
2015-08-23 00:15:39 +02:00
if ( vEvictionCandidates . empty ( ) ) return false ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
// Protect connections with certain characteristics
2015-08-21 01:47:49 +02:00
// Deterministically select 4 peers to protect by netgroup.
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
// An attacker cannot predict which netgroups will be protected
std : : sort ( vEvictionCandidates . begin ( ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) , CompareNetGroupKeyed ) ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
vEvictionCandidates . erase ( vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) - std : : min ( 4 , static_cast < int > ( vEvictionCandidates . size ( ) ) ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) ) ;
2015-08-23 00:15:39 +02:00
if ( vEvictionCandidates . empty ( ) ) return false ;
2016-05-04 15:51:38 +02:00
// Protect the 8 nodes with the lowest minimum ping time.
2015-08-21 01:47:49 +02:00
// An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without physically moving nodes closer to the target.
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
std : : sort ( vEvictionCandidates . begin ( ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) , ReverseCompareNodeMinPingTime ) ;
vEvictionCandidates . erase ( vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) - std : : min ( 8 , static_cast < int > ( vEvictionCandidates . size ( ) ) ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) ) ;
2015-08-23 00:15:39 +02:00
if ( vEvictionCandidates . empty ( ) ) return false ;
2017-07-12 13:13:38 +02:00
// Protect 4 nodes that most recently sent us transactions.
// An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work.
std : : sort ( vEvictionCandidates . begin ( ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) , CompareNodeTXTime ) ;
vEvictionCandidates . erase ( vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) - std : : min ( 4 , static_cast < int > ( vEvictionCandidates . size ( ) ) ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) ) ;
if ( vEvictionCandidates . empty ( ) ) return false ;
// Protect 4 nodes that most recently sent us blocks.
// An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work.
std : : sort ( vEvictionCandidates . begin ( ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) , CompareNodeBlockTime ) ;
vEvictionCandidates . erase ( vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) - std : : min ( 4 , static_cast < int > ( vEvictionCandidates . size ( ) ) ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) ) ;
if ( vEvictionCandidates . empty ( ) ) return false ;
2015-08-26 01:31:13 +02:00
// Protect the half of the remaining nodes which have been connected the longest.
2016-05-04 15:51:38 +02:00
// This replicates the non-eviction implicit behavior, and precludes attacks that start later.
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
std : : sort ( vEvictionCandidates . begin ( ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) , ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected ) ;
2015-08-23 00:15:39 +02:00
vEvictionCandidates . erase ( vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) - static_cast < int > ( vEvictionCandidates . size ( ) / 2 ) , vEvictionCandidates . end ( ) ) ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
2015-08-23 00:15:39 +02:00
if ( vEvictionCandidates . empty ( ) ) return false ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
2015-11-23 04:48:54 +01:00
// Identify the network group with the most connections and youngest member.
// (vEvictionCandidates is already sorted by reverse connect time)
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
uint64_t naMostConnections ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
unsigned int nMostConnections = 0 ;
2015-11-23 04:48:54 +01:00
int64_t nMostConnectionsTime = 0 ;
2016-08-03 11:50:10 +02:00
std : : map < uint64_t , std : : vector < NodeEvictionCandidate > > mapNetGroupNodes ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const NodeEvictionCandidate & node : vEvictionCandidates ) {
2016-08-03 11:50:10 +02:00
mapNetGroupNodes [ node . nKeyedNetGroup ] . push_back ( node ) ;
int64_t grouptime = mapNetGroupNodes [ node . nKeyedNetGroup ] [ 0 ] . nTimeConnected ;
size_t groupsize = mapNetGroupNodes [ node . nKeyedNetGroup ] . size ( ) ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
2015-11-23 04:48:54 +01:00
if ( groupsize > nMostConnections | | ( groupsize = = nMostConnections & & grouptime > nMostConnectionsTime ) ) {
nMostConnections = groupsize ;
nMostConnectionsTime = grouptime ;
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
naMostConnections = node . nKeyedNetGroup ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
}
2015-08-26 02:06:15 +02:00
// Reduce to the network group with the most connections
2016-08-03 11:50:10 +02:00
vEvictionCandidates = std : : move ( mapNetGroupNodes [ naMostConnections ] ) ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
2015-11-23 04:48:54 +01:00
// Disconnect from the network group with the most connections
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
NodeId evicted = vEvictionCandidates . front ( ) . id ;
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( std : : vector < CNode * > : : const_iterator it ( vNodes . begin ( ) ) ; it ! = vNodes . end ( ) ; + + it ) {
if ( ( * it ) - > GetId ( ) = = evicted ) {
( * it ) - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
2017-03-13 07:29:16 +01:00
}
}
return false ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : AcceptConnection ( const ListenSocket & hListenSocket ) {
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
struct sockaddr_storage sockaddr ;
socklen_t len = sizeof ( sockaddr ) ;
SOCKET hSocket = accept ( hListenSocket . socket , ( struct sockaddr * ) & sockaddr , & len ) ;
CAddress addr ;
int nInbound = 0 ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
int nVerifiedInboundMasternodes = 0 ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
int nMaxInbound = nMaxConnections - ( nMaxOutbound + nMaxFeeler ) ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
if ( hSocket ! = INVALID_SOCKET ) {
if ( ! addr . SetSockAddr ( ( const struct sockaddr * ) & sockaddr ) ) {
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Warning: Unknown socket family \n " ) ;
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
}
}
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool whitelisted = hListenSocket . whitelisted | | IsWhitelistedRange ( addr ) ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
if ( pnode - > fInbound ) {
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
nInbound + + ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
if ( ! pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash . IsNull ( ) ) {
nVerifiedInboundMasternodes + + ;
}
}
}
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
if ( hSocket = = INVALID_SOCKET )
{
int nErr = WSAGetLastError ( ) ;
if ( nErr ! = WSAEWOULDBLOCK )
LogPrintf ( " socket error accept failed: %s \n " , NetworkErrorString ( nErr ) ) ;
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
return ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
std : : string strDropped ;
if ( fLogIPs ) {
strDropped = strprintf ( " connection from %s dropped " , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
} else {
strDropped = " connection dropped " ;
}
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
if ( ! fNetworkActive ) {
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " %s: not accepting new connections \n " , strDropped ) ;
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
return ;
}
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
if ( ! IsSelectableSocket ( hSocket ) )
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
{
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " %s: non-selectable socket \n " , strDropped ) ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
return ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
2015-10-22 01:52:29 +02:00
// According to the internet TCP_NODELAY is not carried into accepted sockets
// on all platforms. Set it again here just to be sure.
2017-05-18 02:26:54 +02:00
SetSocketNoDelay ( hSocket ) ;
2015-10-22 01:52:29 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( IsBanned ( addr ) & & ! whitelisted )
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
{
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " %s (banned) \n " , strDropped ) ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
return ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
// Evict connections until we are below nMaxInbound. In case eviction protection resulted in nodes to not be evicted
// before, they might get evicted in batches now (after the protection timeout).
// We don't evict verified MN connections and also don't take them into account when checking limits. We can do this
// because we know that such connections are naturally limited by the total number of MNs, so this is not usable
// for attacks.
while ( nInbound - nVerifiedInboundMasternodes > = nMaxInbound )
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
{
2017-07-12 13:13:38 +02:00
if ( ! AttemptToEvictConnection ( ) ) {
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
// No connection to evict, disconnect the new connection
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " failed to find an eviction candidate - connection dropped (full) \n " ) ;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
return ;
}
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
nInbound - - ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
2017-02-16 16:40:40 +01:00
// don't accept incoming connections until fully synced
2018-01-26 02:11:01 +01:00
if ( fMasternodeMode & & ! masternodeSync . IsSynced ( ) ) {
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " AcceptConnection -- masternode is not synced yet, skipping inbound connection attempt \n " ) ;
2017-02-16 16:40:40 +01:00
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
return ;
}
2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
NodeId id = GetNewNodeId ( ) ;
uint64_t nonce = GetDeterministicRandomizer ( RANDOMIZER_ID_LOCALHOSTNONCE ) . Write ( id ) . Finalize ( ) ;
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
CAddress addr_bind = GetBindAddress ( hSocket ) ;
2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
CNode * pnode = new CNode ( id , nLocalServices , GetBestHeight ( ) , hSocket , addr , CalculateKeyedNetGroup ( addr ) , nonce , addr_bind , " " , true ) ;
2018-01-17 17:45:38 +01:00
pnode - > AddRef ( ) ;
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
pnode - > fWhitelisted = whitelisted ;
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
m_msgproc - > InitializeNode ( pnode ) ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
if ( fLogIPs ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " connection from %s accepted \n " , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " connection accepted \n " ) ;
}
2015-08-13 11:16:46 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
vNodes . push_back ( pnode ) ;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : ThreadSocketHandler ( )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2012-04-22 20:01:25 +02:00
unsigned int nPrevNodeCount = 0 ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
while ( ! interruptNet )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
//
// Disconnect nodes
//
{
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Disconnect unused nodes
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : vector < CNode * > vNodesCopy = vNodes ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodesCopy )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
if ( pnode - > fDisconnect )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
if ( fLogIPs ) {
LogPrintf ( " ThreadSocketHandler -- removing node: peer=%d addr=%s nRefCount=%d fInbound=%d fMasternode=%d \n " ,
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
pnode - > GetId ( ) , pnode - > addr . ToString ( ) , pnode - > GetRefCount ( ) , pnode - > fInbound , pnode - > fMasternode ) ;
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
} else {
LogPrintf ( " ThreadSocketHandler -- removing node: peer=%d nRefCount=%d fInbound=%d fMasternode=%d \n " ,
pnode - > GetId ( ) , pnode - > GetRefCount ( ) , pnode - > fInbound , pnode - > fMasternode ) ;
}
2017-02-05 17:45:36 +01:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// remove from vNodes
vNodes . erase ( remove ( vNodes . begin ( ) , vNodes . end ( ) , pnode ) , vNodes . end ( ) ) ;
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
// release outbound grant (if any)
pnode - > grantOutbound . Release ( ) ;
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
pnode - > grantMasternodeOutbound . Release ( ) ;
2012-04-04 16:01:57 +02:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// close socket and cleanup
pnode - > CloseSocketDisconnect ( ) ;
// hold in disconnected pool until all refs are released
2016-12-01 02:13:00 +01:00
pnode - > Release ( ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
vNodesDisconnected . push_back ( pnode ) ;
}
}
2013-07-25 02:25:25 +02:00
}
{
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Delete disconnected nodes
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : list < CNode * > vNodesDisconnectedCopy = vNodesDisconnected ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodesDisconnectedCopy )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
// wait until threads are done using it
2017-02-08 14:46:35 +01:00
if ( pnode - > GetRefCount ( ) < = 0 ) {
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
bool fDelete = false ;
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
{
2017-02-08 14:46:35 +01:00
TRY_LOCK ( pnode - > cs_inventory , lockInv ) ;
if ( lockInv ) {
TRY_LOCK ( pnode - > cs_vSend , lockSend ) ;
if ( lockSend ) {
fDelete = true ;
}
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
}
}
2017-02-08 14:46:35 +01:00
if ( fDelete ) {
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
vNodesDisconnected . remove ( pnode ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
DeleteNode ( pnode ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
}
}
2017-09-25 16:16:56 +02:00
size_t vNodesSize ;
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
vNodesSize = vNodes . size ( ) ;
}
if ( vNodesSize ! = nPrevNodeCount ) {
nPrevNodeCount = vNodesSize ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( clientInterface )
clientInterface - > NotifyNumConnectionsChanged ( nPrevNodeCount ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
//
// Find which sockets have data to receive
//
struct timeval timeout ;
timeout . tv_sec = 0 ;
timeout . tv_usec = 50000 ; // frequency to poll pnode->vSend
fd_set fdsetRecv ;
fd_set fdsetSend ;
fd_set fdsetError ;
FD_ZERO ( & fdsetRecv ) ;
FD_ZERO ( & fdsetSend ) ;
FD_ZERO ( & fdsetError ) ;
SOCKET hSocketMax = 0 ;
2012-09-05 22:01:28 +02:00
bool have_fds = false ;
2010-12-22 14:08:00 +01:00
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
# ifndef WIN32
// We add a pipe to the read set so that the select() call can be woken up from the outside
// This is done when data is available for sending and at the same time optimistic sending was disabled
// when pushing the data.
// This is currently only implemented for POSIX compliant systems. This means that Windows will fall back to
// timing out after 50ms and then trying to send. This is ok as we assume that heavy-load daemons are usually
// run on Linux and friends.
FD_SET ( wakeupPipe [ 0 ] , & fdsetRecv ) ;
hSocketMax = std : : max ( hSocketMax , ( SOCKET ) wakeupPipe [ 0 ] ) ;
have_fds = true ;
# endif
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const ListenSocket & hListenSocket : vhListenSocket ) {
2014-06-21 13:34:36 +02:00
FD_SET ( hListenSocket . socket , & fdsetRecv ) ;
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
hSocketMax = std : : max ( hSocketMax , hListenSocket . socket ) ;
2012-09-05 22:01:28 +02:00
have_fds = true ;
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
}
2014-06-24 09:09:45 +02:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2013-04-30 18:42:01 +02:00
// Implement the following logic:
// * If there is data to send, select() for sending data. As this only
// happens when optimistic write failed, we choose to first drain the
// write buffer in this case before receiving more. This avoids
// needlessly queueing received data, if the remote peer is not themselves
// receiving data. This means properly utilizing TCP flow control signalling.
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
// * Otherwise, if there is space left in the receive buffer, select() for
// receiving data.
// * Hand off all complete messages to the processor, to be handled without
// blocking here.
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
bool select_recv = ! pnode - > fPauseRecv ;
bool select_send ;
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
{
2017-01-19 20:19:29 +01:00
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_vSend ) ;
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
select_send = ! pnode - > vSendMsg . empty ( ) ;
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
}
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_hSocket ) ;
if ( pnode - > hSocket = = INVALID_SOCKET )
continue ;
FD_SET ( pnode - > hSocket , & fdsetError ) ;
hSocketMax = std : : max ( hSocketMax , pnode - > hSocket ) ;
have_fds = true ;
if ( select_send ) {
FD_SET ( pnode - > hSocket , & fdsetSend ) ;
continue ;
}
if ( select_recv ) {
FD_SET ( pnode - > hSocket , & fdsetRecv ) ;
2013-04-30 18:42:01 +02:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
2019-04-12 12:58:42 +02:00
wakeupSelectNeeded = true ;
2012-09-05 22:01:28 +02:00
int nSelect = select ( have_fds ? hSocketMax + 1 : 0 ,
& fdsetRecv , & fdsetSend , & fdsetError , & timeout ) ;
2019-04-12 12:58:42 +02:00
wakeupSelectNeeded = false ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( interruptNet )
return ;
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
if ( nSelect = = SOCKET_ERROR )
{
2012-09-05 22:01:28 +02:00
if ( have_fds )
2011-06-07 00:48:37 +02:00
{
2012-09-05 22:01:28 +02:00
int nErr = WSAGetLastError ( ) ;
2014-05-08 14:15:19 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " socket select error %s \n " , NetworkErrorString ( nErr ) ) ;
2012-04-15 22:52:09 +02:00
for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < = hSocketMax ; i + + )
2011-06-07 00:48:37 +02:00
FD_SET ( i , & fdsetRecv ) ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
FD_ZERO ( & fdsetSend ) ;
FD_ZERO ( & fdsetError ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( timeout . tv_usec / 1000 ) ) )
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
# ifndef WIN32
// drain the wakeup pipe
if ( FD_ISSET ( wakeupPipe [ 0 ] , & fdsetRecv ) ) {
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " woke up select() \n " ) ;
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
char buf [ 128 ] ;
while ( true ) {
int r = read ( wakeupPipe [ 0 ] , buf , sizeof ( buf ) ) ;
if ( r < = 0 ) {
break ;
}
}
}
# endif
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
//
// Accept new connections
//
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const ListenSocket & hListenSocket : vhListenSocket )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2014-06-21 13:34:36 +02:00
if ( hListenSocket . socket ! = INVALID_SOCKET & & FD_ISSET ( hListenSocket . socket , & fdsetRecv ) )
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
{
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
AcceptConnection ( hListenSocket ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
//
// Service each socket
//
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : vector < CNode * > vNodesCopy = CopyNodeVector ( ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodesCopy )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( interruptNet )
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
//
// Receive
//
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
bool recvSet = false ;
bool sendSet = false ;
bool errorSet = false ;
{
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_hSocket ) ;
if ( pnode - > hSocket = = INVALID_SOCKET )
continue ;
recvSet = FD_ISSET ( pnode - > hSocket , & fdsetRecv ) ;
sendSet = FD_ISSET ( pnode - > hSocket , & fdsetSend ) ;
errorSet = FD_ISSET ( pnode - > hSocket , & fdsetError ) ;
}
if ( recvSet | | errorSet )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2017-04-26 08:49:22 +02:00
// typical socket buffer is 8K-64K
char pchBuf [ 0x10000 ] ;
int nBytes = 0 ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2017-04-26 08:49:22 +02:00
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_hSocket ) ;
if ( pnode - > hSocket = = INVALID_SOCKET )
continue ;
nBytes = recv ( pnode - > hSocket , pchBuf , sizeof ( pchBuf ) , MSG_DONTWAIT ) ;
}
if ( nBytes > 0 )
{
bool notify = false ;
if ( ! pnode - > ReceiveMsgBytes ( pchBuf , nBytes , notify ) )
pnode - > CloseSocketDisconnect ( ) ;
RecordBytesRecv ( nBytes ) ;
if ( notify ) {
size_t nSizeAdded = 0 ;
auto it ( pnode - > vRecvMsg . begin ( ) ) ;
for ( ; it ! = pnode - > vRecvMsg . end ( ) ; + + it ) {
if ( ! it - > complete ( ) )
break ;
nSizeAdded + = it - > vRecv . size ( ) + CMessageHeader : : HEADER_SIZE ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
2011-02-16 19:18:11 +01:00
{
2017-04-26 08:49:22 +02:00
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_vProcessMsg ) ;
pnode - > vProcessMsg . splice ( pnode - > vProcessMsg . end ( ) , pnode - > vRecvMsg , pnode - > vRecvMsg . begin ( ) , it ) ;
pnode - > nProcessQueueSize + = nSizeAdded ;
pnode - > fPauseRecv = pnode - > nProcessQueueSize > nReceiveFloodSize ;
2011-02-16 19:18:11 +01:00
}
2017-04-26 08:49:22 +02:00
WakeMessageHandler ( ) ;
}
}
else if ( nBytes = = 0 )
{
// socket closed gracefully
if ( ! pnode - > fDisconnect ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " socket closed \n " ) ;
}
pnode - > CloseSocketDisconnect ( ) ;
}
else if ( nBytes < 0 )
{
// error
int nErr = WSAGetLastError ( ) ;
if ( nErr ! = WSAEWOULDBLOCK & & nErr ! = WSAEMSGSIZE & & nErr ! = WSAEINTR & & nErr ! = WSAEINPROGRESS )
{
if ( ! pnode - > fDisconnect )
LogPrintf ( " socket recv error %s \n " , NetworkErrorString ( nErr ) ) ;
pnode - > CloseSocketDisconnect ( ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
}
//
// Send
//
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
if ( sendSet )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2017-01-19 20:19:29 +01:00
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_vSend ) ;
size_t nBytes = SocketSendData ( pnode ) ;
if ( nBytes ) {
RecordBytesSent ( nBytes ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
//
// Inactivity checking
//
2017-08-24 01:38:29 +02:00
int64_t nTime = GetSystemTimeInSeconds ( ) ;
2013-10-15 00:34:20 +02:00
if ( nTime - pnode - > nTimeConnected > 60 )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
if ( pnode - > nLastRecv = = 0 | | pnode - > nLastSend = = 0 )
{
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " socket no message in first 60 seconds, %d %d from %d \n " , pnode - > nLastRecv ! = 0 , pnode - > nLastSend ! = 0 , pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
2013-10-15 00:34:20 +02:00
else if ( nTime - pnode - > nLastSend > TIMEOUT_INTERVAL )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2013-10-15 00:34:20 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " socket sending timeout: %is \n " , nTime - pnode - > nLastSend ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
2013-10-15 00:34:20 +02:00
else if ( nTime - pnode - > nLastRecv > ( pnode - > nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION ? TIMEOUT_INTERVAL : 90 * 60 ) )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2013-10-15 00:34:20 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " socket receive timeout: %is \n " , nTime - pnode - > nLastRecv ) ;
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
else if ( pnode - > nPingNonceSent & & pnode - > nPingUsecStart + TIMEOUT_INTERVAL * 1000000 < GetTimeMicros ( ) )
{
LogPrintf ( " ping timeout: %fs \n " , 0.000001 * ( GetTimeMicros ( ) - pnode - > nPingUsecStart ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
2017-02-14 14:34:20 +01:00
else if ( ! pnode - > fSuccessfullyConnected )
{
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " version handshake timeout from %d \n " , pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2017-02-14 14:34:20 +01:00
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
2017-03-05 20:16:12 +01:00
ReleaseNodeVector ( vNodesCopy ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
void CConnman : : WakeMessageHandler ( )
{
{
std : : lock_guard < std : : mutex > lock ( mutexMsgProc ) ;
fMsgProcWake = true ;
}
condMsgProc . notify_one ( ) ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
void CConnman : : WakeSelect ( )
{
# ifndef WIN32
if ( wakeupPipe [ 1 ] = = - 1 ) {
return ;
}
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " waking up select() \n " ) ;
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
char buf [ 1 ] ;
if ( write ( wakeupPipe [ 1 ] , buf , 1 ) ! = 1 ) {
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " write to wakeupPipe failed \n " ) ;
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
}
# endif
2019-04-12 12:58:42 +02:00
wakeupSelectNeeded = false ;
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
# ifdef USE_UPNP
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
void ThreadMapPort ( )
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
{
2012-09-05 23:36:19 +02:00
std : : string port = strprintf ( " %u " , GetListenPort ( ) ) ;
2017-08-16 15:54:51 +02:00
const char * multicastif = nullptr ;
const char * minissdpdpath = nullptr ;
struct UPNPDev * devlist = nullptr ;
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
char lanaddr [ 64 ] ;
2011-12-10 17:52:50 +01:00
# ifndef UPNPDISCOVER_SUCCESS
/* miniupnpc 1.5 */
devlist = upnpDiscover ( 2000 , multicastif , minissdpdpath , 0 ) ;
2015-12-09 10:06:41 +01:00
# elif MINIUPNPC_API_VERSION < 14
2011-12-10 17:52:50 +01:00
/* miniupnpc 1.6 */
int error = 0 ;
2011-08-12 00:20:07 +02:00
devlist = upnpDiscover ( 2000 , multicastif , minissdpdpath , 0 , 0 , & error ) ;
2015-12-09 10:06:41 +01:00
# else
/* miniupnpc 1.9.20150730 */
int error = 0 ;
devlist = upnpDiscover ( 2000 , multicastif , minissdpdpath , 0 , 0 , 2 , & error ) ;
2011-12-10 17:52:50 +01:00
# endif
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
struct UPNPUrls urls ;
struct IGDdatas data ;
int r ;
2011-04-16 20:35:45 +02:00
r = UPNP_GetValidIGD ( devlist , & urls , & data , lanaddr , sizeof ( lanaddr ) ) ;
if ( r = = 1 )
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
{
2012-05-24 19:02:21 +02:00
if ( fDiscover ) {
2012-02-10 04:41:42 +01:00
char externalIPAddress [ 40 ] ;
r = UPNP_GetExternalIPAddress ( urls . controlURL , data . first . servicetype , externalIPAddress ) ;
if ( r ! = UPNPCOMMAND_SUCCESS )
2013-09-18 12:38:08 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " UPnP: GetExternalIPAddress() returned %d \n " , r ) ;
2012-02-10 04:41:42 +01:00
else
{
if ( externalIPAddress [ 0 ] )
{
2017-09-03 15:29:10 +02:00
CNetAddr resolved ;
if ( LookupHost ( externalIPAddress , resolved , false ) ) {
LogPrintf ( " UPnP: ExternalIPAddress = %s \n " , resolved . ToString ( ) . c_str ( ) ) ;
AddLocal ( resolved , LOCAL_UPNP ) ;
}
2012-02-10 04:41:42 +01:00
}
else
2013-09-18 12:38:08 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " UPnP: GetExternalIPAddress failed. \n " ) ;
2012-02-10 04:41:42 +01:00
}
}
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : string strDesc = " Dash Core " + FormatFullVersion ( ) ;
2011-08-12 00:20:07 +02:00
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
try {
2013-07-31 06:06:44 +02:00
while ( true ) {
2012-01-31 23:36:25 +01:00
# ifndef UPNPDISCOVER_SUCCESS
/* miniupnpc 1.5 */
r = UPNP_AddPortMapping ( urls . controlURL , data . first . servicetype ,
2012-09-03 08:23:34 +02:00
port . c_str ( ) , port . c_str ( ) , lanaddr , strDesc . c_str ( ) , " TCP " , 0 ) ;
2012-01-31 23:36:25 +01:00
# else
/* miniupnpc 1.6 */
r = UPNP_AddPortMapping ( urls . controlURL , data . first . servicetype ,
2012-09-03 08:23:34 +02:00
port . c_str ( ) , port . c_str ( ) , lanaddr , strDesc . c_str ( ) , " TCP " , 0 , " 0 " ) ;
2012-01-31 23:36:25 +01:00
# endif
if ( r ! = UPNPCOMMAND_SUCCESS )
2013-09-18 12:38:08 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " AddPortMapping(%s, %s, %s) failed with code %d (%s) \n " ,
2014-01-16 16:15:27 +01:00
port , port , lanaddr , r , strupnperror ( r ) ) ;
2012-01-31 23:36:25 +01:00
else
2017-09-07 17:59:00 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " UPnP Port Mapping successful. \n " ) ;
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
MilliSleep ( 20 * 60 * 1000 ) ; // Refresh every 20 minutes
2012-01-31 23:36:25 +01:00
}
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
}
2014-12-07 13:29:06 +01:00
catch ( const boost : : thread_interrupted & )
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
{
r = UPNP_DeletePortMapping ( urls . controlURL , data . first . servicetype , port . c_str ( ) , " TCP " , 0 ) ;
2015-01-08 11:44:25 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " UPNP_DeletePortMapping() returned: %d \n " , r ) ;
2017-08-16 15:54:51 +02:00
freeUPNPDevlist ( devlist ) ; devlist = nullptr ;
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
FreeUPNPUrls ( & urls ) ;
throw ;
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
}
} else {
2013-09-18 12:38:08 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " No valid UPnP IGDs found \n " ) ;
2017-08-16 15:54:51 +02:00
freeUPNPDevlist ( devlist ) ; devlist = nullptr ;
2011-04-16 20:35:45 +02:00
if ( r ! = 0 )
FreeUPNPUrls ( & urls ) ;
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
}
}
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
void MapPort ( bool fUseUPnP )
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
{
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
static boost : : thread * upnp_thread = nullptr ;
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
if ( fUseUPnP )
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
{
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
if ( upnp_thread ) {
upnp_thread - > interrupt ( ) ;
upnp_thread - > join ( ) ;
delete upnp_thread ;
}
2013-04-23 11:36:54 +02:00
upnp_thread = new boost : : thread ( boost : : bind ( & TraceThread < void ( * ) ( ) > , " upnp " , & ThreadMapPort ) ) ;
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
}
else if ( upnp_thread ) {
upnp_thread - > interrupt ( ) ;
upnp_thread - > join ( ) ;
delete upnp_thread ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
upnp_thread = nullptr ;
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
}
}
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
2011-08-09 18:38:17 +02:00
# else
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
void MapPort ( bool )
2011-08-09 18:38:17 +02:00
{
// Intentionally left blank.
}
2011-03-26 13:01:27 +01:00
# endif
2016-06-16 10:57:55 +02:00
static std : : string GetDNSHost ( const CDNSSeedData & data , ServiceFlags * requiredServiceBits )
{
//use default host for non-filter-capable seeds or if we use the default service bits (NODE_NETWORK)
if ( ! data . supportsServiceBitsFiltering | | * requiredServiceBits = = NODE_NETWORK ) {
* requiredServiceBits = NODE_NETWORK ;
return data . host ;
}
return strprintf ( " x%x.%s " , * requiredServiceBits , data . host ) ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : ThreadDNSAddressSeed ( )
2011-11-21 18:25:00 +01:00
{
2014-07-29 17:04:46 +02:00
// goal: only query DNS seeds if address need is acute
2016-10-19 10:41:49 +02:00
// Avoiding DNS seeds when we don't need them improves user privacy by
// creating fewer identifying DNS requests, reduces trust by giving seeds
// less influence on the network topology, and reduces traffic to the seeds.
2014-07-29 17:04:46 +02:00
if ( ( addrman . size ( ) > 0 ) & &
2019-06-24 18:44:27 +02:00
( ! gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -forcednsseed " , DEFAULT_FORCEDNSSEED ) ) ) {
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : seconds ( 11 ) ) )
return ;
2014-07-29 17:04:46 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2016-10-19 10:41:49 +02:00
int nRelevant = 0 ;
for ( auto pnode : vNodes ) {
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
nRelevant + = pnode - > fSuccessfullyConnected & & ! pnode - > fFeeler & & ! pnode - > fOneShot & & ! pnode - > m_manual_connection & & ! pnode - > fInbound ;
2016-10-19 10:41:49 +02:00
}
if ( nRelevant > = 2 ) {
2014-07-29 17:04:46 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " P2P peers available. Skipped DNS seeding. \n " ) ;
return ;
}
}
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
const std : : vector < CDNSSeedData > & vSeeds = Params ( ) . DNSSeeds ( ) ;
2011-03-09 04:40:50 +01:00
int found = 0 ;
2013-09-18 12:38:08 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Loading addresses from DNS seeds (could take a while) \n " ) ;
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const CDNSSeedData & seed : vSeeds ) {
2017-04-17 14:08:19 +02:00
if ( interruptNet ) {
return ;
}
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
if ( HaveNameProxy ( ) ) {
2013-05-07 15:16:25 +02:00
AddOneShot ( seed . host ) ;
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
} else {
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : vector < CNetAddr > vIPs ;
std : : vector < CAddress > vAdd ;
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
ServiceFlags requiredServiceBits = GetDesirableServiceFlags ( NODE_NONE ) ;
2017-06-24 12:16:41 +02:00
std : : string host = GetDNSHost ( seed , & requiredServiceBits ) ;
CNetAddr resolveSource ;
if ( ! resolveSource . SetInternal ( host ) ) {
continue ;
}
if ( LookupHost ( host . c_str ( ) , vIPs , 0 , true ) )
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
{
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const CNetAddr & ip : vIPs )
2011-05-02 15:34:42 +02:00
{
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
int nOneDay = 24 * 3600 ;
2016-06-08 17:33:21 +02:00
CAddress addr = CAddress ( CService ( ip , Params ( ) . GetDefaultPort ( ) ) , requiredServiceBits ) ;
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
addr . nTime = GetTime ( ) - 3 * nOneDay - GetRand ( 4 * nOneDay ) ; // use a random age between 3 and 7 days old
vAdd . push_back ( addr ) ;
found + + ;
2011-05-02 15:34:42 +02:00
}
2017-06-24 12:16:41 +02:00
addrman . Add ( vAdd , resolveSource ) ;
2017-09-02 22:07:11 +02:00
}
2011-03-09 04:40:50 +01:00
}
}
2013-09-18 12:38:08 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " %d addresses found from DNS seeds \n " , found ) ;
2011-03-09 04:40:50 +01:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2011-11-21 18:25:00 +01:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : DumpAddresses ( )
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
{
2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
2012-05-17 04:11:19 +02:00
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
CAddrDB adb ;
2012-05-17 04:11:19 +02:00
adb . Write ( addrman ) ;
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Flushed %d addresses to peers.dat %dms \n " ,
2012-05-17 04:11:19 +02:00
addrman . size ( ) , GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStart ) ;
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : DumpData ( )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
DumpAddresses ( ) ;
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
DumpBanlist ( ) ;
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : ProcessOneShot ( )
2012-04-24 02:15:00 +02:00
{
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : string strDest ;
2012-04-24 02:15:00 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vOneShots ) ;
if ( vOneShots . empty ( ) )
return ;
strDest = vOneShots . front ( ) ;
vOneShots . pop_front ( ) ;
}
CAddress addr ;
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
CSemaphoreGrant grant ( * semOutbound , true ) ;
if ( grant ) {
2016-06-08 12:58:21 +02:00
if ( ! OpenNetworkConnection ( addr , false , & grant , strDest . c_str ( ) , true ) )
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
AddOneShot ( strDest ) ;
}
2012-04-24 02:15:00 +02:00
}
2017-11-02 20:13:17 +01:00
bool CConnman : : GetTryNewOutboundPeer ( )
{
return m_try_another_outbound_peer ;
}
void CConnman : : SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( bool flag )
{
m_try_another_outbound_peer = flag ;
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " net: setting try another outbound peer=%s \n " , flag ? " true " : " false " ) ;
}
// Return the number of peers we have over our outbound connection limit
// Exclude peers that are marked for disconnect, or are going to be
// disconnected soon (eg one-shots and feelers)
// Also exclude peers that haven't finished initial connection handshake yet
// (so that we don't decide we're over our desired connection limit, and then
// evict some peer that has finished the handshake)
int CConnman : : GetExtraOutboundCount ( )
{
int nOutbound = 0 ;
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
2019-09-26 15:36:54 +02:00
// don't count outbound masternodes
if ( pnode - > fMasternode ) {
continue ;
}
2017-11-02 20:13:17 +01:00
if ( ! pnode - > fInbound & & ! pnode - > m_manual_connection & & ! pnode - > fFeeler & & ! pnode - > fDisconnect & & ! pnode - > fOneShot & & pnode - > fSuccessfullyConnected ) {
+ + nOutbound ;
}
}
}
return std : : max ( nOutbound - nMaxOutbound , 0 ) ;
}
2017-09-06 01:54:31 +02:00
void CConnman : : ThreadOpenConnections ( const std : : vector < std : : string > connect )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
// Connect to specific addresses
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if ( ! connect . empty ( ) )
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{
2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
for ( int64_t nLoop = 0 ; ; nLoop + + )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2012-04-24 02:15:00 +02:00
ProcessOneShot ( ) ;
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for ( const std : : string & strAddr : connect )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
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CAddress addr ( CService ( ) , NODE_NONE ) ;
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
OpenNetworkConnection ( addr , false , nullptr , strAddr . c_str ( ) , false , false , true ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 10 & & i < nLoop ; i + + )
{
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if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( 500 ) ) )
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( 500 ) ) )
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
// Initiate network connections
2013-04-13 07:13:08 +02:00
int64_t nStart = GetTime ( ) ;
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// Minimum time before next feeler connection (in microseconds).
int64_t nNextFeeler = PoissonNextSend ( nStart * 1000 * 1000 , FEELER_INTERVAL ) ;
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while ( ! interruptNet )
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{
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ProcessOneShot ( ) ;
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if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( 500 ) ) )
return ;
2012-02-15 21:17:15 +01:00
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
CSemaphoreGrant grant ( * semOutbound ) ;
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if ( interruptNet )
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2013-05-07 15:16:25 +02:00
// Add seed nodes if DNS seeds are all down (an infrastructure attack?).
if ( addrman . size ( ) = = 0 & & ( GetTime ( ) - nStart > 60 ) ) {
static bool done = false ;
if ( ! done ) {
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LogPrintf ( " Adding fixed seed nodes as DNS doesn't seem to be available. \n " ) ;
2017-09-03 15:29:10 +02:00
CNetAddr local ;
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local . SetInternal ( " fixedseeds " ) ;
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addrman . Add ( convertSeed6 ( Params ( ) . FixedSeeds ( ) ) , local ) ;
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done = true ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
//
// Choose an address to connect to based on most recently seen
//
CAddress addrConnect ;
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// Only connect out to one peer per network group (/16 for IPv4).
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// Do this here so we don't have to critsect vNodes inside mapAddresses critsect.
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// This is only done for mainnet and testnet
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
int nOutbound = 0 ;
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std : : set < std : : vector < unsigned char > > setConnected ;
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if ( ! Params ( ) . AllowMultipleAddressesFromGroup ( ) ) {
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LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
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for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
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if ( ! pnode - > fInbound & & ! pnode - > fMasternode & & ! pnode - > m_manual_connection ) {
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// Netgroups for inbound and addnode peers are not excluded because our goal here
// is to not use multiple of our limited outbound slots on a single netgroup
// but inbound and addnode peers do not use our outbound slots. Inbound peers
// also have the added issue that they're attacker controlled and could be used
// to prevent us from connecting to particular hosts if we used them here.
2012-07-02 02:23:26 +02:00
setConnected . insert ( pnode - > addr . GetGroup ( ) ) ;
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nOutbound + + ;
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}
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}
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}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2017-07-17 12:39:12 +02:00
// Feeler Connections
//
// Design goals:
// * Increase the number of connectable addresses in the tried table.
//
// Method:
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// * Choose a random address from new and attempt to connect to it if we can connect
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// successfully it is added to tried.
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// * Start attempting feeler connections only after node finishes making outbound
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// connections.
// * Only make a feeler connection once every few minutes.
//
bool fFeeler = false ;
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if ( nOutbound > = nMaxOutbound & & ! GetTryNewOutboundPeer ( ) ) {
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int64_t nTime = GetTimeMicros ( ) ; // The current time right now (in microseconds).
if ( nTime > nNextFeeler ) {
nNextFeeler = PoissonNextSend ( nTime , FEELER_INTERVAL ) ;
fFeeler = true ;
} else {
continue ;
}
}
2011-10-04 05:41:47 +02:00
2019-04-10 18:14:20 +02:00
auto mnList = deterministicMNManager - > GetListAtChainTip ( ) ;
2017-07-17 12:39:12 +02:00
int64_t nANow = GetAdjustedTime ( ) ;
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int nTries = 0 ;
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while ( ! interruptNet )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
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CAddrInfo addr = addrman . Select ( fFeeler ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2019-06-13 11:03:20 +02:00
bool isMasternode = mnList . GetMNByService ( addr ) ! = nullptr ;
2019-04-10 18:14:20 +02:00
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
// if we selected an invalid address, restart
2018-07-07 23:19:33 +02:00
if ( ! addr . IsValid ( ) | | setConnected . count ( addr . GetGroup ( ) ) )
break ;
// if we selected a local address, restart (local addresses are allowed in regtest and devnet)
bool fAllowLocal = Params ( ) . AllowMultiplePorts ( ) & & addrConnect . GetPort ( ) ! = GetListenPort ( ) ;
if ( ! fAllowLocal & & IsLocal ( addrConnect ) )
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
break ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2012-08-21 17:32:04 +02:00
// If we didn't find an appropriate destination after trying 100 addresses fetched from addrman,
// stop this loop, and let the outer loop run again (which sleeps, adds seed nodes, recalculates
// already-connected network ranges, ...) before trying new addrman addresses.
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
nTries + + ;
2012-08-21 17:32:04 +02:00
if ( nTries > 100 )
break ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2012-05-04 16:46:22 +02:00
if ( IsLimited ( addr ) )
continue ;
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
// only consider very recently tried nodes after 30 failed attempts
if ( nANow - addr . nLastTry < 600 & & nTries < 30 )
continue ;
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
// for non-feelers, require all the services we'll want,
// for feelers, only require they be a full node (only because most
// SPV clients don't have a good address DB available)
if ( ! isMasternode & & ! fFeeler & & ! HasAllDesirableServiceFlags ( addr . nServices ) ) {
continue ;
} else if ( ! isMasternode & & fFeeler & & ! MayHaveUsefulAddressDB ( addr . nServices ) ) {
2018-01-25 18:16:40 +01:00
continue ;
2017-06-01 13:20:56 +02:00
}
2018-01-25 18:16:40 +01:00
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
// do not allow non-default ports, unless after 50 invalid addresses selected already
2019-04-10 18:14:20 +02:00
if ( ( ! isMasternode | | ! Params ( ) . AllowMultiplePorts ( ) ) & & addr . GetPort ( ) ! = Params ( ) . GetDefaultPort ( ) & & addr . GetPort ( ) ! = GetListenPort ( ) & & nTries < 50 )
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
continue ;
addrConnect = addr ;
break ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
2017-07-17 12:39:12 +02:00
if ( addrConnect . IsValid ( ) ) {
if ( fFeeler ) {
// Add small amount of random noise before connection to avoid synchronization.
int randsleep = GetRandInt ( FEELER_SLEEP_WINDOW * 1000 ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( randsleep ) ) )
return ;
2019-09-22 22:48:15 +02:00
if ( fLogIPs ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Making feeler connection to %s \n " , addrConnect . ToString ( ) ) ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Making feeler connection \n " ) ;
}
2017-07-17 12:39:12 +02:00
}
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
OpenNetworkConnection ( addrConnect , ( int ) setConnected . size ( ) > = std : : min ( nMaxConnections - 1 , 2 ) , & grant , nullptr , false , fFeeler ) ;
2017-07-17 12:39:12 +02:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
std : : vector < AddedNodeInfo > CConnman : : GetAddedNodeInfo ( )
2011-12-17 01:48:03 +01:00
{
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
std : : vector < AddedNodeInfo > ret ;
std : : list < std : : string > lAddresses ( 0 ) ;
2012-07-02 19:55:16 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vAddedNodes ) ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
ret . reserve ( vAddedNodes . size ( ) ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const std : : string & strAddNode : vAddedNodes )
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
lAddresses . push_back ( strAddNode ) ;
2012-07-02 19:55:16 +02:00
}
2011-12-17 01:48:03 +01:00
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
// Build a map of all already connected addresses (by IP:port and by name) to inbound/outbound and resolved CService
std : : map < CService , bool > mapConnected ;
std : : map < std : : string , std : : pair < bool , CService > > mapConnectedByName ;
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( const CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
if ( pnode - > addr . IsValid ( ) ) {
mapConnected [ pnode - > addr ] = pnode - > fInbound ;
2012-07-02 19:55:16 +02:00
}
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
std : : string addrName = pnode - > GetAddrName ( ) ;
if ( ! addrName . empty ( ) ) {
mapConnectedByName [ std : : move ( addrName ) ] = std : : make_pair ( pnode - > fInbound , static_cast < const CService & > ( pnode - > addr ) ) ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
}
}
}
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const std : : string & strAddNode : lAddresses ) {
2017-09-03 15:29:10 +02:00
CService service ( LookupNumeric ( strAddNode . c_str ( ) , Params ( ) . GetDefaultPort ( ) ) ) ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
if ( service . IsValid ( ) ) {
// strAddNode is an IP:port
auto it = mapConnected . find ( service ) ;
if ( it ! = mapConnected . end ( ) ) {
ret . push_back ( AddedNodeInfo { strAddNode , service , true , it - > second } ) ;
} else {
ret . push_back ( AddedNodeInfo { strAddNode , CService ( ) , false , false } ) ;
}
} else {
// strAddNode is a name
auto it = mapConnectedByName . find ( strAddNode ) ;
if ( it ! = mapConnectedByName . end ( ) ) {
ret . push_back ( AddedNodeInfo { strAddNode , it - > second . second , true , it - > second . first } ) ;
} else {
ret . push_back ( AddedNodeInfo { strAddNode , CService ( ) , false , false } ) ;
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
}
}
}
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
return ret ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : ThreadOpenAddedConnections ( )
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
{
{
LOCK ( cs_vAddedNodes ) ;
2017-06-27 14:22:54 +02:00
vAddedNodes = gArgs . GetArgs ( " -addnode " ) ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
}
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
while ( true )
2011-12-17 01:48:03 +01:00
{
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
CSemaphoreGrant grant ( * semAddnode ) ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
std : : vector < AddedNodeInfo > vInfo = GetAddedNodeInfo ( ) ;
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
bool tried = false ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
for ( const AddedNodeInfo & info : vInfo ) {
if ( ! info . fConnected ) {
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
if ( ! grant . TryAcquire ( ) ) {
// If we've used up our semaphore and need a new one, lets not wait here since while we are waiting
// the addednodeinfo state might change.
break ;
}
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
// If strAddedNode is an IP/port, decode it immediately, so
// OpenNetworkConnection can detect existing connections to that IP/port.
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
tried = true ;
2017-09-03 15:29:10 +02:00
CService service ( LookupNumeric ( info . strAddedNode . c_str ( ) , Params ( ) . GetDefaultPort ( ) ) ) ;
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
OpenNetworkConnection ( CAddress ( service , NODE_NONE ) , false , & grant , info . strAddedNode . c_str ( ) , false , false , true ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( 500 ) ) )
return ;
2017-07-14 18:58:57 +02:00
}
2012-07-02 19:55:16 +02:00
}
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
// Retry every 60 seconds if a connection was attempted, otherwise two seconds
if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : seconds ( tried ? 60 : 2 ) ) )
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
return ;
2011-12-17 01:48:03 +01:00
}
}
2018-02-01 02:10:52 +01:00
void CConnman : : ThreadOpenMasternodeConnections ( )
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
{
// Connecting to specific addresses, no masternode connections available
2019-06-24 18:44:27 +02:00
if ( gArgs . IsArgSet ( " -connect " ) & & gArgs . GetArgs ( " -connect " ) . size ( ) > 0 )
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
return ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
while ( ! interruptNet )
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
{
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( ! interruptNet . sleep_for ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( 1000 ) ) )
return ;
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
std : : set < CService > connectedNodes ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
std : : set < uint256 > connectedProRegTxHashes ;
ForEachNode ( [ & ] ( const CNode * pnode ) {
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
connectedNodes . emplace ( pnode - > addr ) ;
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
if ( ! pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash . IsNull ( ) ) {
connectedProRegTxHashes . emplace ( pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash ) ;
}
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
} ) ;
2019-04-09 09:13:31 +02:00
auto mnList = deterministicMNManager - > GetListAtChainTip ( ) ;
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
CSemaphoreGrant grant ( * semMasternodeOutbound ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( interruptNet )
return ;
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
2019-06-14 13:04:19 +02:00
int64_t nANow = GetAdjustedTime ( ) ;
2018-05-26 20:03:49 +02:00
// NOTE: Process only one pending masternode at a time
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
CService addr ;
{ // don't hold lock while calling OpenMasternodeConnection as cs_main is locked deep inside
LOCK2 ( cs_vNodes , cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
2018-05-26 20:03:49 +02:00
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
std : : vector < CService > pending ;
2019-01-11 10:00:40 +01:00
for ( const auto & group : masternodeQuorumNodes ) {
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
for ( const auto & proRegTxHash : group . second ) {
2019-06-13 11:03:20 +02:00
auto dmn = mnList . GetMN ( proRegTxHash ) ;
2019-04-09 09:13:31 +02:00
if ( ! dmn ) {
continue ;
}
const auto & addr2 = dmn - > pdmnState - > addr ;
2019-04-09 09:09:45 +02:00
if ( ! connectedNodes . count ( addr2 ) & & ! IsMasternodeOrDisconnectRequested ( addr2 ) & & ! connectedProRegTxHashes . count ( proRegTxHash ) ) {
2019-06-14 13:04:19 +02:00
auto addrInfo = addrman . GetAddressInfo ( addr2 ) ;
// back off trying connecting to an address if we already tried recently
if ( addrInfo . IsValid ( ) & & nANow - addrInfo . nLastTry < 60 ) {
continue ;
}
2019-04-09 09:09:45 +02:00
pending . emplace_back ( addr2 ) ;
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
}
}
}
if ( ! vPendingMasternodes . empty ( ) ) {
2019-04-09 09:09:45 +02:00
auto addr2 = vPendingMasternodes . front ( ) ;
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
vPendingMasternodes . erase ( vPendingMasternodes . begin ( ) ) ;
2019-04-09 09:09:45 +02:00
if ( ! connectedNodes . count ( addr2 ) & & ! IsMasternodeOrDisconnectRequested ( addr2 ) ) {
pending . emplace_back ( addr2 ) ;
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
}
}
if ( pending . empty ( ) ) {
// nothing to do, keep waiting
continue ;
}
std : : random_shuffle ( pending . begin ( ) , pending . end ( ) ) ;
addr = pending . front ( ) ;
2017-01-31 16:29:27 +01:00
}
2018-05-26 20:03:49 +02:00
OpenMasternodeConnection ( CAddress ( addr , NODE_NETWORK ) ) ;
// should be in the list now if connection was opened
ForNode ( addr , CConnman : : AllNodes , [ & ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
if ( pnode - > fDisconnect ) {
return false ;
}
grant . MoveTo ( pnode - > grantMasternodeOutbound ) ;
return true ;
} ) ;
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
}
}
2012-07-26 02:48:39 +02:00
// if successful, this moves the passed grant to the constructed node
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
bool CConnman : : OpenNetworkConnection ( const CAddress & addrConnect , bool fCountFailure , CSemaphoreGrant * grantOutbound , const char * pszDest , bool fOneShot , bool fFeeler , bool manual_connection , bool fConnectToMasternode )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
//
// Initiate outbound network connection
//
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( interruptNet ) {
return false ;
}
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
if ( ! fNetworkActive ) {
return false ;
2018-02-21 17:32:08 +01:00
}
2014-05-24 11:14:52 +02:00
if ( ! pszDest ) {
2018-07-07 23:19:33 +02:00
// banned or exact match?
if ( IsBanned ( addrConnect ) | | FindNode ( addrConnect . ToStringIPPort ( ) ) )
return false ;
// local and not a connection to itself?
bool fAllowLocal = Params ( ) . AllowMultiplePorts ( ) & & addrConnect . GetPort ( ) ! = GetListenPort ( ) ;
if ( ! fAllowLocal & & IsLocal ( addrConnect ) )
return false ;
// if multiple ports for same IP are allowed, search for IP:PORT match, otherwise search for IP-only match
if ( ( ! Params ( ) . AllowMultiplePorts ( ) & & FindNode ( ( CNetAddr ) addrConnect ) ) | |
( Params ( ) . AllowMultiplePorts ( ) & & FindNode ( ( CService ) addrConnect ) ) )
2012-04-19 17:38:03 +02:00
return false ;
2015-05-31 15:44:22 +02:00
} else if ( FindNode ( std : : string ( pszDest ) ) )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return false ;
2016-06-08 12:58:21 +02:00
CNode * pnode = ConnectNode ( addrConnect , pszDest , fCountFailure ) ;
2013-03-07 04:31:26 +01:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
if ( ! pnode )
return false ;
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
if ( grantOutbound )
grantOutbound - > MoveTo ( pnode - > grantOutbound ) ;
2012-04-24 02:15:00 +02:00
if ( fOneShot )
pnode - > fOneShot = true ;
2017-07-17 12:39:12 +02:00
if ( fFeeler )
pnode - > fFeeler = true ;
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
if ( manual_connection )
pnode - > m_manual_connection = true ;
2018-01-17 16:09:08 +01:00
if ( fConnectToMasternode )
pnode - > fMasternode = true ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
m_msgproc - > InitializeNode ( pnode ) ;
2017-01-24 22:51:22 +01:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
vNodes . push_back ( pnode ) ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return true ;
}
2018-01-17 16:09:08 +01:00
bool CConnman : : OpenMasternodeConnection ( const CAddress & addrConnect ) {
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
return OpenNetworkConnection ( addrConnect , false , nullptr , nullptr , false , false , false , true ) ;
2018-01-17 16:09:08 +01:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : ThreadMessageHandler ( )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
while ( ! flagInterruptMsgProc )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : vector < CNode * > vNodesCopy = CopyNodeVector ( ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
bool fMoreWork = false ;
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodesCopy )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2013-03-01 01:41:28 +01:00
if ( pnode - > fDisconnect )
continue ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Receive messages
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
bool fMoreNodeWork = m_msgproc - > ProcessMessages ( pnode , flagInterruptMsgProc ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
fMoreWork | = ( fMoreNodeWork & & ! pnode - > fPauseSend ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( flagInterruptMsgProc )
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Send messages
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
{
2017-01-19 20:19:29 +01:00
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_sendProcessing ) ;
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
m_msgproc - > SendMessages ( pnode , flagInterruptMsgProc ) ;
2012-04-06 18:39:12 +02:00
}
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( flagInterruptMsgProc )
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
2017-03-05 20:16:12 +01:00
ReleaseNodeVector ( vNodesCopy ) ;
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
std : : unique_lock < std : : mutex > lock ( mutexMsgProc ) ;
if ( ! fMoreWork ) {
condMsgProc . wait_until ( lock , std : : chrono : : steady_clock : : now ( ) + std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( 100 ) , [ this ] { return fMsgProcWake ; } ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
fMsgProcWake = false ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : BindListenPort ( const CService & addrBind , std : : string & strError , bool fWhitelisted )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
strError = " " ;
int nOne = 1 ;
// Create socket for listening for incoming connections
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
struct sockaddr_storage sockaddr ;
socklen_t len = sizeof ( sockaddr ) ;
if ( ! addrBind . GetSockAddr ( ( struct sockaddr * ) & sockaddr , & len ) )
{
2014-05-24 11:14:52 +02:00
strError = strprintf ( " Error: Bind address family for %s not supported " , addrBind . ToString ( ) ) ;
2014-01-16 16:15:27 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " %s \n " , strError ) ;
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
return false ;
}
SOCKET hListenSocket = socket ( ( ( struct sockaddr * ) & sockaddr ) - > sa_family , SOCK_STREAM , IPPROTO_TCP ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
if ( hListenSocket = = INVALID_SOCKET )
{
2014-05-08 14:15:19 +02:00
strError = strprintf ( " Error: Couldn't open socket for incoming connections (socket returned error %s) " , NetworkErrorString ( WSAGetLastError ( ) ) ) ;
2014-01-16 16:15:27 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " %s \n " , strError ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return false ;
}
2015-07-10 00:23:27 +02:00
if ( ! IsSelectableSocket ( hListenSocket ) )
{
strError = " Error: Couldn't create a listenable socket for incoming connections " ;
LogPrintf ( " %s \n " , strError ) ;
return false ;
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2014-06-24 09:03:18 +02:00
# ifndef WIN32
2011-08-07 18:18:05 +02:00
# ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Different way of disabling SIGPIPE on BSD
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , SOL_SOCKET , SO_NOSIGPIPE , ( void * ) & nOne , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
# endif
// Allow binding if the port is still in TIME_WAIT state after
2015-08-20 21:50:13 +02:00
// the program was closed and restarted.
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , SOL_SOCKET , SO_REUSEADDR , ( void * ) & nOne , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
2015-10-22 01:52:29 +02:00
// Disable Nagle's algorithm
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , IPPROTO_TCP , TCP_NODELAY , ( void * ) & nOne , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
2015-08-20 21:50:13 +02:00
# else
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , SOL_SOCKET , SO_REUSEADDR , ( const char * ) & nOne , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
2015-10-22 01:52:29 +02:00
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , IPPROTO_TCP , TCP_NODELAY , ( const char * ) & nOne , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
# endif
2012-07-26 02:48:39 +02:00
// Set to non-blocking, incoming connections will also inherit this
2014-07-09 11:00:00 +02:00
if ( ! SetSocketNonBlocking ( hListenSocket , true ) ) {
2017-07-24 14:58:25 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hListenSocket ) ;
2014-07-09 11:00:00 +02:00
strError = strprintf ( " BindListenPort: Setting listening socket to non-blocking failed, error %s \n " , NetworkErrorString ( WSAGetLastError ( ) ) ) ;
2014-01-16 16:15:27 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " %s \n " , strError ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return false ;
}
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
// some systems don't have IPV6_V6ONLY but are always v6only; others do have the option
// and enable it by default or not. Try to enable it, if possible.
if ( addrBind . IsIPv6 ( ) ) {
# ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
2013-07-13 13:05:04 +02:00
# ifdef WIN32
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , IPPROTO_IPV6 , IPV6_V6ONLY , ( const char * ) & nOne , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
# else
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , IPPROTO_IPV6 , IPV6_V6ONLY , ( void * ) & nOne , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
2012-03-31 17:58:25 +02:00
# endif
2013-07-13 13:05:04 +02:00
# endif
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
# ifdef WIN32
2014-06-24 09:03:18 +02:00
int nProtLevel = PROTECTION_LEVEL_UNRESTRICTED ;
setsockopt ( hListenSocket , IPPROTO_IPV6 , IPV6_PROTECTION_LEVEL , ( const char * ) & nProtLevel , sizeof ( int ) ) ;
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
# endif
}
if ( : : bind ( hListenSocket , ( struct sockaddr * ) & sockaddr , len ) = = SOCKET_ERROR )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
int nErr = WSAGetLastError ( ) ;
if ( nErr = = WSAEADDRINUSE )
2016-02-04 13:41:58 +01:00
strError = strprintf ( _ ( " Unable to bind to %s on this computer. %s is probably already running. " ) , addrBind . ToString ( ) , _ ( PACKAGE_NAME ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
else
2014-05-08 14:15:19 +02:00
strError = strprintf ( _ ( " Unable to bind to %s on this computer (bind returned error %s) " ) , addrBind . ToString ( ) , NetworkErrorString ( nErr ) ) ;
2014-01-16 16:15:27 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " %s \n " , strError ) ;
2014-07-17 22:33:58 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hListenSocket ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return false ;
}
2014-01-16 16:15:27 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " Bound to %s \n " , addrBind . ToString ( ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Listen for incoming connections
if ( listen ( hListenSocket , SOMAXCONN ) = = SOCKET_ERROR )
{
2014-05-08 14:15:19 +02:00
strError = strprintf ( _ ( " Error: Listening for incoming connections failed (listen returned error %s) " ) , NetworkErrorString ( WSAGetLastError ( ) ) ) ;
2014-01-16 16:15:27 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " %s \n " , strError ) ;
2014-07-17 22:33:58 +02:00
CloseSocket ( hListenSocket ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return false ;
}
2014-06-21 13:34:36 +02:00
vhListenSocket . push_back ( ListenSocket ( hListenSocket , fWhitelisted ) ) ;
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
2014-06-21 13:34:36 +02:00
if ( addrBind . IsRoutable ( ) & & fDiscover & & ! fWhitelisted )
2012-05-11 15:28:59 +02:00
AddLocal ( addrBind , LOCAL_BIND ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return true ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void Discover ( boost : : thread_group & threadGroup )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2012-05-24 19:02:21 +02:00
if ( ! fDiscover )
2012-02-19 20:44:35 +01:00
return ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2011-10-07 17:02:21 +02:00
# ifdef WIN32
2012-07-26 02:48:39 +02:00
// Get local host IP
2014-11-13 15:23:15 +01:00
char pszHostName [ 256 ] = " " ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
if ( gethostname ( pszHostName , sizeof ( pszHostName ) ) ! = SOCKET_ERROR )
{
2017-07-12 03:20:12 +02:00
std : : vector < CNetAddr > vaddr ;
2017-09-02 22:07:11 +02:00
if ( LookupHost ( pszHostName , vaddr , 0 , true ) )
2012-05-01 01:44:59 +02:00
{
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const CNetAddr & addr : vaddr )
2012-05-01 01:44:59 +02:00
{
2014-11-13 15:20:57 +01:00
if ( AddLocal ( addr , LOCAL_IF ) )
LogPrintf ( " %s: %s - %s \n " , __func__ , pszHostName , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
2012-05-01 01:44:59 +02:00
}
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
# else
// Get local host ip
struct ifaddrs * myaddrs ;
if ( getifaddrs ( & myaddrs ) = = 0 )
{
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
for ( struct ifaddrs * ifa = myaddrs ; ifa ! = nullptr ; ifa = ifa - > ifa_next )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
if ( ifa - > ifa_addr = = nullptr ) continue ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
if ( ( ifa - > ifa_flags & IFF_UP ) = = 0 ) continue ;
if ( strcmp ( ifa - > ifa_name , " lo " ) = = 0 ) continue ;
if ( strcmp ( ifa - > ifa_name , " lo0 " ) = = 0 ) continue ;
if ( ifa - > ifa_addr - > sa_family = = AF_INET )
{
struct sockaddr_in * s4 = ( struct sockaddr_in * ) ( ifa - > ifa_addr ) ;
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
CNetAddr addr ( s4 - > sin_addr ) ;
2012-03-31 17:58:25 +02:00
if ( AddLocal ( addr , LOCAL_IF ) )
2014-11-13 15:20:57 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " %s: IPv4 %s: %s \n " , __func__ , ifa - > ifa_name , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
else if ( ifa - > ifa_addr - > sa_family = = AF_INET6 )
{
struct sockaddr_in6 * s6 = ( struct sockaddr_in6 * ) ( ifa - > ifa_addr ) ;
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
CNetAddr addr ( s6 - > sin6_addr ) ;
2012-03-31 17:58:25 +02:00
if ( AddLocal ( addr , LOCAL_IF ) )
2014-11-13 15:20:57 +01:00
LogPrintf ( " %s: IPv6 %s: %s \n " , __func__ , ifa - > ifa_name , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
freeifaddrs ( myaddrs ) ;
}
# endif
2012-02-19 20:44:35 +01:00
}
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
void CConnman : : SetNetworkActive ( bool active )
{
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " SetNetworkActive: %s \n " , active ) ;
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
2017-07-26 11:11:25 +02:00
if ( fNetworkActive = = active ) {
return ;
}
fNetworkActive = active ;
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
2017-07-26 11:11:25 +02:00
if ( ! fNetworkActive ) {
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
// Close sockets to all nodes
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
pnode - > CloseSocketDisconnect ( ) ;
}
}
uiInterface . NotifyNetworkActiveChanged ( fNetworkActive ) ;
}
2018-07-07 23:19:33 +02:00
CConnman : : CConnman ( uint64_t nSeed0In , uint64_t nSeed1In ) :
2018-09-28 09:55:11 +02:00
addrman ( Params ( ) . AllowMultiplePorts ( ) ) ,
nSeed0 ( nSeed0In ) , nSeed1 ( nSeed1In )
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
{
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
fNetworkActive = true ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
setBannedIsDirty = false ;
fAddressesInitialized = false ;
nLastNodeId = 0 ;
nSendBufferMaxSize = 0 ;
nReceiveFloodSize = 0 ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
semOutbound = nullptr ;
semAddnode = nullptr ;
semMasternodeOutbound = nullptr ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
flagInterruptMsgProc = false ;
2017-11-02 20:13:17 +01:00
SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( false ) ;
Merge #10977: [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest&)
11dd29b [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
When running `test_bitcoin` under Valgrind I found the following issue:
```
$ valgrind src/test/test_bitcoin
...
==10465== Use of uninitialised value of size 8
==10465== at 0x6D09B61: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D0B1BB: std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::_M_insert_int<unsigned long>(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D0B36C: std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::do_put(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D17699: std::ostream& std::ostream::_M_insert<unsigned long>(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: operator<< (ostream:171)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: formatValue<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:345)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: void tinyformat::detail::FormatArg::formatImpl<ServiceFlags>(std::ostream&, char const*, char const*, int, void const*) (tinyformat.h:523)
==10465== by 0x1924D4: format (tinyformat.h:510)
==10465== by 0x1924D4: tinyformat::detail::formatImpl(std::ostream&, char const*, tinyformat::detail::FormatArg const*, int) (tinyformat.h:803)
==10465== by 0x553A55: vformat (tinyformat.h:947)
==10465== by 0x553A55: format<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:957)
==10465== by 0x553A55: std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > tinyformat::format<ServiceFlags>(char const*, ServiceFlags const&) (tinyformat.h:966)
==10465== by 0x54C952: getnetworkinfo(JSONRPCRequest const&) (net.cpp:462)
==10465== by 0x28EDB5: CallRPC(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >) (rpc_tests.cpp:31)
==10465== by 0x293947: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork::test_method() (rpc_tests.cpp:88)
==10465== by 0x2950E5: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork_invoker() (rpc_tests.cpp:84)
==10465== by 0x182496: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56)
==10465== by 0x182496: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89)
...
```
The read of the uninitialized variable `nLocalServices` is triggered by `g_connman->GetLocalServices()` in `getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)` (`net.cpp:462`):
```c++
UniValue getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
{
...
if(g_connman)
obj.push_back(Pair("localservices", strprintf("%016x", g_connman->GetLocalServices())));
...
}
```
The reason for the uninitialized `nLocalServices` is that `CConnman::Start(...)` is not called
by the tests, and hence the initialization normally performed by `CConnman::Start(...)` is
not done.
This commit adds a method `Init(const Options& connOptions)` which is called by both the
constructor and `CConnman::Start(...)`. This method initializes `nLocalServices` and the other
relevant values from the supplied `Options` object.
Tree-SHA512: d8742363acffd03b2ee081cc56840275569e17edc6fa4bb1dee4a5971ffe4b8ab1d2fe7b68f98a086bf133b7ec46f4e471243ca08b45bf82356e8c831a5a5f21
2017-08-05 13:23:10 +02:00
Options connOptions ;
Init ( connOptions ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
NodeId CConnman : : GetNewNodeId ( )
2012-02-19 20:44:35 +01:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
return nLastNodeId . fetch_add ( 1 , std : : memory_order_relaxed ) ;
}
2017-06-26 14:42:46 +02:00
bool CConnman : : Bind ( const CService & addr , unsigned int flags ) {
if ( ! ( flags & BF_EXPLICIT ) & & IsLimited ( addr ) )
return false ;
std : : string strError ;
if ( ! BindListenPort ( addr , strError , ( flags & BF_WHITELIST ) ! = 0 ) ) {
if ( ( flags & BF_REPORT_ERROR ) & & clientInterface ) {
clientInterface - > ThreadSafeMessageBox ( strError , " " , CClientUIInterface : : MSG_ERROR ) ;
}
return false ;
}
return true ;
}
bool CConnman : : InitBinds ( const std : : vector < CService > & binds , const std : : vector < CService > & whiteBinds ) {
bool fBound = false ;
for ( const auto & addrBind : binds ) {
fBound | = Bind ( addrBind , ( BF_EXPLICIT | BF_REPORT_ERROR ) ) ;
}
for ( const auto & addrBind : whiteBinds ) {
fBound | = Bind ( addrBind , ( BF_EXPLICIT | BF_REPORT_ERROR | BF_WHITELIST ) ) ;
}
if ( binds . empty ( ) & & whiteBinds . empty ( ) ) {
struct in_addr inaddr_any ;
inaddr_any . s_addr = INADDR_ANY ;
2019-07-15 21:05:25 +02:00
fBound | = Bind ( CService ( ( in6_addr ) IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT , GetListenPort ( ) ) , BF_NONE ) ;
2017-06-26 14:42:46 +02:00
fBound | = Bind ( CService ( inaddr_any , GetListenPort ( ) ) , ! fBound ? BF_REPORT_ERROR : BF_NONE ) ;
}
return fBound ;
}
Merge #10977: [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest&)
11dd29b [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
When running `test_bitcoin` under Valgrind I found the following issue:
```
$ valgrind src/test/test_bitcoin
...
==10465== Use of uninitialised value of size 8
==10465== at 0x6D09B61: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D0B1BB: std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::_M_insert_int<unsigned long>(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D0B36C: std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::do_put(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D17699: std::ostream& std::ostream::_M_insert<unsigned long>(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: operator<< (ostream:171)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: formatValue<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:345)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: void tinyformat::detail::FormatArg::formatImpl<ServiceFlags>(std::ostream&, char const*, char const*, int, void const*) (tinyformat.h:523)
==10465== by 0x1924D4: format (tinyformat.h:510)
==10465== by 0x1924D4: tinyformat::detail::formatImpl(std::ostream&, char const*, tinyformat::detail::FormatArg const*, int) (tinyformat.h:803)
==10465== by 0x553A55: vformat (tinyformat.h:947)
==10465== by 0x553A55: format<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:957)
==10465== by 0x553A55: std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > tinyformat::format<ServiceFlags>(char const*, ServiceFlags const&) (tinyformat.h:966)
==10465== by 0x54C952: getnetworkinfo(JSONRPCRequest const&) (net.cpp:462)
==10465== by 0x28EDB5: CallRPC(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >) (rpc_tests.cpp:31)
==10465== by 0x293947: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork::test_method() (rpc_tests.cpp:88)
==10465== by 0x2950E5: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork_invoker() (rpc_tests.cpp:84)
==10465== by 0x182496: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56)
==10465== by 0x182496: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89)
...
```
The read of the uninitialized variable `nLocalServices` is triggered by `g_connman->GetLocalServices()` in `getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)` (`net.cpp:462`):
```c++
UniValue getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
{
...
if(g_connman)
obj.push_back(Pair("localservices", strprintf("%016x", g_connman->GetLocalServices())));
...
}
```
The reason for the uninitialized `nLocalServices` is that `CConnman::Start(...)` is not called
by the tests, and hence the initialization normally performed by `CConnman::Start(...)` is
not done.
This commit adds a method `Init(const Options& connOptions)` which is called by both the
constructor and `CConnman::Start(...)`. This method initializes `nLocalServices` and the other
relevant values from the supplied `Options` object.
Tree-SHA512: d8742363acffd03b2ee081cc56840275569e17edc6fa4bb1dee4a5971ffe4b8ab1d2fe7b68f98a086bf133b7ec46f4e471243ca08b45bf82356e8c831a5a5f21
2017-08-05 13:23:10 +02:00
bool CConnman : : Start ( CScheduler & scheduler , const Options & connOptions )
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
{
Merge #10977: [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest&)
11dd29b [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
When running `test_bitcoin` under Valgrind I found the following issue:
```
$ valgrind src/test/test_bitcoin
...
==10465== Use of uninitialised value of size 8
==10465== at 0x6D09B61: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D0B1BB: std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::_M_insert_int<unsigned long>(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D0B36C: std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::do_put(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x6D17699: std::ostream& std::ostream::_M_insert<unsigned long>(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: operator<< (ostream:171)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: formatValue<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:345)
==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: void tinyformat::detail::FormatArg::formatImpl<ServiceFlags>(std::ostream&, char const*, char const*, int, void const*) (tinyformat.h:523)
==10465== by 0x1924D4: format (tinyformat.h:510)
==10465== by 0x1924D4: tinyformat::detail::formatImpl(std::ostream&, char const*, tinyformat::detail::FormatArg const*, int) (tinyformat.h:803)
==10465== by 0x553A55: vformat (tinyformat.h:947)
==10465== by 0x553A55: format<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:957)
==10465== by 0x553A55: std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > tinyformat::format<ServiceFlags>(char const*, ServiceFlags const&) (tinyformat.h:966)
==10465== by 0x54C952: getnetworkinfo(JSONRPCRequest const&) (net.cpp:462)
==10465== by 0x28EDB5: CallRPC(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >) (rpc_tests.cpp:31)
==10465== by 0x293947: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork::test_method() (rpc_tests.cpp:88)
==10465== by 0x2950E5: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork_invoker() (rpc_tests.cpp:84)
==10465== by 0x182496: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56)
==10465== by 0x182496: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89)
...
```
The read of the uninitialized variable `nLocalServices` is triggered by `g_connman->GetLocalServices()` in `getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)` (`net.cpp:462`):
```c++
UniValue getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
{
...
if(g_connman)
obj.push_back(Pair("localservices", strprintf("%016x", g_connman->GetLocalServices())));
...
}
```
The reason for the uninitialized `nLocalServices` is that `CConnman::Start(...)` is not called
by the tests, and hence the initialization normally performed by `CConnman::Start(...)` is
not done.
This commit adds a method `Init(const Options& connOptions)` which is called by both the
constructor and `CConnman::Start(...)`. This method initializes `nLocalServices` and the other
relevant values from the supplied `Options` object.
Tree-SHA512: d8742363acffd03b2ee081cc56840275569e17edc6fa4bb1dee4a5971ffe4b8ab1d2fe7b68f98a086bf133b7ec46f4e471243ca08b45bf82356e8c831a5a5f21
2017-08-05 13:23:10 +02:00
Init ( connOptions ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
nTotalBytesRecv = 0 ;
nTotalBytesSent = 0 ;
nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle = 0 ;
nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime = 0 ;
2017-06-26 14:42:46 +02:00
if ( fListen & & ! InitBinds ( connOptions . vBinds , connOptions . vWhiteBinds ) ) {
if ( clientInterface ) {
clientInterface - > ThreadSafeMessageBox (
_ ( " Failed to listen on any port. Use -listen=0 if you want this. " ) ,
" " , CClientUIInterface : : MSG_ERROR ) ;
}
return false ;
}
2017-05-31 17:29:29 +02:00
for ( const auto & strDest : connOptions . vSeedNodes ) {
AddOneShot ( strDest ) ;
}
2017-03-01 11:16:11 +01:00
if ( clientInterface ) {
clientInterface - > InitMessage ( _ ( " Loading P2P addresses... " ) ) ;
}
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
// Load addresses from peers.dat
2014-09-18 14:08:43 +02:00
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
{
CAddrDB adb ;
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
if ( adb . Read ( addrman ) )
LogPrintf ( " Loaded %i addresses from peers.dat %dms \n " , addrman . size ( ) , GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStart ) ;
2017-07-05 01:26:13 +02:00
else {
2017-07-05 02:40:22 +02:00
addrman . Clear ( ) ; // Addrman can be in an inconsistent state after failure, reset it
2014-09-18 14:08:43 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Invalid or missing peers.dat; recreating \n " ) ;
2017-07-05 01:26:13 +02:00
DumpAddresses ( ) ;
}
2014-09-18 14:08:43 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( clientInterface )
clientInterface - > InitMessage ( _ ( " Loading banlist... " ) ) ;
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
// Load addresses from banlist.dat
nStart = GetTimeMillis ( ) ;
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
CBanDB bandb ;
2015-06-26 21:38:33 +02:00
banmap_t banmap ;
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
if ( bandb . Read ( banmap ) ) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
SetBanned ( banmap ) ; // thread save setter
SetBannedSetDirty ( false ) ; // no need to write down, just read data
SweepBanned ( ) ; // sweep out unused entries
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Loaded %d banned node ips/subnets from banlist.dat %dms \n " ,
2017-07-04 23:39:05 +02:00
banmap . size ( ) , GetTimeMillis ( ) - nStart ) ;
2017-07-05 01:26:13 +02:00
} else {
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Invalid or missing banlist.dat; recreating \n " ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
SetBannedSetDirty ( true ) ; // force write
2017-07-05 01:26:13 +02:00
DumpBanlist ( ) ;
}
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
2016-08-04 12:21:59 +02:00
uiInterface . InitMessage ( _ ( " Starting network threads... " ) ) ;
2014-09-18 14:08:43 +02:00
fAddressesInitialized = true ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
if ( semOutbound = = nullptr ) {
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
// initialize semaphore
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
semOutbound = new CSemaphore ( std : : min ( ( nMaxOutbound + nMaxFeeler ) , nMaxConnections ) ) ;
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
}
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
if ( semAddnode = = nullptr ) {
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
// initialize semaphore
semAddnode = new CSemaphore ( nMaxAddnode ) ;
}
2012-05-10 18:44:07 +02:00
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
if ( semMasternodeOutbound = = nullptr ) {
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
// initialize semaphore
2019-03-21 21:47:29 +01:00
semMasternodeOutbound = new CSemaphore ( fMasternodeMode ? MAX_OUTBOUND_MASTERNODE_CONNECTIONS_ON_MN : MAX_OUTBOUND_MASTERNODE_CONNECTIONS ) ;
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
}
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
//
// Start threads
//
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
assert ( m_msgproc ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
InterruptSocks5 ( false ) ;
interruptNet . reset ( ) ;
flagInterruptMsgProc = false ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
{
std : : unique_lock < std : : mutex > lock ( mutexMsgProc ) ;
fMsgProcWake = false ;
}
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
# ifndef WIN32
2019-02-15 16:30:42 +01:00
if ( pipe ( wakeupPipe ) ! = 0 ) {
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
wakeupPipe [ 0 ] = wakeupPipe [ 1 ] = - 1 ;
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " pipe() for wakeupPipe failed \n " ) ;
2019-02-15 16:30:42 +01:00
} else {
int fFlags = fcntl ( wakeupPipe [ 0 ] , F_GETFL , 0 ) ;
if ( fcntl ( wakeupPipe [ 0 ] , F_SETFL , fFlags | O_NONBLOCK ) = = - 1 ) {
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " fcntl for O_NONBLOCK on wakeupPipe failed \n " ) ;
2019-02-15 16:30:42 +01:00
}
fFlags = fcntl ( wakeupPipe [ 1 ] , F_GETFL , 0 ) ;
if ( fcntl ( wakeupPipe [ 1 ] , F_SETFL , fFlags | O_NONBLOCK ) = = - 1 ) {
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " fcntl for O_NONBLOCK on wakeupPipe failed \n " ) ;
2019-02-15 16:30:42 +01:00
}
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
}
# endif
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
// Send and receive from sockets, accept connections
threadSocketHandler = std : : thread ( & TraceThread < std : : function < void ( ) > > , " net " , std : : function < void ( ) > ( std : : bind ( & CConnman : : ThreadSocketHandler , this ) ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2019-06-24 18:44:27 +02:00
if ( ! gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -dnsseed " , true ) )
2013-09-18 12:38:08 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " DNS seeding disabled \n " ) ;
2011-11-21 18:25:00 +01:00
else
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
threadDNSAddressSeed = std : : thread ( & TraceThread < std : : function < void ( ) > > , " dnsseed " , std : : function < void ( ) > ( std : : bind ( & CConnman : : ThreadDNSAddressSeed , this ) ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2011-12-17 01:48:03 +01:00
// Initiate outbound connections from -addnode
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
threadOpenAddedConnections = std : : thread ( & TraceThread < std : : function < void ( ) > > , " addcon " , std : : function < void ( ) > ( std : : bind ( & CConnman : : ThreadOpenAddedConnections , this ) ) ) ;
2011-12-17 01:48:03 +01:00
2017-09-06 01:54:31 +02:00
if ( connOptions . m_use_addrman_outgoing & & ! connOptions . m_specified_outgoing . empty ( ) ) {
if ( clientInterface ) {
clientInterface - > ThreadSafeMessageBox (
_ ( " Cannot provide specific connections and have addrman find outgoing connections at the same. " ) ,
" " , CClientUIInterface : : MSG_ERROR ) ;
}
return false ;
}
if ( connOptions . m_use_addrman_outgoing | | ! connOptions . m_specified_outgoing . empty ( ) )
threadOpenConnections = std : : thread ( & TraceThread < std : : function < void ( ) > > , " opencon " , std : : function < void ( ) > ( std : : bind ( & CConnman : : ThreadOpenConnections , this , connOptions . m_specified_outgoing ) ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
// Initiate masternode connections
2018-02-01 02:10:52 +01:00
threadOpenMasternodeConnections = std : : thread ( & TraceThread < std : : function < void ( ) > > , " mncon " , std : : function < void ( ) > ( std : : bind ( & CConnman : : ThreadOpenMasternodeConnections , this ) ) ) ;
2017-01-21 20:03:55 +01:00
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
// Process messages
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
threadMessageHandler = std : : thread ( & TraceThread < std : : function < void ( ) > > , " msghand " , std : : function < void ( ) > ( std : : bind ( & CConnman : : ThreadMessageHandler , this ) ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
2012-01-04 23:39:45 +01:00
// Dump network addresses
2017-03-07 11:00:46 +01:00
scheduler . scheduleEvery ( std : : bind ( & CConnman : : DumpData , this ) , DUMP_ADDRESSES_INTERVAL * 1000 ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
return true ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
class CNetCleanup
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
public :
CNetCleanup ( ) { }
~ CNetCleanup ( )
{
# ifdef WIN32
// Shutdown Windows Sockets
WSACleanup ( ) ;
# endif
}
}
instance_of_cnetcleanup ;
void CExplicitNetCleanup : : callCleanup ( )
{
// Explicit call to destructor of CNetCleanup because it's not implicitly called
// when the wallet is restarted from within the wallet itself.
CNetCleanup * tmp = new CNetCleanup ( ) ;
delete tmp ; // Stroustrup's gonna kill me for that
}
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
void CConnman : : Interrupt ( )
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
{
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
{
std : : lock_guard < std : : mutex > lock ( mutexMsgProc ) ;
flagInterruptMsgProc = true ;
}
condMsgProc . notify_all ( ) ;
interruptNet ( ) ;
InterruptSocks5 ( true ) ;
2017-03-13 06:57:07 +01:00
if ( semOutbound ) {
for ( int i = 0 ; i < ( nMaxOutbound + nMaxFeeler ) ; i + + ) {
2012-05-12 17:44:14 +02:00
semOutbound - > post ( ) ;
2017-03-13 06:57:07 +01:00
}
}
if ( semAddnode ) {
for ( int i = 0 ; i < nMaxAddnode ; i + + ) {
semAddnode - > post ( ) ;
}
}
2018-03-19 14:08:32 +01:00
if ( semMasternodeOutbound ) {
2019-03-21 21:47:29 +01:00
int nMaxMasternodeOutbound = fMasternodeMode ? MAX_OUTBOUND_MASTERNODE_CONNECTIONS_ON_MN : MAX_OUTBOUND_MASTERNODE_CONNECTIONS ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < nMaxMasternodeOutbound ; i + + ) {
2018-03-19 14:08:32 +01:00
semMasternodeOutbound - > post ( ) ;
}
}
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
}
void CConnman : : Stop ( )
{
if ( threadMessageHandler . joinable ( ) )
threadMessageHandler . join ( ) ;
2018-02-01 02:10:52 +01:00
if ( threadOpenMasternodeConnections . joinable ( ) )
threadOpenMasternodeConnections . join ( ) ;
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
if ( threadOpenConnections . joinable ( ) )
threadOpenConnections . join ( ) ;
if ( threadOpenAddedConnections . joinable ( ) )
threadOpenAddedConnections . join ( ) ;
if ( threadDNSAddressSeed . joinable ( ) )
threadDNSAddressSeed . join ( ) ;
if ( threadSocketHandler . joinable ( ) )
threadSocketHandler . join ( ) ;
2014-09-18 14:08:43 +02:00
if ( fAddressesInitialized )
{
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
DumpData ( ) ;
2014-09-18 14:08:43 +02:00
fAddressesInitialized = false ;
}
2013-03-29 02:17:10 +01:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
// Close sockets
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes )
2017-02-10 12:38:45 +01:00
pnode - > CloseSocketDisconnect ( ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( ListenSocket & hListenSocket : vhListenSocket )
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( hListenSocket . socket ! = INVALID_SOCKET )
if ( ! CloseSocket ( hListenSocket . socket ) )
LogPrintf ( " CloseSocket(hListenSocket) failed with error %s \n " , NetworkErrorString ( WSAGetLastError ( ) ) ) ;
// clean up some globals (to help leak detection)
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
DeleteNode ( pnode ) ;
}
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodesDisconnected ) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
DeleteNode ( pnode ) ;
}
vNodes . clear ( ) ;
vNodesDisconnected . clear ( ) ;
vhListenSocket . clear ( ) ;
delete semOutbound ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
semOutbound = nullptr ;
2017-01-06 16:47:05 +01:00
delete semAddnode ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
semAddnode = nullptr ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
delete semMasternodeOutbound ;
2019-08-06 05:08:33 +02:00
semMasternodeOutbound = nullptr ;
2019-02-14 18:50:18 +01:00
# ifndef WIN32
if ( wakeupPipe [ 0 ] ! = - 1 ) close ( wakeupPipe [ 0 ] ) ;
if ( wakeupPipe [ 1 ] ! = - 1 ) close ( wakeupPipe [ 1 ] ) ;
wakeupPipe [ 0 ] = wakeupPipe [ 1 ] = - 1 ;
# endif
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
void CConnman : : DeleteNode ( CNode * pnode )
{
assert ( pnode ) ;
bool fUpdateConnectionTime = false ;
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
m_msgproc - > FinalizeNode ( pnode - > GetId ( ) , fUpdateConnectionTime ) ;
if ( fUpdateConnectionTime ) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
addrman . Connected ( pnode - > addr ) ;
2017-09-08 01:00:49 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
delete pnode ;
}
CConnman : : ~ CConnman ( )
{
2017-08-09 18:06:31 +02:00
Interrupt ( ) ;
2017-07-28 00:39:53 +02:00
Stop ( ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
size_t CConnman : : GetAddressCount ( ) const
{
return addrman . size ( ) ;
}
void CConnman : : SetServices ( const CService & addr , ServiceFlags nServices )
{
addrman . SetServices ( addr , nServices ) ;
}
void CConnman : : MarkAddressGood ( const CAddress & addr )
{
addrman . Good ( addr ) ;
}
void CConnman : : AddNewAddresses ( const std : : vector < CAddress > & vAddr , const CAddress & addrFrom , int64_t nTimePenalty )
{
addrman . Add ( vAddr , addrFrom , nTimePenalty ) ;
}
std : : vector < CAddress > CConnman : : GetAddresses ( )
{
return addrman . GetAddr ( ) ;
}
bool CConnman : : AddNode ( const std : : string & strNode )
{
LOCK ( cs_vAddedNodes ) ;
for ( std : : vector < std : : string > : : const_iterator it = vAddedNodes . begin ( ) ; it ! = vAddedNodes . end ( ) ; + + it ) {
if ( strNode = = * it )
return false ;
}
vAddedNodes . push_back ( strNode ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
return true ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : RemoveAddedNode ( const std : : string & strNode )
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vAddedNodes ) ;
for ( std : : vector < std : : string > : : iterator it = vAddedNodes . begin ( ) ; it ! = vAddedNodes . end ( ) ; + + it ) {
if ( strNode = = * it ) {
vAddedNodes . erase ( it ) ;
return true ;
}
}
return false ;
}
2014-05-24 11:14:52 +02:00
2018-02-01 02:10:52 +01:00
bool CConnman : : AddPendingMasternode ( const CService & service )
{
LOCK ( cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
for ( std : : vector < CService > : : const_iterator it = vPendingMasternodes . begin ( ) ; it ! = vPendingMasternodes . end ( ) ; + + it ) {
if ( service = = * it )
return false ;
}
vPendingMasternodes . push_back ( service ) ;
return true ;
}
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
bool CConnman : : AddMasternodeQuorumNodes ( Consensus : : LLMQType llmqType , const uint256 & quorumHash , const std : : set < uint256 > & proTxHashes )
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
auto it = masternodeQuorumNodes . find ( std : : make_pair ( llmqType , quorumHash ) ) ;
if ( it ! = masternodeQuorumNodes . end ( ) ) {
return false ;
}
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
masternodeQuorumNodes . emplace ( std : : make_pair ( llmqType , quorumHash ) , proTxHashes ) ;
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
return true ;
}
bool CConnman : : HasMasternodeQuorumNodes ( Consensus : : LLMQType llmqType , const uint256 & quorumHash )
{
LOCK ( cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
return masternodeQuorumNodes . count ( std : : make_pair ( llmqType , quorumHash ) ) ;
}
std : : set < uint256 > CConnman : : GetMasternodeQuorums ( Consensus : : LLMQType llmqType )
{
LOCK ( cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
std : : set < uint256 > result ;
2019-01-11 10:00:40 +01:00
for ( const auto & p : masternodeQuorumNodes ) {
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
if ( p . first . first ! = llmqType ) {
continue ;
}
result . emplace ( p . first . second ) ;
}
return result ;
}
std : : set < NodeId > CConnman : : GetMasternodeQuorumNodes ( Consensus : : LLMQType llmqType , const uint256 & quorumHash ) const
{
LOCK2 ( cs_vNodes , cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
auto it = masternodeQuorumNodes . find ( std : : make_pair ( llmqType , quorumHash ) ) ;
if ( it = = masternodeQuorumNodes . end ( ) ) {
return { } ;
}
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
const auto & proRegTxHashes = it - > second ;
2019-03-22 15:21:34 +01:00
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
std : : set < NodeId > nodes ;
2019-01-11 10:00:40 +01:00
for ( const auto pnode : vNodes ) {
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
if ( pnode - > fDisconnect ) {
continue ;
}
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
if ( ! pnode - > qwatch & & ( pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash . IsNull ( ) | | ! proRegTxHashes . count ( pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash ) ) ) {
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
continue ;
}
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
nodes . emplace ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
}
return nodes ;
}
void CConnman : : RemoveMasternodeQuorumNodes ( Consensus : : LLMQType llmqType , const uint256 & quorumHash )
{
LOCK ( cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
masternodeQuorumNodes . erase ( std : : make_pair ( llmqType , quorumHash ) ) ;
}
2019-03-22 15:21:34 +01:00
bool CConnman : : IsMasternodeQuorumNode ( const CNode * pnode )
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
{
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
// Let's see if this is an outgoing connection to an address that is known to be a masternode
// We however only need to know this if the node did not authenticate itself as a MN yet
uint256 assumedProTxHash ;
if ( pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash . IsNull ( ) & & ! pnode - > fInbound ) {
auto mnList = deterministicMNManager - > GetListAtChainTip ( ) ;
2019-06-13 11:03:20 +02:00
auto dmn = mnList . GetMNByService ( pnode - > addr ) ;
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
if ( dmn = = nullptr ) {
// This is definitely not a masternode
return false ;
}
assumedProTxHash = dmn - > proTxHash ;
}
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vPendingMasternodes ) ;
for ( const auto & p : masternodeQuorumNodes ) {
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
if ( ! pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash . IsNull ( ) ) {
if ( p . second . count ( pnode - > verifiedProRegTxHash ) ) {
2019-03-22 15:21:34 +01:00
return true ;
}
2019-04-09 12:22:46 +02:00
} else if ( ! assumedProTxHash . IsNull ( ) ) {
if ( p . second . count ( assumedProTxHash ) ) {
2019-03-22 15:21:34 +01:00
return true ;
}
2018-05-24 16:15:52 +02:00
}
}
return false ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
size_t CConnman : : GetNodeCount ( NumConnections flags )
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
if ( flags = = CConnman : : CONNECTIONS_ALL ) // Shortcut if we want total
return vNodes . size ( ) ;
2013-03-29 02:17:10 +01:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
int nNum = 0 ;
for ( std : : vector < CNode * > : : const_iterator it = vNodes . begin ( ) ; it ! = vNodes . end ( ) ; + + it )
if ( flags & ( ( * it ) - > fInbound ? CONNECTIONS_IN : CONNECTIONS_OUT ) )
nNum + + ;
return nNum ;
}
2020-01-01 15:13:14 +01:00
size_t CConnman : : GetMaxOutboundNodeCount ( )
{
return nMaxOutbound ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : GetNodeStats ( std : : vector < CNodeStats > & vstats )
{
vstats . clear ( ) ;
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
vstats . reserve ( vNodes . size ( ) ) ;
for ( std : : vector < CNode * > : : iterator it = vNodes . begin ( ) ; it ! = vNodes . end ( ) ; + + it ) {
CNode * pnode = * it ;
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
vstats . emplace_back ( ) ;
pnode - > copyStats ( vstats . back ( ) ) ;
2010-08-29 18:58:15 +02:00
}
}
2012-08-13 05:26:30 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : DisconnectNode ( const std : : string & strNode )
{
2017-08-29 01:51:56 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if ( CNode * pnode = FindNode ( strNode ) ) {
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
bool CConnman : : DisconnectNode ( NodeId id )
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes ) {
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
if ( id = = pnode - > GetId ( ) ) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
}
return false ;
2015-05-25 22:59:38 +02:00
}
2012-08-13 05:26:30 +02:00
2016-05-16 22:47:29 +02:00
void CConnman : : RelayTransaction ( const CTransaction & tx )
2012-08-13 05:26:30 +02:00
{
2016-05-24 01:06:09 +02:00
uint256 hash = tx . GetHash ( ) ;
2019-02-28 13:44:53 +01:00
int nInv = MSG_TX ;
if ( CPrivateSend : : GetDSTX ( hash ) ) {
nInv = MSG_DSTX ;
}
2016-05-24 01:06:09 +02:00
CInv inv ( nInv , hash ) ;
2012-08-13 05:26:30 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( CNode * pnode : vNodes )
2012-08-13 05:26:30 +02:00
{
2016-05-05 13:14:29 +02:00
pnode - > PushInventory ( inv ) ;
2012-08-13 05:26:30 +02:00
}
}
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : RelayInv ( CInv & inv , const int minProtoVersion ) {
2015-07-08 02:37:23 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2018-02-06 12:09:33 +01:00
for ( const auto & pnode : vNodes )
2015-07-08 02:37:23 +02:00
if ( pnode - > nVersion > = minProtoVersion )
pnode - > PushInventory ( inv ) ;
}
2018-07-20 15:32:41 +02:00
void CConnman : : RelayInvFiltered ( CInv & inv , const CTransaction & relatedTx , const int minProtoVersion )
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( const auto & pnode : vNodes ) {
if ( pnode - > nVersion < minProtoVersion )
continue ;
{
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( pnode - > pfilter & & ! pnode - > pfilter - > IsRelevantAndUpdate ( relatedTx ) )
continue ;
}
pnode - > PushInventory ( inv ) ;
}
}
2018-11-23 15:40:19 +01:00
void CConnman : : RelayInvFiltered ( CInv & inv , const uint256 & relatedTxHash , const int minProtoVersion )
{
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( const auto & pnode : vNodes ) {
if ( pnode - > nVersion < minProtoVersion ) continue ;
{
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( pnode - > pfilter & & ! pnode - > pfilter - > contains ( relatedTxHash ) ) continue ;
}
pnode - > PushInventory ( inv ) ;
}
}
2018-10-26 18:42:11 +02:00
void CConnman : : RemoveAskFor ( const uint256 & hash )
{
mapAlreadyAskedFor . erase ( hash ) ;
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( const auto & pnode : vNodes ) {
pnode - > RemoveAskFor ( hash ) ;
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : RecordBytesRecv ( uint64_t bytes )
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesRecv ) ;
nTotalBytesRecv + = bytes ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : RecordBytesSent ( uint64_t bytes )
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
nTotalBytesSent + = bytes ;
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
uint64_t now = GetTime ( ) ;
if ( nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime + nMaxOutboundTimeframe < now )
{
// timeframe expired, reset cycle
nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime = now ;
nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle = 0 ;
}
// TODO, exclude whitebind peers
nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle + = bytes ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : SetMaxOutboundTarget ( uint64_t limit )
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
nMaxOutboundLimit = limit ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman : : GetMaxOutboundTarget ( )
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
return nMaxOutboundLimit ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman : : GetMaxOutboundTimeframe ( )
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
return nMaxOutboundTimeframe ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman : : GetMaxOutboundTimeLeftInCycle ( )
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
if ( nMaxOutboundLimit = = 0 )
return 0 ;
if ( nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime = = 0 )
return nMaxOutboundTimeframe ;
uint64_t cycleEndTime = nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime + nMaxOutboundTimeframe ;
uint64_t now = GetTime ( ) ;
return ( cycleEndTime < now ) ? 0 : cycleEndTime - GetTime ( ) ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : SetMaxOutboundTimeframe ( uint64_t timeframe )
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
if ( nMaxOutboundTimeframe ! = timeframe )
{
// reset measure-cycle in case of changing
// the timeframe
nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime = GetTime ( ) ;
}
nMaxOutboundTimeframe = timeframe ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman : : OutboundTargetReached ( bool historicalBlockServingLimit )
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
if ( nMaxOutboundLimit = = 0 )
return false ;
if ( historicalBlockServingLimit )
{
2017-09-07 17:59:00 +02:00
// keep a large enough buffer to at least relay each block once
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
uint64_t timeLeftInCycle = GetMaxOutboundTimeLeftInCycle ( ) ;
2017-09-11 16:13:30 +02:00
uint64_t buffer = timeLeftInCycle / 600 * MaxBlockSize ( fDIP0001ActiveAtTip ) ;
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
if ( buffer > = nMaxOutboundLimit | | nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle > = nMaxOutboundLimit - buffer )
return true ;
}
else if ( nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle > = nMaxOutboundLimit )
return true ;
return false ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman : : GetOutboundTargetBytesLeft ( )
2015-09-02 17:03:27 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
if ( nMaxOutboundLimit = = 0 )
return 0 ;
return ( nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle > = nMaxOutboundLimit ) ? 0 : nMaxOutboundLimit - nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle ;
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman : : GetTotalBytesRecv ( )
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesRecv ) ;
return nTotalBytesRecv ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman : : GetTotalBytesSent ( )
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK ( cs_totalBytesSent ) ;
return nTotalBytesSent ;
}
2013-10-28 07:28:00 +01:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
ServiceFlags CConnman : : GetLocalServices ( ) const
{
return nLocalServices ;
}
void CConnman : : SetBestHeight ( int height )
{
nBestHeight . store ( height , std : : memory_order_release ) ;
}
int CConnman : : GetBestHeight ( ) const
{
return nBestHeight . load ( std : : memory_order_acquire ) ;
}
unsigned int CConnman : : GetReceiveFloodSize ( ) const { return nReceiveFloodSize ; }
2013-11-29 16:33:34 +01:00
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
CNode : : CNode ( NodeId idIn , ServiceFlags nLocalServicesIn , int nMyStartingHeightIn , SOCKET hSocketIn , const CAddress & addrIn , uint64_t nKeyedNetGroupIn , uint64_t nLocalHostNonceIn , const CAddress & addrBindIn , const std : : string & addrNameIn , bool fInboundIn ) :
2017-02-11 00:53:31 +01:00
nTimeConnected ( GetSystemTimeInSeconds ( ) ) ,
2019-03-22 11:52:37 +01:00
nTimeFirstMessageReceived ( 0 ) ,
fFirstMessageIsMNAUTH ( false ) ,
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
addr ( addrIn ) ,
2017-06-05 15:39:11 +02:00
addrBind ( addrBindIn ) ,
2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
fInbound ( fInboundIn ) ,
2016-09-19 17:05:35 +02:00
nKeyedNetGroup ( nKeyedNetGroupIn ) ,
2015-07-19 21:43:34 +02:00
addrKnown ( 5000 , 0.001 ) ,
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
filterInventoryKnown ( 50000 , 0.000001 ) ,
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
id ( idIn ) ,
2016-11-03 10:45:11 +01:00
nLocalHostNonce ( nLocalHostNonceIn ) ,
nLocalServices ( nLocalServicesIn ) ,
nMyStartingHeight ( nMyStartingHeightIn ) ,
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
nSendVersion ( 0 )
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
{
2017-07-05 05:45:23 +02:00
nServices = NODE_NONE ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
hSocket = hSocketIn ;
nRecvVersion = INIT_PROTO_VERSION ;
nLastSend = 0 ;
nLastRecv = 0 ;
nSendBytes = 0 ;
nRecvBytes = 0 ;
2014-12-15 11:06:15 +01:00
nTimeOffset = 0 ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
addrName = addrNameIn = = " " ? addr . ToStringIPPort ( ) : addrNameIn ;
nVersion = 0 ;
2017-01-19 20:06:32 +01:00
nNumWarningsSkipped = 0 ;
nLastWarningTime = 0 ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
strSubVer = " " ;
fWhitelisted = false ;
fOneShot = false ;
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
m_manual_connection = false ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
fClient = false ; // set by version message
2017-07-17 12:39:12 +02:00
fFeeler = false ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
fSuccessfullyConnected = false ;
fDisconnect = false ;
nRefCount = 0 ;
nSendSize = 0 ;
nSendOffset = 0 ;
2014-12-15 09:11:16 +01:00
hashContinue = uint256 ( ) ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
nStartingHeight = - 1 ;
2015-11-26 06:25:30 +01:00
filterInventoryKnown . reset ( ) ;
2016-05-05 13:14:29 +02:00
fSendMempool = false ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
fGetAddr = false ;
2015-04-08 20:20:00 +02:00
nNextLocalAddrSend = 0 ;
nNextAddrSend = 0 ;
nNextInvSend = 0 ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
fRelayTxes = false ;
2016-04-15 09:02:41 +02:00
fSentAddr = false ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
pfilter = new CBloomFilter ( ) ;
2016-05-31 15:47:15 +02:00
timeLastMempoolReq = 0 ;
2017-07-12 13:13:38 +02:00
nLastBlockTime = 0 ;
nLastTXTime = 0 ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
nPingNonceSent = 0 ;
nPingUsecStart = 0 ;
nPingUsecTime = 0 ;
fPingQueued = false ;
2016-07-30 13:05:41 +02:00
fMasternode = false ;
2015-09-04 15:43:21 +02:00
nMinPingUsecTime = std : : numeric_limits < int64_t > : : max ( ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
fPauseRecv = false ;
fPauseSend = false ;
nProcessQueueSize = 0 ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
2019-07-05 09:06:28 +02:00
for ( const std : : string & msg : getAllNetMessageTypes ( ) )
2017-06-29 03:51:10 +02:00
mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd [ msg ] = 0 ;
mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd [ NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER ] = 0 ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
if ( fLogIPs ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Added connection to %s peer=%d \n " , addrName , id ) ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Added connection peer=%d \n " , id ) ;
}
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
}
CNode : : ~ CNode ( )
{
CloseSocket ( hSocket ) ;
if ( pfilter )
delete pfilter ;
}
2018-10-26 16:01:38 +02:00
void CNode : : AskFor ( const CInv & inv , int64_t doubleRequestDelay )
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
{
2019-10-16 16:10:36 +02:00
if ( queueAskFor . size ( ) > MAPASKFOR_MAX_SZ | | setAskFor . size ( ) > SETASKFOR_MAX_SZ ) {
2017-01-19 20:06:32 +01:00
int64_t nNow = GetTime ( ) ;
if ( nNow - nLastWarningTime > WARNING_INTERVAL ) {
Collection of minor performance optimizations (#2855)
* Merge #13176: Improve CRollingBloomFilter performance: replace modulus with FastMod
9aac9f90d5e56752cc6cbfac48063ad29a01143c replace modulus with FastMod (Martin Ankerl)
Pull request description:
Not sure if this is optimization is necessary, but anyway I have some spare time so here it is. This replaces the slow modulo operation with a much faster 64bit multiplication & shift. This works when the hash is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2^32-1. This speeds up the benchmark by a factor of about 1.3:
```
RollingBloom, 5, 1500000, 3.73733, 4.97569e-07, 4.99002e-07, 4.98372e-07 # before
RollingBloom, 5, 1500000, 2.86842, 3.81630e-07, 3.83730e-07, 3.82473e-07 # FastMod
```
Be aware that this changes the internal data of the filter, so this should probably
not be used for CBloomFilter because of interoperability problems.
Tree-SHA512: 04104f3fb09f56c9d14458a6aad919aeb0a5af944e8ee6a31f00e93c753e22004648c1cd65bf36752b6addec528d19fb665c27b955ce1666a85a928e17afa47a
* Use unordered_map in CSporkManager
In one of my profiling sessions with many InstantSend transactions
happening, calls into CSporkManager added up to about 1% of total CPU time.
This is easily avoidable by using unordered maps.
* Use std::unordered_map instead of std::map in limitedmap
* Use unordered_set for CNode::setAskFor
* Add serialization support for unordered maps and sets
* Use unordered_map for mapArgs and mapMultiArgs
* Let limitedmap prune in batches and use unordered_multimap
Due to the batched pruning, there is no need to maintain an ordered map
of values anymore. Only when nPruneAfterSize, there is a need to create
a temporary ordered vector of values to figure out what can be removed.
* Instead of using a multimap for mapAskFor, use a vector which we sort on demand
CNode::AskFor will now push entries into an initially unordered vector
instead of an ordered multimap. Only when we later want to use vecAskFor in
SendMessages, we sort the vector.
The vector will actually be mostly sorted in most cases as insertion order
usually mimics the desired ordering. Only the last few entries might need
some shuffling around. Doing the sort on-demand should be less wasteful
then trying to maintain correct order all the time.
* Fix compilation of tests
* Fix limitedmap tests
* Rename limitedmap to unordered_limitedmap to ensure backports conflict
This ensures that future backports that depends on limitedmap's ordering
conflict so that we are made aware of needed action.
* Fix compilation error on Travis
2019-04-11 14:42:14 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " CNode::AskFor -- WARNING: inventory message dropped: vecAskFor.size = %d, setAskFor.size = %d, MAPASKFOR_MAX_SZ = %d, SETASKFOR_MAX_SZ = %d, nSkipped = %d, peer=%d \n " ,
2019-10-16 16:10:36 +02:00
queueAskFor . size ( ) , setAskFor . size ( ) , MAPASKFOR_MAX_SZ , SETASKFOR_MAX_SZ , nNumWarningsSkipped , id ) ;
2017-01-19 20:06:32 +01:00
nLastWarningTime = nNow ;
nNumWarningsSkipped = 0 ;
}
else {
+ + nNumWarningsSkipped ;
}
2014-09-09 09:18:05 +02:00
return ;
2017-01-18 16:23:49 +01:00
}
2015-11-23 02:54:23 +01:00
// a peer may not have multiple non-responded queue positions for a single inv item
2019-10-16 16:10:36 +02:00
if ( ! setAskFor . emplace ( inv . hash ) . second )
2014-07-16 23:31:41 +02:00
return ;
2019-10-16 16:10:36 +02:00
// We're using queueAskFor as a priority queue,
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
// the key is the earliest time the request can be sent
int64_t nRequestTime ;
Collection of minor performance optimizations (#2855)
* Merge #13176: Improve CRollingBloomFilter performance: replace modulus with FastMod
9aac9f90d5e56752cc6cbfac48063ad29a01143c replace modulus with FastMod (Martin Ankerl)
Pull request description:
Not sure if this is optimization is necessary, but anyway I have some spare time so here it is. This replaces the slow modulo operation with a much faster 64bit multiplication & shift. This works when the hash is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2^32-1. This speeds up the benchmark by a factor of about 1.3:
```
RollingBloom, 5, 1500000, 3.73733, 4.97569e-07, 4.99002e-07, 4.98372e-07 # before
RollingBloom, 5, 1500000, 2.86842, 3.81630e-07, 3.83730e-07, 3.82473e-07 # FastMod
```
Be aware that this changes the internal data of the filter, so this should probably
not be used for CBloomFilter because of interoperability problems.
Tree-SHA512: 04104f3fb09f56c9d14458a6aad919aeb0a5af944e8ee6a31f00e93c753e22004648c1cd65bf36752b6addec528d19fb665c27b955ce1666a85a928e17afa47a
* Use unordered_map in CSporkManager
In one of my profiling sessions with many InstantSend transactions
happening, calls into CSporkManager added up to about 1% of total CPU time.
This is easily avoidable by using unordered maps.
* Use std::unordered_map instead of std::map in limitedmap
* Use unordered_set for CNode::setAskFor
* Add serialization support for unordered maps and sets
* Use unordered_map for mapArgs and mapMultiArgs
* Let limitedmap prune in batches and use unordered_multimap
Due to the batched pruning, there is no need to maintain an ordered map
of values anymore. Only when nPruneAfterSize, there is a need to create
a temporary ordered vector of values to figure out what can be removed.
* Instead of using a multimap for mapAskFor, use a vector which we sort on demand
CNode::AskFor will now push entries into an initially unordered vector
instead of an ordered multimap. Only when we later want to use vecAskFor in
SendMessages, we sort the vector.
The vector will actually be mostly sorted in most cases as insertion order
usually mimics the desired ordering. Only the last few entries might need
some shuffling around. Doing the sort on-demand should be less wasteful
then trying to maintain correct order all the time.
* Fix compilation of tests
* Fix limitedmap tests
* Rename limitedmap to unordered_limitedmap to ensure backports conflict
This ensures that future backports that depends on limitedmap's ordering
conflict so that we are made aware of needed action.
* Fix compilation error on Travis
2019-04-11 14:42:14 +02:00
auto it = mapAlreadyAskedFor . find ( inv . hash ) ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
if ( it ! = mapAlreadyAskedFor . end ( ) )
nRequestTime = it - > second ;
else
nRequestTime = 0 ;
2016-06-08 08:57:16 +02:00
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " askfor %s %d (%s) peer=%d \n " , inv . ToString ( ) , nRequestTime , DateTimeStrFormat ( " %H:%M:%S " , nRequestTime / 1000000 ) , id ) ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
// Make sure not to reuse time indexes to keep things in the same order
int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros ( ) - 1000000 ;
static int64_t nLastTime ;
+ + nLastTime ;
nNow = std : : max ( nNow , nLastTime ) ;
nLastTime = nNow ;
// Each retry is 2 minutes after the last
2018-10-26 16:01:38 +02:00
nRequestTime = std : : max ( nRequestTime + doubleRequestDelay , nNow ) ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
if ( it ! = mapAlreadyAskedFor . end ( ) )
mapAlreadyAskedFor . update ( it , nRequestTime ) ;
else
2016-04-11 18:52:29 +02:00
mapAlreadyAskedFor . insert ( std : : make_pair ( inv . hash , nRequestTime ) ) ;
2019-10-16 16:10:36 +02:00
queueAskFor . emplace ( nRequestTime , inv ) ;
setAskForInQueue . emplace ( inv . hash ) ;
2014-08-21 05:17:21 +02:00
}
2018-10-26 18:42:11 +02:00
void CNode : : RemoveAskFor ( const uint256 & hash )
{
2019-10-16 16:10:36 +02:00
setAskFor . erase ( hash ) ;
// we don't really remove it from queueAskFor as it would be too expensive to rebuild the heap
// instead, we're ignoring the entry later as it won't be found in setAskForInQueue anymore
setAskForInQueue . erase ( hash ) ;
2018-10-26 18:42:11 +02:00
}
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
bool CConnman : : NodeFullyConnected ( const CNode * pnode )
{
return pnode & & pnode - > fSuccessfullyConnected & & ! pnode - > fDisconnect ;
}
2019-02-15 14:08:49 +01:00
void CConnman : : PushMessage ( CNode * pnode , CSerializedNetMsg & & msg , bool allowOptimisticSend )
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
{
2016-11-25 20:01:56 +01:00
size_t nMessageSize = msg . data . size ( ) ;
size_t nTotalSize = nMessageSize + CMessageHeader : : HEADER_SIZE ;
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " sending %s (%d bytes) peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( msg . command . c_str ( ) ) , nMessageSize , pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
2016-11-25 20:01:56 +01:00
std : : vector < unsigned char > serializedHeader ;
serializedHeader . reserve ( CMessageHeader : : HEADER_SIZE ) ;
uint256 hash = Hash ( msg . data . data ( ) , msg . data . data ( ) + nMessageSize ) ;
CMessageHeader hdr ( Params ( ) . MessageStart ( ) , msg . command . c_str ( ) , nMessageSize ) ;
memcpy ( hdr . pchChecksum , hash . begin ( ) , CMessageHeader : : CHECKSUM_SIZE ) ;
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
2016-11-25 20:01:56 +01:00
CVectorWriter { SER_NETWORK , INIT_PROTO_VERSION , serializedHeader , 0 , hdr } ;
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
size_t nBytesSent = 0 ;
{
LOCK ( pnode - > cs_vSend ) ;
2019-04-11 14:43:22 +02:00
bool hasPendingData = ! pnode - > vSendMsg . empty ( ) ;
2019-02-15 14:08:49 +01:00
bool optimisticSend ( allowOptimisticSend & & pnode - > vSendMsg . empty ( ) ) ;
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
//log total amount of bytes per command
2016-11-25 20:01:56 +01:00
pnode - > mapSendBytesPerMsgCmd [ msg . command ] + = nTotalSize ;
pnode - > nSendSize + = nTotalSize ;
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
if ( pnode - > nSendSize > nSendBufferMaxSize )
pnode - > fPauseSend = true ;
2016-11-25 20:01:56 +01:00
pnode - > vSendMsg . push_back ( std : : move ( serializedHeader ) ) ;
if ( nMessageSize )
pnode - > vSendMsg . push_back ( std : : move ( msg . data ) ) ;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586)
* net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size
Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably
because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around.
Send/Recv corks need tests!
* net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice()
* net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public
This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages
* net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set
These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be
relying on the refcount to disconnect.
* net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer
when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other
threads to mess with it anymore.
* net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize
We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway.
* net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes
This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed
Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times.
* net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor
* net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler
This may be used publicly in the future
* net: remove useless comments
* net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check
This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the
sendbuffer size should not be possible.
* net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps
In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node
has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps.
Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages
encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return
value as whether or not that node has more work to do.
Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads,
which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision.
Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop
(except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in
PR #3180.
The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the
back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases.
* net: add a new message queue for the message processor
This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for
processing, allowing the locks to be split.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full
Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so
it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting.
The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message
hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time
a message is popped off of its queue.
* net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full
Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send
buffer is full.
The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses
if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer.
* net: remove cs_vRecvMsg
vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread.
The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also
only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from
rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to
be addressed separately.
Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
// If write queue empty, attempt "optimistic write"
if ( optimisticSend = = true )
nBytesSent = SocketSendData ( pnode ) ;
2019-04-11 14:43:22 +02:00
// wake up select() call in case there was no pending data before (so it was not selecting this socket for sending)
2019-04-12 12:58:42 +02:00
else if ( ! hasPendingData & & wakeupSelectNeeded )
2019-04-11 14:43:22 +02:00
WakeSelect ( ) ;
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
}
if ( nBytesSent )
RecordBytesSent ( nBytesSent ) ;
}
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
bool CConnman : : ForNode ( const CService & addr , std : : function < bool ( const CNode * pnode ) > cond , std : : function < bool ( CNode * pnode ) > func )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode * found = nullptr ;
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( auto & & pnode : vNodes ) {
if ( ( CService ) pnode - > addr = = addr ) {
found = pnode ;
break ;
}
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
return found ! = nullptr & & cond ( found ) & & func ( found ) ;
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
bool CConnman : : ForNode ( NodeId id , std : : function < bool ( const CNode * pnode ) > cond , std : : function < bool ( CNode * pnode ) > func )
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode * found = nullptr ;
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( auto & & pnode : vNodes ) {
2017-05-07 09:59:42 +02:00
if ( pnode - > GetId ( ) = = id ) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
found = pnode ;
break ;
}
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
return found ! = nullptr & & cond ( found ) & & func ( found ) ;
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
2018-01-17 16:09:08 +01:00
bool CConnman : : IsMasternodeOrDisconnectRequested ( const CService & addr ) {
return ForNode ( addr , AllNodes , [ ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
return pnode - > fMasternode | | pnode - > fDisconnect ;
} ) ;
}
2015-04-08 20:20:00 +02:00
int64_t PoissonNextSend ( int64_t nNow , int average_interval_seconds ) {
return nNow + ( int64_t ) ( log1p ( GetRand ( 1ULL < < 48 ) * - 0.0000000000000035527136788 /* -1/2^48 */ ) * average_interval_seconds * - 1000000.0 + 0.5 ) ;
}
2017-03-05 20:16:12 +01:00
2018-01-22 14:17:11 +01:00
std : : vector < CNode * > CConnman : : CopyNodeVector ( std : : function < bool ( const CNode * pnode ) > cond )
2017-03-05 20:16:12 +01:00
{
std : : vector < CNode * > vecNodesCopy ;
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < vNodes . size ( ) ; + + i ) {
CNode * pnode = vNodes [ i ] ;
2018-01-22 14:17:11 +01:00
if ( ! cond ( pnode ) )
continue ;
2017-03-05 20:16:12 +01:00
pnode - > AddRef ( ) ;
vecNodesCopy . push_back ( pnode ) ;
}
return vecNodesCopy ;
}
2018-01-22 14:17:11 +01:00
std : : vector < CNode * > CConnman : : CopyNodeVector ( )
{
return CopyNodeVector ( AllNodes ) ;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman : : ReleaseNodeVector ( const std : : vector < CNode * > & vecNodes )
2017-03-05 20:16:12 +01:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537)
* net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp
This will eventually solve a circular dependency
* net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections
* net: Move socket binding into CConnman
* net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman
* net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman
* net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman
* net: move added node functions to CConnman
* net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman
* net: handle nodesignals in CConnman
* net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global
* net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality
* net: Pass CConnman around as needed
* gui: add NodeID to the peer table
* net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman
* net: move whitelist functions into CConnman
* net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman
* net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman
This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken.
Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all
non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected
to ourself.
* net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman
* net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman
* net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman
* net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman
These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer
different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so).
* net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman
* net: SocketSendData returns written size
* net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman
* net: Pass best block known height into CConnman
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
* net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman
* net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly
* net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params
* net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options
* net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman
* Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting
* Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead
* net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_vNodes ) ;
2017-03-05 20:16:12 +01:00
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < vecNodes . size ( ) ; + + i ) {
CNode * pnode = vecNodes [ i ] ;
pnode - > Release ( ) ;
}
}
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
2017-02-06 14:31:37 +01:00
CSipHasher CConnman : : GetDeterministicRandomizer ( uint64_t id ) const
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
{
2016-09-19 17:05:35 +02:00
return CSipHasher ( nSeed0 , nSeed1 ) . Write ( id ) ;
}
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
2017-02-06 14:31:37 +01:00
uint64_t CConnman : : CalculateKeyedNetGroup ( const CAddress & ad ) const
2016-09-19 17:05:35 +02:00
{
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
std : : vector < unsigned char > vchNetGroup ( ad . GetGroup ( ) ) ;
2017-07-13 01:23:59 +02:00
return GetDeterministicRandomizer ( RANDOMIZER_ID_NETGROUP ) . Write ( vchNetGroup . data ( ) , vchNetGroup . size ( ) ) . Finalize ( ) ;
2016-06-08 18:05:01 +02:00
}