dash/src/net.cpp

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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2019 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Copyright (c) 2014-2022 The Dash Core developers
2014-12-13 05:09:33 +01:00
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <config/dash-config.h>
#endif
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <net.h>
#include <netmessagemaker.h>
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
#include <banman.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <chainparams.h>
#include <clientversion.h>
#include <consensus/consensus.h>
#include <crypto/sha256.h>
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
#include <net_permissions.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <netbase.h>
#include <random.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <scheduler.h>
#include <ui_interface.h>
merge bitcoin#14555: Move util files to directory (script modified to account for Dash backports, doesn't account for rebasing) ------------- BEGIN SCRIPT --------------- mkdir -p src/util git mv src/util.h src/util/system.h git mv src/util.cpp src/util/system.cpp git mv src/utilmemory.h src/util/memory.h git mv src/utilmoneystr.h src/util/moneystr.h git mv src/utilmoneystr.cpp src/util/moneystr.cpp git mv src/utilstrencodings.h src/util/strencodings.h git mv src/utilstrencodings.cpp src/util/strencodings.cpp git mv src/utiltime.h src/util/time.h git mv src/utiltime.cpp src/util/time.cpp git mv src/utilasmap.h src/util/asmap.h git mv src/utilasmap.cpp src/util/asmap.cpp git mv src/utilstring.h src/util/string.h git mv src/utilstring.cpp src/util/string.cpp gsed -i 's/<util\.h>/<util\/system\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilmemory\.h>/<util\/memory\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilmoneystr\.h>/<util\/moneystr\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilstrencodings\.h>/<util\/strencodings\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utiltime\.h>/<util\/time\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilasmap\.h>/<util\/asmap\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilstring\.h>/<util\/string\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTIL_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_SYSTEM_H/g' src/util/system.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILMEMORY_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_MEMORY_H/g' src/util/memory.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILMONEYSTR_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_MONEYSTR_H/g' src/util/moneystr.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILSTRENCODINGS_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_STRENCODINGS_H/g' src/util/strencodings.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILTIME_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_TIME_H/g' src/util/time.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILASMAP_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_ASMAP_H/g' src/util/asmap.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILSTRING_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_STRING_H/g' src/util/string.h gsed -i 's/ util\.\(h\|cpp\)/ util\/system\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilmemory\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/memory\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilmoneystr\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/moneystr\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilstrencodings\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/strencodings\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utiltime\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/time\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilasmap\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/asmap\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilstring\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/string\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/-> util ->/-> util\/system ->/' test/lint/lint-circular-dependencies.sh gsed -i 's/src\/util\.cpp/src\/util\/system\.cpp/g' test/lint/lint-format-strings.py test/lint/lint-locale-dependence.sh gsed -i 's/src\/utilmoneystr\.cpp/src\/util\/moneystr\.cpp/g' test/lint/lint-locale-dependence.sh gsed -i 's/src\/utilstrencodings\.\(h\|cpp\)/src\/util\/strencodings\.\1/g' test/lint/lint-locale-dependence.sh ------------- END SCRIPT ---------------
2021-06-27 08:33:13 +02:00
#include <util/strencodings.h>
#include <util/translation.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <validation.h>
#include <masternode/meta.h>
#include <masternode/sync.h>
#include <coinjoin/coinjoin.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <evo/deterministicmns.h>
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
#include <statsd_client.h>
#ifdef WIN32
#include <string.h>
#else
#include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_POLL
#include <poll.h>
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#endif
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#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
#include <sys/event.h>
#endif
#include <unordered_map>
#include <math.h>
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
// Dump addresses to peers.dat every 15 minutes (900s)
static constexpr int DUMP_PEERS_INTERVAL = 15 * 60;
/** Number of DNS seeds to query when the number of connections is low. */
static constexpr int DNSSEEDS_TO_QUERY_AT_ONCE = 3;
// We add a random period time (0 to 1 seconds) to feeler connections to prevent synchronization.
#define FEELER_SLEEP_WINDOW 1
// MSG_NOSIGNAL is not available on some platforms, if it doesn't exist define it as 0
#if !defined(MSG_NOSIGNAL)
#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0
#endif
// MSG_DONTWAIT is not available on some platforms, if it doesn't exist define it as 0
#if !defined(MSG_DONTWAIT)
#define MSG_DONTWAIT 0
#endif
/** Used to pass flags to the Bind() function */
enum BindFlags {
BF_NONE = 0,
BF_EXPLICIT = (1U << 0),
BF_REPORT_ERROR = (1U << 1),
};
#ifndef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
// The set of sockets cannot be modified while waiting
// The sleep time needs to be small to avoid new sockets stalling
static const uint64_t SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS = 50;
#else
// select() is woken up through the wakeup pipe whenever a new node is added, so we can wait much longer.
// We are however still somewhat limited in how long we can sleep as there is periodic work (cleanup) to be done in
// the socket handler thread
static const uint64_t SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS = 500;
#endif
const std::string NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER = "*other*";
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
constexpr const CConnman::CFullyConnectedOnly CConnman::FullyConnectedOnly;
constexpr const CConnman::CAllNodes CConnman::AllNodes;
static const uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_NETGROUP = 0x6c0edd8036ef4036ULL; // SHA256("netgroup")[0:8]
static const uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_LOCALHOSTNONCE = 0xd93e69e2bbfa5735ULL; // SHA256("localhostnonce")[0:8]
//
// Global state variables
//
2012-05-24 19:02:21 +02:00
bool fDiscover = true;
bool fListen = true;
bool g_relay_txes = !DEFAULT_BLOCKSONLY;
CCriticalSection cs_mapLocalHost;
std::map<CNetAddr, LocalServiceInfo> mapLocalHost GUARDED_BY(cs_mapLocalHost);
static bool vfLimited[NET_MAX] GUARDED_BY(cs_mapLocalHost) = {};
std::string strSubVersion;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::AddOneShot(const std::string& strDest)
{
LOCK(cs_vOneShots);
vOneShots.push_back(strDest);
}
unsigned short GetListenPort()
{
return (unsigned short)(gArgs.GetArg("-port", Params().GetDefaultPort()));
}
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// find 'best' local address for a particular peer
bool GetLocal(CService& addr, const CNetAddr *paddrPeer)
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{
if (!fListen)
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return false;
int nBestScore = -1;
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int nBestReachability = -1;
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
for (const auto& entry : mapLocalHost)
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{
int nScore = entry.second.nScore;
int nReachability = entry.first.GetReachabilityFrom(paddrPeer);
if (nReachability > nBestReachability || (nReachability == nBestReachability && nScore > nBestScore))
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{
addr = CService(entry.first, entry.second.nPort);
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nBestReachability = nReachability;
nBestScore = nScore;
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}
}
}
return nBestScore >= 0;
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}
//! Convert the pnSeed6 array into usable address objects.
static std::vector<CAddress> convertSeed6(const std::vector<SeedSpec6> &vSeedsIn)
{
// It'll only connect to one or two seed nodes because once it connects,
// it'll get a pile of addresses with newer timestamps.
// Seed nodes are given a random 'last seen time' of between one and two
// weeks ago.
const int64_t nOneWeek = 7*24*60*60;
std::vector<CAddress> vSeedsOut;
vSeedsOut.reserve(vSeedsIn.size());
Merge #14624: Some simple improvements to the RNG code e414486d56b9f06af7aeb07ce13e3c3780c2b69b Do not permit copying FastRandomContexts (Pieter Wuille) 022cf47dd7ef8f46e32a184e84f94d1e9f3a495c Simplify testing RNG code (Pieter Wuille) fd3e7973ffaaa15ed32e5aeadcb02956849b8fc7 Make unit tests use the insecure_rand_ctx exclusively (Pieter Wuille) 8d98d426116f0178612f14d1874d331042c4c4b7 Bugfix: randbytes should seed when needed (non reachable issue) (Pieter Wuille) 273d02580aa736b7ccea8fce51d90541665fdbd1 Use a FastRandomContext in LimitOrphanTxSize (Pieter Wuille) 3db746beb407f7cdd9cd6a605a195bef1254b4c0 Introduce a Shuffle for FastRandomContext and use it in wallet and coinselection (Pieter Wuille) 8098379be5465f598220e1d6174fc57c56f9da42 Use a local FastRandomContext in a few more places in net (Pieter Wuille) 9695f31d7544778853aa373f0aeed629fa68d85e Make addrman use its local RNG exclusively (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This improves a few minor issues with the RNG code: * Avoid calling `GetRand*()` functions (which currently invoke OpenSSL, later may switch to using our own RNG pool) inside loops in addrman, networking code, `KnapsackSolver`, and `LimitOrphanSize` * Fix a currently unreachable bug in `FastRandomContext::randbytes`. * Make a number of simplifications to the unit tests' randomness code (some tests unnecessarily used their own RNG or the OpenSSL one, instead of using the unit test specific `insecure_rand_ctx`). * As a precaution, make it illegal to copy a `FastRandomContext`. Tree-SHA512: 084c70b533ea68ca7adc0186c39f0b3e0a5c0ae43a12c37286e5d42086e056a8cd026dde61b12c0a296dc80f87fdc87fe303b9e8e6161b460ac2086cf7615f9d
2018-12-13 13:43:12 +01:00
FastRandomContext rng;
for (const auto& seed_in : vSeedsIn) {
struct in6_addr ip;
memcpy(&ip, seed_in.addr, sizeof(ip));
CAddress addr(CService(ip, seed_in.port), GetDesirableServiceFlags(NODE_NONE));
Merge #14624: Some simple improvements to the RNG code e414486d56b9f06af7aeb07ce13e3c3780c2b69b Do not permit copying FastRandomContexts (Pieter Wuille) 022cf47dd7ef8f46e32a184e84f94d1e9f3a495c Simplify testing RNG code (Pieter Wuille) fd3e7973ffaaa15ed32e5aeadcb02956849b8fc7 Make unit tests use the insecure_rand_ctx exclusively (Pieter Wuille) 8d98d426116f0178612f14d1874d331042c4c4b7 Bugfix: randbytes should seed when needed (non reachable issue) (Pieter Wuille) 273d02580aa736b7ccea8fce51d90541665fdbd1 Use a FastRandomContext in LimitOrphanTxSize (Pieter Wuille) 3db746beb407f7cdd9cd6a605a195bef1254b4c0 Introduce a Shuffle for FastRandomContext and use it in wallet and coinselection (Pieter Wuille) 8098379be5465f598220e1d6174fc57c56f9da42 Use a local FastRandomContext in a few more places in net (Pieter Wuille) 9695f31d7544778853aa373f0aeed629fa68d85e Make addrman use its local RNG exclusively (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This improves a few minor issues with the RNG code: * Avoid calling `GetRand*()` functions (which currently invoke OpenSSL, later may switch to using our own RNG pool) inside loops in addrman, networking code, `KnapsackSolver`, and `LimitOrphanSize` * Fix a currently unreachable bug in `FastRandomContext::randbytes`. * Make a number of simplifications to the unit tests' randomness code (some tests unnecessarily used their own RNG or the OpenSSL one, instead of using the unit test specific `insecure_rand_ctx`). * As a precaution, make it illegal to copy a `FastRandomContext`. Tree-SHA512: 084c70b533ea68ca7adc0186c39f0b3e0a5c0ae43a12c37286e5d42086e056a8cd026dde61b12c0a296dc80f87fdc87fe303b9e8e6161b460ac2086cf7615f9d
2018-12-13 13:43:12 +01:00
addr.nTime = GetTime() - rng.randrange(nOneWeek) - nOneWeek;
vSeedsOut.push_back(addr);
}
return vSeedsOut;
}
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
// get best local address for a particular peer as a CAddress
// Otherwise, return the unroutable 0.0.0.0 but filled in with
// the normal parameters, since the IP may be changed to a useful
// one by discovery.
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CAddress GetLocalAddress(const CNetAddr *paddrPeer, ServiceFlags nLocalServices)
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
CAddress ret(CService(CNetAddr(),GetListenPort()), nLocalServices);
CService addr;
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
if (GetLocal(addr, paddrPeer))
{
ret = CAddress(addr, nLocalServices);
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
}
ret.nTime = GetAdjustedTime();
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
return ret;
}
static int GetnScore(const CService& addr)
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
const auto it = mapLocalHost.find(addr);
return (it != mapLocalHost.end()) ? it->second.nScore : 0;
}
// Is our peer's addrLocal potentially useful as an external IP source?
bool IsPeerAddrLocalGood(CNode *pnode)
{
CService addrLocal = pnode->GetAddrLocal();
return fDiscover && pnode->addr.IsRoutable() && addrLocal.IsRoutable() &&
IsReachable(addrLocal.GetNetwork());
}
// pushes our own address to a peer
void AdvertiseLocal(CNode *pnode)
{
if (fListen && pnode->fSuccessfullyConnected)
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CAddress addrLocal = GetLocalAddress(&pnode->addr, pnode->GetLocalServices());
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-addrmantest", false)) {
// use IPv4 loopback during addrmantest
addrLocal = CAddress(CService(LookupNumeric("127.0.0.1", GetListenPort())), pnode->GetLocalServices());
}
// If discovery is enabled, sometimes give our peer the address it
// tells us that it sees us as in case it has a better idea of our
// address than we do.
Merge #14624: Some simple improvements to the RNG code e414486d56b9f06af7aeb07ce13e3c3780c2b69b Do not permit copying FastRandomContexts (Pieter Wuille) 022cf47dd7ef8f46e32a184e84f94d1e9f3a495c Simplify testing RNG code (Pieter Wuille) fd3e7973ffaaa15ed32e5aeadcb02956849b8fc7 Make unit tests use the insecure_rand_ctx exclusively (Pieter Wuille) 8d98d426116f0178612f14d1874d331042c4c4b7 Bugfix: randbytes should seed when needed (non reachable issue) (Pieter Wuille) 273d02580aa736b7ccea8fce51d90541665fdbd1 Use a FastRandomContext in LimitOrphanTxSize (Pieter Wuille) 3db746beb407f7cdd9cd6a605a195bef1254b4c0 Introduce a Shuffle for FastRandomContext and use it in wallet and coinselection (Pieter Wuille) 8098379be5465f598220e1d6174fc57c56f9da42 Use a local FastRandomContext in a few more places in net (Pieter Wuille) 9695f31d7544778853aa373f0aeed629fa68d85e Make addrman use its local RNG exclusively (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This improves a few minor issues with the RNG code: * Avoid calling `GetRand*()` functions (which currently invoke OpenSSL, later may switch to using our own RNG pool) inside loops in addrman, networking code, `KnapsackSolver`, and `LimitOrphanSize` * Fix a currently unreachable bug in `FastRandomContext::randbytes`. * Make a number of simplifications to the unit tests' randomness code (some tests unnecessarily used their own RNG or the OpenSSL one, instead of using the unit test specific `insecure_rand_ctx`). * As a precaution, make it illegal to copy a `FastRandomContext`. Tree-SHA512: 084c70b533ea68ca7adc0186c39f0b3e0a5c0ae43a12c37286e5d42086e056a8cd026dde61b12c0a296dc80f87fdc87fe303b9e8e6161b460ac2086cf7615f9d
2018-12-13 13:43:12 +01:00
FastRandomContext rng;
if (IsPeerAddrLocalGood(pnode) && (!addrLocal.IsRoutable() ||
Merge #14624: Some simple improvements to the RNG code e414486d56b9f06af7aeb07ce13e3c3780c2b69b Do not permit copying FastRandomContexts (Pieter Wuille) 022cf47dd7ef8f46e32a184e84f94d1e9f3a495c Simplify testing RNG code (Pieter Wuille) fd3e7973ffaaa15ed32e5aeadcb02956849b8fc7 Make unit tests use the insecure_rand_ctx exclusively (Pieter Wuille) 8d98d426116f0178612f14d1874d331042c4c4b7 Bugfix: randbytes should seed when needed (non reachable issue) (Pieter Wuille) 273d02580aa736b7ccea8fce51d90541665fdbd1 Use a FastRandomContext in LimitOrphanTxSize (Pieter Wuille) 3db746beb407f7cdd9cd6a605a195bef1254b4c0 Introduce a Shuffle for FastRandomContext and use it in wallet and coinselection (Pieter Wuille) 8098379be5465f598220e1d6174fc57c56f9da42 Use a local FastRandomContext in a few more places in net (Pieter Wuille) 9695f31d7544778853aa373f0aeed629fa68d85e Make addrman use its local RNG exclusively (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This improves a few minor issues with the RNG code: * Avoid calling `GetRand*()` functions (which currently invoke OpenSSL, later may switch to using our own RNG pool) inside loops in addrman, networking code, `KnapsackSolver`, and `LimitOrphanSize` * Fix a currently unreachable bug in `FastRandomContext::randbytes`. * Make a number of simplifications to the unit tests' randomness code (some tests unnecessarily used their own RNG or the OpenSSL one, instead of using the unit test specific `insecure_rand_ctx`). * As a precaution, make it illegal to copy a `FastRandomContext`. Tree-SHA512: 084c70b533ea68ca7adc0186c39f0b3e0a5c0ae43a12c37286e5d42086e056a8cd026dde61b12c0a296dc80f87fdc87fe303b9e8e6161b460ac2086cf7615f9d
2018-12-13 13:43:12 +01:00
rng.randbits((GetnScore(addrLocal) > LOCAL_MANUAL) ? 3 : 1) == 0))
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
addrLocal.SetIP(pnode->GetAddrLocal());
}
if (addrLocal.IsRoutable() || gArgs.GetBoolArg("-addrmantest", false))
{
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "AdvertiseLocal: advertising address %s\n", addrLocal.ToString());
Merge #14624: Some simple improvements to the RNG code e414486d56b9f06af7aeb07ce13e3c3780c2b69b Do not permit copying FastRandomContexts (Pieter Wuille) 022cf47dd7ef8f46e32a184e84f94d1e9f3a495c Simplify testing RNG code (Pieter Wuille) fd3e7973ffaaa15ed32e5aeadcb02956849b8fc7 Make unit tests use the insecure_rand_ctx exclusively (Pieter Wuille) 8d98d426116f0178612f14d1874d331042c4c4b7 Bugfix: randbytes should seed when needed (non reachable issue) (Pieter Wuille) 273d02580aa736b7ccea8fce51d90541665fdbd1 Use a FastRandomContext in LimitOrphanTxSize (Pieter Wuille) 3db746beb407f7cdd9cd6a605a195bef1254b4c0 Introduce a Shuffle for FastRandomContext and use it in wallet and coinselection (Pieter Wuille) 8098379be5465f598220e1d6174fc57c56f9da42 Use a local FastRandomContext in a few more places in net (Pieter Wuille) 9695f31d7544778853aa373f0aeed629fa68d85e Make addrman use its local RNG exclusively (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This improves a few minor issues with the RNG code: * Avoid calling `GetRand*()` functions (which currently invoke OpenSSL, later may switch to using our own RNG pool) inside loops in addrman, networking code, `KnapsackSolver`, and `LimitOrphanSize` * Fix a currently unreachable bug in `FastRandomContext::randbytes`. * Make a number of simplifications to the unit tests' randomness code (some tests unnecessarily used their own RNG or the OpenSSL one, instead of using the unit test specific `insecure_rand_ctx`). * As a precaution, make it illegal to copy a `FastRandomContext`. Tree-SHA512: 084c70b533ea68ca7adc0186c39f0b3e0a5c0ae43a12c37286e5d42086e056a8cd026dde61b12c0a296dc80f87fdc87fe303b9e8e6161b460ac2086cf7615f9d
2018-12-13 13:43:12 +01:00
pnode->PushAddress(addrLocal, rng);
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
}
}
}
// learn a new local address
bool AddLocal(const CService& addr, int nScore)
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
if (!addr.IsRoutable() && Params().RequireRoutableExternalIP())
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
return false;
2012-05-24 19:02:21 +02:00
if (!fDiscover && nScore < LOCAL_MANUAL)
2012-05-13 14:11:53 +02:00
return false;
if (!IsReachable(addr))
2012-05-13 15:11:51 +02:00
return false;
LogPrintf("AddLocal(%s,%i)\n", addr.ToString(), nScore);
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
const auto [it, is_newly_added] = mapLocalHost.emplace(addr, LocalServiceInfo());
LocalServiceInfo &info = it->second;
if (is_newly_added || nScore >= info.nScore) {
info.nScore = nScore + (is_newly_added ? 0 : 1);
2012-08-29 02:33:25 +02:00
info.nPort = addr.GetPort();
}
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
}
return true;
}
bool AddLocal(const CNetAddr &addr, int nScore)
{
return AddLocal(CService(addr, GetListenPort()), nScore);
}
void RemoveLocal(const CService& addr)
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
LogPrintf("RemoveLocal(%s)\n", addr.ToString());
mapLocalHost.erase(addr);
}
void SetReachable(enum Network net, bool reachable)
{
if (net == NET_UNROUTABLE || net == NET_INTERNAL)
2012-05-14 17:15:58 +02:00
return;
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
vfLimited[net] = !reachable;
}
bool IsReachable(enum Network net)
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
return !vfLimited[net];
2012-05-14 17:15:58 +02:00
}
bool IsReachable(const CNetAddr &addr)
2012-05-14 17:15:58 +02:00
{
return IsReachable(addr.GetNetwork());
}
/** vote for a local address */
bool SeenLocal(const CService& addr)
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
const auto it = mapLocalHost.find(addr);
if (it == mapLocalHost.end()) return false;
++it->second.nScore;
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
return true;
}
/** check whether a given address is potentially local */
bool IsLocal(const CService& addr)
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
return mapLocalHost.count(addr) > 0;
}
CNode* CConnman::FindNode(const CNetAddr& ip, bool fExcludeDisconnecting)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (fExcludeDisconnecting && pnode->fDisconnect) {
continue;
}
if (static_cast<CNetAddr>(pnode->addr) == ip) {
return pnode;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
CNode* CConnman::FindNode(const CSubNet& subNet, bool fExcludeDisconnecting)
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (fExcludeDisconnecting && pnode->fDisconnect) {
continue;
}
if (subNet.Match(static_cast<CNetAddr>(pnode->addr))) {
return pnode;
}
}
return nullptr;
2015-05-25 20:03:51 +02:00
}
CNode* CConnman::FindNode(const std::string& addrName, bool fExcludeDisconnecting)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (fExcludeDisconnecting && pnode->fDisconnect) {
continue;
}
if (pnode->GetAddrName() == addrName) {
return pnode;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
CNode* CConnman::FindNode(const CService& addr, bool fExcludeDisconnecting)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (fExcludeDisconnecting && pnode->fDisconnect) {
continue;
}
if (static_cast<CService>(pnode->addr) == addr) {
return pnode;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman::CheckIncomingNonce(uint64_t nonce)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if (!pnode->fSuccessfullyConnected && !pnode->fInbound && pnode->GetLocalNonce() == nonce)
return false;
}
return true;
}
/** Get the bind address for a socket as CAddress */
static CAddress GetBindAddress(SOCKET sock)
{
CAddress addr_bind;
struct sockaddr_storage sockaddr_bind;
socklen_t sockaddr_bind_len = sizeof(sockaddr_bind);
if (sock != INVALID_SOCKET) {
if (!getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&sockaddr_bind, &sockaddr_bind_len)) {
addr_bind.SetSockAddr((const struct sockaddr*)&sockaddr_bind);
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Warning: getsockname failed\n");
}
}
return addr_bind;
}
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
CNode* CConnman::ConnectNode(CAddress addrConnect, const char *pszDest, bool fCountFailure, bool manual_connection, bool block_relay_only)
{
if (pszDest == nullptr) {
bool fAllowLocal = Params().AllowMultiplePorts() && addrConnect.GetPort() != GetListenPort();
if (!fAllowLocal && IsLocal(addrConnect)) {
return nullptr;
}
// Look for an existing connection
CNode* pnode = FindNode(static_cast<CService>(addrConnect));
if (pnode)
{
LogPrintf("Failed to open new connection, already connected\n");
return nullptr;
}
}
/// debug print
if (fLogIPs) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "trying connection %s lastseen=%.1fhrs\n",
pszDest ? pszDest : addrConnect.ToString(),
pszDest ? 0.0 : (double)(GetAdjustedTime() - addrConnect.nTime)/3600.0);
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "trying connection lastseen=%.1fhrs\n",
pszDest ? 0.0 : (double)(GetAdjustedTime() - addrConnect.nTime)/3600.0);
}
// Resolve
const int default_port = Params().GetDefaultPort();
if (pszDest) {
std::vector<CService> resolved;
if (Lookup(pszDest, resolved, default_port, fNameLookup && !HaveNameProxy(), 256) && !resolved.empty()) {
addrConnect = CAddress(resolved[GetRand(resolved.size())], NODE_NONE);
if (!addrConnect.IsValid()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Resolver returned invalid address %s for %s\n", addrConnect.ToString(), pszDest);
return nullptr;
}
// It is possible that we already have a connection to the IP/port pszDest resolved to.
// In that case, drop the connection that was just created, and return the existing CNode instead.
// Also store the name we used to connect in that CNode, so that future FindNode() calls to that
// name catch this early.
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
CNode* pnode = FindNode(static_cast<CService>(addrConnect));
if (pnode)
{
pnode->MaybeSetAddrName(std::string(pszDest));
LogPrintf("Failed to open new connection, already connected\n");
return nullptr;
}
}
}
// Connect
bool connected = false;
SOCKET hSocket = INVALID_SOCKET;
proxyType proxy;
if (addrConnect.IsValid()) {
bool proxyConnectionFailed = false;
if (GetProxy(addrConnect.GetNetwork(), proxy)) {
hSocket = CreateSocket(proxy.proxy);
if (hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
return nullptr;
}
connected = ConnectThroughProxy(proxy, addrConnect.ToStringIP(), addrConnect.GetPort(), hSocket, nConnectTimeout, &proxyConnectionFailed);
} else {
// no proxy needed (none set for target network)
hSocket = CreateSocket(addrConnect);
if (hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
return nullptr;
}
Merge #12569: net: Increase signal-to-noise ratio in debug.log by adjusting log level when logging failed non-manual connect():s cba2800 Increase signal-to-noise ratio in debug.log by adjusting log level when logging failed non-manual connect():s (practicalswift) Pull request description: Increase signal-to-noise ratio in `debug.log` by adjusting log level when logging failed non-manual `connect()`:s. Before this patch: ``` $ src/bitcoind -printtoconsole … 2018-02-28 18:42:51 UpdateTip: new best=0000000000005448b10a219683d34b770a28044e1cc421032dea1a79ff548948 height=1286903 version=0x20000000 log2_work=69.791313 tx=17408546 date='2018-02-28 18:42:46' progress=1.000000 cache=0.0MiB(173txo) 2018-02-28 18:37:52 connect() 10.11.21.34:18333 failed after select(): Connection refused (111) 2018-02-28 18:43:22 connect() to 10.11.43.14:18333 failed after select(): Network is unreachable (101) 2018-02-28 18:44:49 UpdateTip: new best=000000000000029a521ff2803e1441b09413b876accff5084a4cccf7747d798b height=1286904 version=0x20000000 log2_work=69.791345 tx=17408559 date='2018-02-28 18:44:51' progress=1.000000 cache=0.1MiB(502txo) 2018-02-28 18:46:54 connect() to [2001:0:9d38:78ff:1234:1234:1234:1234]:18333 failed: Network is unreachable (101) 2018-02-28 18:48:56 connect() to [2001:0:9d38:6aff:1234:1234:1234:1234]:18333 failed: Network is unreachable (101) 2018-02-28 18:49:11 UpdateTip: new best=000000000000000206b79eb235e5dd907b6369de0e5d764330bf40ec0d460311 height=1286905 version=0x20000000 log2_work=69.791377 tx=17408577 date='2018-02-28 18:49:12' progress=1.000000 cache=1.0MiB(5245txo) ``` After this patch: ``` $ src/bitcoind -printtoconsole … 2018-02-28 18:42:51 UpdateTip: new best=0000000000005448b10a219683d34b770a28044e1cc421032dea1a79ff548948 height=1286903 version=0x20000000 log2_work=69.791313 tx=17408546 date='2018-02-28 18:42:46' progress=1.000000 cache=0.0MiB(173txo) 2018-02-28 18:44:49 UpdateTip: new best=000000000000029a521ff2803e1441b09413b876accff5084a4cccf7747d798b height=1286904 version=0x20000000 log2_work=69.791345 tx=17408559 date='2018-02-28 18:44:51' progress=1.000000 cache=0.1MiB(502txo) 2018-02-28 18:49:11 UpdateTip: new best=000000000000000206b79eb235e5dd907b6369de0e5d764330bf40ec0d460311 height=1286905 version=0x20000000 log2_work=69.791377 tx=17408577 date='2018-02-28 18:49:12' progress=1.000000 cache=1.0MiB(5245txo) ``` Please note that "manual `connect()`:s" (invoked via `-connect`, `-proxy` or `addnode`) are still reported at the default log level as these messages are likely to be relevant to end-users: ``` $ src/bitcoind -printtoconsole -connect=127.0.0.1:1234 … 2018-02-28 18:31:13 connect() to 127.0.0.1:1234 failed after select(): Connection refused (111) $ src/bitcoind -printtoconsole -proxy=127.0.0.1:1234 … 2018-02-28 18:32:32 connect() to 127.0.0.1:1234 failed after select(): Connection refused (111) $ src/bitcoind -printtoconsole & $ src/bitcoin-cli addnode 127.0.0.1:1234 onetry … 2018-02-28 18:33:40 connect() to 127.0.0.1:1234 failed after select(): Connection refused (111) ``` Tree-SHA512: 92e3c1e4b54ce8ccdd7ec31de147c8505710cd799ceb2bbc8576a086709967802403c9184df364b3cfa59bd98859f6ac8feb27fb09b9324194c6c47a042fc6d3 fix compilation Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org>
2018-04-13 19:15:35 +02:00
connected = ConnectSocketDirectly(addrConnect, hSocket, nConnectTimeout, manual_connection);
}
if (!proxyConnectionFailed) {
// If a connection to the node was attempted, and failure (if any) is not caused by a problem connecting to
// the proxy, mark this as an attempt.
addrman.Attempt(addrConnect, fCountFailure);
}
} else if (pszDest && GetNameProxy(proxy)) {
hSocket = CreateSocket(proxy.proxy);
if (hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
return nullptr;
}
std::string host;
int port = default_port;
SplitHostPort(std::string(pszDest), port, host);
connected = ConnectThroughProxy(proxy, host, port, hSocket, nConnectTimeout, nullptr);
}
if (!connected) {
CloseSocket(hSocket);
return nullptr;
}
// Add node
NodeId id = GetNewNodeId();
uint64_t nonce = GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_LOCALHOSTNONCE).Write(id).Finalize();
CAddress addr_bind = GetBindAddress(hSocket);
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
CNode* pnode = new CNode(id, nLocalServices, GetBestHeight(), hSocket, addrConnect, CalculateKeyedNetGroup(addrConnect), nonce, addr_bind, pszDest ? pszDest : "", false, block_relay_only);
pnode->AddRef();
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
statsClient.inc("peers.connect", 1.0f);
// We're making a new connection, harvest entropy from the time (and our peer count)
RandAddEvent((uint32_t)id);
return pnode;
}
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
void CNode::CloseSocketDisconnect(CConnman* connman)
{
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
AssertLockHeld(connman->cs_vNodes);
fDisconnect = true;
LOCK(cs_hSocket);
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
if (hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
return;
}
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
fHasRecvData = false;
fCanSendData = false;
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
connman->mapSocketToNode.erase(hSocket);
connman->mapReceivableNodes.erase(GetId());
connman->mapSendableNodes.erase(GetId());
{
LOCK(connman->cs_mapNodesWithDataToSend);
if (connman->mapNodesWithDataToSend.erase(GetId()) != 0) {
// See comment in PushMessage
Release();
}
}
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
connman->UnregisterEvents(this);
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "disconnecting peer=%d\n", id);
CloseSocket(hSocket);
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
statsClient.inc("peers.disconnect", 1.0f);
}
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
void CConnman::AddWhitelistPermissionFlags(NetPermissionFlags& flags, const CNetAddr &addr) const {
for (const auto& subnet : vWhitelistedRange) {
if (subnet.m_subnet.Match(addr)) NetPermissions::AddFlag(flags, subnet.m_flags);
}
}
std::string CNode::GetAddrName() const {
LOCK(cs_addrName);
return addrName;
}
void CNode::MaybeSetAddrName(const std::string& addrNameIn) {
LOCK(cs_addrName);
if (addrName.empty()) {
addrName = addrNameIn;
}
}
CService CNode::GetAddrLocal() const {
LOCK(cs_addrLocal);
return addrLocal;
}
void CNode::SetAddrLocal(const CService& addrLocalIn) {
LOCK(cs_addrLocal);
if (addrLocal.IsValid()) {
error("Addr local already set for node: %i. Refusing to change from %s to %s", id, addrLocal.ToString(), addrLocalIn.ToString());
} else {
addrLocal = addrLocalIn;
}
}
std::string CNode::GetLogString() const
{
return fLogIPs ? addr.ToString() : strprintf("%d", id);
}
#undef X
#define X(name) stats.name = name
2020-01-29 22:55:40 +01:00
void CNode::copyStats(CNodeStats &stats, const std::vector<bool> &m_asmap)
{
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
stats.nodeid = this->GetId();
X(nServices);
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 2 (#1615) * Merge #7506: Use CCoinControl selection in CWallet::FundTransaction d6cc6a1 Use CCoinControl selection in CWallet::FundTransaction (João Barbosa) * Merge #7732: [Qt] Debug window: replace "Build date" with "Datadir" fc737d1 [Qt] remove unused formatBuildDate method (Jonas Schnelli) 4856f1d [Qt] Debug window: replace "Build date" with "Datadir" (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #7707: [RPC][QT] UI support for abandoned transactions 8efed3b [Qt] Support for abandoned/abandoning transactions (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #7688: List solvability in listunspent output and improve help c3932b3 List solvability in listunspent output and improve help (Pieter Wuille) * Merge #8006: Qt: Add option to disable the system tray icon 8b0e497 Qt: Add option to hide the system tray icon (Tyler Hardin) * Merge #8073: qt: askpassphrasedialog: Clear pass fields on accept 02ce2a3 qt: askpassphrasedialog: Clear pass fields on accept (Pavel Vasin) * Merge #8231: [Qt] fix a bug where the SplashScreen will not be hidden during startup b3e1348 [Qt] fix a bug where the SplashScreen will not be hidden during startup (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #8257: Do not ask a UI question from bitcoind 1acf1db Do not ask a UI question from bitcoind (Pieter Wuille) * Merge #8463: [qt] Remove Priority from coincontrol dialog fa8dd78 [qt] Remove Priority from coincontrol dialog (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8678: [Qt][CoinControl] fix UI bug that could result in paying unexpected fee 0480293 [Qt][CoinControl] fix UI bug that could result in paying unexpected fee (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #8672: Qt: Show transaction size in transaction details window c015634 qt: Adding transaction size to transaction details window (Hampus Sjöberg) \-- merge fix for s/size/total size/ fdf82fb Adding method GetTotalSize() to CTransaction (Hampus Sjöberg) * Merge #8371: [Qt] Add out-of-sync modal info layer 08827df [Qt] modalinfolayer: removed unused comments, renamed signal, code style overhaul (Jonas Schnelli) d8b062e [Qt] only update "amount of blocks left" when the header chain is in-sync (Jonas Schnelli) e3245b4 [Qt] add out-of-sync modal info layer (Jonas Schnelli) e47052f [Qt] ClientModel add method to get the height of the header chain (Jonas Schnelli) a001f18 [Qt] Always pass the numBlocksChanged signal for headers tip changed (Jonas Schnelli) bd44a04 [Qt] make Out-Of-Sync warning icon clickable (Jonas Schnelli) 0904c3c [Refactor] refactor function that forms human readable text out of a timeoffset (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #8805: Trivial: Grammar and capitalization c9ce17b Trivial: Grammar and capitalization (Derek Miller) * Merge #8885: gui: fix ban from qt console cb78c60 gui: fix ban from qt console (Cory Fields) * Merge #8821: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't block during reindex fa85e86 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show estimated number of headers left (MarcoFalke) faa4de2 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't block during reindex (MarcoFalke) * Support themes for new transaction_abandoned icon * Fix constructor call to COutput * Merge #7842: RPC: do not print minping time in getpeerinfo when no ping received yet 62a6486 RPC: do not print ping info in getpeerinfo when no ping received yet, fix help (Pavel Janík) * Merge #8918: Qt: Add "Copy URI" to payment request context menu 21f5a63 Qt: Add "Copy URI" to payment request context menu (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #8925: qt: Display minimum ping in debug window. 1724a40 Display minimum ping in debug window. (R E Broadley) * Merge #8972: [Qt] make warnings label selectable (jonasschnelli) ef0c9ee [Qt] make warnings label selectable (Jonas Schnelli) * Make background of warning icon transparent in modaloverlay * Merge #9088: Reduce ambiguity of warning message 77cbbd9 Make warning message about wallet balance possibly being incorrect less ambiguous. (R E Broadley) * Replace Bitcoin with Dash in modal overlay * Remove clicked signals from labelWalletStatus and labelTransactionsStatus As both are really just labels, clicking on those is not possible. This is different in Bitcoin, where these labels are actually buttons. * Pull out modaloverlay show/hide into it's own if/else block and switch to time based check Also don't use masternodeSync.IsBlockchainSynced() for now as it won't report the blockchain being synced before the first block (or other MN data?) arrives. This would otherwise give the impression that sync is being stuck.
2017-09-09 09:04:02 +02:00
X(addr);
X(addrBind);
stats.m_mapped_as = addr.GetMappedAS(m_asmap);
if (!m_block_relay_only_peer) {
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
LOCK(m_tx_relay->cs_filter);
stats.fRelayTxes = m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes;
} else {
stats.fRelayTxes = false;
}
X(nLastSend);
X(nLastRecv);
X(nTimeConnected);
2014-12-15 11:06:15 +01:00
X(nTimeOffset);
stats.addrName = GetAddrName();
X(nVersion);
{
LOCK(cs_SubVer);
X(cleanSubVer);
}
X(fInbound);
Merge #11456: Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. 15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo) 5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo) 57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo) 44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman. Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check for NETWORK|WITNESS. This changes the following: * Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit more from protocol-level logic. * Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler connections (feelers still only require NETWORK). * This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices. * This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to continue using our valuable outbound slots on them. * In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to -connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true of addnodes). * Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the eviction metrics from the same sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring HasRelevantServices. This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement. Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
X(m_manual_connection);
X(nStartingHeight);
{
LOCK(cs_vSend);
X(mapSendBytesPerMsgCmd);
X(nSendBytes);
}
{
LOCK(cs_vRecv);
X(mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd);
X(nRecvBytes);
}
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
X(m_legacyWhitelisted);
X(m_permissionFlags);
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
// It is common for nodes with good ping times to suddenly become lagged,
// due to a new block arriving or other large transfer.
// Merely reporting pingtime might fool the caller into thinking the node was still responsive,
// since pingtime does not update until the ping is complete, which might take a while.
// So, if a ping is taking an unusually long time in flight,
// the caller can immediately detect that this is happening.
int64_t nPingUsecWait = 0;
if ((0 != nPingNonceSent) && (0 != nPingUsecStart)) {
nPingUsecWait = GetTimeMicros() - nPingUsecStart;
}
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
2015-03-18 00:06:58 +01:00
// Raw ping time is in microseconds, but show it to user as whole seconds (Dash users should be well used to small numbers with many decimal places by now :)
stats.m_ping_usec = nPingUsecTime;
stats.m_min_ping_usec = nMinPingUsecTime;
stats.m_ping_wait_usec = nPingUsecWait;
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
// Leave string empty if addrLocal invalid (not filled in yet)
CService addrLocalUnlocked = GetAddrLocal();
stats.addrLocal = addrLocalUnlocked.IsValid() ? addrLocalUnlocked.ToString() : "";
{
LOCK(cs_mnauth);
X(verifiedProRegTxHash);
X(verifiedPubKeyHash);
}
X(m_masternode_connection);
}
#undef X
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CNode::ReceiveMsgBytes(const char *pch, unsigned int nBytes, bool& complete)
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
complete = false;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
int64_t nTimeMicros = GetTimeMicros();
LOCK(cs_vRecv);
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
nLastRecv = nTimeMicros / 1000000;
nRecvBytes += nBytes;
while (nBytes > 0) {
// absorb network data
int handled = m_deserializer->Read(pch, nBytes);
if (handled < 0) return false;
pch += handled;
nBytes -= handled;
if (m_deserializer->Complete()) {
// decompose a transport agnostic CNetMessage from the deserializer
CNetMessage msg = m_deserializer->GetMessage(Params().MessageStart(), nTimeMicros);
//store received bytes per message command
//to prevent a memory DOS, only allow valid commands
mapMsgCmdSize::iterator i = mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd.find(msg.m_command);
if (i == mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd.end())
i = mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd.find(NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER);
assert(i != mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd.end());
i->second += msg.m_raw_message_size;
statsClient.count("bandwidth.message." + std::string(msg.m_command) + ".bytesReceived", msg.m_raw_message_size, 1.0f);
// push the message to the process queue,
vRecvMsg.push_back(std::move(msg));
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
complete = true;
}
}
return true;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
void CNode::SetSendVersion(int nVersionIn)
{
// Send version may only be changed in the version message, and
// only one version message is allowed per session. We can therefore
// treat this value as const and even atomic as long as it's only used
// once a version message has been successfully processed. Any attempt to
// set this twice is an error.
if (nSendVersion != 0) {
error("Send version already set for node: %i. Refusing to change from %i to %i", id, nSendVersion, nVersionIn);
} else {
nSendVersion = nVersionIn;
}
}
int CNode::GetSendVersion() const
{
// The send version should always be explicitly set to
// INIT_PROTO_VERSION rather than using this value until SetSendVersion
// has been called.
if (nSendVersion == 0) {
error("Requesting unset send version for node: %i. Using %i", id, INIT_PROTO_VERSION);
return INIT_PROTO_VERSION;
}
return nSendVersion;
}
int V1TransportDeserializer::readHeader(const char *pch, unsigned int nBytes)
{
// copy data to temporary parsing buffer
unsigned int nRemaining = 24 - nHdrPos;
unsigned int nCopy = std::min(nRemaining, nBytes);
memcpy(&hdrbuf[nHdrPos], pch, nCopy);
nHdrPos += nCopy;
// if header incomplete, exit
if (nHdrPos < 24)
return nCopy;
// deserialize to CMessageHeader
try {
hdrbuf >> hdr;
}
catch (const std::exception&) {
return -1;
}
// reject messages larger than MAX_SIZE or MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH
if (hdr.nMessageSize > MAX_SIZE || hdr.nMessageSize > MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH) {
return -1;
}
// switch state to reading message data
in_data = true;
return nCopy;
}
int V1TransportDeserializer::readData(const char *pch, unsigned int nBytes)
{
unsigned int nRemaining = hdr.nMessageSize - nDataPos;
unsigned int nCopy = std::min(nRemaining, nBytes);
2014-06-21 17:00:38 +02:00
if (vRecv.size() < nDataPos + nCopy) {
// Allocate up to 256 KiB ahead, but never more than the total message size.
vRecv.resize(std::min(hdr.nMessageSize, nDataPos + nCopy + 256 * 1024));
}
hasher.Write({(const unsigned char*)pch, nCopy});
memcpy(&vRecv[nDataPos], pch, nCopy);
nDataPos += nCopy;
return nCopy;
}
const uint256& V1TransportDeserializer::GetMessageHash() const
{
assert(Complete());
if (data_hash.IsNull())
hasher.Finalize(data_hash);
return data_hash;
}
CNetMessage V1TransportDeserializer::GetMessage(const CMessageHeader::MessageStartChars& message_start, int64_t time) {
// decompose a single CNetMessage from the TransportDeserializer
CNetMessage msg(std::move(vRecv));
// store state about valid header, netmagic and checksum
msg.m_valid_header = hdr.IsValid(message_start);
msg.m_valid_netmagic = (memcmp(hdr.pchMessageStart, message_start, CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_START_SIZE) == 0);
uint256 hash = GetMessageHash();
// store command string, payload size
msg.m_command = hdr.GetCommand();
msg.m_message_size = hdr.nMessageSize;
msg.m_raw_message_size = hdr.nMessageSize + CMessageHeader::HEADER_SIZE;
// We just received a message off the wire, harvest entropy from the time (and the message checksum)
RandAddEvent(ReadLE32(hash.begin()));
msg.m_valid_checksum = (memcmp(hash.begin(), hdr.pchChecksum, CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE) == 0);
if (!msg.m_valid_checksum) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "CHECKSUM ERROR (%s, %u bytes), expected %s was %s\n",
SanitizeString(msg.m_command), msg.m_message_size,
HexStr(Span<uint8_t>(hash.begin(), hash.begin()+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE)),
HexStr(Span<uint8_t>(hdr.pchChecksum, hdr.pchChecksum+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE)));
}
// store receive time
msg.m_time = time;
// reset the network deserializer (prepare for the next message)
Reset();
return msg;
}
void V1TransportSerializer::prepareForTransport(CSerializedNetMsg& msg, std::vector<unsigned char>& header) {
// create dbl-sha256 checksum
uint256 hash = Hash(msg.data.begin(), msg.data.end());
// create header
CMessageHeader hdr(Params().MessageStart(), msg.command.c_str(), msg.data.size());
memcpy(hdr.pchChecksum, hash.begin(), CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE);
// serialize header
header.reserve(CMessageHeader::HEADER_SIZE);
CVectorWriter{SER_NETWORK, INIT_PROTO_VERSION, header, 0, hdr};
}
2020-04-07 14:27:06 +02:00
size_t CConnman::SocketSendData(CNode *pnode) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(pnode->cs_vSend)
{
auto it = pnode->vSendMsg.begin();
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
size_t nSentSize = 0;
while (it != pnode->vSendMsg.end()) {
const auto &data = *it;
assert(data.size() > pnode->nSendOffset);
int nBytes = 0;
{
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
if (pnode->hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET)
break;
nBytes = send(pnode->hSocket, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data.data()) + pnode->nSendOffset, data.size() - pnode->nSendOffset, MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
if (nBytes > 0) {
pnode->nLastSend = GetSystemTimeInSeconds();
pnode->nSendBytes += nBytes;
pnode->nSendOffset += nBytes;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
nSentSize += nBytes;
if (pnode->nSendOffset == data.size()) {
pnode->nSendOffset = 0;
pnode->nSendSize -= data.size();
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
pnode->fPauseSend = pnode->nSendSize > nSendBufferMaxSize;
it++;
} else {
// could not send full message; stop sending more
pnode->fCanSendData = false;
break;
}
} else {
if (nBytes < 0) {
// error
int nErr = WSAGetLastError();
if (nErr != WSAEWOULDBLOCK && nErr != WSAEMSGSIZE && nErr != WSAEINTR && nErr != WSAEINPROGRESS)
{
LogPrintf("socket send error %s (peer=%d)\n", NetworkErrorString(nErr), pnode->GetId());
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
}
}
// couldn't send anything at all
pnode->fCanSendData = false;
break;
}
}
if (it == pnode->vSendMsg.end()) {
assert(pnode->nSendOffset == 0);
assert(pnode->nSendSize == 0);
}
pnode->vSendMsg.erase(pnode->vSendMsg.begin(), it);
pnode->nSendMsgSize = pnode->vSendMsg.size();
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
return nSentSize;
}
struct NodeEvictionCandidate
{
NodeId id;
int64_t nTimeConnected;
int64_t nMinPingUsecTime;
int64_t nLastBlockTime;
int64_t nLastTXTime;
bool fRelevantServices;
bool fRelayTxes;
bool fBloomFilter;
uint64_t nKeyedNetGroup;
bool prefer_evict;
2015-08-21 02:29:04 +02:00
};
static bool ReverseCompareNodeMinPingTime(const NodeEvictionCandidate& a, const NodeEvictionCandidate& b)
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
{
return a.nMinPingUsecTime > b.nMinPingUsecTime;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
static bool ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected(const NodeEvictionCandidate& a, const NodeEvictionCandidate& b)
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
{
return a.nTimeConnected > b.nTimeConnected;
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
static bool CompareNetGroupKeyed(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b) {
return a.nKeyedNetGroup < b.nKeyedNetGroup;
}
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
static bool CompareNodeBlockTime(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b)
{
// There is a fall-through here because it is common for a node to have many peers which have not yet relayed a block.
if (a.nLastBlockTime != b.nLastBlockTime) return a.nLastBlockTime < b.nLastBlockTime;
if (a.fRelevantServices != b.fRelevantServices) return b.fRelevantServices;
return a.nTimeConnected > b.nTimeConnected;
}
static bool CompareNodeTXTime(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b)
{
// There is a fall-through here because it is common for a node to have more than a few peers that have not yet relayed txn.
if (a.nLastTXTime != b.nLastTXTime) return a.nLastTXTime < b.nLastTXTime;
if (a.fRelayTxes != b.fRelayTxes) return b.fRelayTxes;
if (a.fBloomFilter != b.fBloomFilter) return a.fBloomFilter;
return a.nTimeConnected > b.nTimeConnected;
}
//! Sort an array by the specified comparator, then erase the last K elements.
template<typename T, typename Comparator>
static void EraseLastKElements(std::vector<T> &elements, Comparator comparator, size_t k)
{
std::sort(elements.begin(), elements.end(), comparator);
size_t eraseSize = std::min(k, elements.size());
elements.erase(elements.end() - eraseSize, elements.end());
}
/** Try to find a connection to evict when the node is full.
* Extreme care must be taken to avoid opening the node to attacker
* triggered network partitioning.
* The strategy used here is to protect a small number of peers
* for each of several distinct characteristics which are difficult
* to forge. In order to partition a node the attacker must be
* simultaneously better at all of them than honest peers.
*/
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman::AttemptToEvictConnection()
{
std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> vEvictionCandidates;
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{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const CNode* node : vNodes) {
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
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if (node->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN))
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continue;
if (!node->fInbound)
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continue;
if (node->fDisconnect)
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continue;
if (fMasternodeMode) {
// This handles eviction protected nodes. Nodes are always protected for a short time after the connection
// was accepted. This short time is meant for the VERSION/VERACK exchange and the possible MNAUTH that might
// follow when the incoming connection is from another masternode. When a message other than MNAUTH
// is received after VERSION/VERACK, the protection is lifted immediately.
bool isProtected = GetSystemTimeInSeconds() - node->nTimeConnected < INBOUND_EVICTION_PROTECTION_TIME;
if (node->nTimeFirstMessageReceived != 0 && !node->fFirstMessageIsMNAUTH) {
isProtected = false;
}
// if MNAUTH was valid, the node is always protected (and at the same time not accounted when
// checking incoming connection limits)
if (!node->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash().IsNull()) {
isProtected = true;
}
if (isProtected) {
continue;
}
}
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
bool peer_relay_txes = false;
bool peer_filter_not_null = false;
if (!node->m_block_relay_only_peer) {
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
LOCK(node->m_tx_relay->cs_filter);
peer_relay_txes = node->m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes;
peer_filter_not_null = node->m_tx_relay->pfilter != nullptr;
}
NodeEvictionCandidate candidate = {node->GetId(), node->nTimeConnected, node->nMinPingUsecTime,
node->nLastBlockTime, node->nLastTXTime,
Merge #11456: Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. 15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo) 5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo) 57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo) 44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman. Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check for NETWORK|WITNESS. This changes the following: * Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit more from protocol-level logic. * Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler connections (feelers still only require NETWORK). * This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices. * This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to continue using our valuable outbound slots on them. * In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to -connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true of addnodes). * Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the eviction metrics from the same sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring HasRelevantServices. This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement. Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(node->nServices),
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
peer_relay_txes, peer_filter_not_null, node->nKeyedNetGroup,
node->m_prefer_evict};
vEvictionCandidates.push_back(candidate);
2015-08-13 11:58:58 +02:00
}
}
// Protect connections with certain characteristics
// Deterministically select 4 peers to protect by netgroup.
// An attacker cannot predict which netgroups will be protected
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, CompareNetGroupKeyed, 4);
// Protect the 8 nodes with the lowest minimum ping time.
// An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without physically moving nodes closer to the target.
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, ReverseCompareNodeMinPingTime, 8);
// Protect 4 nodes that most recently sent us novel transactions accepted into our mempool.
// An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work.
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, CompareNodeTXTime, 4);
// Protect 4 nodes that most recently sent us novel blocks.
// An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work.
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, CompareNodeBlockTime, 4);
2015-08-26 01:31:13 +02:00
// Protect the half of the remaining nodes which have been connected the longest.
// This replicates the non-eviction implicit behavior, and precludes attacks that start later.
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected, vEvictionCandidates.size() / 2);
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if (vEvictionCandidates.empty()) return false;
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// If any remaining peers are preferred for eviction consider only them.
// This happens after the other preferences since if a peer is really the best by other criteria (esp relaying blocks)
// then we probably don't want to evict it no matter what.
if (std::any_of(vEvictionCandidates.begin(),vEvictionCandidates.end(),[](NodeEvictionCandidate const &n){return n.prefer_evict;})) {
vEvictionCandidates.erase(std::remove_if(vEvictionCandidates.begin(),vEvictionCandidates.end(),
[](NodeEvictionCandidate const &n){return !n.prefer_evict;}),vEvictionCandidates.end());
}
// Identify the network group with the most connections and youngest member.
// (vEvictionCandidates is already sorted by reverse connect time)
uint64_t naMostConnections;
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unsigned int nMostConnections = 0;
int64_t nMostConnectionsTime = 0;
std::map<uint64_t, std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> > mapNetGroupNodes;
for (const NodeEvictionCandidate &node : vEvictionCandidates) {
std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> &group = mapNetGroupNodes[node.nKeyedNetGroup];
group.push_back(node);
int64_t grouptime = group[0].nTimeConnected;
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if (group.size() > nMostConnections || (group.size() == nMostConnections && grouptime > nMostConnectionsTime)) {
nMostConnections = group.size();
nMostConnectionsTime = grouptime;
naMostConnections = node.nKeyedNetGroup;
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}
}
// Reduce to the network group with the most connections
vEvictionCandidates = std::move(mapNetGroupNodes[naMostConnections]);
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// Disconnect from the network group with the most connections
NodeId evicted = vEvictionCandidates.front().id;
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->GetId() == evicted) {
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
return true;
}
}
return false;
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}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::AcceptConnection(const ListenSocket& hListenSocket) {
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
struct sockaddr_storage sockaddr;
socklen_t len = sizeof(sockaddr);
SOCKET hSocket = accept(hListenSocket.socket, (struct sockaddr*)&sockaddr, &len);
CAddress addr;
int nInbound = 0;
int nVerifiedInboundMasternodes = 0;
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
int nMaxInbound = nMaxConnections - m_max_outbound;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
if (hSocket != INVALID_SOCKET) {
if (!addr.SetSockAddr((const struct sockaddr*)&sockaddr)) {
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
LogPrintf("Warning: Unknown socket family\n");
}
}
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
NetPermissionFlags permissionFlags = NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE;
hListenSocket.AddSocketPermissionFlags(permissionFlags);
AddWhitelistPermissionFlags(permissionFlags, addr);
bool legacyWhitelisted = false;
if (NetPermissions::HasFlag(permissionFlags, NetPermissionFlags::PF_ISIMPLICIT)) {
NetPermissions::ClearFlag(permissionFlags, PF_ISIMPLICIT);
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistforcerelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY)) NetPermissions::AddFlag(permissionFlags, PF_FORCERELAY);
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY)) NetPermissions::AddFlag(permissionFlags, PF_RELAY);
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
NetPermissions::AddFlag(permissionFlags, PF_MEMPOOL);
NetPermissions::AddFlag(permissionFlags, PF_NOBAN);
legacyWhitelisted = true;
}
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->fInbound) {
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
nInbound++;
if (!pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash().IsNull()) {
nVerifiedInboundMasternodes++;
}
}
}
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
if (hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET)
{
int nErr = WSAGetLastError();
if (nErr != WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
LogPrintf("socket error accept failed: %s\n", NetworkErrorString(nErr));
return;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
std::string strDropped;
if (fLogIPs) {
strDropped = strprintf("connection from %s dropped", addr.ToString());
} else {
strDropped = "connection dropped";
}
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 3 (#1617) * Merge #8996: Network activity toggle 19f46f1 Qt: New network_disabled icon (Luke Dashjr) 54cf997 RPC/Net: Use boolean consistently for networkactive, and remove from getinfo (Luke Dashjr) b2b33d9 Overhaul network activity toggle (Jonas Schnelli) 32efa79 Qt: Add GUI feedback and control of network activity state. (Jon Lund Steffensen) e38993b RPC: Add "togglenetwork" method to toggle network activity temporarily (Jon Lund Steffensen) 7c9a98a Allow network activity to be temporarily suspended. (Jon Lund Steffensen) * Revert on-click behavior of network status icon to showing peers list Stay with the way Dash handled clicking on the status icon * Add theme support for network disabled icon * Merge #8874: Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables 1077577 Fix auto-deselection of peers (Andrew Chow) addfdeb Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables (Andrew Chow) * Merge #9190: qt: Plug many memory leaks ed998ea qt: Avoid OpenSSL certstore-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 5204598 qt: Avoid shutdownwindow-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) e4f126a qt: Avoid splash-screen related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 693384e qt: Prevent thread/memory leak on exiting RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 47db075 qt: Plug many memory leaks (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9218: qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon 042f9fa qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 827d9a3 qt: Replace NetworkToggleStatusBarControl with generic ClickableLabel (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9266: Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places df17fe0 Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #9255: qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged f36349e qt: Remove on_toggleNetworkActiveButton_clicked from RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 297cc20 qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Use UniValue until bitcoin PR #8788 is backported Network active toggle was already based on "[RPC] Give RPC commands more information about the RPC request" We need to use the old UniValue style until that one is backported * Merge #8906: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice fafeec3 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8985: Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() 3154d6e [Qt] use NotifyHeaderTip's height and date for the progress update (Jonas Schnelli) 0a261b6 Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9280: [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, allow hiding 89a3723 [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, disabled show() in sync mode (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9461: [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding 40ec7c7 [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9588: qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant fa4d478 qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant (MarcoFalke) * Hide modal overlay forever when syncing has catched up Don't allow to open it again by clicking on the progress bar and spinner icon. Currently the overlay does not show meaningful information about masternode sync and it gives the impression of being stuck after the block chain sync is done. * Don't include chainparams.h in sendcoinsdialog.cpp This was just a remainder of a backported PR which meant to change some calculation in this file which does not apply to Dash. * Also check for fNetworkActive in ConnectNode * Merge #9528: [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) 988d300 [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) (practicalswift) * Merge #11237: qt: Fixing division by zero in time remaining c8d38abd6 Refactor tipUpdate as per style guide (MeshCollider) 3b69a08c5 Fix division by zero in time remaining (MeshCollider) Pull request description: Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10291, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11265 progressDelta may be 0 (or even negative according to 11265), this checks for that and prints unknown if it is, because we cannot calculate an estimate for the time remaining (would be infinite or negative). Tree-SHA512: bc5708e5ed6e4670d008219558c5fbb25709bd99a32c98ec39bb74f94a0b7fa058f3d03389ccdd39e6723e6b5b48e34b13ceee7c051c2db631e51d8ec3e1d68c
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
if (!fNetworkActive) {
LogPrintf("%s: not accepting new connections\n", strDropped);
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 3 (#1617) * Merge #8996: Network activity toggle 19f46f1 Qt: New network_disabled icon (Luke Dashjr) 54cf997 RPC/Net: Use boolean consistently for networkactive, and remove from getinfo (Luke Dashjr) b2b33d9 Overhaul network activity toggle (Jonas Schnelli) 32efa79 Qt: Add GUI feedback and control of network activity state. (Jon Lund Steffensen) e38993b RPC: Add "togglenetwork" method to toggle network activity temporarily (Jon Lund Steffensen) 7c9a98a Allow network activity to be temporarily suspended. (Jon Lund Steffensen) * Revert on-click behavior of network status icon to showing peers list Stay with the way Dash handled clicking on the status icon * Add theme support for network disabled icon * Merge #8874: Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables 1077577 Fix auto-deselection of peers (Andrew Chow) addfdeb Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables (Andrew Chow) * Merge #9190: qt: Plug many memory leaks ed998ea qt: Avoid OpenSSL certstore-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 5204598 qt: Avoid shutdownwindow-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) e4f126a qt: Avoid splash-screen related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 693384e qt: Prevent thread/memory leak on exiting RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 47db075 qt: Plug many memory leaks (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9218: qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon 042f9fa qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 827d9a3 qt: Replace NetworkToggleStatusBarControl with generic ClickableLabel (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9266: Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places df17fe0 Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #9255: qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged f36349e qt: Remove on_toggleNetworkActiveButton_clicked from RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 297cc20 qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Use UniValue until bitcoin PR #8788 is backported Network active toggle was already based on "[RPC] Give RPC commands more information about the RPC request" We need to use the old UniValue style until that one is backported * Merge #8906: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice fafeec3 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8985: Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() 3154d6e [Qt] use NotifyHeaderTip's height and date for the progress update (Jonas Schnelli) 0a261b6 Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9280: [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, allow hiding 89a3723 [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, disabled show() in sync mode (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9461: [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding 40ec7c7 [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9588: qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant fa4d478 qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant (MarcoFalke) * Hide modal overlay forever when syncing has catched up Don't allow to open it again by clicking on the progress bar and spinner icon. Currently the overlay does not show meaningful information about masternode sync and it gives the impression of being stuck after the block chain sync is done. * Don't include chainparams.h in sendcoinsdialog.cpp This was just a remainder of a backported PR which meant to change some calculation in this file which does not apply to Dash. * Also check for fNetworkActive in ConnectNode * Merge #9528: [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) 988d300 [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) (practicalswift) * Merge #11237: qt: Fixing division by zero in time remaining c8d38abd6 Refactor tipUpdate as per style guide (MeshCollider) 3b69a08c5 Fix division by zero in time remaining (MeshCollider) Pull request description: Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10291, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11265 progressDelta may be 0 (or even negative according to 11265), this checks for that and prints unknown if it is, because we cannot calculate an estimate for the time remaining (would be infinite or negative). Tree-SHA512: bc5708e5ed6e4670d008219558c5fbb25709bd99a32c98ec39bb74f94a0b7fa058f3d03389ccdd39e6723e6b5b48e34b13ceee7c051c2db631e51d8ec3e1d68c
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
CloseSocket(hSocket);
return;
}
if (!IsSelectableSocket(hSocket))
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{
LogPrintf("%s: non-selectable socket\n", strDropped);
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CloseSocket(hSocket);
return;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
// According to the internet TCP_NODELAY is not carried into accepted sockets
// on all platforms. Set it again here just to be sure.
SetSocketNoDelay(hSocket);
// Don't accept connections from banned peers.
bool banned = m_banman->IsBanned(addr);
if (!NetPermissions::HasFlag(permissionFlags, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NOBAN) && banned)
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{
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s (banned)\n", strDropped);
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CloseSocket(hSocket);
return;
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
// Only accept connections from discouraged peers if our inbound slots aren't (almost) full.
bool discouraged = m_banman->IsDiscouraged(addr);
if (!NetPermissions::HasFlag(permissionFlags, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NOBAN) && nInbound + 1 >= nMaxInbound && discouraged)
{
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "connection from %s dropped (discouraged)\n", addr.ToString());
CloseSocket(hSocket);
return;
}
// Evict connections until we are below nMaxInbound. In case eviction protection resulted in nodes to not be evicted
// before, they might get evicted in batches now (after the protection timeout).
// We don't evict verified MN connections and also don't take them into account when checking limits. We can do this
// because we know that such connections are naturally limited by the total number of MNs, so this is not usable
// for attacks.
while (nInbound - nVerifiedInboundMasternodes >= nMaxInbound)
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{
if (!AttemptToEvictConnection()) {
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// No connection to evict, disconnect the new connection
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to find an eviction candidate - connection dropped (full)\n");
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CloseSocket(hSocket);
return;
}
nInbound--;
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}
// don't accept incoming connections until blockchain is synced
if(fMasternodeMode && !masternodeSync.IsBlockchainSynced()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "AcceptConnection -- blockchain is not synced yet, skipping inbound connection attempt\n");
CloseSocket(hSocket);
return;
}
NodeId id = GetNewNodeId();
uint64_t nonce = GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_LOCALHOSTNONCE).Write(id).Finalize();
CAddress addr_bind = GetBindAddress(hSocket);
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
ServiceFlags nodeServices = nLocalServices;
if (NetPermissions::HasFlag(permissionFlags, PF_BLOOMFILTER)) {
nodeServices = static_cast<ServiceFlags>(nodeServices | NODE_BLOOM);
}
CNode* pnode = new CNode(id, nodeServices, GetBestHeight(), hSocket, addr, CalculateKeyedNetGroup(addr), nonce, addr_bind, "", true);
pnode->AddRef();
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
pnode->m_permissionFlags = permissionFlags;
// If this flag is present, the user probably expect that RPC and QT report it as whitelisted (backward compatibility)
pnode->m_legacyWhitelisted = legacyWhitelisted;
pnode->m_prefer_evict = discouraged;
m_msgproc->InitializeNode(pnode);
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
if (fLogIPs) {
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "connection from %s accepted, sock=%d, peer=%d\n", addr.ToString(), hSocket, pnode->GetId());
} else {
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "connection accepted, sock=%d, peer=%d\n", hSocket, pnode->GetId());
}
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
vNodes.push_back(pnode);
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
mapSocketToNode.emplace(hSocket, pnode);
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
RegisterEvents(pnode);
WakeSelect();
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
// We received a new connection, harvest entropy from the time (and our peer count)
RandAddEvent((uint32_t)id);
2015-08-13 11:00:10 +02:00
}
void CConnman::DisconnectNodes()
{
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
if (!fNetworkActive) {
// Disconnect any connected nodes
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (!pnode->fDisconnect) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Network not active, dropping peer=%d\n", pnode->GetId());
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
}
}
}
// Disconnect unused nodes
for (auto it = vNodes.begin(); it != vNodes.end(); )
{
CNode* pnode = *it;
if (pnode->fDisconnect)
{
// If we were the ones who initiated the disconnect, we must assume that the other side wants to see
// pending messages. If the other side initiated the disconnect (or disconnected after we've shutdown
// the socket), we can be pretty sure that they are not interested in any pending messages anymore and
// thus can immediately close the socket.
if (!pnode->fOtherSideDisconnected) {
if (pnode->nDisconnectLingerTime == 0) {
// let's not immediately close the socket but instead wait for at least 100ms so that there is a
// chance to flush all/some pending data. Otherwise the other side might not receive REJECT messages
// that were pushed right before setting fDisconnect=true
// Flushing must happen in two places to ensure data can be received by the other side:
// 1. vSendMsg must be empty and all messages sent via send(). This is ensured by SocketHandler()
// being called before DisconnectNodes and also by the linger time
// 2. Internal socket send buffers must be flushed. This is ensured solely by the linger time
pnode->nDisconnectLingerTime = GetTimeMillis() + 100;
}
if (GetTimeMillis() < pnode->nDisconnectLingerTime) {
// everything flushed to the kernel?
if (!pnode->fSocketShutdown && pnode->nSendMsgSize == 0) {
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
if (pnode->hSocket != INVALID_SOCKET) {
// Give the other side a chance to detect the disconnect as early as possible (recv() will return 0)
::shutdown(pnode->hSocket, SD_SEND);
}
pnode->fSocketShutdown = true;
}
++it;
continue;
}
}
if (fLogIPs) {
LogPrintf("ThreadSocketHandler -- removing node: peer=%d addr=%s nRefCount=%d fInbound=%d m_masternode_connection=%d m_masternode_iqr_connection=%d\n",
pnode->GetId(), pnode->addr.ToString(), pnode->GetRefCount(), pnode->fInbound, pnode->m_masternode_connection, pnode->m_masternode_iqr_connection);
} else {
LogPrintf("ThreadSocketHandler -- removing node: peer=%d nRefCount=%d fInbound=%d m_masternode_connection=%d m_masternode_iqr_connection=%d\n",
pnode->GetId(), pnode->GetRefCount(), pnode->fInbound, pnode->m_masternode_connection, pnode->m_masternode_iqr_connection);
}
// remove from vNodes
it = vNodes.erase(it);
// release outbound grant (if any)
pnode->grantOutbound.Release();
// close socket and cleanup
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect(this);
// hold in disconnected pool until all refs are released
pnode->Release();
vNodesDisconnected.push_back(pnode);
} else {
++it;
}
}
}
{
// Delete disconnected nodes
std::list<CNode*> vNodesDisconnectedCopy = vNodesDisconnected;
for (auto it = vNodesDisconnected.begin(); it != vNodesDisconnected.end(); )
{
CNode* pnode = *it;
// wait until threads are done using it
bool fDelete = false;
if (pnode->GetRefCount() <= 0) {
{
TRY_LOCK(pnode->cs_inventory, lockInv);
if (lockInv) {
TRY_LOCK(pnode->cs_vSend, lockSend);
if (lockSend) {
fDelete = true;
}
}
}
if (fDelete) {
it = vNodesDisconnected.erase(it);
DeleteNode(pnode);
}
}
if (!fDelete) {
++it;
}
}
}
}
void CConnman::NotifyNumConnectionsChanged()
{
size_t vNodesSize;
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
vNodesSize = vNodes.size();
}
masternode|net|rpc: Improve masternode sync process (#3690) * masternode: Replace sync states INITIAL and WAITING with BLOCKCHAIN * masternode: Peer dependent "assume tip" timeout I would say its enough to only wait 1 tick if we have more than 3 peers before we move over to governance sync. * masternode: Notify the UI instantly if switched to governance sync Without this it takes one iteration more for the UI to receive the update. * masternode: Notify the UI about CMasternodeSync::Reset calls * masternode: Don't instantly reset the sync process Give it MASTERNODE_SYNC_RESET_SECONDS (600) seconds time after the last UpdateBlockTip call. * rpc: Don't switch to next asset in "mnsync reset" * rpc: Force the reset in "mnsync reset" * net: Make sure the sync gets a reset if required after network changes This will reset the sync process if its outdated in the following cases: - If the connections dropped to zero - If the connections went from zero to one - If the network has been enabled or disabled * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com> * net: Only open masternode connections if the blockchain is synced In general it doesn't make sense to connect to masternodes before due to MNAUTH requires blockchain sync. This could lead to failing quorum connections/failing masternode probing.. if a just restarted node/a out of sync node would hit a dkg block.. Then they would not try to open those llmq/probing connections for the next 60s (nLLMQConnectionRetryTimeout). Thats basically what happens in tests right now and they fail without this commit. * test: Make sure nodes are synced when they get restored after isolation Their sync might be out of date otherwise due to bigger mocktime bumps Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-09-11 14:07:34 +02:00
// If we had zero connections before and new connections now or if we just dropped
// to zero connections reset the sync process if its outdated.
if ((vNodesSize > 0 && nPrevNodeCount == 0) || (vNodesSize == 0 && nPrevNodeCount > 0)) {
masternodeSync.Reset();
}
if(vNodesSize != nPrevNodeCount) {
nPrevNodeCount = vNodesSize;
if(clientInterface)
clientInterface->NotifyNumConnectionsChanged(vNodesSize);
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
CalculateNumConnectionsChangedStats();
}
}
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
void CConnman::CalculateNumConnectionsChangedStats()
{
if (!gArgs.GetBoolArg("-statsenabled", DEFAULT_STATSD_ENABLE)) {
return;
}
// count various node attributes for statsD
int fullNodes = 0;
int spvNodes = 0;
int inboundNodes = 0;
int outboundNodes = 0;
int ipv4Nodes = 0;
int ipv6Nodes = 0;
int torNodes = 0;
mapMsgCmdSize mapRecvBytesMsgStats;
mapMsgCmdSize mapSentBytesMsgStats;
for (const std::string &msg : getAllNetMessageTypes()) {
mapRecvBytesMsgStats[msg] = 0;
mapSentBytesMsgStats[msg] = 0;
}
mapRecvBytesMsgStats[NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER] = 0;
mapSentBytesMsgStats[NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER] = 0;
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
auto vNodesCopy = CopyNodeVector(CConnman::FullyConnectedOnly);
for (auto pnode : vNodesCopy) {
LOCK(pnode->cs_vRecv);
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
for (const mapMsgCmdSize::value_type &i : pnode->mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd)
mapRecvBytesMsgStats[i.first] += i.second;
for (const mapMsgCmdSize::value_type &i : pnode->mapSendBytesPerMsgCmd)
mapSentBytesMsgStats[i.first] += i.second;
if(pnode->fClient)
spvNodes++;
else
fullNodes++;
if(pnode->fInbound)
inboundNodes++;
else
outboundNodes++;
if(pnode->addr.IsIPv4())
ipv4Nodes++;
if(pnode->addr.IsIPv6())
ipv6Nodes++;
if(pnode->addr.IsTor())
torNodes++;
if(pnode->nPingUsecTime > 0)
statsClient.timing("peers.ping_us", pnode->nPingUsecTime, 1.0f);
}
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
ReleaseNodeVector(vNodesCopy);
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
for (const std::string &msg : getAllNetMessageTypes()) {
statsClient.gauge("bandwidth.message." + msg + ".totalBytesReceived", mapRecvBytesMsgStats[msg], 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("bandwidth.message." + msg + ".totalBytesSent", mapSentBytesMsgStats[msg], 1.0f);
}
statsClient.gauge("peers.totalConnections", nPrevNodeCount, 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("peers.spvNodeConnections", spvNodes, 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("peers.fullNodeConnections", fullNodes, 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("peers.inboundConnections", inboundNodes, 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("peers.outboundConnections", outboundNodes, 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("peers.ipv4Connections", ipv4Nodes, 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("peers.ipv6Connections", ipv6Nodes, 1.0f);
statsClient.gauge("peers.torConnections", torNodes, 1.0f);
}
void CConnman::InactivityCheck(CNode *pnode)
{
int64_t nTime = GetSystemTimeInSeconds();
Merge #14733: P2P: Make peer timeout configurable, speed up very slow test and ensure correct code path tested. 48b37db50 make peertimeout a debug argument, remove error message translation (Zain Iqbal Allarakhia) 8042bbfbf p2p: allow p2ptimeout to be configurable, speed up slow test (Zain Iqbal Allarakhia) Pull request description: **Summary:** 1. _Primary_: Adds a `debug_only=true` flag for peertimeout, defaults to 60 sec., the current hard-coded setting. 2. _Secondary_: Drastically speeds up `p2p_timeout.py` test. 3. _Secondary_: Tests that the correct code path is being tested by adding log assertions to the test. **Rationale:** - P2P timeout was hard-coded: make it explicitly specified and configurable, instead of a magic number. - Addresses #13518; `p2p_timeout.py` takes 4 sec. to run instead of 61 sec. - Makes `p2p_timeout.py` more explicit. Previously, we relied on a comment to inform us of the timeout amount being tested. Now it is specified directly in the test via passing in the new arg; `-peertimeout=3`. - Opens us up to testing more P2P scenarios; oftentimes slow tests are the reason we don't test. **Locally verified changes:** _With Proposed Change (4.7 sec.):_ ``` $ time ./test/functional/p2p_timeouts.py 2018-11-19T00:04:19.077000Z TestFramework (INFO): Initializing test directory /tmp/testhja7g2n7 2018-11-19T00:04:23.479000Z TestFramework (INFO): Stopping nodes 2018-11-19T00:04:23.683000Z TestFramework (INFO): Cleaning up /tmp/testhja7g2n7 on exit 2018-11-19T00:04:23.683000Z TestFramework (INFO): Tests successful real 0m4.743s ``` _Currently on master (62.8 sec.):_ ``` $ time ./test/functional/p2p_timeouts.py 2018-11-19T00:06:10.948000Z TestFramework (INFO): Initializing test directory /tmp/test6mo6k21h 2018-11-19T00:07:13.376000Z TestFramework (INFO): Stopping nodes 2018-11-19T00:07:13.631000Z TestFramework (INFO): Cleaning up /tmp/test6mo6k21h on exit 2018-11-19T00:07:13.631000Z TestFramework (INFO): Tests successful real 1m2.836s ``` _Error message demonstrated for new argument `-peertimeout`:_ ``` $ ./bitcoind -peertimeout=-5 ... Error: peertimeout cannot be configured with a negative value. ``` Tree-SHA512: ff7a244ebea54c4059407bf4fb86465714e6a79cef5d2bcaa22cfe831a81761aaf597ba4d5172fc2ec12266f54712216fc41b5d24849e5d9dab39ba6f09e3a2a
2018-12-04 12:06:35 +01:00
if (nTime - pnode->nTimeConnected > m_peer_connect_timeout)
{
if (pnode->nLastRecv == 0 || pnode->nLastSend == 0)
{
Merge #14733: P2P: Make peer timeout configurable, speed up very slow test and ensure correct code path tested. 48b37db50 make peertimeout a debug argument, remove error message translation (Zain Iqbal Allarakhia) 8042bbfbf p2p: allow p2ptimeout to be configurable, speed up slow test (Zain Iqbal Allarakhia) Pull request description: **Summary:** 1. _Primary_: Adds a `debug_only=true` flag for peertimeout, defaults to 60 sec., the current hard-coded setting. 2. _Secondary_: Drastically speeds up `p2p_timeout.py` test. 3. _Secondary_: Tests that the correct code path is being tested by adding log assertions to the test. **Rationale:** - P2P timeout was hard-coded: make it explicitly specified and configurable, instead of a magic number. - Addresses #13518; `p2p_timeout.py` takes 4 sec. to run instead of 61 sec. - Makes `p2p_timeout.py` more explicit. Previously, we relied on a comment to inform us of the timeout amount being tested. Now it is specified directly in the test via passing in the new arg; `-peertimeout=3`. - Opens us up to testing more P2P scenarios; oftentimes slow tests are the reason we don't test. **Locally verified changes:** _With Proposed Change (4.7 sec.):_ ``` $ time ./test/functional/p2p_timeouts.py 2018-11-19T00:04:19.077000Z TestFramework (INFO): Initializing test directory /tmp/testhja7g2n7 2018-11-19T00:04:23.479000Z TestFramework (INFO): Stopping nodes 2018-11-19T00:04:23.683000Z TestFramework (INFO): Cleaning up /tmp/testhja7g2n7 on exit 2018-11-19T00:04:23.683000Z TestFramework (INFO): Tests successful real 0m4.743s ``` _Currently on master (62.8 sec.):_ ``` $ time ./test/functional/p2p_timeouts.py 2018-11-19T00:06:10.948000Z TestFramework (INFO): Initializing test directory /tmp/test6mo6k21h 2018-11-19T00:07:13.376000Z TestFramework (INFO): Stopping nodes 2018-11-19T00:07:13.631000Z TestFramework (INFO): Cleaning up /tmp/test6mo6k21h on exit 2018-11-19T00:07:13.631000Z TestFramework (INFO): Tests successful real 1m2.836s ``` _Error message demonstrated for new argument `-peertimeout`:_ ``` $ ./bitcoind -peertimeout=-5 ... Error: peertimeout cannot be configured with a negative value. ``` Tree-SHA512: ff7a244ebea54c4059407bf4fb86465714e6a79cef5d2bcaa22cfe831a81761aaf597ba4d5172fc2ec12266f54712216fc41b5d24849e5d9dab39ba6f09e3a2a
2018-12-04 12:06:35 +01:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "socket no message in first %i seconds, %d %d from %d\n", m_peer_connect_timeout, pnode->nLastRecv != 0, pnode->nLastSend != 0, pnode->GetId());
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
}
else if (nTime - pnode->nLastSend > TIMEOUT_INTERVAL)
{
LogPrintf("socket sending timeout: %is\n", nTime - pnode->nLastSend);
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
}
else if (nTime - pnode->nLastRecv > TIMEOUT_INTERVAL)
{
LogPrintf("socket receive timeout: %is\n", nTime - pnode->nLastRecv);
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
}
else if (pnode->nPingNonceSent && pnode->nPingUsecStart + TIMEOUT_INTERVAL * 1000000 < GetTimeMicros())
{
LogPrintf("ping timeout: %fs\n", 0.000001 * (GetTimeMicros() - pnode->nPingUsecStart));
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
}
else if (!pnode->fSuccessfullyConnected)
{
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "version handshake timeout from %d\n", pnode->GetId());
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
}
}
}
bool CConnman::GenerateSelectSet(std::set<SOCKET> &recv_set, std::set<SOCKET> &send_set, std::set<SOCKET> &error_set)
{
for (const ListenSocket& hListenSocket : vhListenSocket) {
recv_set.insert(hListenSocket.socket);
}
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes)
{
bool select_recv = !pnode->fHasRecvData;
bool select_send = !pnode->fCanSendData;
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
if (pnode->hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET)
continue;
error_set.insert(pnode->hSocket);
if (select_send) {
send_set.insert(pnode->hSocket);
}
if (select_recv) {
recv_set.insert(pnode->hSocket);
}
}
}
#ifdef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
// We add a pipe to the read set so that the select() call can be woken up from the outside
// This is done when data is added to send buffers (vSendMsg) or when new peers are added
// This is currently only implemented for POSIX compliant systems. This means that Windows will fall back to
// timing out after 50ms and then trying to send. This is ok as we assume that heavy-load daemons are usually
// run on Linux and friends.
recv_set.insert(wakeupPipe[0]);
#endif
return !recv_set.empty() || !send_set.empty() || !error_set.empty();
}
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
void CConnman::SocketEventsKqueue(std::set<SOCKET> &recv_set, std::set<SOCKET> &send_set, std::set<SOCKET> &error_set, bool fOnlyPoll)
{
const size_t maxEvents = 64;
struct kevent events[maxEvents];
struct timespec timeout;
timeout.tv_sec = fOnlyPoll ? 0 : SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS / 1000;
timeout.tv_nsec = (fOnlyPoll ? 0 : SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS % 1000) * 1000 * 1000;
wakeupSelectNeeded = true;
int n = kevent(kqueuefd, nullptr, 0, events, maxEvents, &timeout);
wakeupSelectNeeded = false;
if (n == -1) {
LogPrintf("kevent wait error\n");
} else if (n > 0) {
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
auto& event = events[i];
if ((event.flags & EV_ERROR) || (event.flags & EV_EOF)) {
error_set.insert((SOCKET)event.ident);
continue;
}
if (event.filter == EVFILT_READ) {
recv_set.insert((SOCKET)event.ident);
}
if (event.filter == EVFILT_WRITE) {
send_set.insert((SOCKET)event.ident);
}
}
}
}
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
void CConnman::SocketEventsEpoll(std::set<SOCKET> &recv_set, std::set<SOCKET> &send_set, std::set<SOCKET> &error_set, bool fOnlyPoll)
{
const size_t maxEvents = 64;
epoll_event events[maxEvents];
wakeupSelectNeeded = true;
int n = epoll_wait(epollfd, events, maxEvents, fOnlyPoll ? 0 : SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS);
wakeupSelectNeeded = false;
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
auto& e = events[i];
if((e.events & EPOLLERR) || (e.events & EPOLLHUP)) {
error_set.insert((SOCKET)e.data.fd);
continue;
}
if (e.events & EPOLLIN) {
recv_set.insert((SOCKET)e.data.fd);
}
if (e.events & EPOLLOUT) {
send_set.insert((SOCKET)e.data.fd);
}
}
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_POLL
void CConnman::SocketEventsPoll(std::set<SOCKET> &recv_set, std::set<SOCKET> &send_set, std::set<SOCKET> &error_set, bool fOnlyPoll)
{
std::set<SOCKET> recv_select_set, send_select_set, error_select_set;
if (!GenerateSelectSet(recv_select_set, send_select_set, error_select_set)) {
if (!fOnlyPoll) interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS));
return;
}
std::unordered_map<SOCKET, struct pollfd> pollfds;
for (SOCKET socket_id : recv_select_set) {
pollfds[socket_id].fd = socket_id;
pollfds[socket_id].events |= POLLIN;
}
for (SOCKET socket_id : send_select_set) {
pollfds[socket_id].fd = socket_id;
pollfds[socket_id].events |= POLLOUT;
}
for (SOCKET socket_id : error_select_set) {
pollfds[socket_id].fd = socket_id;
// These flags are ignored, but we set them for clarity
pollfds[socket_id].events |= POLLERR|POLLHUP;
}
std::vector<struct pollfd> vpollfds;
vpollfds.reserve(pollfds.size());
for (auto it : pollfds) {
vpollfds.push_back(std::move(it.second));
}
wakeupSelectNeeded = true;
int r = poll(vpollfds.data(), vpollfds.size(), fOnlyPoll ? 0 : SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS);
wakeupSelectNeeded = false;
if (r < 0) {
return;
}
if (interruptNet) return;
for (struct pollfd pollfd_entry : vpollfds) {
if (pollfd_entry.revents & POLLIN) recv_set.insert(pollfd_entry.fd);
if (pollfd_entry.revents & POLLOUT) send_set.insert(pollfd_entry.fd);
if (pollfd_entry.revents & (POLLERR|POLLHUP)) error_set.insert(pollfd_entry.fd);
}
}
#endif
void CConnman::SocketEventsSelect(std::set<SOCKET> &recv_set, std::set<SOCKET> &send_set, std::set<SOCKET> &error_set, bool fOnlyPoll)
{
std::set<SOCKET> recv_select_set, send_select_set, error_select_set;
if (!GenerateSelectSet(recv_select_set, send_select_set, error_select_set)) {
interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS));
return;
}
//
// Find which sockets have data to receive
//
struct timeval timeout;
timeout.tv_sec = 0;
timeout.tv_usec = fOnlyPoll ? 0 : SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS * 1000; // frequency to poll pnode->vSend
fd_set fdsetRecv;
fd_set fdsetSend;
fd_set fdsetError;
FD_ZERO(&fdsetRecv);
FD_ZERO(&fdsetSend);
FD_ZERO(&fdsetError);
SOCKET hSocketMax = 0;
for (SOCKET hSocket : recv_select_set) {
FD_SET(hSocket, &fdsetRecv);
hSocketMax = std::max(hSocketMax, hSocket);
}
for (SOCKET hSocket : send_select_set) {
FD_SET(hSocket, &fdsetSend);
hSocketMax = std::max(hSocketMax, hSocket);
}
for (SOCKET hSocket : error_select_set) {
FD_SET(hSocket, &fdsetError);
hSocketMax = std::max(hSocketMax, hSocket);
}
wakeupSelectNeeded = true;
int nSelect = select(hSocketMax + 1, &fdsetRecv, &fdsetSend, &fdsetError, &timeout);
wakeupSelectNeeded = false;
if (interruptNet)
return;
if (nSelect == SOCKET_ERROR)
{
int nErr = WSAGetLastError();
LogPrintf("socket select error %s\n", NetworkErrorString(nErr));
for (unsigned int i = 0; i <= hSocketMax; i++)
FD_SET(i, &fdsetRecv);
FD_ZERO(&fdsetSend);
FD_ZERO(&fdsetError);
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(SELECT_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS)))
return;
}
for (SOCKET hSocket : recv_select_set) {
if (FD_ISSET(hSocket, &fdsetRecv)) {
recv_set.insert(hSocket);
}
}
for (SOCKET hSocket : send_select_set) {
if (FD_ISSET(hSocket, &fdsetSend)) {
send_set.insert(hSocket);
}
}
for (SOCKET hSocket : error_select_set) {
if (FD_ISSET(hSocket, &fdsetError)) {
error_set.insert(hSocket);
}
}
}
void CConnman::SocketEvents(std::set<SOCKET> &recv_set, std::set<SOCKET> &send_set, std::set<SOCKET> &error_set, bool fOnlyPoll)
{
switch (socketEventsMode) {
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
case SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE:
SocketEventsKqueue(recv_set, send_set, error_set, fOnlyPoll);
break;
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
case SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL:
SocketEventsEpoll(recv_set, send_set, error_set, fOnlyPoll);
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_POLL
case SOCKETEVENTS_POLL:
SocketEventsPoll(recv_set, send_set, error_set, fOnlyPoll);
break;
#endif
case SOCKETEVENTS_SELECT:
SocketEventsSelect(recv_set, send_set, error_set, fOnlyPoll);
break;
default:
assert(false);
}
}
void CConnman::SocketHandler()
{
bool fOnlyPoll = false;
{
// check if we have work to do and thus should avoid waiting for events
LOCK2(cs_vNodes, cs_mapNodesWithDataToSend);
if (!mapReceivableNodes.empty()) {
fOnlyPoll = true;
} else if (!mapSendableNodes.empty() && !mapNodesWithDataToSend.empty()) {
// we must check if at least one of the nodes with pending messages is also sendable, as otherwise a single
// node would be able to make the network thread busy with polling
for (auto& p : mapNodesWithDataToSend) {
if (mapSendableNodes.count(p.first)) {
fOnlyPoll = true;
break;
}
}
}
}
std::set<SOCKET> recv_set, send_set, error_set;
SocketEvents(recv_set, send_set, error_set, fOnlyPoll);
#ifdef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
// drain the wakeup pipe
if (recv_set.count(wakeupPipe[0])) {
char buf[128];
while (true) {
int r = read(wakeupPipe[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
if (r <= 0) {
break;
}
}
}
#endif
if (interruptNet) return;
//
// Accept new connections
//
for (const ListenSocket& hListenSocket : vhListenSocket)
{
if (hListenSocket.socket != INVALID_SOCKET && recv_set.count(hListenSocket.socket) > 0)
{
AcceptConnection(hListenSocket);
}
}
std::vector<CNode*> vErrorNodes;
std::vector<CNode*> vReceivableNodes;
std::vector<CNode*> vSendableNodes;
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (auto hSocket : error_set) {
auto it = mapSocketToNode.find(hSocket);
if (it == mapSocketToNode.end()) {
continue;
}
it->second->AddRef();
vErrorNodes.emplace_back(it->second);
}
for (auto hSocket : recv_set) {
if (error_set.count(hSocket)) {
// no need to handle it twice
continue;
}
auto it = mapSocketToNode.find(hSocket);
if (it == mapSocketToNode.end()) {
continue;
}
auto jt = mapReceivableNodes.emplace(it->second->GetId(), it->second);
assert(jt.first->second == it->second);
it->second->fHasRecvData = true;
}
for (auto hSocket : send_set) {
auto it = mapSocketToNode.find(hSocket);
if (it == mapSocketToNode.end()) {
continue;
}
auto jt = mapSendableNodes.emplace(it->second->GetId(), it->second);
assert(jt.first->second == it->second);
it->second->fCanSendData = true;
}
// collect nodes that have a receivable socket
// also clean up mapReceivableNodes from nodes that were receivable in the last iteration but aren't anymore
vReceivableNodes.reserve(mapReceivableNodes.size());
for (auto it = mapReceivableNodes.begin(); it != mapReceivableNodes.end(); ) {
if (!it->second->fHasRecvData) {
it = mapReceivableNodes.erase(it);
} else {
// Implement the following logic:
// * If there is data to send, try sending data. As this only
// happens when optimistic write failed, we choose to first drain the
// write buffer in this case before receiving more. This avoids
// needlessly queueing received data, if the remote peer is not themselves
// receiving data. This means properly utilizing TCP flow control signalling.
// * Otherwise, if there is space left in the receive buffer (!fPauseRecv), try
// receiving data (which should succeed as the socket signalled as receivable).
if (!it->second->fPauseRecv && it->second->nSendMsgSize == 0 && !it->second->fDisconnect) {
it->second->AddRef();
vReceivableNodes.emplace_back(it->second);
}
++it;
}
}
// collect nodes that have data to send and have a socket with non-empty write buffers
// also clean up mapNodesWithDataToSend from nodes that had messages to send in the last iteration
// but don't have any in this iteration
LOCK(cs_mapNodesWithDataToSend);
vSendableNodes.reserve(mapNodesWithDataToSend.size());
for (auto it = mapNodesWithDataToSend.begin(); it != mapNodesWithDataToSend.end(); ) {
if (it->second->nSendMsgSize == 0) {
// See comment in PushMessage
it->second->Release();
it = mapNodesWithDataToSend.erase(it);
} else {
if (it->second->fCanSendData) {
it->second->AddRef();
vSendableNodes.emplace_back(it->second);
}
++it;
}
}
}
for (CNode* pnode : vErrorNodes)
{
if (interruptNet) {
break;
}
// let recv() return errors and then handle it
SocketRecvData(pnode);
}
for (CNode* pnode : vReceivableNodes)
{
if (interruptNet) {
break;
}
if (pnode->fPauseRecv) {
continue;
}
SocketRecvData(pnode);
}
for (CNode* pnode : vSendableNodes) {
if (interruptNet) {
break;
}
LOCK(pnode->cs_vSend);
size_t nBytes = SocketSendData(pnode);
if (nBytes) {
RecordBytesSent(nBytes);
}
}
ReleaseNodeVector(vErrorNodes);
ReleaseNodeVector(vReceivableNodes);
ReleaseNodeVector(vSendableNodes);
if (interruptNet) {
return;
}
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
// remove nodes from mapSendableNodes, so that the next iteration knows that there is no work to do
// (even if there are pending messages to be sent)
for (auto it = mapSendableNodes.begin(); it != mapSendableNodes.end(); ) {
if (!it->second->fCanSendData) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s -- remove mapSendableNodes, peer=%d\n", __func__, it->second->GetId());
it = mapSendableNodes.erase(it);
} else {
++it;
}
}
}
}
size_t CConnman::SocketRecvData(CNode *pnode)
{
// typical socket buffer is 8K-64K
char pchBuf[0x10000];
int nBytes = 0;
{
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
if (pnode->hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET)
return 0;
nBytes = recv(pnode->hSocket, pchBuf, sizeof(pchBuf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (nBytes < (int)sizeof(pchBuf)) {
pnode->fHasRecvData = false;
}
}
if (nBytes > 0)
{
bool notify = false;
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
if (!pnode->ReceiveMsgBytes(pchBuf, nBytes, notify)) {
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect(this);
}
RecordBytesRecv(nBytes);
if (notify) {
size_t nSizeAdded = 0;
auto it(pnode->vRecvMsg.begin());
for (; it != pnode->vRecvMsg.end(); ++it) {
// vRecvMsg contains only completed CNetMessage
// the single possible partially deserialized message are held by TransportDeserializer
nSizeAdded += it->m_raw_message_size;
}
{
LOCK(pnode->cs_vProcessMsg);
pnode->vProcessMsg.splice(pnode->vProcessMsg.end(), pnode->vRecvMsg, pnode->vRecvMsg.begin(), it);
pnode->nProcessQueueSize += nSizeAdded;
pnode->fPauseRecv = pnode->nProcessQueueSize > nReceiveFloodSize;
}
WakeMessageHandler();
}
}
else if (nBytes == 0)
{
// socket closed gracefully
if (!pnode->fDisconnect) {
Merge #17251: net: SocketHandler logs peer id for close and disconnect 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46 [net] SocketHandler: log peer id for close and disconnect (Sjors Provoost) Pull request description: When combined with `-logips` this makes it easier to diagnose disconnects. To test on macOS, find a connection you want to disrupt: ``` lsof -nP -iTCP:8333 -sTCP:ESTABLISHED ``` To shut it down gracefully you can use tcpkill or this Python script: https://github.com/google/tcp_killer The log should say: ``` 2019-10-25T13:26:55Z socket closed for peer=1 2019-10-25T13:26:55Z disconnecting peer=1 2019-10-25T13:26:55Z Cleared nodestate for peer=1 ``` To shut it down ungracefully I made a patch to the above script, adding a `-force` argument. _Careful, this may result in data corruption_. Then the log should say: ``` 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z socket select error Bad file descriptor (9) 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z socket recv error for peer=0: Bad file descriptor (9) 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z disconnecting peer=0 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z Socket close failed: 35. Error: Bad file descriptor (9) 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z Cleared nodestate for peer=0 ``` ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: unsigned ACK 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46 TheBlueMatt: unsigned ACK 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46 LGTM! theuni: unsigned ACK 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46. Tree-SHA512: 415313908484f97ffe11a48b4ed6afab3ab0be660c788adb9ad975f88b69aa1cfd5ccbe5859350cdf19ef8fde191fd530fb22cef34e70638defdc9f3d761c71d
2019-10-25 20:56:10 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "socket closed for peer=%d\n", pnode->GetId());
}
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
pnode->fOtherSideDisconnected = true; // avoid lingering
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect(this);
}
else if (nBytes < 0)
{
// error
int nErr = WSAGetLastError();
if (nErr != WSAEWOULDBLOCK && nErr != WSAEMSGSIZE && nErr != WSAEINTR && nErr != WSAEINPROGRESS)
{
Merge #17251: net: SocketHandler logs peer id for close and disconnect 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46 [net] SocketHandler: log peer id for close and disconnect (Sjors Provoost) Pull request description: When combined with `-logips` this makes it easier to diagnose disconnects. To test on macOS, find a connection you want to disrupt: ``` lsof -nP -iTCP:8333 -sTCP:ESTABLISHED ``` To shut it down gracefully you can use tcpkill or this Python script: https://github.com/google/tcp_killer The log should say: ``` 2019-10-25T13:26:55Z socket closed for peer=1 2019-10-25T13:26:55Z disconnecting peer=1 2019-10-25T13:26:55Z Cleared nodestate for peer=1 ``` To shut it down ungracefully I made a patch to the above script, adding a `-force` argument. _Careful, this may result in data corruption_. Then the log should say: ``` 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z socket select error Bad file descriptor (9) 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z socket recv error for peer=0: Bad file descriptor (9) 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z disconnecting peer=0 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z Socket close failed: 35. Error: Bad file descriptor (9) 2019-10-25T13:39:57Z Cleared nodestate for peer=0 ``` ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: unsigned ACK 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46 TheBlueMatt: unsigned ACK 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46 LGTM! theuni: unsigned ACK 04dbdd613fe5c0a742de915e07553614cd4cbf46. Tree-SHA512: 415313908484f97ffe11a48b4ed6afab3ab0be660c788adb9ad975f88b69aa1cfd5ccbe5859350cdf19ef8fde191fd530fb22cef34e70638defdc9f3d761c71d
2019-10-25 20:56:10 +02:00
if (!pnode->fDisconnect){
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "socket recv error for peer=%d: %s\n", pnode->GetId(), NetworkErrorString(nErr));
}
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
pnode->fOtherSideDisconnected = true; // avoid lingering
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect(this);
}
}
if (nBytes < 0) {
return 0;
}
return (size_t)nBytes;
}
void CConnman::ThreadSocketHandler()
{
int64_t nLastCleanupNodes = 0;
while (!interruptNet)
{
// Handle sockets before we do the next round of disconnects. This allows us to flush send buffers one last time
// before actually closing sockets. Receiving is however skipped in case a peer is pending to be disconnected
SocketHandler();
if (GetTimeMillis() - nLastCleanupNodes > 1000) {
ForEachNode(AllNodes, [&](CNode* pnode) {
InactivityCheck(pnode);
});
nLastCleanupNodes = GetTimeMillis();
}
DisconnectNodes();
NotifyNumConnectionsChanged();
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
void CConnman::WakeMessageHandler()
{
{
LOCK(mutexMsgProc);
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
fMsgProcWake = true;
}
condMsgProc.notify_one();
}
void CConnman::WakeSelect()
{
#ifdef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
if (wakeupPipe[1] == -1) {
return;
}
char buf{0};
if (write(wakeupPipe[1], &buf, sizeof(buf)) != 1) {
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "write to wakeupPipe failed\n");
}
#endif
wakeupSelectNeeded = false;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::ThreadDNSAddressSeed()
2011-11-21 18:25:00 +01:00
{
FastRandomContext rng;
std::vector<std::string> seeds = Params().DNSSeeds();
Shuffle(seeds.begin(), seeds.end(), rng);
int seeds_right_now = 0; // Number of seeds left before testing if we have enough connections
int found = 0;
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-forcednsseed", DEFAULT_FORCEDNSSEED)) {
// When -forcednsseed is provided, query all.
seeds_right_now = seeds.size();
}
for (const std::string& seed : seeds) {
// goal: only query DNS seed if address need is acute
// Avoiding DNS seeds when we don't need them improves user privacy by
// creating fewer identifying DNS requests, reduces trust by giving seeds
// less influence on the network topology, and reduces traffic to the seeds.
if (addrman.size() > 0 && seeds_right_now == 0) {
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::seconds(11))) return;
2011-03-09 04:40:50 +01:00
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
int nRelevant = 0;
for (const CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
nRelevant += pnode->fSuccessfullyConnected && !pnode->fFeeler && !pnode->fOneShot && !pnode->m_manual_connection && !pnode->fInbound && !pnode->m_masternode_probe_connection;
}
if (nRelevant >= 2) {
LogPrintf("P2P peers available. Skipped DNS seeding.\n");
return;
}
seeds_right_now += DNSSEEDS_TO_QUERY_AT_ONCE;
}
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
if (interruptNet) {
return;
}
LogPrintf("Loading addresses from DNS seed %s\n", seed);
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
if (HaveNameProxy()) {
AddOneShot(seed);
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
} else {
std::vector<CNetAddr> vIPs;
std::vector<CAddress> vAdd;
Merge #11456: Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. 15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo) 5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo) 57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo) 44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman. Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check for NETWORK|WITNESS. This changes the following: * Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit more from protocol-level logic. * Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler connections (feelers still only require NETWORK). * This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices. * This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to continue using our valuable outbound slots on them. * In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to -connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true of addnodes). * Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the eviction metrics from the same sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring HasRelevantServices. This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement. Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
ServiceFlags requiredServiceBits = GetDesirableServiceFlags(NODE_NONE);
std::string host = strprintf("x%x.%s", requiredServiceBits, seed);
CNetAddr resolveSource;
if (!resolveSource.SetInternal(host)) {
continue;
}
unsigned int nMaxIPs = 256; // Limits number of IPs learned from a DNS seed
if (LookupHost(host.c_str(), vIPs, nMaxIPs, true)) {
for (const CNetAddr& ip : vIPs) {
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
int nOneDay = 24*3600;
CAddress addr = CAddress(CService(ip, Params().GetDefaultPort()), requiredServiceBits);
addr.nTime = GetTime() - 3*nOneDay - rng.randrange(4*nOneDay); // use a random age between 3 and 7 days old
2013-01-30 05:13:17 +01:00
vAdd.push_back(addr);
found++;
}
addrman.Add(vAdd, resolveSource);
} else {
// We now avoid directly using results from DNS Seeds which do not support service bit filtering,
// instead using them as a oneshot to get nodes with our desired service bits.
AddOneShot(seed);
}
2011-03-09 04:40:50 +01:00
}
--seeds_right_now;
2011-03-09 04:40:50 +01:00
}
LogPrintf("%d addresses found from DNS seeds\n", found);
2011-03-09 04:40:50 +01:00
}
2011-11-21 18:25:00 +01:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::DumpAddresses()
{
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMillis();
CAddrDB adb;
adb.Write(addrman);
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Flushed %d addresses to peers.dat %dms\n",
addrman.size(), GetTimeMillis() - nStart);
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::ProcessOneShot()
{
std::string strDest;
{
LOCK(cs_vOneShots);
if (vOneShots.empty())
return;
strDest = vOneShots.front();
vOneShots.pop_front();
}
CAddress addr;
CSemaphoreGrant grant(*semOutbound, true);
if (grant) {
OpenNetworkConnection(addr, false, &grant, strDest.c_str(), true);
}
}
bool CConnman::GetTryNewOutboundPeer()
{
return m_try_another_outbound_peer;
}
void CConnman::SetTryNewOutboundPeer(bool flag)
{
m_try_another_outbound_peer = flag;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "net: setting try another outbound peer=%s\n", flag ? "true" : "false");
}
// Return the number of peers we have over our outbound connection limit
// Exclude peers that are marked for disconnect, or are going to be
// disconnected soon (eg one-shots and feelers)
// Also exclude peers that haven't finished initial connection handshake yet
// (so that we don't decide we're over our desired connection limit, and then
// evict some peer that has finished the handshake)
int CConnman::GetExtraOutboundCount()
{
int nOutbound = 0;
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
// don't count outbound masternodes
if (pnode->m_masternode_connection) {
continue;
}
if (!pnode->fInbound && !pnode->m_manual_connection && !pnode->fFeeler && !pnode->fDisconnect && !pnode->fOneShot && pnode->fSuccessfullyConnected && !pnode->m_masternode_probe_connection) {
++nOutbound;
}
}
}
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
return std::max(nOutbound - m_max_outbound_full_relay - m_max_outbound_block_relay, 0);
}
void CConnman::ThreadOpenConnections(const std::vector<std::string> connect)
{
// Connect to specific addresses
if (!connect.empty())
{
for (int64_t nLoop = 0;; nLoop++)
{
ProcessOneShot();
for (const std::string& strAddr : connect)
{
CAddress addr(CService(), NODE_NONE);
Merge #11456: Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. 15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo) 5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo) 57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo) 44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman. Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check for NETWORK|WITNESS. This changes the following: * Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit more from protocol-level logic. * Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler connections (feelers still only require NETWORK). * This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices. * This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to continue using our valuable outbound slots on them. * In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to -connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true of addnodes). * Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the eviction metrics from the same sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring HasRelevantServices. This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement. Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
OpenNetworkConnection(addr, false, nullptr, strAddr.c_str(), false, false, true);
for (int i = 0; i < 10 && i < nLoop; i++)
{
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(500)))
return;
}
}
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(500)))
return;
}
}
// Initiate network connections
int64_t nStart = GetTime();
// Minimum time before next feeler connection (in microseconds).
int64_t nNextFeeler = PoissonNextSend(nStart*1000*1000, FEELER_INTERVAL);
while (!interruptNet)
{
ProcessOneShot();
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(500)))
return;
CSemaphoreGrant grant(*semOutbound);
if (interruptNet)
return;
// Add seed nodes if DNS seeds are all down (an infrastructure attack?).
if (addrman.size() == 0 && (GetTime() - nStart > 60)) {
static bool done = false;
if (!done) {
LogPrintf("Adding fixed seed nodes as DNS doesn't seem to be available.\n");
CNetAddr local;
local.SetInternal("fixedseeds");
addrman.Add(convertSeed6(Params().FixedSeeds()), local);
done = true;
}
}
//
// Choose an address to connect to based on most recently seen
//
CAddress addrConnect;
// Only connect out to one peer per network group (/16 for IPv4).
Implement named devnets (#1791) * Initial devnet * Move genesis block adding into its own method * Introduce -allowprivatenet to lift limitation on RFC1918 addresses Normally, RFC1918 (192.168.x.x/10.x.x.x/...) addresses are not allowed to be relayed. Also, masternodes won't start when the address is considered invalid. This is needed to test local devnet or regtest based networks. * Lift the requirement of minimum MN age for regtest/devnet * Implement named devnets This allows the creation of multiple independent devnets. Each one is identified by a name which is hardened into a "devnet genesis" block, which is automatically positioned at height 1. Validation rules will ensure that a node from devnet=test1 never be able to accept blocks from devnet=test2. This is done by checking the expected devnet genesis block. The genesis block of the devnet is the same as the one from regtest. This starts the devnet with a very low difficulty, allowing us to fill up needed balances for masternodes very fast. Also, the devnet name is put into the sub-version of the VERSION message. If a node connects to the wrong network, it will immediately be disconnected. * Allow to select multiple addresses from the same group in devnet/regtest The selection code normally only allows to select addresses from the same group (e.g. 192.168.x.x) once. This results in connecting to only a single node in devnet/regtest. * Show the devnet name in the title bar and on the loading screen * Add AllowMultipleAddressesFromGroup to chainparams and use it in net.cpp * Remove unused/unneeded scripts from devnet geneses creation 1. OP_RETURN not needed in input script of devnet genesis 2. genesisOutputScript was unused * Fix copy/paste error in -allowprivatenet description * Improve -devnet parameter error handling - Only allow one of -devnet, -regtest or -testnet - Only allow -devnet=name to be specified once * Use different datadir for each devnet * Fix `devnet-devnet` issue * Fix devnet splashscreen (should use testnet img) * Avoid passing devNetName around (most of the time) * Remove nMaxTipAge from CDevNetParams Not present anymore after rebase on develop
2017-12-20 12:45:01 +01:00
// This is only done for mainnet and testnet
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
int nOutboundFullRelay = 0;
int nOutboundBlockRelay = 0;
std::set<std::vector<unsigned char> > setConnected;
Implement named devnets (#1791) * Initial devnet * Move genesis block adding into its own method * Introduce -allowprivatenet to lift limitation on RFC1918 addresses Normally, RFC1918 (192.168.x.x/10.x.x.x/...) addresses are not allowed to be relayed. Also, masternodes won't start when the address is considered invalid. This is needed to test local devnet or regtest based networks. * Lift the requirement of minimum MN age for regtest/devnet * Implement named devnets This allows the creation of multiple independent devnets. Each one is identified by a name which is hardened into a "devnet genesis" block, which is automatically positioned at height 1. Validation rules will ensure that a node from devnet=test1 never be able to accept blocks from devnet=test2. This is done by checking the expected devnet genesis block. The genesis block of the devnet is the same as the one from regtest. This starts the devnet with a very low difficulty, allowing us to fill up needed balances for masternodes very fast. Also, the devnet name is put into the sub-version of the VERSION message. If a node connects to the wrong network, it will immediately be disconnected. * Allow to select multiple addresses from the same group in devnet/regtest The selection code normally only allows to select addresses from the same group (e.g. 192.168.x.x) once. This results in connecting to only a single node in devnet/regtest. * Show the devnet name in the title bar and on the loading screen * Add AllowMultipleAddressesFromGroup to chainparams and use it in net.cpp * Remove unused/unneeded scripts from devnet geneses creation 1. OP_RETURN not needed in input script of devnet genesis 2. genesisOutputScript was unused * Fix copy/paste error in -allowprivatenet description * Improve -devnet parameter error handling - Only allow one of -devnet, -regtest or -testnet - Only allow -devnet=name to be specified once * Use different datadir for each devnet * Fix `devnet-devnet` issue * Fix devnet splashscreen (should use testnet img) * Avoid passing devNetName around (most of the time) * Remove nMaxTipAge from CDevNetParams Not present anymore after rebase on develop
2017-12-20 12:45:01 +01:00
if (!Params().AllowMultipleAddressesFromGroup()) {
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (!pnode->fInbound && !pnode->m_masternode_connection && !pnode->m_manual_connection) {
// Netgroups for inbound and addnode peers are not excluded because our goal here
// is to not use multiple of our limited outbound slots on a single netgroup
// but inbound and addnode peers do not use our outbound slots. Inbound peers
// also have the added issue that they're attacker controlled and could be used
// to prevent us from connecting to particular hosts if we used them here.
setConnected.insert(pnode->addr.GetGroup(addrman.m_asmap));
if (pnode->m_block_relay_only_peer) {
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
nOutboundBlockRelay++;
} else if (!pnode->fFeeler) {
nOutboundFullRelay++;
}
}
}
}
std::set<uint256> setConnectedMasternodes;
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
auto verifiedProRegTxHash = pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash();
if (!verifiedProRegTxHash.IsNull()) {
setConnectedMasternodes.emplace(verifiedProRegTxHash);
}
}
}
// Feeler Connections
//
// Design goals:
// * Increase the number of connectable addresses in the tried table.
//
// Method:
// * Choose a random address from new and attempt to connect to it if we can connect
// successfully it is added to tried.
// * Start attempting feeler connections only after node finishes making outbound
// connections.
// * Only make a feeler connection once every few minutes.
//
bool fFeeler = false;
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
if (nOutboundFullRelay >= m_max_outbound_full_relay && nOutboundBlockRelay >= m_max_outbound_block_relay && !GetTryNewOutboundPeer()) {
int64_t nTime = GetTimeMicros(); // The current time right now (in microseconds).
if (nTime > nNextFeeler) {
nNextFeeler = PoissonNextSend(nTime, FEELER_INTERVAL);
fFeeler = true;
} else {
continue;
}
}
Merge #9037: net: Add test-before-evict discipline to addrman e68172ed9 Add test-before-evict discipline to addrman (Ethan Heilman) Pull request description: This change implement countermeasures 3 (test-before-evict) suggested in our paper: ["Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-Peer Network"](http://cs-people.bu.edu/heilman/eclipse/). # Design: A collision occurs when an address, addr1, is being moved to the tried table from the new table, but maps to a position in the tried table which already contains an address (addr2). The current behavior is that addr1 would evict addr2 from the tried table. This change ensures that during a collision, addr1 is not inserted into tried but instead inserted into a buffer (setTriedCollisions). The to-be-evicted address, addr2, is then tested by [a feeler connection](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8282). If addr2 is found to be online, we remove addr1 from the buffer and addr2 is not evicted, on the other hand if addr2 is found be offline it is replaced by addr1. An additional small advantage of this change is that, as no more than ten addresses can be in the test buffer at once, and addresses are only cleared one at a time from the test buffer (at 2 minute intervals), thus an attacker is forced to wait at least two minutes to insert a new address into tried after filling up the test buffer. This rate limits an attacker attempting to launch an eclipse attack. # Risk mitigation: - To prevent this functionality from being used as a DoS vector, we limit the number of addresses which are to be tested to ten. If we have more than ten addresses to test, we drop new addresses being added to tried if they would evict an address. Since the feeler thread only creates one new connection every 2 minutes the additional network overhead is limited. - An address in tried gains immunity from tests for 4 hours after it has been tested or successfully connected to. # Tests: This change includes additional addrman unittests which test this behavior. I ran an instance of this change with a much smaller tried table (2 buckets of 64 addresses) so that collisions were much more likely and observed evictions. ``` 2016-10-27 07:20:26 Swapping 208.12.64.252:8333 for 68.62.95.247:8333 in tried table 2016-10-27 07:20:26 Moving 208.12.64.252:8333 to tried ``` I documented tests we ran against similar earlier versions of this change in #6355. # Security Benefit This is was originally posted in PR #8282 see [this comment for full details](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8282#issuecomment-237255215). To determine the security benefit of these larger numbers of IPs in the tried table I modeled the attack presented in [Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-Peer Network](https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/263). ![attackergraph40000-10-1000short-line](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/274814/17366828/372af458-595b-11e6-81e5-2c9f97282305.png) **Default node:** 595 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. **Default node + test-before-evict:** 620 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. **Feeler node:** 5540 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. **Feeler node + test-before-evict:** 8600 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. The node running feeler connections has 10 times as many online IP addresses in its tried table making an attack 10 times harder (i.e. requiring the an attacker require 10 times as many IP addresses in different /16s). Adding test-before-evict increases resistance of the node by an additional 3000 attacker IP addresses. Below I graph the attack over even greater attacker resources (i.e. more attacker controled IP addresses). Note that test-before-evict maintains some security far longer even against an attacker with 50,000 IPs. If this node had a larger tried table test-before-evict could greatly boost a nodes resistance to eclipse attacks. ![attacker graph long view](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/274814/17367108/96f46d64-595c-11e6-91cd-edba160598e7.png) Tree-SHA512: fdad4d26aadeaad9bcdc71929b3eb4e1f855b3ee3541fbfbe25dca8d7d0a1667815402db0cb4319db6bd3fcd32d67b5bbc0e12045c4252d62d6239b7d77c4395
2018-03-06 21:36:48 +01:00
addrman.ResolveCollisions();
auto mnList = deterministicMNManager->GetListAtChainTip();
int64_t nANow = GetAdjustedTime();
int nTries = 0;
while (!interruptNet)
{
Merge #9037: net: Add test-before-evict discipline to addrman e68172ed9 Add test-before-evict discipline to addrman (Ethan Heilman) Pull request description: This change implement countermeasures 3 (test-before-evict) suggested in our paper: ["Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-Peer Network"](http://cs-people.bu.edu/heilman/eclipse/). # Design: A collision occurs when an address, addr1, is being moved to the tried table from the new table, but maps to a position in the tried table which already contains an address (addr2). The current behavior is that addr1 would evict addr2 from the tried table. This change ensures that during a collision, addr1 is not inserted into tried but instead inserted into a buffer (setTriedCollisions). The to-be-evicted address, addr2, is then tested by [a feeler connection](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8282). If addr2 is found to be online, we remove addr1 from the buffer and addr2 is not evicted, on the other hand if addr2 is found be offline it is replaced by addr1. An additional small advantage of this change is that, as no more than ten addresses can be in the test buffer at once, and addresses are only cleared one at a time from the test buffer (at 2 minute intervals), thus an attacker is forced to wait at least two minutes to insert a new address into tried after filling up the test buffer. This rate limits an attacker attempting to launch an eclipse attack. # Risk mitigation: - To prevent this functionality from being used as a DoS vector, we limit the number of addresses which are to be tested to ten. If we have more than ten addresses to test, we drop new addresses being added to tried if they would evict an address. Since the feeler thread only creates one new connection every 2 minutes the additional network overhead is limited. - An address in tried gains immunity from tests for 4 hours after it has been tested or successfully connected to. # Tests: This change includes additional addrman unittests which test this behavior. I ran an instance of this change with a much smaller tried table (2 buckets of 64 addresses) so that collisions were much more likely and observed evictions. ``` 2016-10-27 07:20:26 Swapping 208.12.64.252:8333 for 68.62.95.247:8333 in tried table 2016-10-27 07:20:26 Moving 208.12.64.252:8333 to tried ``` I documented tests we ran against similar earlier versions of this change in #6355. # Security Benefit This is was originally posted in PR #8282 see [this comment for full details](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8282#issuecomment-237255215). To determine the security benefit of these larger numbers of IPs in the tried table I modeled the attack presented in [Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-Peer Network](https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/263). ![attackergraph40000-10-1000short-line](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/274814/17366828/372af458-595b-11e6-81e5-2c9f97282305.png) **Default node:** 595 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. **Default node + test-before-evict:** 620 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. **Feeler node:** 5540 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. **Feeler node + test-before-evict:** 8600 attacker IPs for ~50% attack success. The node running feeler connections has 10 times as many online IP addresses in its tried table making an attack 10 times harder (i.e. requiring the an attacker require 10 times as many IP addresses in different /16s). Adding test-before-evict increases resistance of the node by an additional 3000 attacker IP addresses. Below I graph the attack over even greater attacker resources (i.e. more attacker controled IP addresses). Note that test-before-evict maintains some security far longer even against an attacker with 50,000 IPs. If this node had a larger tried table test-before-evict could greatly boost a nodes resistance to eclipse attacks. ![attacker graph long view](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/274814/17367108/96f46d64-595c-11e6-91cd-edba160598e7.png) Tree-SHA512: fdad4d26aadeaad9bcdc71929b3eb4e1f855b3ee3541fbfbe25dca8d7d0a1667815402db0cb4319db6bd3fcd32d67b5bbc0e12045c4252d62d6239b7d77c4395
2018-03-06 21:36:48 +01:00
CAddrInfo addr = addrman.SelectTriedCollision();
// SelectTriedCollision returns an invalid address if it is empty.
if (!fFeeler || !addr.IsValid()) {
addr = addrman.Select(fFeeler);
}
auto dmn = mnList.GetMNByService(addr);
bool isMasternode = dmn != nullptr;
// Require outbound connections, other than feelers, to be to distinct network groups
if (!fFeeler && setConnected.count(addr.GetGroup(addrman.m_asmap))) {
break;
}
// if we selected an invalid address, restart
if (!addr.IsValid() || setConnected.count(addr.GetGroup(addrman.m_asmap)))
break;
// don't try to connect to masternodes that we already have a connection to (most likely inbound)
if (isMasternode && setConnectedMasternodes.count(dmn->proTxHash))
break;
// if we selected a local address, restart (local addresses are allowed in regtest and devnet)
bool fAllowLocal = Params().AllowMultiplePorts() && addrConnect.GetPort() != GetListenPort();
if (!fAllowLocal && IsLocal(addrConnect)) {
break;
}
2012-08-21 17:32:04 +02:00
// If we didn't find an appropriate destination after trying 100 addresses fetched from addrman,
// stop this loop, and let the outer loop run again (which sleeps, adds seed nodes, recalculates
// already-connected network ranges, ...) before trying new addrman addresses.
nTries++;
2012-08-21 17:32:04 +02:00
if (nTries > 100)
break;
if (!IsReachable(addr))
continue;
// only consider very recently tried nodes after 30 failed attempts
if (nANow - addr.nLastTry < 600 && nTries < 30)
continue;
Merge #11456: Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. 15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo) 5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo) 57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo) 44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman. Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check for NETWORK|WITNESS. This changes the following: * Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit more from protocol-level logic. * Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler connections (feelers still only require NETWORK). * This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices. * This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to continue using our valuable outbound slots on them. * In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to -connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true of addnodes). * Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the eviction metrics from the same sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring HasRelevantServices. This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement. Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
// for non-feelers, require all the services we'll want,
// for feelers, only require they be a full node (only because most
// SPV clients don't have a good address DB available)
if (!isMasternode && !fFeeler && !HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(addr.nServices)) {
continue;
} else if (!isMasternode && fFeeler && !MayHaveUsefulAddressDB(addr.nServices)) {
continue;
}
// do not allow non-default ports, unless after 50 invalid addresses selected already
if ((!isMasternode || !Params().AllowMultiplePorts()) && addr.GetPort() != Params().GetDefaultPort() && addr.GetPort() != GetListenPort() && nTries < 50)
continue;
addrConnect = addr;
break;
}
if (addrConnect.IsValid()) {
if (fFeeler) {
// Add small amount of random noise before connection to avoid synchronization.
int randsleep = GetRandInt(FEELER_SLEEP_WINDOW * 1000);
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(randsleep)))
return;
if (fLogIPs) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Making feeler connection to %s\n", addrConnect.ToString());
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Making feeler connection\n");
}
}
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
// Open this connection as block-relay-only if we're already at our
// full-relay capacity, but not yet at our block-relay peer limit.
// (It should not be possible for fFeeler to be set if we're not
// also at our block-relay peer limit, but check against that as
// well for sanity.)
bool block_relay_only = nOutboundBlockRelay < m_max_outbound_block_relay && !fFeeler && nOutboundFullRelay >= m_max_outbound_full_relay;
OpenNetworkConnection(addrConnect, (int)setConnected.size() >= std::min(nMaxConnections - 1, 2), &grant, nullptr, false, fFeeler, false, block_relay_only);
}
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
std::vector<AddedNodeInfo> CConnman::GetAddedNodeInfo()
{
std::vector<AddedNodeInfo> ret;
std::list<std::string> lAddresses(0);
{
LOCK(cs_vAddedNodes);
ret.reserve(vAddedNodes.size());
std::copy(vAddedNodes.cbegin(), vAddedNodes.cend(), std::back_inserter(lAddresses));
}
// Build a map of all already connected addresses (by IP:port and by name) to inbound/outbound and resolved CService
std::map<CService, bool> mapConnected;
std::map<std::string, std::pair<bool, CService>> mapConnectedByName;
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->addr.IsValid()) {
mapConnected[pnode->addr] = pnode->fInbound;
}
std::string addrName = pnode->GetAddrName();
if (!addrName.empty()) {
mapConnectedByName[std::move(addrName)] = std::make_pair(pnode->fInbound, static_cast<const CService&>(pnode->addr));
}
}
}
for (const std::string& strAddNode : lAddresses) {
CService service(LookupNumeric(strAddNode.c_str(), Params().GetDefaultPort()));
AddedNodeInfo addedNode{strAddNode, CService(), false, false};
if (service.IsValid()) {
// strAddNode is an IP:port
auto it = mapConnected.find(service);
if (it != mapConnected.end()) {
addedNode.resolvedAddress = service;
addedNode.fConnected = true;
addedNode.fInbound = it->second;
}
} else {
// strAddNode is a name
auto it = mapConnectedByName.find(strAddNode);
if (it != mapConnectedByName.end()) {
addedNode.resolvedAddress = it->second.second;
addedNode.fConnected = true;
addedNode.fInbound = it->second.first;
}
}
ret.emplace_back(std::move(addedNode));
}
return ret;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::ThreadOpenAddedConnections()
{
while (true)
{
CSemaphoreGrant grant(*semAddnode);
std::vector<AddedNodeInfo> vInfo = GetAddedNodeInfo();
bool tried = false;
for (const AddedNodeInfo& info : vInfo) {
if (!info.fConnected) {
if (!grant.TryAcquire()) {
// If we've used up our semaphore and need a new one, let's not wait here since while we are waiting
// the addednodeinfo state might change.
break;
}
tried = true;
CAddress addr(CService(), NODE_NONE);
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
// KNST should be false
OpenNetworkConnection(addr, false, &grant, info.strAddedNode.c_str(), false, false, true /* ,false*/);
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(500)))
return;
}
}
// Retry every 60 seconds if a connection was attempted, otherwise two seconds
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::seconds(tried ? 60 : 2)))
return;
}
}
void CConnman::ThreadOpenMasternodeConnections()
{
// Connecting to specific addresses, no masternode connections available
if (gArgs.IsArgSet("-connect") && gArgs.GetArgs("-connect").size() > 0)
return;
auto& chainParams = Params();
bool didConnect = false;
while (!interruptNet)
{
int sleepTime = 1000;
if (didConnect) {
sleepTime = 100;
}
if (!interruptNet.sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(sleepTime)))
return;
didConnect = false;
masternode|net|rpc: Improve masternode sync process (#3690) * masternode: Replace sync states INITIAL and WAITING with BLOCKCHAIN * masternode: Peer dependent "assume tip" timeout I would say its enough to only wait 1 tick if we have more than 3 peers before we move over to governance sync. * masternode: Notify the UI instantly if switched to governance sync Without this it takes one iteration more for the UI to receive the update. * masternode: Notify the UI about CMasternodeSync::Reset calls * masternode: Don't instantly reset the sync process Give it MASTERNODE_SYNC_RESET_SECONDS (600) seconds time after the last UpdateBlockTip call. * rpc: Don't switch to next asset in "mnsync reset" * rpc: Force the reset in "mnsync reset" * net: Make sure the sync gets a reset if required after network changes This will reset the sync process if its outdated in the following cases: - If the connections dropped to zero - If the connections went from zero to one - If the network has been enabled or disabled * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com> * net: Only open masternode connections if the blockchain is synced In general it doesn't make sense to connect to masternodes before due to MNAUTH requires blockchain sync. This could lead to failing quorum connections/failing masternode probing.. if a just restarted node/a out of sync node would hit a dkg block.. Then they would not try to open those llmq/probing connections for the next 60s (nLLMQConnectionRetryTimeout). Thats basically what happens in tests right now and they fail without this commit. * test: Make sure nodes are synced when they get restored after isolation Their sync might be out of date otherwise due to bigger mocktime bumps Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-09-11 14:07:34 +02:00
if (!fNetworkActive || !masternodeSync.IsBlockchainSynced())
continue;
std::set<CService> connectedNodes;
std::map<uint256, bool> connectedProRegTxHashes;
ForEachNode([&](const CNode* pnode) {
auto verifiedProRegTxHash = pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash();
connectedNodes.emplace(pnode->addr);
if (!verifiedProRegTxHash.IsNull()) {
connectedProRegTxHashes.emplace(verifiedProRegTxHash, pnode->fInbound);
}
});
auto mnList = deterministicMNManager->GetListAtChainTip();
if (interruptNet)
return;
int64_t nANow = GetAdjustedTime();
// NOTE: Process only one pending masternode at a time
CDeterministicMNCPtr connectToDmn;
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
MasternodeProbeConn isProbe = MasternodeProbeConn::IsNotConnection;
{ // don't hold lock while calling OpenMasternodeConnection as cs_main is locked deep inside
LOCK2(cs_vNodes, cs_vPendingMasternodes);
if (!vPendingMasternodes.empty()) {
auto dmn = mnList.GetValidMN(vPendingMasternodes.front());
vPendingMasternodes.erase(vPendingMasternodes.begin());
if (dmn && !connectedNodes.count(dmn->pdmnState->addr) && !IsMasternodeOrDisconnectRequested(dmn->pdmnState->addr)) {
connectToDmn = dmn;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- opening pending masternode connection to %s, service=%s\n", __func__, dmn->proTxHash.ToString(), dmn->pdmnState->addr.ToString(false));
}
}
if (!connectToDmn) {
std::vector<CDeterministicMNCPtr> pending;
for (const auto& group : masternodeQuorumNodes) {
for (const auto& proRegTxHash : group.second) {
auto dmn = mnList.GetMN(proRegTxHash);
if (!dmn) {
continue;
}
const auto& addr2 = dmn->pdmnState->addr;
if (!connectedNodes.count(addr2) && !IsMasternodeOrDisconnectRequested(addr2) && !connectedProRegTxHashes.count(proRegTxHash)) {
int64_t lastAttempt = mmetaman.GetMetaInfo(dmn->proTxHash)->GetLastOutboundAttempt();
// back off trying connecting to an address if we already tried recently
if (nANow - lastAttempt < chainParams.LLMQConnectionRetryTimeout()) {
continue;
}
pending.emplace_back(dmn);
}
}
}
if (!pending.empty()) {
connectToDmn = pending[GetRandInt(pending.size())];
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- opening quorum connection to %s, service=%s\n", __func__, connectToDmn->proTxHash.ToString(), connectToDmn->pdmnState->addr.ToString(false));
}
}
if (!connectToDmn) {
std::vector<CDeterministicMNCPtr> pending;
for (auto it = masternodePendingProbes.begin(); it != masternodePendingProbes.end(); ) {
auto dmn = mnList.GetMN(*it);
if (!dmn) {
it = masternodePendingProbes.erase(it);
continue;
}
bool connectedAndOutbound = connectedProRegTxHashes.count(dmn->proTxHash) && !connectedProRegTxHashes[dmn->proTxHash];
if (connectedAndOutbound) {
// we already have an outbound connection to this MN so there is no theed to probe it again
mmetaman.GetMetaInfo(dmn->proTxHash)->SetLastOutboundSuccess(nANow);
it = masternodePendingProbes.erase(it);
continue;
}
++it;
int64_t lastAttempt = mmetaman.GetMetaInfo(dmn->proTxHash)->GetLastOutboundAttempt();
// back off trying connecting to an address if we already tried recently
if (nANow - lastAttempt < chainParams.LLMQConnectionRetryTimeout()) {
continue;
}
pending.emplace_back(dmn);
}
if (!pending.empty()) {
connectToDmn = pending[GetRandInt(pending.size())];
masternodePendingProbes.erase(connectToDmn->proTxHash);
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
isProbe = MasternodeProbeConn::IsConnection;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- probing masternode %s, service=%s\n", __func__, connectToDmn->proTxHash.ToString(), connectToDmn->pdmnState->addr.ToString(false));
}
}
}
if (!connectToDmn) {
continue;
}
didConnect = true;
mmetaman.GetMetaInfo(connectToDmn->proTxHash)->SetLastOutboundAttempt(nANow);
OpenMasternodeConnection(CAddress(connectToDmn->pdmnState->addr, NODE_NETWORK), isProbe);
// should be in the list now if connection was opened
bool connected = ForNode(connectToDmn->pdmnState->addr, CConnman::AllNodes, [&](CNode* pnode) {
if (pnode->fDisconnect) {
return false;
}
return true;
});
if (!connected) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- connection failed for masternode %s, service=%s\n", __func__, connectToDmn->proTxHash.ToString(), connectToDmn->pdmnState->addr.ToString(false));
// Will take a few consequent failed attempts to PoSe-punish a MN.
if (mmetaman.GetMetaInfo(connectToDmn->proTxHash)->OutboundFailedTooManyTimes()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- failed to connect to masternode %s too many times\n", __func__, connectToDmn->proTxHash.ToString());
}
}
}
}
2012-07-26 02:48:39 +02:00
// if successful, this moves the passed grant to the constructed node
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
void CConnman::OpenNetworkConnection(const CAddress& addrConnect, bool fCountFailure, CSemaphoreGrant *grantOutbound, const char *pszDest, bool fOneShot, bool fFeeler, bool manual_connection, bool block_relay_only, MasternodeConn masternode_connection, MasternodeProbeConn masternode_probe_connection)
{
//
// Initiate outbound network connection
//
if (interruptNet) {
return;
}
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 3 (#1617) * Merge #8996: Network activity toggle 19f46f1 Qt: New network_disabled icon (Luke Dashjr) 54cf997 RPC/Net: Use boolean consistently for networkactive, and remove from getinfo (Luke Dashjr) b2b33d9 Overhaul network activity toggle (Jonas Schnelli) 32efa79 Qt: Add GUI feedback and control of network activity state. (Jon Lund Steffensen) e38993b RPC: Add "togglenetwork" method to toggle network activity temporarily (Jon Lund Steffensen) 7c9a98a Allow network activity to be temporarily suspended. (Jon Lund Steffensen) * Revert on-click behavior of network status icon to showing peers list Stay with the way Dash handled clicking on the status icon * Add theme support for network disabled icon * Merge #8874: Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables 1077577 Fix auto-deselection of peers (Andrew Chow) addfdeb Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables (Andrew Chow) * Merge #9190: qt: Plug many memory leaks ed998ea qt: Avoid OpenSSL certstore-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 5204598 qt: Avoid shutdownwindow-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) e4f126a qt: Avoid splash-screen related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 693384e qt: Prevent thread/memory leak on exiting RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 47db075 qt: Plug many memory leaks (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9218: qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon 042f9fa qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 827d9a3 qt: Replace NetworkToggleStatusBarControl with generic ClickableLabel (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9266: Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places df17fe0 Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #9255: qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged f36349e qt: Remove on_toggleNetworkActiveButton_clicked from RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 297cc20 qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Use UniValue until bitcoin PR #8788 is backported Network active toggle was already based on "[RPC] Give RPC commands more information about the RPC request" We need to use the old UniValue style until that one is backported * Merge #8906: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice fafeec3 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8985: Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() 3154d6e [Qt] use NotifyHeaderTip's height and date for the progress update (Jonas Schnelli) 0a261b6 Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9280: [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, allow hiding 89a3723 [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, disabled show() in sync mode (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9461: [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding 40ec7c7 [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9588: qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant fa4d478 qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant (MarcoFalke) * Hide modal overlay forever when syncing has catched up Don't allow to open it again by clicking on the progress bar and spinner icon. Currently the overlay does not show meaningful information about masternode sync and it gives the impression of being stuck after the block chain sync is done. * Don't include chainparams.h in sendcoinsdialog.cpp This was just a remainder of a backported PR which meant to change some calculation in this file which does not apply to Dash. * Also check for fNetworkActive in ConnectNode * Merge #9528: [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) 988d300 [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) (practicalswift) * Merge #11237: qt: Fixing division by zero in time remaining c8d38abd6 Refactor tipUpdate as per style guide (MeshCollider) 3b69a08c5 Fix division by zero in time remaining (MeshCollider) Pull request description: Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10291, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11265 progressDelta may be 0 (or even negative according to 11265), this checks for that and prints unknown if it is, because we cannot calculate an estimate for the time remaining (would be infinite or negative). Tree-SHA512: bc5708e5ed6e4670d008219558c5fbb25709bd99a32c98ec39bb74f94a0b7fa058f3d03389ccdd39e6723e6b5b48e34b13ceee7c051c2db631e51d8ec3e1d68c
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
if (!fNetworkActive) {
return;
}
auto getIpStr = [&]() {
if (fLogIPs) {
return addrConnect.ToString(false);
} else {
return std::string("new peer");
}
};
if (!pszDest) {
// banned, discouraged or exact match?
if ((m_banman && (m_banman->IsDiscouraged(addrConnect) || m_banman->IsBanned(addrConnect))) || FindNode(addrConnect.ToStringIPPort()))
return;
// local and not a connection to itself?
bool fAllowLocal = Params().AllowMultiplePorts() && addrConnect.GetPort() != GetListenPort();
if (!fAllowLocal && IsLocal(addrConnect))
return;
// Search for IP:PORT match:
// - if multiple ports for the same IP are allowed,
// - for probe connections
// Search for IP-only match otherwise
bool searchIPPort = Params().AllowMultiplePorts() || masternode_probe_connection == MasternodeProbeConn::IsConnection;
bool skip = searchIPPort ?
FindNode(static_cast<CService>(addrConnect)) :
FindNode(static_cast<CNetAddr>(addrConnect));
if (skip) {
LogPrintf("CConnman::%s -- Failed to open new connection to %s, already connected\n", __func__, getIpStr());
return;
}
} else if (FindNode(std::string(pszDest)))
return;
2020-04-17 12:21:00 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- connecting to %s\n", __func__, getIpStr());
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
CNode* pnode = ConnectNode(addrConnect, pszDest, fCountFailure, manual_connection, block_relay_only);
2020-04-07 06:51:50 +02:00
if (!pnode) {
2020-04-17 12:21:00 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- ConnectNode failed for %s\n", __func__, getIpStr());
return;
2020-04-07 06:51:50 +02:00
}
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
{
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
2021-07-19 12:39:22 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET_NETCONN, "CConnman::%s -- successfully connected to %s, sock=%d, peer=%d\n", __func__, getIpStr(), pnode->hSocket, pnode->GetId());
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
}
if (grantOutbound)
grantOutbound->MoveTo(pnode->grantOutbound);
if (fOneShot)
pnode->fOneShot = true;
if (fFeeler)
pnode->fFeeler = true;
Merge #11456: Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. 15f5d3b17 Switch DNSSeed-needed metric to any-automatic-nodes, not services (Matt Corallo) 5ee88b4bd Clarify docs for requirements/handling of addnode/connect nodes (Matt Corallo) 57edc0b0c Rename fAddnode to a more-descriptive "manual_connection" (Matt Corallo) 44407100f Replace relevant services logic with a function suite. (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: This was mostly written as a way to clean things up so that the NETWORK_LIMITED PR (#10387) can be simplified a ton, but its also a nice standalone cleanup that will also require a bit of review because it tweaks a lot of stuff across net. The new functions are fine in protocol.h right now since they're straight-forward, but after NETWORK_LIMITED will really want to move elsewhere after @theuni moves the nServices-based selection to addrman from connman. Adds HasAllRelevantServices and GetRelevantServices, which check for NETWORK|WITNESS. This changes the following: * Removes nRelevantServices from CConnman, disconnecting it a bit more from protocol-level logic. * Replaces our sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes logic with simply always requiring WITNESS|NETWORK for outbound non-feeler connections (feelers still only require NETWORK). * This has the added benefit of removing nServicesExpected from CNode - instead letting net_processing's VERSION message handling simply check HasAllRelevantServices. * This implies we believe WITNESS nodes to continue to be a significant majority of nodes on the network, but also because we cannot sync properly from !WITNESS nodes, it is strange to continue using our valuable outbound slots on them. * In order to prevent this change from preventing connection to -connect= nodes which have !WITNESS, -connect nodes are now given the "addnode" flag. This also allows outbound connections to !NODE_NETWORK nodes for -connect nodes (which was already true of addnodes). * Has the (somewhat unintended) consequence of changing one of the eviction metrics from the same sometimes-connect-to-!WITNESS-nodes metric to requiring HasRelevantServices. This should make NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED much simpler to implement. Tree-SHA512: 90606896c86cc5da14c77843b16674a6a012065e7b583d76d1c47a18215358abefcbab44ff4fab3fadcd39aa9a42d4740c6dc8874a58033bdfc8ad3fb5c649fc
2017-10-14 00:25:16 +02:00
if (manual_connection)
pnode->m_manual_connection = true;
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
if (masternode_connection == MasternodeConn::IsConnection)
pnode->m_masternode_connection = true;
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
if (masternode_probe_connection == MasternodeProbeConn::IsConnection)
pnode->m_masternode_probe_connection = true;
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
{
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
LOCK2(cs_vNodes, pnode->cs_hSocket);
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
mapSocketToNode.emplace(pnode->hSocket, pnode);
}
m_msgproc->InitializeNode(pnode);
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
vNodes.push_back(pnode);
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
RegisterEvents(pnode);
WakeSelect();
}
}
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
void CConnman::OpenMasternodeConnection(const CAddress &addrConnect, MasternodeProbeConn probe) {
OpenNetworkConnection(addrConnect, false, nullptr, nullptr, false, false, false, false, MasternodeConn::IsConnection, probe);
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::ThreadMessageHandler()
{
int64_t nLastSendMessagesTimeMasternodes = 0;
while (!flagInterruptMsgProc)
{
std::vector<CNode*> vNodesCopy = CopyNodeVector();
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
bool fMoreWork = false;
bool fSkipSendMessagesForMasternodes = true;
if (GetTimeMillis() - nLastSendMessagesTimeMasternodes >= 100) {
fSkipSendMessagesForMasternodes = false;
nLastSendMessagesTimeMasternodes = GetTimeMillis();
}
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
for (CNode* pnode : vNodesCopy)
{
if (pnode->fDisconnect)
continue;
// Receive messages
bool fMoreNodeWork = m_msgproc->ProcessMessages(pnode, flagInterruptMsgProc);
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
fMoreWork |= (fMoreNodeWork && !pnode->fPauseSend);
if (flagInterruptMsgProc)
return;
// Send messages
if (!fSkipSendMessagesForMasternodes || !pnode->m_masternode_connection) {
LOCK(pnode->cs_sendProcessing);
m_msgproc->SendMessages(pnode);
}
if (flagInterruptMsgProc)
return;
}
ReleaseNodeVector(vNodesCopy);
2013-11-15 12:24:34 +01:00
WAIT_LOCK(mutexMsgProc, lock);
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
if (!fMoreWork) {
condMsgProc.wait_until(lock, std::chrono::steady_clock::now() + std::chrono::milliseconds(100), [this]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(mutexMsgProc) { return fMsgProcWake; });
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
fMsgProcWake = false;
}
}
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
bool CConnman::BindListenPort(const CService& addrBind, bilingual_str& strError, NetPermissionFlags permissions)
{
int nOne = 1;
// Create socket for listening for incoming connections
struct sockaddr_storage sockaddr;
socklen_t len = sizeof(sockaddr);
if (!addrBind.GetSockAddr((struct sockaddr*)&sockaddr, &len))
{
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
strError = strprintf(Untranslated("Error: Bind address family for %s not supported"), addrBind.ToString());
LogPrintf("%s\n", strError.original);
return false;
}
SOCKET hListenSocket = CreateSocket(addrBind);
if (hListenSocket == INVALID_SOCKET)
{
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
strError = strprintf(Untranslated("Error: Couldn't open socket for incoming connections (socket returned error %s)"), NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
LogPrintf("%s\n", strError.original);
return false;
}
// Allow binding if the port is still in TIME_WAIT state after
// the program was closed and restarted.
setsockopt(hListenSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (sockopt_arg_type)&nOne, sizeof(int));
// some systems don't have IPV6_V6ONLY but are always v6only; others do have the option
// and enable it by default or not. Try to enable it, if possible.
if (addrBind.IsIPv6()) {
#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
setsockopt(hListenSocket, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, (sockopt_arg_type)&nOne, sizeof(int));
#endif
#ifdef WIN32
int nProtLevel = PROTECTION_LEVEL_UNRESTRICTED;
setsockopt(hListenSocket, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PROTECTION_LEVEL, (const char*)&nProtLevel, sizeof(int));
#endif
}
if (::bind(hListenSocket, (struct sockaddr*)&sockaddr, len) == SOCKET_ERROR)
{
int nErr = WSAGetLastError();
if (nErr == WSAEADDRINUSE)
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
strError = strprintf(_("Unable to bind to %s on this computer. %s is probably already running."), addrBind.ToString(), PACKAGE_NAME);
else
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
strError = strprintf(_("Unable to bind to %s on this computer (bind returned error %s)"), addrBind.ToString(), NetworkErrorString(nErr));
LogPrintf("%s\n", strError.original);
CloseSocket(hListenSocket);
return false;
}
LogPrintf("Bound to %s\n", addrBind.ToString());
// Listen for incoming connections
if (listen(hListenSocket, SOMAXCONN) == SOCKET_ERROR)
{
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
strError = strprintf(_("Error: Listening for incoming connections failed (listen returned error %s)"), NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
LogPrintf("%s\n", strError.original);
CloseSocket(hListenSocket);
return false;
}
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE) {
struct kevent event;
EV_SET(&event, hListenSocket, EVFILT_READ, EV_ADD, 0, 0, nullptr);
if (kevent(kqueuefd, &event, 1, nullptr, 0, nullptr) != 0) {
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
strError = strprintf(_("Error: failed to add socket to kqueuefd (kevent returned error %s)"), NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
LogPrintf("%s\n", strError.original);
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
CloseSocket(hListenSocket);
return false;
}
}
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL) {
epoll_event event;
event.data.fd = hListenSocket;
event.events = EPOLLIN;
if (epoll_ctl(epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, hListenSocket, &event) != 0) {
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
strError = strprintf(_("Error: failed to add socket to epollfd (epoll_ctl returned error %s)"), NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
LogPrintf("%s\n", strError.original);
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
CloseSocket(hListenSocket);
return false;
}
}
#endif
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
vhListenSocket.push_back(ListenSocket(hListenSocket, permissions));
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
if (addrBind.IsRoutable() && fDiscover && (permissions & PF_NOBAN) == 0)
AddLocal(addrBind, LOCAL_BIND);
return true;
}
void Discover()
{
2012-05-24 19:02:21 +02:00
if (!fDiscover)
return;
#ifdef WIN32
2012-07-26 02:48:39 +02:00
// Get local host IP
char pszHostName[256] = "";
if (gethostname(pszHostName, sizeof(pszHostName)) != SOCKET_ERROR)
{
std::vector<CNetAddr> vaddr;
if (LookupHost(pszHostName, vaddr, 0, true))
{
for (const CNetAddr &addr : vaddr)
{
if (AddLocal(addr, LOCAL_IF))
LogPrintf("%s: %s - %s\n", __func__, pszHostName, addr.ToString());
}
}
}
#elif (HAVE_DECL_GETIFADDRS && HAVE_DECL_FREEIFADDRS)
// Get local host ip
struct ifaddrs* myaddrs;
if (getifaddrs(&myaddrs) == 0)
{
for (struct ifaddrs* ifa = myaddrs; ifa != nullptr; ifa = ifa->ifa_next)
{
if (ifa->ifa_addr == nullptr) continue;
if ((ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) continue;
if (strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, "lo") == 0) continue;
if (strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, "lo0") == 0) continue;
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family == AF_INET)
{
struct sockaddr_in* s4 = (struct sockaddr_in*)(ifa->ifa_addr);
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
CNetAddr addr(s4->sin_addr);
if (AddLocal(addr, LOCAL_IF))
LogPrintf("%s: IPv4 %s: %s\n", __func__, ifa->ifa_name, addr.ToString());
}
else if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family == AF_INET6)
{
struct sockaddr_in6* s6 = (struct sockaddr_in6*)(ifa->ifa_addr);
2012-02-12 13:45:24 +01:00
CNetAddr addr(s6->sin6_addr);
if (AddLocal(addr, LOCAL_IF))
LogPrintf("%s: IPv6 %s: %s\n", __func__, ifa->ifa_name, addr.ToString());
}
}
freeifaddrs(myaddrs);
}
#endif
}
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 3 (#1617) * Merge #8996: Network activity toggle 19f46f1 Qt: New network_disabled icon (Luke Dashjr) 54cf997 RPC/Net: Use boolean consistently for networkactive, and remove from getinfo (Luke Dashjr) b2b33d9 Overhaul network activity toggle (Jonas Schnelli) 32efa79 Qt: Add GUI feedback and control of network activity state. (Jon Lund Steffensen) e38993b RPC: Add "togglenetwork" method to toggle network activity temporarily (Jon Lund Steffensen) 7c9a98a Allow network activity to be temporarily suspended. (Jon Lund Steffensen) * Revert on-click behavior of network status icon to showing peers list Stay with the way Dash handled clicking on the status icon * Add theme support for network disabled icon * Merge #8874: Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables 1077577 Fix auto-deselection of peers (Andrew Chow) addfdeb Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables (Andrew Chow) * Merge #9190: qt: Plug many memory leaks ed998ea qt: Avoid OpenSSL certstore-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 5204598 qt: Avoid shutdownwindow-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) e4f126a qt: Avoid splash-screen related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 693384e qt: Prevent thread/memory leak on exiting RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 47db075 qt: Plug many memory leaks (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9218: qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon 042f9fa qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 827d9a3 qt: Replace NetworkToggleStatusBarControl with generic ClickableLabel (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9266: Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places df17fe0 Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #9255: qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged f36349e qt: Remove on_toggleNetworkActiveButton_clicked from RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 297cc20 qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Use UniValue until bitcoin PR #8788 is backported Network active toggle was already based on "[RPC] Give RPC commands more information about the RPC request" We need to use the old UniValue style until that one is backported * Merge #8906: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice fafeec3 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8985: Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() 3154d6e [Qt] use NotifyHeaderTip's height and date for the progress update (Jonas Schnelli) 0a261b6 Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9280: [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, allow hiding 89a3723 [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, disabled show() in sync mode (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9461: [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding 40ec7c7 [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9588: qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant fa4d478 qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant (MarcoFalke) * Hide modal overlay forever when syncing has catched up Don't allow to open it again by clicking on the progress bar and spinner icon. Currently the overlay does not show meaningful information about masternode sync and it gives the impression of being stuck after the block chain sync is done. * Don't include chainparams.h in sendcoinsdialog.cpp This was just a remainder of a backported PR which meant to change some calculation in this file which does not apply to Dash. * Also check for fNetworkActive in ConnectNode * Merge #9528: [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) 988d300 [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) (practicalswift) * Merge #11237: qt: Fixing division by zero in time remaining c8d38abd6 Refactor tipUpdate as per style guide (MeshCollider) 3b69a08c5 Fix division by zero in time remaining (MeshCollider) Pull request description: Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10291, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11265 progressDelta may be 0 (or even negative according to 11265), this checks for that and prints unknown if it is, because we cannot calculate an estimate for the time remaining (would be infinite or negative). Tree-SHA512: bc5708e5ed6e4670d008219558c5fbb25709bd99a32c98ec39bb74f94a0b7fa058f3d03389ccdd39e6723e6b5b48e34b13ceee7c051c2db631e51d8ec3e1d68c
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
void CConnman::SetNetworkActive(bool active)
{
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "SetNetworkActive: %s\n", active);
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 3 (#1617) * Merge #8996: Network activity toggle 19f46f1 Qt: New network_disabled icon (Luke Dashjr) 54cf997 RPC/Net: Use boolean consistently for networkactive, and remove from getinfo (Luke Dashjr) b2b33d9 Overhaul network activity toggle (Jonas Schnelli) 32efa79 Qt: Add GUI feedback and control of network activity state. (Jon Lund Steffensen) e38993b RPC: Add "togglenetwork" method to toggle network activity temporarily (Jon Lund Steffensen) 7c9a98a Allow network activity to be temporarily suspended. (Jon Lund Steffensen) * Revert on-click behavior of network status icon to showing peers list Stay with the way Dash handled clicking on the status icon * Add theme support for network disabled icon * Merge #8874: Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables 1077577 Fix auto-deselection of peers (Andrew Chow) addfdeb Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables (Andrew Chow) * Merge #9190: qt: Plug many memory leaks ed998ea qt: Avoid OpenSSL certstore-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 5204598 qt: Avoid shutdownwindow-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) e4f126a qt: Avoid splash-screen related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 693384e qt: Prevent thread/memory leak on exiting RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 47db075 qt: Plug many memory leaks (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9218: qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon 042f9fa qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 827d9a3 qt: Replace NetworkToggleStatusBarControl with generic ClickableLabel (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9266: Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places df17fe0 Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #9255: qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged f36349e qt: Remove on_toggleNetworkActiveButton_clicked from RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 297cc20 qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Use UniValue until bitcoin PR #8788 is backported Network active toggle was already based on "[RPC] Give RPC commands more information about the RPC request" We need to use the old UniValue style until that one is backported * Merge #8906: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice fafeec3 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8985: Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() 3154d6e [Qt] use NotifyHeaderTip's height and date for the progress update (Jonas Schnelli) 0a261b6 Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9280: [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, allow hiding 89a3723 [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, disabled show() in sync mode (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9461: [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding 40ec7c7 [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9588: qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant fa4d478 qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant (MarcoFalke) * Hide modal overlay forever when syncing has catched up Don't allow to open it again by clicking on the progress bar and spinner icon. Currently the overlay does not show meaningful information about masternode sync and it gives the impression of being stuck after the block chain sync is done. * Don't include chainparams.h in sendcoinsdialog.cpp This was just a remainder of a backported PR which meant to change some calculation in this file which does not apply to Dash. * Also check for fNetworkActive in ConnectNode * Merge #9528: [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) 988d300 [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) (practicalswift) * Merge #11237: qt: Fixing division by zero in time remaining c8d38abd6 Refactor tipUpdate as per style guide (MeshCollider) 3b69a08c5 Fix division by zero in time remaining (MeshCollider) Pull request description: Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10291, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11265 progressDelta may be 0 (or even negative according to 11265), this checks for that and prints unknown if it is, because we cannot calculate an estimate for the time remaining (would be infinite or negative). Tree-SHA512: bc5708e5ed6e4670d008219558c5fbb25709bd99a32c98ec39bb74f94a0b7fa058f3d03389ccdd39e6723e6b5b48e34b13ceee7c051c2db631e51d8ec3e1d68c
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
if (fNetworkActive == active) {
return;
}
fNetworkActive = active;
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 3 (#1617) * Merge #8996: Network activity toggle 19f46f1 Qt: New network_disabled icon (Luke Dashjr) 54cf997 RPC/Net: Use boolean consistently for networkactive, and remove from getinfo (Luke Dashjr) b2b33d9 Overhaul network activity toggle (Jonas Schnelli) 32efa79 Qt: Add GUI feedback and control of network activity state. (Jon Lund Steffensen) e38993b RPC: Add "togglenetwork" method to toggle network activity temporarily (Jon Lund Steffensen) 7c9a98a Allow network activity to be temporarily suspended. (Jon Lund Steffensen) * Revert on-click behavior of network status icon to showing peers list Stay with the way Dash handled clicking on the status icon * Add theme support for network disabled icon * Merge #8874: Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables 1077577 Fix auto-deselection of peers (Andrew Chow) addfdeb Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables (Andrew Chow) * Merge #9190: qt: Plug many memory leaks ed998ea qt: Avoid OpenSSL certstore-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 5204598 qt: Avoid shutdownwindow-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) e4f126a qt: Avoid splash-screen related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 693384e qt: Prevent thread/memory leak on exiting RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 47db075 qt: Plug many memory leaks (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9218: qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon 042f9fa qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 827d9a3 qt: Replace NetworkToggleStatusBarControl with generic ClickableLabel (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9266: Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places df17fe0 Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #9255: qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged f36349e qt: Remove on_toggleNetworkActiveButton_clicked from RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 297cc20 qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Use UniValue until bitcoin PR #8788 is backported Network active toggle was already based on "[RPC] Give RPC commands more information about the RPC request" We need to use the old UniValue style until that one is backported * Merge #8906: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice fafeec3 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8985: Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() 3154d6e [Qt] use NotifyHeaderTip's height and date for the progress update (Jonas Schnelli) 0a261b6 Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9280: [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, allow hiding 89a3723 [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, disabled show() in sync mode (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9461: [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding 40ec7c7 [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9588: qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant fa4d478 qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant (MarcoFalke) * Hide modal overlay forever when syncing has catched up Don't allow to open it again by clicking on the progress bar and spinner icon. Currently the overlay does not show meaningful information about masternode sync and it gives the impression of being stuck after the block chain sync is done. * Don't include chainparams.h in sendcoinsdialog.cpp This was just a remainder of a backported PR which meant to change some calculation in this file which does not apply to Dash. * Also check for fNetworkActive in ConnectNode * Merge #9528: [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) 988d300 [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) (practicalswift) * Merge #11237: qt: Fixing division by zero in time remaining c8d38abd6 Refactor tipUpdate as per style guide (MeshCollider) 3b69a08c5 Fix division by zero in time remaining (MeshCollider) Pull request description: Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10291, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11265 progressDelta may be 0 (or even negative according to 11265), this checks for that and prints unknown if it is, because we cannot calculate an estimate for the time remaining (would be infinite or negative). Tree-SHA512: bc5708e5ed6e4670d008219558c5fbb25709bd99a32c98ec39bb74f94a0b7fa058f3d03389ccdd39e6723e6b5b48e34b13ceee7c051c2db631e51d8ec3e1d68c
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
masternode|net|rpc: Improve masternode sync process (#3690) * masternode: Replace sync states INITIAL and WAITING with BLOCKCHAIN * masternode: Peer dependent "assume tip" timeout I would say its enough to only wait 1 tick if we have more than 3 peers before we move over to governance sync. * masternode: Notify the UI instantly if switched to governance sync Without this it takes one iteration more for the UI to receive the update. * masternode: Notify the UI about CMasternodeSync::Reset calls * masternode: Don't instantly reset the sync process Give it MASTERNODE_SYNC_RESET_SECONDS (600) seconds time after the last UpdateBlockTip call. * rpc: Don't switch to next asset in "mnsync reset" * rpc: Force the reset in "mnsync reset" * net: Make sure the sync gets a reset if required after network changes This will reset the sync process if its outdated in the following cases: - If the connections dropped to zero - If the connections went from zero to one - If the network has been enabled or disabled * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com> * net: Only open masternode connections if the blockchain is synced In general it doesn't make sense to connect to masternodes before due to MNAUTH requires blockchain sync. This could lead to failing quorum connections/failing masternode probing.. if a just restarted node/a out of sync node would hit a dkg block.. Then they would not try to open those llmq/probing connections for the next 60s (nLLMQConnectionRetryTimeout). Thats basically what happens in tests right now and they fail without this commit. * test: Make sure nodes are synced when they get restored after isolation Their sync might be out of date otherwise due to bigger mocktime bumps Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-09-11 14:07:34 +02:00
// Always call the Reset() if the network gets enabled/disabled to make sure the sync process
// gets a reset if its outdated..
masternodeSync.Reset();
Backport Bitcoin Qt/Gui changes up to 0.14.x part 3 (#1617) * Merge #8996: Network activity toggle 19f46f1 Qt: New network_disabled icon (Luke Dashjr) 54cf997 RPC/Net: Use boolean consistently for networkactive, and remove from getinfo (Luke Dashjr) b2b33d9 Overhaul network activity toggle (Jonas Schnelli) 32efa79 Qt: Add GUI feedback and control of network activity state. (Jon Lund Steffensen) e38993b RPC: Add "togglenetwork" method to toggle network activity temporarily (Jon Lund Steffensen) 7c9a98a Allow network activity to be temporarily suspended. (Jon Lund Steffensen) * Revert on-click behavior of network status icon to showing peers list Stay with the way Dash handled clicking on the status icon * Add theme support for network disabled icon * Merge #8874: Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables 1077577 Fix auto-deselection of peers (Andrew Chow) addfdeb Multiple Selection for peer and ban tables (Andrew Chow) * Merge #9190: qt: Plug many memory leaks ed998ea qt: Avoid OpenSSL certstore-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 5204598 qt: Avoid shutdownwindow-related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) e4f126a qt: Avoid splash-screen related memory leak (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 693384e qt: Prevent thread/memory leak on exiting RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 47db075 qt: Plug many memory leaks (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9218: qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon 042f9fa qt: Show progress overlay when clicking spinner icon (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 827d9a3 qt: Replace NetworkToggleStatusBarControl with generic ClickableLabel (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Merge #9266: Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places df17fe0 Bugfix: Qt/RPCConsole: Put column enum in the right places (Luke Dashjr) * Merge #9255: qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged f36349e qt: Remove on_toggleNetworkActiveButton_clicked from RPCConsole (Wladimir J. van der Laan) 297cc20 qt: layoutAboutToChange signal is called layoutAboutToBeChanged (Wladimir J. van der Laan) * Use UniValue until bitcoin PR #8788 is backported Network active toggle was already based on "[RPC] Give RPC commands more information about the RPC request" We need to use the old UniValue style until that one is backported * Merge #8906: [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice fafeec3 [qt] sync-overlay: Don't show progress twice (MarcoFalke) * Merge #8985: Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() 3154d6e [Qt] use NotifyHeaderTip's height and date for the progress update (Jonas Schnelli) 0a261b6 Use pindexBestHeader instead of setBlockIndexCandidates for NotifyHeaderTip() (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9280: [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, allow hiding 89a3723 [Qt] Show ModalOverlay by pressing the progress bar, disabled show() in sync mode (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9461: [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding 40ec7c7 [Qt] Improve progress display during headers-sync and peer-finding (Jonas Schnelli) * Merge #9588: qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant fa4d478 qt: Use nPowTargetSpacing constant (MarcoFalke) * Hide modal overlay forever when syncing has catched up Don't allow to open it again by clicking on the progress bar and spinner icon. Currently the overlay does not show meaningful information about masternode sync and it gives the impression of being stuck after the block chain sync is done. * Don't include chainparams.h in sendcoinsdialog.cpp This was just a remainder of a backported PR which meant to change some calculation in this file which does not apply to Dash. * Also check for fNetworkActive in ConnectNode * Merge #9528: [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) 988d300 [qt] Rename formateNiceTimeOffset(qint64) to formatNiceTimeOffset(qint64) (practicalswift) * Merge #11237: qt: Fixing division by zero in time remaining c8d38abd6 Refactor tipUpdate as per style guide (MeshCollider) 3b69a08c5 Fix division by zero in time remaining (MeshCollider) Pull request description: Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10291, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11265 progressDelta may be 0 (or even negative according to 11265), this checks for that and prints unknown if it is, because we cannot calculate an estimate for the time remaining (would be infinite or negative). Tree-SHA512: bc5708e5ed6e4670d008219558c5fbb25709bd99a32c98ec39bb74f94a0b7fa058f3d03389ccdd39e6723e6b5b48e34b13ceee7c051c2db631e51d8ec3e1d68c
2017-09-11 15:38:14 +02:00
uiInterface.NotifyNetworkActiveChanged(fNetworkActive);
}
CConnman::CConnman(uint64_t nSeed0In, uint64_t nSeed1In) :
addrman(Params().AllowMultiplePorts()),
nSeed0(nSeed0In), nSeed1(nSeed1In)
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
{
SetTryNewOutboundPeer(false);
Merge #10977: [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest&) 11dd29b [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) (practicalswift) Pull request description: When running `test_bitcoin` under Valgrind I found the following issue: ``` $ valgrind src/test/test_bitcoin ... ==10465== Use of uninitialised value of size 8 ==10465== at 0x6D09B61: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D0B1BB: std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::_M_insert_int<unsigned long>(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D0B36C: std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::do_put(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D17699: std::ostream& std::ostream::_M_insert<unsigned long>(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: operator<< (ostream:171) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: formatValue<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:345) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: void tinyformat::detail::FormatArg::formatImpl<ServiceFlags>(std::ostream&, char const*, char const*, int, void const*) (tinyformat.h:523) ==10465== by 0x1924D4: format (tinyformat.h:510) ==10465== by 0x1924D4: tinyformat::detail::formatImpl(std::ostream&, char const*, tinyformat::detail::FormatArg const*, int) (tinyformat.h:803) ==10465== by 0x553A55: vformat (tinyformat.h:947) ==10465== by 0x553A55: format<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:957) ==10465== by 0x553A55: std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > tinyformat::format<ServiceFlags>(char const*, ServiceFlags const&) (tinyformat.h:966) ==10465== by 0x54C952: getnetworkinfo(JSONRPCRequest const&) (net.cpp:462) ==10465== by 0x28EDB5: CallRPC(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >) (rpc_tests.cpp:31) ==10465== by 0x293947: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork::test_method() (rpc_tests.cpp:88) ==10465== by 0x2950E5: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork_invoker() (rpc_tests.cpp:84) ==10465== by 0x182496: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56) ==10465== by 0x182496: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89) ... ``` The read of the uninitialized variable `nLocalServices` is triggered by `g_connman->GetLocalServices()` in `getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)` (`net.cpp:462`): ```c++ UniValue getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) { ... if(g_connman) obj.push_back(Pair("localservices", strprintf("%016x", g_connman->GetLocalServices()))); ... } ``` The reason for the uninitialized `nLocalServices` is that `CConnman::Start(...)` is not called by the tests, and hence the initialization normally performed by `CConnman::Start(...)` is not done. This commit adds a method `Init(const Options& connOptions)` which is called by both the constructor and `CConnman::Start(...)`. This method initializes `nLocalServices` and the other relevant values from the supplied `Options` object. Tree-SHA512: d8742363acffd03b2ee081cc56840275569e17edc6fa4bb1dee4a5971ffe4b8ab1d2fe7b68f98a086bf133b7ec46f4e471243ca08b45bf82356e8c831a5a5f21
2017-08-05 13:23:10 +02:00
Options connOptions;
Init(connOptions);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
NodeId CConnman::GetNewNodeId()
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
return nLastNodeId.fetch_add(1, std::memory_order_relaxed);
}
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
bool CConnman::Bind(const CService &addr, unsigned int flags, NetPermissionFlags permissions) {
if (!(flags & BF_EXPLICIT) && !IsReachable(addr))
return false;
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
bilingual_str strError;
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
if (!BindListenPort(addr, strError, permissions)) {
if ((flags & BF_REPORT_ERROR) && clientInterface) {
clientInterface->ThreadSafeMessageBox(strError, "", CClientUIInterface::MSG_ERROR);
}
return false;
}
return true;
}
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
bool CConnman::InitBinds(const std::vector<CService>& binds, const std::vector<NetWhitebindPermissions>& whiteBinds)
{
bool fBound = false;
for (const auto& addrBind : binds) {
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
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fBound |= Bind(addrBind, (BF_EXPLICIT | BF_REPORT_ERROR), NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE);
}
for (const auto& addrBind : whiteBinds) {
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
2019-08-14 16:35:54 +02:00
fBound |= Bind(addrBind.m_service, (BF_EXPLICIT | BF_REPORT_ERROR), addrBind.m_flags);
}
if (binds.empty() && whiteBinds.empty()) {
struct in_addr inaddr_any;
inaddr_any.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
struct in6_addr inaddr6_any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
Merge #16248: Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Add functional tests for flexible whitebind/list (nicolas.dorier) d541fa391844f658bd7035659b5b16695733dd56 Replace the use of fWhitelisted by permission checks (nicolas.dorier) ecd5cf7ea4c3644a30092100ffc399e30e193275 Do not disconnect peer for asking mempool if it has NO_BAN permission (nicolas.dorier) e5b26deaaa6842f7dd7c4537ede000f965ea0189 Make whitebind/whitelist permissions more flexible (nicolas.dorier) Pull request description: # Motivation In 0.19, bloom filter will be disabled by default. I tried to make [a PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176) to enable bloom filter for whitelisted peers regardless of `-peerbloomfilters`. Bloom filter have non existent privacy and server can omit filter's matches. However, both problems are completely irrelevant when you connect to your own node. If you connect to your own node, bloom filters are the most bandwidth efficient way to synchronize your light client without the need of some middleware like Electrum. It is also a superior alternative to BIP157 as it does not require to maintain an additional index and it would work well on pruned nodes. When I attempted to allow bloom filters for whitelisted peer, my proposal has been NACKed in favor of [a more flexible approach](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16176#issuecomment-500762907) which should allow node operator to set fine grained permissions instead of a global `whitelisted` attribute. Doing so will also make follow up idea very easy to implement in a backward compatible way. # Implementation details The PR propose a new format for `--white{list,bind}`. I added a way to specify permissions granted to inbound connection matching `white{list,bind}`. The following permissions exists: * ForceRelay * Relay * NoBan * BloomFilter * Mempool Example: * `-whitelist=bloomfilter@127.0.0.1/32`. * `-whitebind=bloomfilter,relay,noban@127.0.0.1:10020`. If no permissions are specified, `NoBan | Mempool` is assumed. (making this PR backward compatible) When we receive an inbound connection, we calculate the effective permissions for this peer by fetching the permissions granted from `whitelist` and add to it the permissions granted from `whitebind`. To keep backward compatibility, if no permissions are specified in `white{list,bind}` (e.g. `--whitelist=127.0.0.1`) then parameters `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` will add the permissions `ForceRelay` and `Relay` to the inbound node. `-whitelistforcerelay` and `-whiterelay` are ignored if the permissions flags are explicitly set in `white{bind,list}`. # Follow up idea Based on this PR, other changes become quite easy to code in a trivially review-able, backward compatible way: * Changing `connect` at rpc and config file level to understand the permissions flags. * Changing the permissions of a peer at RPC level. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: re-ACK c5b404e8f1973afe071a07c63ba1038eefe13f0f Tree-SHA512: adfefb373d09e68cae401247c8fc64034e305694cdef104bdcdacb9f1704277bd53b18f52a2427a5cffdbc77bda410d221aed252bc2ece698ffbb9cf1b830577
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fBound |= Bind(CService(inaddr6_any, GetListenPort()), BF_NONE, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE);
fBound |= Bind(CService(inaddr_any, GetListenPort()), !fBound ? BF_REPORT_ERROR : BF_NONE, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE);
}
return fBound;
}
Merge #10977: [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest&) 11dd29b [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) (practicalswift) Pull request description: When running `test_bitcoin` under Valgrind I found the following issue: ``` $ valgrind src/test/test_bitcoin ... ==10465== Use of uninitialised value of size 8 ==10465== at 0x6D09B61: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D0B1BB: std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::_M_insert_int<unsigned long>(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D0B36C: std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::do_put(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D17699: std::ostream& std::ostream::_M_insert<unsigned long>(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: operator<< (ostream:171) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: formatValue<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:345) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: void tinyformat::detail::FormatArg::formatImpl<ServiceFlags>(std::ostream&, char const*, char const*, int, void const*) (tinyformat.h:523) ==10465== by 0x1924D4: format (tinyformat.h:510) ==10465== by 0x1924D4: tinyformat::detail::formatImpl(std::ostream&, char const*, tinyformat::detail::FormatArg const*, int) (tinyformat.h:803) ==10465== by 0x553A55: vformat (tinyformat.h:947) ==10465== by 0x553A55: format<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:957) ==10465== by 0x553A55: std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > tinyformat::format<ServiceFlags>(char const*, ServiceFlags const&) (tinyformat.h:966) ==10465== by 0x54C952: getnetworkinfo(JSONRPCRequest const&) (net.cpp:462) ==10465== by 0x28EDB5: CallRPC(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >) (rpc_tests.cpp:31) ==10465== by 0x293947: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork::test_method() (rpc_tests.cpp:88) ==10465== by 0x2950E5: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork_invoker() (rpc_tests.cpp:84) ==10465== by 0x182496: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56) ==10465== by 0x182496: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89) ... ``` The read of the uninitialized variable `nLocalServices` is triggered by `g_connman->GetLocalServices()` in `getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)` (`net.cpp:462`): ```c++ UniValue getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) { ... if(g_connman) obj.push_back(Pair("localservices", strprintf("%016x", g_connman->GetLocalServices()))); ... } ``` The reason for the uninitialized `nLocalServices` is that `CConnman::Start(...)` is not called by the tests, and hence the initialization normally performed by `CConnman::Start(...)` is not done. This commit adds a method `Init(const Options& connOptions)` which is called by both the constructor and `CConnman::Start(...)`. This method initializes `nLocalServices` and the other relevant values from the supplied `Options` object. Tree-SHA512: d8742363acffd03b2ee081cc56840275569e17edc6fa4bb1dee4a5971ffe4b8ab1d2fe7b68f98a086bf133b7ec46f4e471243ca08b45bf82356e8c831a5a5f21
2017-08-05 13:23:10 +02:00
bool CConnman::Start(CScheduler& scheduler, const Options& connOptions)
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
{
Merge #10977: [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest&) 11dd29b [net] Fix use of uninitialized value in getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) (practicalswift) Pull request description: When running `test_bitcoin` under Valgrind I found the following issue: ``` $ valgrind src/test/test_bitcoin ... ==10465== Use of uninitialised value of size 8 ==10465== at 0x6D09B61: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D0B1BB: std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::_M_insert_int<unsigned long>(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D0B36C: std::num_put<char, std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> > >::do_put(std::ostreambuf_iterator<char, std::char_traits<char> >, std::ios_base&, char, unsigned long) const (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x6D17699: std::ostream& std::ostream::_M_insert<unsigned long>(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: operator<< (ostream:171) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: formatValue<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:345) ==10465== by 0x4CAAD7: void tinyformat::detail::FormatArg::formatImpl<ServiceFlags>(std::ostream&, char const*, char const*, int, void const*) (tinyformat.h:523) ==10465== by 0x1924D4: format (tinyformat.h:510) ==10465== by 0x1924D4: tinyformat::detail::formatImpl(std::ostream&, char const*, tinyformat::detail::FormatArg const*, int) (tinyformat.h:803) ==10465== by 0x553A55: vformat (tinyformat.h:947) ==10465== by 0x553A55: format<ServiceFlags> (tinyformat.h:957) ==10465== by 0x553A55: std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > tinyformat::format<ServiceFlags>(char const*, ServiceFlags const&) (tinyformat.h:966) ==10465== by 0x54C952: getnetworkinfo(JSONRPCRequest const&) (net.cpp:462) ==10465== by 0x28EDB5: CallRPC(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >) (rpc_tests.cpp:31) ==10465== by 0x293947: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork::test_method() (rpc_tests.cpp:88) ==10465== by 0x2950E5: rpc_tests::rpc_togglenetwork_invoker() (rpc_tests.cpp:84) ==10465== by 0x182496: invoke<void (*)()> (callback.hpp:56) ==10465== by 0x182496: boost::unit_test::ut_detail::callback0_impl_t<boost::unit_test::ut_detail::unused, void (*)()>::invoke() (callback.hpp:89) ... ``` The read of the uninitialized variable `nLocalServices` is triggered by `g_connman->GetLocalServices()` in `getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request)` (`net.cpp:462`): ```c++ UniValue getnetworkinfo(const JSONRPCRequest& request) { ... if(g_connman) obj.push_back(Pair("localservices", strprintf("%016x", g_connman->GetLocalServices()))); ... } ``` The reason for the uninitialized `nLocalServices` is that `CConnman::Start(...)` is not called by the tests, and hence the initialization normally performed by `CConnman::Start(...)` is not done. This commit adds a method `Init(const Options& connOptions)` which is called by both the constructor and `CConnman::Start(...)`. This method initializes `nLocalServices` and the other relevant values from the supplied `Options` object. Tree-SHA512: d8742363acffd03b2ee081cc56840275569e17edc6fa4bb1dee4a5971ffe4b8ab1d2fe7b68f98a086bf133b7ec46f4e471243ca08b45bf82356e8c831a5a5f21
2017-08-05 13:23:10 +02:00
Init(connOptions);
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesRecv);
nTotalBytesRecv = 0;
}
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
nTotalBytesSent = 0;
nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle = 0;
nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime = 0;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE) {
kqueuefd = kqueue();
if (kqueuefd == -1) {
LogPrintf("kqueue failed\n");
return false;
}
}
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL) {
epollfd = epoll_create1(0);
if (epollfd == -1) {
LogPrintf("epoll_create1 failed\n");
return false;
}
}
#endif
if (fListen && !InitBinds(connOptions.vBinds, connOptions.vWhiteBinds)) {
if (clientInterface) {
clientInterface->ThreadSafeMessageBox(
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
_("Failed to listen on any port. Use -listen=0 if you want this."),
"", CClientUIInterface::MSG_ERROR);
}
return false;
}
for (const auto& strDest : connOptions.vSeedNodes) {
AddOneShot(strDest);
}
if (clientInterface) {
clientInterface->InitMessage(_("Loading P2P addresses...").translated);
}
// Load addresses from peers.dat
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMillis();
{
CAddrDB adb;
if (adb.Read(addrman))
LogPrintf("Loaded %i addresses from peers.dat %dms\n", addrman.size(), GetTimeMillis() - nStart);
else {
addrman.Clear(); // Addrman can be in an inconsistent state after failure, reset it
Merge #21222: log: Clarify log message when file does not exist faf48f20f196e418b2eea390a0140db3604cfa15 log: Clarify log message when file does not exist (MarcoFalke) Pull request description: Shorter and broader alternative to #21181 Rendered diff: ```diff @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Bitcoin Core version v21.99.0-db656db2ed5a (release build) +Bitcoin Core version v21.99.0-faf48f20f196 (release build) Qt 5.15.2 (dynamic), plugin=wayland (dynamic) No static plugins. Style: adwaita / Adwaita::Style @@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ scheduler thread start Using wallet directory /tmp/test_001/regtest/wallets init message: Verifying wallet(s)... init message: Loading banlist... -ERROR: DeserializeFileDB: Failed to open file /tmp/test_001/regtest/banlist.dat -Invalid or missing banlist.dat; recreating +Missing or invalid file /tmp/test_001/regtest/banlist.dat +Recreating banlist.dat SetNetworkActive: true Failed to read fee estimates from /tmp/test_001/regtest/fee_estimates.dat. Continue anyway. Using /16 prefix for IP bucketing @@ -63,9 +63,9 @@ Bound to [::]:18444 Bound to 0.0.0.0:18444 Bound to 127.0.0.1:18445 init message: Loading P2P addresses... -ERROR: DeserializeFileDB: Failed to open file /tmp/test_001/regtest/peers.dat -Invalid or missing peers.dat; recreating -ERROR: DeserializeFileDB: Failed to open file /tmp/test_001/regtest/anchors.dat +Missing or invalid file /tmp/test_001/regtest/peers.dat +Recreating peers.dat +Missing or invalid file /tmp/test_001/regtest/anchors.dat 0 block-relay-only anchors will be tried for connections. init message: Starting network threads... net thread start ACKs for top commit: jnewbery: utACK faf48f20f196e418b2eea390a0140db3604cfa15 amitiuttarwar: utACK faf48f20f1, 👍 for consistency. also checked where we create / load other `.dat` files, looks good to me. practicalswift: cr ACK faf48f20f196e418b2eea390a0140db3604cfa15 Tree-SHA512: 697a728ef2b9f203363ac00b03eaf23ddf80bee043ecd3719265a0d884e8cfe88cd39afe946c86ab849edd1c836f05ec51125f052bdc14fe184b84447567756f
2021-02-23 16:03:05 +01:00
LogPrintf("Recreating peers.dat\n");
DumpAddresses();
}
}
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
uiInterface.InitMessage(_("Starting network threads...").translated);
fAddressesInitialized = true;
if (semOutbound == nullptr) {
// initialize semaphore
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
semOutbound = MakeUnique<CSemaphore>(std::min(m_max_outbound, nMaxConnections));
}
if (semAddnode == nullptr) {
// initialize semaphore
Merge #11043: Use std::unique_ptr (C++11) where possible a357293 Use MakeUnique<Db>(...) (practicalswift) 3e09b39 Use MakeUnique<T>(...) instead of std::unique_ptr<T>(new T(...)) (practicalswift) 8617989 Add MakeUnique (substitute for C++14 std::make_unique) (practicalswift) d223bc9 Use unique_ptr for pcoinscatcher/pcoinsdbview/pcoinsTip/pblocktree (practicalswift) b45c597 Use unique_ptr for pdbCopy (Db) and fix potential memory leak (practicalswift) 29ab96d Use unique_ptr for dbenv (DbEnv) (practicalswift) f72cbf9 Use unique_ptr for pfilter (CBloomFilter) (practicalswift) 8ccf1bb Use unique_ptr for sem{Addnode,Outbound} (CSemaphore) (practicalswift) 73db063 Use unique_ptr for upnp_thread (boost::thread) (practicalswift) 0024531 Use unique_ptr for dbw (CDBWrapper) (practicalswift) fa6d122 Use unique_ptr:s for {fee,short,long}Stats (TxConfirmStats) (practicalswift) 5a6f768 Use unique_ptr for httpRPCTimerInterface (HTTPRPCTimerInterface) (practicalswift) 860e912 Use unique_ptr for pwalletMain (CWallet) (practicalswift) Pull request description: Use `std::unique_ptr` (C++11) where possible. Rationale: 1. Avoid resource leaks (specifically: forgetting to `delete` an object created using `new`) 2. Avoid undefined behaviour (specifically: double `delete`:s) **Note to reviewers:** Please let me know if I've missed any obvious `std::unique_ptr` candidates. Hopefully this PR should cover all the trivial cases. Tree-SHA512: 9fbeb47b800ab8ff4e0be9f2a22ab63c23d5c613a0c6716d9183db8d22ddbbce592fb8384a8b7874bf7375c8161efb13ca2197ad6f24b75967148037f0f7b20c
2017-11-09 21:22:08 +01:00
semAddnode = MakeUnique<CSemaphore>(nMaxAddnode);
}
//
// Start threads
//
assert(m_msgproc);
InterruptSocks5(false);
interruptNet.reset();
flagInterruptMsgProc = false;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
{
LOCK(mutexMsgProc);
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
fMsgProcWake = false;
}
#ifdef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
if (pipe(wakeupPipe) != 0) {
wakeupPipe[0] = wakeupPipe[1] = -1;
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "pipe() for wakeupPipe failed\n");
} else {
int fFlags = fcntl(wakeupPipe[0], F_GETFL, 0);
if (fcntl(wakeupPipe[0], F_SETFL, fFlags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) {
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "fcntl for O_NONBLOCK on wakeupPipe failed\n");
}
fFlags = fcntl(wakeupPipe[1], F_GETFL, 0);
if (fcntl(wakeupPipe[1], F_SETFL, fFlags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) {
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "fcntl for O_NONBLOCK on wakeupPipe failed\n");
}
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE) {
struct kevent event;
EV_SET(&event, wakeupPipe[0], EVFILT_READ, EV_ADD, 0, 0, nullptr);
int r = kevent(kqueuefd, &event, 1, nullptr, 0, nullptr);
if (r != 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s -- kevent(%d, %d, %d, ...) failed. error: %s\n", __func__,
kqueuefd, EV_ADD, wakeupPipe[0], NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
return false;
}
}
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL) {
epoll_event event;
event.events = EPOLLIN;
event.data.fd = wakeupPipe[0];
int r = epoll_ctl(epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, wakeupPipe[0], &event);
if (r != 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s -- epoll_ctl(%d, %d, %d, ...) failed. error: %s\n", __func__,
epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, wakeupPipe[0], NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
return false;
}
}
#endif
}
#endif
// Send and receive from sockets, accept connections
threadSocketHandler = std::thread(&TraceThread<std::function<void()> >, "net", std::function<void()>(std::bind(&CConnman::ThreadSocketHandler, this)));
if (!gArgs.GetBoolArg("-dnsseed", true))
LogPrintf("DNS seeding disabled\n");
2011-11-21 18:25:00 +01:00
else
threadDNSAddressSeed = std::thread(&TraceThread<std::function<void()> >, "dnsseed", std::function<void()>(std::bind(&CConnman::ThreadDNSAddressSeed, this)));
// Initiate outbound connections from -addnode
threadOpenAddedConnections = std::thread(&TraceThread<std::function<void()> >, "addcon", std::function<void()>(std::bind(&CConnman::ThreadOpenAddedConnections, this)));
if (connOptions.m_use_addrman_outgoing && !connOptions.m_specified_outgoing.empty()) {
if (clientInterface) {
clientInterface->ThreadSafeMessageBox(
Merge #16224: gui: Bilingual GUI error messages 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad util: Cleanup translation.h (Hennadii Stepanov) e95e658b8ec6e02229691a1941d688e96d4df6af doc: Do not translate technical or extremely rare errors (Hennadii Stepanov) 7e923d47ba9891856b86bc9f718cf2f1f773bdf6 Make InitError bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 917ca93553917251e0fd59717a347c63cdfd8a14 Make ThreadSafe{MessageBox|Question} bilingual (Hennadii Stepanov) 23b9fa2e5ec0425980301d2eebad81e660a5ea39 gui: Add detailed text to BitcoinGUI::message (Hennadii Stepanov) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #15340 (it works with the `Chain` interface; see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15340#issuecomment-502674004). Refs: - #16218 (partial fix) - https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15894#issuecomment-487947077 This PR: - makes GUI error messages bilingual: user's native language + untranslated (i.e. English) - insures that only untranslated messages are written to the debug log file and to `stderr` (that is not the case on master). If a translated string is unavailable only an English string appears to a user. Here are some **examples** (updated): ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-08-37](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222043-e2458780-864e-11ea-83fc-197b7121dba5.png) ![Screenshot from 2020-04-24 17-12-17](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/32963518/80222051-e5407800-864e-11ea-92f7-dfef1144becd.png) * `qt5ct: using qt5ct plugin` message is my local environment specific; please ignore it. --- Note for reviewers: `InitWarning()` is out of this PR scope. ACKs for top commit: Sjors: re-tACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad MarcoFalke: ACK 18bd83b1fee2eb47ed4ad05c91f2d6cc311fc9ad 🐦 Tree-SHA512: 3cc8ec44f84403e54b57d11714c86b0855ed90eb794b5472e432005073354b9e3f7b4e8e7bf347a4c21be47299dbc7170f2d0c4b80e308205ff09596e55a4f96 # Conflicts: # src/dashd.cpp # src/httpserver.cpp # src/index/base.cpp # src/init.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.cpp # src/interfaces/chain.h # src/interfaces/node.cpp # src/net.h # src/qt/bitcoingui.cpp # src/ui_interface.h # src/wallet/init.cpp # src/wallet/load.cpp
2020-05-08 18:17:47 +02:00
_("Cannot provide specific connections and have addrman find outgoing connections at the same."),
"", CClientUIInterface::MSG_ERROR);
}
return false;
}
if (connOptions.m_use_addrman_outgoing || !connOptions.m_specified_outgoing.empty())
threadOpenConnections = std::thread(&TraceThread<std::function<void()> >, "opencon", std::function<void()>(std::bind(&CConnman::ThreadOpenConnections, this, connOptions.m_specified_outgoing)));
// Initiate masternode connections
threadOpenMasternodeConnections = std::thread(&TraceThread<std::function<void()> >, "mncon", std::function<void()>(std::bind(&CConnman::ThreadOpenMasternodeConnections, this)));
// Process messages
threadMessageHandler = std::thread(&TraceThread<std::function<void()> >, "msghand", std::function<void()>(std::bind(&CConnman::ThreadMessageHandler, this)));
// Dump network addresses
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
scheduler.scheduleEvery(std::bind(&CConnman::DumpAddresses, this), DUMP_PEERS_INTERVAL * 1000);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
return true;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
class CNetCleanup
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
public:
CNetCleanup() {}
~CNetCleanup()
{
#ifdef WIN32
// Shutdown Windows Sockets
WSACleanup();
#endif
}
};
static CNetCleanup instance_of_cnetcleanup;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CExplicitNetCleanup::callCleanup()
{
// Explicit call to destructor of CNetCleanup because it's not implicitly called
// when the wallet is restarted from within the wallet itself.
CNetCleanup *tmp = new CNetCleanup();
delete tmp; // Stroustrup's gonna kill me for that
}
void CConnman::Interrupt()
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
{
{
LOCK(mutexMsgProc);
flagInterruptMsgProc = true;
}
condMsgProc.notify_all();
interruptNet();
InterruptSocks5(true);
if (semOutbound) {
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
for (int i=0; i<m_max_outbound; i++) {
semOutbound->post();
}
}
if (semAddnode) {
for (int i=0; i<nMaxAddnode; i++) {
semAddnode->post();
}
}
}
void CConnman::Stop()
{
if (threadMessageHandler.joinable())
threadMessageHandler.join();
if (threadOpenMasternodeConnections.joinable())
threadOpenMasternodeConnections.join();
if (threadOpenConnections.joinable())
threadOpenConnections.join();
if (threadOpenAddedConnections.joinable())
threadOpenAddedConnections.join();
if (threadDNSAddressSeed.joinable())
threadDNSAddressSeed.join();
if (threadSocketHandler.joinable())
threadSocketHandler.join();
if (fAddressesInitialized)
{
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
DumpAddresses();
fAddressesInitialized = false;
}
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
// Close sockets
for (CNode *pnode : vNodes)
pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect(this);
}
for (ListenSocket& hListenSocket : vhListenSocket)
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
if (hListenSocket.socket != INVALID_SOCKET) {
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE) {
struct kevent event;
EV_SET(&event, hListenSocket.socket, EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, nullptr);
kevent(kqueuefd, &event, 1, nullptr, 0, nullptr);
}
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL) {
epoll_ctl(epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, hListenSocket.socket, nullptr);
}
#endif
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if (!CloseSocket(hListenSocket.socket))
LogPrintf("CloseSocket(hListenSocket) failed with error %s\n", NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
// clean up some globals (to help leak detection)
std::vector<CNode*> nodes;
WITH_LOCK(cs_vNodes, nodes.swap(vNodes));
for (CNode *pnode : nodes) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
DeleteNode(pnode);
}
for (CNode *pnode : vNodesDisconnected) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
DeleteNode(pnode);
}
2020-04-07 07:00:41 +02:00
mapSocketToNode.clear();
2021-06-23 10:10:42 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
mapReceivableNodes.clear();
}
{
LOCK(cs_mapNodesWithDataToSend);
mapNodesWithDataToSend.clear();
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
vNodesDisconnected.clear();
vhListenSocket.clear();
Merge #11043: Use std::unique_ptr (C++11) where possible a357293 Use MakeUnique<Db>(...) (practicalswift) 3e09b39 Use MakeUnique<T>(...) instead of std::unique_ptr<T>(new T(...)) (practicalswift) 8617989 Add MakeUnique (substitute for C++14 std::make_unique) (practicalswift) d223bc9 Use unique_ptr for pcoinscatcher/pcoinsdbview/pcoinsTip/pblocktree (practicalswift) b45c597 Use unique_ptr for pdbCopy (Db) and fix potential memory leak (practicalswift) 29ab96d Use unique_ptr for dbenv (DbEnv) (practicalswift) f72cbf9 Use unique_ptr for pfilter (CBloomFilter) (practicalswift) 8ccf1bb Use unique_ptr for sem{Addnode,Outbound} (CSemaphore) (practicalswift) 73db063 Use unique_ptr for upnp_thread (boost::thread) (practicalswift) 0024531 Use unique_ptr for dbw (CDBWrapper) (practicalswift) fa6d122 Use unique_ptr:s for {fee,short,long}Stats (TxConfirmStats) (practicalswift) 5a6f768 Use unique_ptr for httpRPCTimerInterface (HTTPRPCTimerInterface) (practicalswift) 860e912 Use unique_ptr for pwalletMain (CWallet) (practicalswift) Pull request description: Use `std::unique_ptr` (C++11) where possible. Rationale: 1. Avoid resource leaks (specifically: forgetting to `delete` an object created using `new`) 2. Avoid undefined behaviour (specifically: double `delete`:s) **Note to reviewers:** Please let me know if I've missed any obvious `std::unique_ptr` candidates. Hopefully this PR should cover all the trivial cases. Tree-SHA512: 9fbeb47b800ab8ff4e0be9f2a22ab63c23d5c613a0c6716d9183db8d22ddbbce592fb8384a8b7874bf7375c8161efb13ca2197ad6f24b75967148037f0f7b20c
2017-11-09 21:22:08 +01:00
semOutbound.reset();
semAddnode.reset();
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE && kqueuefd != -1) {
#ifdef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
struct kevent event;
EV_SET(&event, wakeupPipe[0], EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, nullptr);
kevent(kqueuefd, &event, 1, nullptr, 0, nullptr);
#endif
close(kqueuefd);
}
kqueuefd = -1;
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
if (socketEventsMode == SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL && epollfd != -1) {
#ifdef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
epoll_ctl(epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, wakeupPipe[0], nullptr);
#endif
close(epollfd);
}
epollfd = -1;
#endif
#ifdef USE_WAKEUP_PIPE
if (wakeupPipe[0] != -1) close(wakeupPipe[0]);
if (wakeupPipe[1] != -1) close(wakeupPipe[1]);
wakeupPipe[0] = wakeupPipe[1] = -1;
#endif
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
void CConnman::DeleteNode(CNode* pnode)
{
assert(pnode);
bool fUpdateConnectionTime = false;
m_msgproc->FinalizeNode(pnode->GetId(), fUpdateConnectionTime);
if(fUpdateConnectionTime) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
addrman.Connected(pnode->addr);
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
delete pnode;
}
CConnman::~CConnman()
{
Interrupt();
Stop();
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
size_t CConnman::GetAddressCount() const
{
return addrman.size();
}
void CConnman::SetServices(const CService &addr, ServiceFlags nServices)
{
addrman.SetServices(addr, nServices);
}
void CConnman::MarkAddressGood(const CAddress& addr)
{
addrman.Good(addr);
}
void CConnman::AddNewAddresses(const std::vector<CAddress>& vAddr, const CAddress& addrFrom, int64_t nTimePenalty)
{
addrman.Add(vAddr, addrFrom, nTimePenalty);
}
std::vector<CAddress> CConnman::GetAddresses()
{
return addrman.GetAddr();
}
bool CConnman::AddNode(const std::string& strNode)
{
LOCK(cs_vAddedNodes);
for (const std::string& it : vAddedNodes) {
if (strNode == it) return false;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
}
vAddedNodes.push_back(strNode);
return true;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman::RemoveAddedNode(const std::string& strNode)
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
LOCK(cs_vAddedNodes);
for(std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = vAddedNodes.begin(); it != vAddedNodes.end(); ++it) {
if (strNode == *it) {
vAddedNodes.erase(it);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool CConnman::AddPendingMasternode(const uint256& proTxHash)
{
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
if (std::find(vPendingMasternodes.begin(), vPendingMasternodes.end(), proTxHash) != vPendingMasternodes.end()) {
return false;
}
vPendingMasternodes.push_back(proTxHash);
return true;
}
void CConnman::SetMasternodeQuorumNodes(Consensus::LLMQType llmqType, const uint256& quorumHash, const std::set<uint256>& proTxHashes)
{
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
auto it = masternodeQuorumNodes.emplace(std::make_pair(llmqType, quorumHash), proTxHashes);
if (!it.second) {
it.first->second = proTxHashes;
}
}
void CConnman::SetMasternodeQuorumRelayMembers(Consensus::LLMQType llmqType, const uint256& quorumHash, const std::set<uint256>& proTxHashes)
{
{
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
auto it = masternodeQuorumRelayMembers.emplace(std::make_pair(llmqType, quorumHash), proTxHashes);
if (!it.second) {
it.first->second = proTxHashes;
}
}
// Update existing connections
ForEachNode([&](CNode* pnode) {
auto verifiedProRegTxHash = pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash();
if (!verifiedProRegTxHash.IsNull() && !pnode->m_masternode_iqr_connection && IsMasternodeQuorumRelayMember(verifiedProRegTxHash)) {
// Tell our peer that we're interested in plain LLMQ recovered signatures.
// Otherwise the peer would only announce/send messages resulting from QRECSIG,
// e.g. InstantSend locks or ChainLocks. SPV and regular full nodes should not send
// this message as they are usually only interested in the higher level messages.
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pnode->GetSendVersion());
PushMessage(pnode, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::QSENDRECSIGS, true));
pnode->m_masternode_iqr_connection = true;
}
});
}
bool CConnman::HasMasternodeQuorumNodes(Consensus::LLMQType llmqType, const uint256& quorumHash)
{
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
return masternodeQuorumNodes.count(std::make_pair(llmqType, quorumHash));
}
std::set<uint256> CConnman::GetMasternodeQuorums(Consensus::LLMQType llmqType)
{
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
std::set<uint256> result;
2019-01-11 10:00:40 +01:00
for (const auto& p : masternodeQuorumNodes) {
if (p.first.first != llmqType) {
continue;
}
result.emplace(p.first.second);
}
return result;
}
std::set<NodeId> CConnman::GetMasternodeQuorumNodes(Consensus::LLMQType llmqType, const uint256& quorumHash) const
{
LOCK2(cs_vNodes, cs_vPendingMasternodes);
auto it = masternodeQuorumNodes.find(std::make_pair(llmqType, quorumHash));
if (it == masternodeQuorumNodes.end()) {
return {};
}
const auto& proRegTxHashes = it->second;
std::set<NodeId> nodes;
2019-01-11 10:00:40 +01:00
for (const auto pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->fDisconnect) {
continue;
}
auto verifiedProRegTxHash = pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash();
if (!pnode->qwatch && (verifiedProRegTxHash.IsNull() || !proRegTxHashes.count(verifiedProRegTxHash))) {
continue;
}
nodes.emplace(pnode->GetId());
}
return nodes;
}
void CConnman::RemoveMasternodeQuorumNodes(Consensus::LLMQType llmqType, const uint256& quorumHash)
{
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
masternodeQuorumNodes.erase(std::make_pair(llmqType, quorumHash));
masternodeQuorumRelayMembers.erase(std::make_pair(llmqType, quorumHash));
}
bool CConnman::IsMasternodeQuorumNode(const CNode* pnode)
{
// Let's see if this is an outgoing connection to an address that is known to be a masternode
// We however only need to know this if the node did not authenticate itself as a MN yet
uint256 assumedProTxHash;
if (pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash().IsNull() && !pnode->fInbound) {
auto mnList = deterministicMNManager->GetListAtChainTip();
auto dmn = mnList.GetMNByService(pnode->addr);
if (dmn == nullptr) {
// This is definitely not a masternode
return false;
}
assumedProTxHash = dmn->proTxHash;
}
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
for (const auto& p : masternodeQuorumNodes) {
if (!pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash().IsNull()) {
if (p.second.count(pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash())) {
return true;
}
} else if (!assumedProTxHash.IsNull()) {
if (p.second.count(assumedProTxHash)) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
bool CConnman::IsMasternodeQuorumRelayMember(const uint256& protxHash)
{
if (protxHash.IsNull()) {
return false;
}
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
for (const auto& p : masternodeQuorumRelayMembers) {
if (p.second.count(protxHash)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
void CConnman::AddPendingProbeConnections(const std::set<uint256> &proTxHashes)
{
LOCK(cs_vPendingMasternodes);
masternodePendingProbes.insert(proTxHashes.begin(), proTxHashes.end());
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
size_t CConnman::GetNodeCount(NumConnections flags)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
int nNum = 0;
for (const auto& pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->fDisconnect) {
continue;
}
if ((flags & CONNECTIONS_VERIFIED) && pnode->GetVerifiedProRegTxHash().IsNull()) {
continue;
}
if (flags & (pnode->fInbound ? CONNECTIONS_IN : CONNECTIONS_OUT)) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
nNum++;
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
return nNum;
}
size_t CConnman::GetMaxOutboundNodeCount()
{
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
return m_max_outbound;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::GetNodeStats(std::vector<CNodeStats>& vstats)
{
vstats.clear();
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
vstats.reserve(vNodes.size());
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->fDisconnect) {
continue;
}
vstats.emplace_back();
pnode->copyStats(vstats.back(), addrman.m_asmap);
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman::DisconnectNode(const std::string& strNode)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
if (CNode* pnode = FindNode(strNode)) {
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
bool CConnman::DisconnectNode(const CSubNet& subnet)
{
bool disconnected = false;
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (subnet.Match(pnode->addr)) {
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
disconnected = true;
}
}
return disconnected;
}
bool CConnman::DisconnectNode(const CNetAddr& addr)
{
return DisconnectNode(CSubNet(addr));
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman::DisconnectNode(NodeId id)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for(CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
if (id == pnode->GetId()) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
return true;
}
}
return false;
2015-05-25 22:59:38 +02:00
}
void CConnman::RelayTransaction(const CTransaction& tx)
{
uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
int nInv = MSG_TX;
if (CCoinJoin::GetDSTX(hash)) {
nInv = MSG_DSTX;
}
CInv inv(nInv, hash);
RelayInv(inv);
}
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
void CConnman::RelayInv(CInv &inv, const int minProtoVersion) {
2015-07-08 02:37:23 +02:00
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const auto& pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->nVersion < minProtoVersion || !pnode->CanRelay())
continue;
pnode->PushInventory(inv);
}
2015-07-08 02:37:23 +02:00
}
void CConnman::RelayInvFiltered(CInv &inv, const CTransaction& relatedTx, const int minProtoVersion)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const auto& pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->nVersion < minProtoVersion || !pnode->CanRelay() || pnode->m_block_relay_only_peer) {
continue;
}
{
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
LOCK(pnode->m_tx_relay->cs_filter);
if (!pnode->m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes) {
continue;
}
if (pnode->m_tx_relay->pfilter && !pnode->m_tx_relay->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(relatedTx)) {
continue;
}
}
pnode->PushInventory(inv);
}
}
void CConnman::RelayInvFiltered(CInv &inv, const uint256& relatedTxHash, const int minProtoVersion)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (const auto& pnode : vNodes) {
if (pnode->nVersion < minProtoVersion || !pnode->CanRelay() || pnode->m_block_relay_only_peer) {
continue;
}
{
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
LOCK(pnode->m_tx_relay->cs_filter);
if (!pnode->m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes) {
continue;
}
if (pnode->m_tx_relay->pfilter && !pnode->m_tx_relay->pfilter->contains(relatedTxHash)) {
continue;
}
}
pnode->PushInventory(inv);
}
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::RecordBytesRecv(uint64_t bytes)
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesRecv);
nTotalBytesRecv += bytes;
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
statsClient.count("bandwidth.bytesReceived", bytes, 0.1f);
statsClient.gauge("bandwidth.totalBytesReceived", nTotalBytesRecv, 0.01f);
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::RecordBytesSent(uint64_t bytes)
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
nTotalBytesSent += bytes;
Backporting Statoshi and bitcoin#16728 (#2515) * Backport Statoshi This backports some of https://github.com/jlopp/statoshi. Missing stuff: README.md and client name changes, segwit and fee estimation stats. Fix RejectCodeToString Fix copy-paste mistake s/InvalidBlockFound/InvalidChainFound/ * Merge #16728: move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f move-only: move coins statistics utils out of RPC (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: This is part of the [assumeutxo project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/11): Parent PR: #15606 Issue: #15605 Specification: https://github.com/jamesob/assumeutxo-docs/tree/master/proposal --- In the short-term, this move-only commit will help with fuzzing (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15606#issuecomment-524482297). Later, these procedures will be used to compute statistics (particularly a content hash) for UTXO sets coming in from snapshots. Most easily reviewed with `git ... --color-moved=dimmed_zebra`. A nice follow-up would be adding unittests, which I'll do if nobody else gets around to it. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 8a3b2eb17572ca2131778d52cc25ec359470a90f, checked --color-moved=dimmed-zebra Tree-SHA512: a187d2f7590ad2450b8e8fa3d038c80a04fc3d903618c24222d7e3172250ce51badea35860c86101f2ba266eb4354e6efb8d7d508b353f29276e4665a1efdf74 * Fix 16728 * Modernize StatsdClient - Reuse some functionality from netbase - Switch from GetRand to FastRandomContext - Drop `using namespace std` and add `// namespace statsd` * Introduce PeriodicStats and make StatsdClient configurable via -stats<smth> (enabled/host/port/ns/period) * Move/rename tip stats from CheckBlock to ConnectBlock * Add new false positives to lint-format-strings.py * Add snprintf in statsd_client to the list of known violations in lint-locale-dependence.sh * Fix incorrect include guard * Use bracket syntax includes * Replace magic numbers with defaults * Move connection stats calculation into its own function And bail out early if stats are disabled * assert in PeriodicStats Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: MarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-12-15 17:22:23 +01:00
statsClient.count("bandwidth.bytesSent", bytes, 0.01f);
statsClient.gauge("bandwidth.totalBytesSent", nTotalBytesSent, 0.01f);
uint64_t now = GetTime();
if (nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime + nMaxOutboundTimeframe < now)
{
// timeframe expired, reset cycle
nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime = now;
nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle = 0;
}
// TODO, exclude whitebind peers
nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle += bytes;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::SetMaxOutboundTarget(uint64_t limit)
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
nMaxOutboundLimit = limit;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman::GetMaxOutboundTarget()
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
return nMaxOutboundLimit;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman::GetMaxOutboundTimeframe()
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
return nMaxOutboundTimeframe;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman::GetMaxOutboundTimeLeftInCycle()
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
if (nMaxOutboundLimit == 0)
return 0;
if (nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime == 0)
return nMaxOutboundTimeframe;
uint64_t cycleEndTime = nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime + nMaxOutboundTimeframe;
uint64_t now = GetTime();
return (cycleEndTime < now) ? 0 : cycleEndTime - GetTime();
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::SetMaxOutboundTimeframe(uint64_t timeframe)
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
if (nMaxOutboundTimeframe != timeframe)
{
// reset measure-cycle in case of changing
// the timeframe
nMaxOutboundCycleStartTime = GetTime();
}
nMaxOutboundTimeframe = timeframe;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
bool CConnman::OutboundTargetReached(bool historicalBlockServingLimit)
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
if (nMaxOutboundLimit == 0)
return false;
if (historicalBlockServingLimit)
{
2017-09-07 17:59:00 +02:00
// keep a large enough buffer to at least relay each block once
uint64_t timeLeftInCycle = GetMaxOutboundTimeLeftInCycle();
uint64_t buffer = timeLeftInCycle / 600 * MaxBlockSize(fDIP0001ActiveAtTip);
if (buffer >= nMaxOutboundLimit || nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle >= nMaxOutboundLimit - buffer)
return true;
}
else if (nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle >= nMaxOutboundLimit)
return true;
return false;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman::GetOutboundTargetBytesLeft()
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
if (nMaxOutboundLimit == 0)
return 0;
return (nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle >= nMaxOutboundLimit) ? 0 : nMaxOutboundLimit - nMaxOutboundTotalBytesSentInCycle;
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman::GetTotalBytesRecv()
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesRecv);
return nTotalBytesRecv;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
uint64_t CConnman::GetTotalBytesSent()
2013-08-22 18:09:32 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_totalBytesSent);
return nTotalBytesSent;
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
ServiceFlags CConnman::GetLocalServices() const
{
return nLocalServices;
}
void CConnman::SetBestHeight(int height)
{
nBestHeight.store(height, std::memory_order_release);
}
int CConnman::GetBestHeight() const
{
return nBestHeight.load(std::memory_order_acquire);
}
unsigned int CConnman::GetReceiveFloodSize() const { return nReceiveFloodSize; }
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
CNode::CNode(NodeId idIn, ServiceFlags nLocalServicesIn, int nMyStartingHeightIn, SOCKET hSocketIn, const CAddress& addrIn, uint64_t nKeyedNetGroupIn, uint64_t nLocalHostNonceIn, const CAddress& addrBindIn, const std::string& addrNameIn, bool fInboundIn, bool block_relay_only)
: nTimeConnected(GetSystemTimeInSeconds()),
addr(addrIn),
addrBind(addrBindIn),
fInbound(fInboundIn),
nKeyedNetGroup(nKeyedNetGroupIn),
addrKnown(5000, 0.001),
m_block_relay_only_peer(block_relay_only),
id(idIn),
nLocalHostNonce(nLocalHostNonceIn),
nLocalServices(nLocalServicesIn),
nMyStartingHeight(nMyStartingHeightIn)
{
hSocket = hSocketIn;
addrName = addrNameIn == "" ? addr.ToStringIPPort() : addrNameIn;
hashContinue = uint256();
m_tx_relay = MakeUnique<TxRelay>();
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
for (const std::string &msg : getAllNetMessageTypes())
mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd[msg] = 0;
mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd[NET_MESSAGE_COMMAND_OTHER] = 0;
Backport Bitcoin#9424, Bitcoin#10123 and Bitcoin#10153 (#2918) * Contains dashification. disables `-debug dash` Merge #9424: Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. 6b3bb3d Change LogAcceptCategory to use uint32_t rather than sets of strings. (Gregory Maxwell) Tree-SHA512: ebb5bcf9a7d00a32dd1390b727ff4d29330a038423611da01268d8e1d2c0229e52a1098e751d4e6db73ef4ae862e1e96d38249883fcaf12b68f55ebb01035b34 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> 31 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Merge #10123: Allow debug logs to be excluded from specified component 3bde556 Add -debugexclude option to switch off logging for specified components (John Newbery) Tree-SHA512: 30202e3f2085fc2fc5dd4bedb92988f4cb162c612a42cf8f6395a7da326f34975ddc347f82bc4ddca6c84c438dc0cc6e87869f90c7ff88105dbeaa52a947fa43 * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * bump to uint64_t due to added Dash codes cont. Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * string -> BCLog format Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * uint32_t -> uint64_t Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Fix CBatchedLogger * Fix most fDebug-s * Fix `debug` rpc * Fix BENCH and RAND conflicts * Add ALERT and use it * Update LogPrint-s in dash-specific code * Tweak few log categories Specifically: - use PRIVATESEND in `CPrivateSendClientManager::GetRandomNotUsedMasternode()` - use ZMQ in `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceVoteNotifier::NotifyGovernanceVote()` and `CZMQPublishRawGovernanceObjectNotifier::NotifyGovernanceObject()` * Drop no longer used MASTERNODE category * Merge #10153: logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile default faab624 logging: Fix off-by-one for shrinkdebugfile (MarcoFalke) Tree-SHA512: d6153e06067906172ff0611af9e585a3ecf0a7d56925b6ad7c12e75aa802441047059b9b6f6c78e79916c3f2abc8f1998bfd2d5b84201ec6421f727c08da3c21 * Shift dash-specific log categories to start from `1ul << 32` to avoid potential future conflicts with bitcoin ones * Fix `dash` category * remove debugCategories Signed-off-by: Pasta <Pasta@dash.org> * Prepend "std::" to find call * Check for BCLog::PRIVATESEND instead of logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Use BCLog::MNPAYMENTS category instead of checking for logCategories != BCLog::NONE * Move "End Dash" comment below "ALERT" When adding new entries here, we'll otherwise get confused with ordering and might end up forgetting that adding something Dash specific must continue with the bit after 43.
2019-05-22 23:51:39 +02:00
if (fLogIPs) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Added connection to %s peer=%d\n", addrName, id);
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Added connection peer=%d\n", id);
}
m_deserializer = MakeUnique<V1TransportDeserializer>(V1TransportDeserializer(Params().MessageStart(), SER_NETWORK, INIT_PROTO_VERSION));
m_serializer = MakeUnique<V1TransportSerializer>(V1TransportSerializer());
}
CNode::~CNode()
{
CloseSocket(hSocket);
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
bool CConnman::NodeFullyConnected(const CNode* pnode)
{
return pnode && pnode->fSuccessfullyConnected && !pnode->fDisconnect;
}
void CConnman::PushMessage(CNode* pnode, CSerializedNetMsg&& msg)
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
{
size_t nMessageSize = msg.data.size();
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "sending %s (%d bytes) peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.command), nMessageSize, pnode->GetId());
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
// make sure we use the appropriate network transport format
std::vector<unsigned char> serializedHeader;
pnode->m_serializer->prepareForTransport(msg, serializedHeader);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
size_t nTotalSize = nMessageSize + serializedHeader.size();
statsClient.count("bandwidth.message." + SanitizeString(msg.command.c_str()) + ".bytesSent", nTotalSize, 1.0f);
statsClient.inc("message.sent." + SanitizeString(msg.command.c_str()), 1.0f);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
size_t nBytesSent = 0;
{
LOCK(pnode->cs_vSend);
bool hasPendingData = !pnode->vSendMsg.empty();
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
//log total amount of bytes per command
pnode->mapSendBytesPerMsgCmd[msg.command] += nTotalSize;
pnode->nSendSize += nTotalSize;
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
if (pnode->nSendSize > nSendBufferMaxSize)
pnode->fPauseSend = true;
pnode->vSendMsg.push_back(std::move(serializedHeader));
if (nMessageSize)
pnode->vSendMsg.push_back(std::move(msg.data));
pnode->nSendMsgSize = pnode->vSendMsg.size();
Backport Bitcoin PR#9441: Net: Massive speedup. Net locks overhaul (#1586) * net: fix typo causing the wrong receive buffer size Surprisingly this hasn't been causing me any issues while testing, probably because it requires lots of large blocks to be flying around. Send/Recv corks need tests! * net: make vRecvMsg a list so that we can use splice() * net: make GetReceiveFloodSize public This will be needed so that the message processor can cork incoming messages * net: only disconnect if fDisconnect has been set These conditions are problematic to check without locking, and we shouldn't be relying on the refcount to disconnect. * net: wait until the node is destroyed to delete its recv buffer when vRecvMsg becomes a private buffer, it won't make sense to allow other threads to mess with it anymore. * net: set message deserialization version when it's actually time to deserialize We'll soon no longer have access to vRecvMsg, and this is more intuitive anyway. * net: handle message accounting in ReceiveMsgBytes This allows locking to be pushed down to only where it's needed Also reuse the current time rather than checking multiple times. * net: record bytes written before notifying the message processor * net: Add a simple function for waking the message handler This may be used publicly in the future * net: remove useless comments * net: remove redundant max sendbuffer size check This is left-over from before there was proper accounting. Hitting 2x the sendbuffer size should not be possible. * net: rework the way that the messagehandler sleeps In order to sleep accurately, the message handler needs to know if _any_ node has more processing that it should do before the entire thread sleeps. Rather than returning a value that represents whether ProcessMessages encountered a message that should trigger a disconnnect, interpret the return value as whether or not that node has more work to do. Also, use a global fProcessWake value that can be set by other threads, which takes precedence (for one cycle) over the messagehandler's decision. Note that the previous behavior was to only process one message per loop (except in the case of a bad checksum or invalid header). That was changed in PR #3180. The only change here in that regard is that the current node now falls to the back of the processing queue for the bad checksum/invalid header cases. * net: add a new message queue for the message processor This separates the storage of messages from the net and queued messages for processing, allowing the locks to be split. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's process queue is full Messages are dumped very quickly from the socket handler to the processor, so it's the depth of the processing queue that's interesting. The socket handler checks the process queue's size during the brief message hand-off and pauses if necessary, and the processor possibly unpauses each time a message is popped off of its queue. * net: add a flag to indicate when a node's send buffer is full Similar to the recv flag, but this one indicates whether or not the net's send buffer is full. The socket handler checks the send queue when a new message is added and pauses if necessary, and possibly unpauses after each message is drained from its buffer. * net: remove cs_vRecvMsg vRecvMsg is now only touched by the socket handler thread. The accounting vars (nRecvBytes/nLastRecv/mapRecvBytesPerMsgCmd) are also only used by the socket handler thread, with the exception of queries from rpc/gui. These accesses are not threadsafe, but they never were. This needs to be addressed separately. Also, update comment describing data flow
2017-08-23 16:20:43 +02:00
{
LOCK(cs_mapNodesWithDataToSend);
// we're not holding cs_vNodes here, so there is a chance of this node being disconnected shortly before
// we get here. Whoever called PushMessage still has a ref to CNode*, but will later Release() it, so we
// might end up having an entry in mapNodesWithDataToSend that is not in vNodes anymore. We need to
// Add/Release refs when adding/erasing mapNodesWithDataToSend.
if (mapNodesWithDataToSend.emplace(pnode->GetId(), pnode).second) {
pnode->AddRef();
}
}
// wake up select() call in case there was no pending data before (so it was not selecting this socket for sending)
if (!hasPendingData && wakeupSelectNeeded)
WakeSelect();
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
}
if (nBytesSent)
RecordBytesSent(nBytesSent);
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
bool CConnman::ForNode(const CService& addr, std::function<bool(const CNode* pnode)> cond, std::function<bool(CNode* pnode)> func)
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode* found = nullptr;
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (auto&& pnode : vNodes) {
if((CService)pnode->addr == addr) {
found = pnode;
break;
}
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
return found != nullptr && cond(found) && func(found);
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
bool CConnman::ForNode(NodeId id, std::function<bool(const CNode* pnode)> cond, std::function<bool(CNode* pnode)> func)
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
{
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
CNode* found = nullptr;
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (auto&& pnode : vNodes) {
if(pnode->GetId() == id) {
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
found = pnode;
break;
}
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
return found != nullptr && cond(found) && func(found);
2015-06-19 15:27:37 +02:00
}
bool CConnman::IsMasternodeOrDisconnectRequested(const CService& addr) {
return ForNode(addr, AllNodes, [](CNode* pnode){
return pnode->m_masternode_connection || pnode->fDisconnect;
});
}
int64_t CConnman::PoissonNextSendInbound(int64_t now, int average_interval_seconds)
{
if (m_next_send_inv_to_incoming < now) {
// If this function were called from multiple threads simultaneously
// it would possible that both update the next send variable, and return a different result to their caller.
// This is not possible in practice as only the net processing thread invokes this function.
m_next_send_inv_to_incoming = PoissonNextSend(now, average_interval_seconds);
}
return m_next_send_inv_to_incoming;
}
int64_t PoissonNextSend(int64_t now, int average_interval_seconds)
{
return now + (int64_t)(log1p(GetRand(1ULL << 48) * -0.0000000000000035527136788 /* -1/2^48 */) * average_interval_seconds * -1000000.0 + 0.5);
}
std::vector<CNode*> CConnman::CopyNodeVector(std::function<bool(const CNode* pnode)> cond)
{
std::vector<CNode*> vecNodesCopy;
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
2020-04-07 07:01:21 +02:00
vecNodesCopy.reserve(vNodes.size());
for(size_t i = 0; i < vNodes.size(); ++i) {
CNode* pnode = vNodes[i];
if (!cond(pnode))
continue;
pnode->AddRef();
vecNodesCopy.push_back(pnode);
}
return vecNodesCopy;
}
std::vector<CNode*> CConnman::CopyNodeVector()
{
return CopyNodeVector(AllNodes);
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
void CConnman::ReleaseNodeVector(const std::vector<CNode*>& vecNodes)
{
for(size_t i = 0; i < vecNodes.size(); ++i) {
CNode* pnode = vecNodes[i];
pnode->Release();
}
}
CSipHasher CConnman::GetDeterministicRandomizer(uint64_t id) const
{
return CSipHasher(nSeed0, nSeed1).Write(id);
}
uint64_t CConnman::CalculateKeyedNetGroup(const CAddress& ad) const
{
std::vector<unsigned char> vchNetGroup(ad.GetGroup(addrman.m_asmap));
return GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_NETGROUP).Write(vchNetGroup.data(), vchNetGroup.size()).Finalize();
}
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
void CConnman::RegisterEvents(CNode *pnode)
{
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
if (socketEventsMode != SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE) {
return;
}
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
assert(pnode->hSocket != INVALID_SOCKET);
struct kevent events[2];
EV_SET(&events[0], pnode->hSocket, EVFILT_READ, EV_ADD, 0, 0, nullptr);
EV_SET(&events[1], pnode->hSocket, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_ADD | EV_CLEAR, 0, 0, nullptr);
int r = kevent(kqueuefd, events, 2, nullptr, 0, nullptr);
if (r != 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s -- kevent(%d, %d, %d, ...) failed. error: %s\n", __func__,
kqueuefd, EV_ADD, pnode->hSocket, NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
}
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
if (socketEventsMode != SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL) {
return;
}
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
assert(pnode->hSocket != INVALID_SOCKET);
epoll_event e;
// We're using edge-triggered mode, so it's important that we drain sockets even if no signals come in
e.events = EPOLLIN | EPOLLOUT | EPOLLET | EPOLLERR | EPOLLHUP;
e.data.fd = pnode->hSocket;
int r = epoll_ctl(epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pnode->hSocket, &e);
if (r != 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s -- epoll_ctl(%d, %d, %d, ...) failed. error: %s\n", __func__,
epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pnode->hSocket, NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
}
#endif
}
void CConnman::UnregisterEvents(CNode *pnode)
{
2020-12-30 20:34:42 +01:00
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE
if (socketEventsMode != SOCKETEVENTS_KQUEUE) {
return;
}
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
if (pnode->hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
return;
}
struct kevent events[2];
EV_SET(&events[0], pnode->hSocket, EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, nullptr);
EV_SET(&events[1], pnode->hSocket, EVFILT_WRITE, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, nullptr);
int r = kevent(kqueuefd, events, 2, nullptr, 0, nullptr);
if (r != 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s -- kevent(%d, %d, %d, ...) failed. error: %s\n", __func__,
kqueuefd, EV_DELETE, pnode->hSocket, NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
}
#endif
2020-04-07 17:58:38 +02:00
#ifdef USE_EPOLL
if (socketEventsMode != SOCKETEVENTS_EPOLL) {
return;
}
LOCK(pnode->cs_hSocket);
if (pnode->hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
return;
}
int r = epoll_ctl(epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, pnode->hSocket, nullptr);
if (r != 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s -- epoll_ctl(%d, %d, %d, ...) failed. error: %s\n", __func__,
epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, pnode->hSocket, NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
}
#endif
}