dash/src/test/denialofservice_tests.cpp

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// Copyright (c) 2011-2015 The Bitcoin Core developers
2014-12-13 05:09:33 +01:00
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
// Unit tests for denial-of-service detection/prevention code
Merge #16878: Fix non-deterministic coverage of test DoS_mapOrphans 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Make test DoS_mapOrphans deterministic (David Reikher) Pull request description: This pull request proposes a solution to make the test `DoS_mapOrphans` in denialofservice_tests.cpp have deterministic coverage. The `RandomOrphan` function in denialofservice_tests.cpp and the implicitly called function `ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax` in pubkey.cpp were causing the non-deterministic test coverage. In the former, if a random orphan was selected the index of which is bigger than the max. orphan index in `mapOrphanTransactions`, the last orphan was returned from `RandomOrphan`. If the random number generated was never large enough, this condition would not be fulfilled and the corresponding branch wouldn't run. The proposed solution is to force one of the 50 dependant orphans to depend on the last orphan in `mapOrphanTransactions` using the newly introduced function `OrphanByIndex` (and passing it a large uint256), forcing this branch to run at least once. In the latter, if values for ECDSA `R` or `S` (or both) had no leading zeros, some code would not be executed. The solution was to find a constant signature that would be comprised of `R` and `S` values with leading zeros and calling `CPubKey::Verify` at the end of the test with this signature forcing this code to always run at least once at the end even if it hadn't throughout the test. To test that the coverage is (at least highly likely) deterministic, I ran `contrib/devtools/test_deterministic_coverage.sh denialofservice_tests/DoS_mapOrphans 1000` and the result was deterministic coverage across 1000 runs. Also - removed denialofservice_tests test entry from the list of non-deterministic tests in the coverage script. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Tree-SHA512: 987eb1f94b80d5bec4d4944e91ef43b9b8603055750362d4b4665b7f011be27045808aa9f4c6ccf8ae009b61405f9a1b8671d65a843c3328e5b8acce1f1c00a6
2020-07-21 09:37:20 +02:00
#include <arith_uint256.h>
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
#include <banman.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <chainparams.h>
#include <llmq/context.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <net.h>
#include <net_processing.h>
Merge #16878: Fix non-deterministic coverage of test DoS_mapOrphans 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Make test DoS_mapOrphans deterministic (David Reikher) Pull request description: This pull request proposes a solution to make the test `DoS_mapOrphans` in denialofservice_tests.cpp have deterministic coverage. The `RandomOrphan` function in denialofservice_tests.cpp and the implicitly called function `ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax` in pubkey.cpp were causing the non-deterministic test coverage. In the former, if a random orphan was selected the index of which is bigger than the max. orphan index in `mapOrphanTransactions`, the last orphan was returned from `RandomOrphan`. If the random number generated was never large enough, this condition would not be fulfilled and the corresponding branch wouldn't run. The proposed solution is to force one of the 50 dependant orphans to depend on the last orphan in `mapOrphanTransactions` using the newly introduced function `OrphanByIndex` (and passing it a large uint256), forcing this branch to run at least once. In the latter, if values for ECDSA `R` or `S` (or both) had no leading zeros, some code would not be executed. The solution was to find a constant signature that would be comprised of `R` and `S` values with leading zeros and calling `CPubKey::Verify` at the end of the test with this signature forcing this code to always run at least once at the end even if it hadn't throughout the test. To test that the coverage is (at least highly likely) deterministic, I ran `contrib/devtools/test_deterministic_coverage.sh denialofservice_tests/DoS_mapOrphans 1000` and the result was deterministic coverage across 1000 runs. Also - removed denialofservice_tests test entry from the list of non-deterministic tests in the coverage script. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Tree-SHA512: 987eb1f94b80d5bec4d4944e91ef43b9b8603055750362d4b4665b7f011be27045808aa9f4c6ccf8ae009b61405f9a1b8671d65a843c3328e5b8acce1f1c00a6
2020-07-21 09:37:20 +02:00
#include <pubkey.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <script/sign.h>
#include <script/signingprovider.h>
#include <script/standard.h>
#include <util/string.h>
merge bitcoin#14555: Move util files to directory (script modified to account for Dash backports, doesn't account for rebasing) ------------- BEGIN SCRIPT --------------- mkdir -p src/util git mv src/util.h src/util/system.h git mv src/util.cpp src/util/system.cpp git mv src/utilmemory.h src/util/memory.h git mv src/utilmoneystr.h src/util/moneystr.h git mv src/utilmoneystr.cpp src/util/moneystr.cpp git mv src/utilstrencodings.h src/util/strencodings.h git mv src/utilstrencodings.cpp src/util/strencodings.cpp git mv src/utiltime.h src/util/time.h git mv src/utiltime.cpp src/util/time.cpp git mv src/utilasmap.h src/util/asmap.h git mv src/utilasmap.cpp src/util/asmap.cpp git mv src/utilstring.h src/util/string.h git mv src/utilstring.cpp src/util/string.cpp gsed -i 's/<util\.h>/<util\/system\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilmemory\.h>/<util\/memory\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilmoneystr\.h>/<util\/moneystr\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilstrencodings\.h>/<util\/strencodings\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utiltime\.h>/<util\/time\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilasmap\.h>/<util\/asmap\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/<utilstring\.h>/<util\/string\.h>/g' $(git ls-files 'src/*.h' 'src/*.cpp') gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTIL_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_SYSTEM_H/g' src/util/system.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILMEMORY_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_MEMORY_H/g' src/util/memory.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILMONEYSTR_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_MONEYSTR_H/g' src/util/moneystr.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILSTRENCODINGS_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_STRENCODINGS_H/g' src/util/strencodings.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILTIME_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_TIME_H/g' src/util/time.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILASMAP_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_ASMAP_H/g' src/util/asmap.h gsed -i 's/BITCOIN_UTILSTRING_H/BITCOIN_UTIL_STRING_H/g' src/util/string.h gsed -i 's/ util\.\(h\|cpp\)/ util\/system\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilmemory\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/memory\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilmoneystr\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/moneystr\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilstrencodings\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/strencodings\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utiltime\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/time\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilasmap\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/asmap\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/utilstring\.\(h\|cpp\)/util\/string\.\1/g' src/Makefile.am gsed -i 's/-> util ->/-> util\/system ->/' test/lint/lint-circular-dependencies.sh gsed -i 's/src\/util\.cpp/src\/util\/system\.cpp/g' test/lint/lint-format-strings.py test/lint/lint-locale-dependence.sh gsed -i 's/src\/utilmoneystr\.cpp/src\/util\/moneystr\.cpp/g' test/lint/lint-locale-dependence.sh gsed -i 's/src\/utilstrencodings\.\(h\|cpp\)/src\/util\/strencodings\.\1/g' test/lint/lint-locale-dependence.sh ------------- END SCRIPT ---------------
2021-06-27 08:33:13 +02:00
#include <util/system.h>
#include <util/time.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <validation.h>
#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
struct CConnmanTest : public CConnman {
using CConnman::CConnman;
void AddNode(CNode& node)
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
vNodes.push_back(&node);
}
void ClearNodes()
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
for (CNode* node : vNodes) {
delete node;
}
vNodes.clear();
}
};
// Tests these internal-to-net_processing.cpp methods:
extern bool AddOrphanTx(const CTransactionRef& tx, NodeId peer);
extern void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer);
extern unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize(unsigned int nMaxOrphans);
struct COrphanTx {
CTransactionRef tx;
NodeId fromPeer;
int64_t nTimeExpire;
};
extern std::map<uint256, COrphanTx> mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans);
2012-02-29 16:14:18 +01:00
static CService ip(uint32_t i)
{
struct in_addr s;
s.s_addr = i;
return CService(CNetAddr(s), Params().GetDefaultPort());
}
Backport Bitcoin PR#8085: p2p: Begin encapsulation (#1537) * net: move CBanDB and CAddrDB out of net.h/cpp This will eventually solve a circular dependency * net: Create CConnman to encapsulate p2p connections * net: Move socket binding into CConnman * net: move OpenNetworkConnection into CConnman * net: move ban and addrman functions into CConnman * net: Add oneshot functions to CConnman * net: move added node functions to CConnman * net: Add most functions needed for vNodes to CConnman * net: handle nodesignals in CConnman * net: Pass CConnection to wallet rather than using the global * net: Add rpc error for missing/disabled p2p functionality * net: Pass CConnman around as needed * gui: add NodeID to the peer table * net: create generic functor accessors and move vNodes to CConnman * net: move whitelist functions into CConnman * net: move nLastNodeId to CConnman * net: move nLocalHostNonce to CConnman This behavior seems to have been quite racy and broken. Move nLocalHostNonce into CNode, and check received nonces against all non-fully-connected nodes. If there's a match, assume we've connected to ourself. * net: move messageHandlerCondition to CConnman * net: move send/recv statistics to CConnman * net: move SendBufferSize/ReceiveFloodSize to CConnman * net: move nLocalServices/nRelevantServices to CConnman These are in-turn passed to CNode at connection time. This allows us to offer different services to different peers (or test the effects of doing so). * net: move semOutbound and semMasternodeOutbound to CConnman * net: SocketSendData returns written size * net: move max/max-outbound to CConnman * net: Pass best block known height into CConnman CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time. This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals only move in one direction. This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn whether the two connections were correlated. This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose the time. * net: pass CClientUIInterface into CConnman * net: Drop StartNode/StopNode and use CConnman directly * net: Introduce CConnection::Options to avoid passing so many params * net: add nSendBufferMaxSize/nReceiveFloodSize to CConnection::Options * net: move vNodesDisconnected into CConnman * Made the ForEachNode* functions in src/net.cpp more pragmatic and self documenting * Convert ForEachNode* functions to take a templated function argument rather than a std::function to eliminate std::function overhead * net: move MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS into connman
2017-07-21 11:35:19 +02:00
static NodeId id = 0;
void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(NodeId node, int64_t time_in_seconds);
BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_SUITE(denialofservice_tests, TestingSetup)
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
// Test eviction of an outbound peer whose chain never advances
// Mock a node connection, and use mocktime to simulate a peer
// which never sends any headers messages. PeerLogic should
// decide to evict that outbound peer, after the appropriate timeouts.
// Note that we protect 4 outbound nodes from being subject to
// this logic; this test takes advantage of that protection only
// being applied to nodes which send headers with sufficient
// work.
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(outbound_slow_chain_eviction)
{
const CChainParams& chainparams = Params();
auto connman = std::make_unique<CConnman>(0x1337, 0x1337, *m_node.addrman);
auto peerLogic = PeerManager::make(chainparams, *connman, *m_node.addrman, nullptr, *m_node.scheduler,
*m_node.chainman, *m_node.mempool, m_node.llmq_ctx, false);
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
// Mock an outbound peer
CAddress addr1(ip(0xa0b0c001), NODE_NONE);
CNode dummyNode1(id++, ServiceFlags(NODE_NETWORK), INVALID_SOCKET, addr1, 0, 0, CAddress(), "", /*fInboundIn=*/ false);
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
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dummyNode1.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
peerLogic->InitializeNode(&dummyNode1);
dummyNode1.nVersion = 1;
dummyNode1.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
// This test requires that we have a chain with non-zero work.
{
LOCK(cs_main);
BOOST_CHECK(::ChainActive().Tip() != nullptr);
BOOST_CHECK(::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork > 0);
}
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
// Test starts here
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode1)); // should result in getheaders
}
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_vSend);
BOOST_CHECK(dummyNode1.vSendMsg.size() > 0);
dummyNode1.vSendMsg.clear();
dummyNode1.nSendMsgSize = 0;
}
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
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int64_t nStartTime = GetTime();
// Wait 21 minutes
SetMockTime(nStartTime+21*60);
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode1)); // should result in getheaders
}
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_vSend);
BOOST_CHECK(dummyNode1.vSendMsg.size() > 0);
}
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
// Wait 3 more minutes
SetMockTime(nStartTime+24*60);
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode1)); // should result in disconnect
}
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
BOOST_CHECK(dummyNode1.fDisconnect == true);
SetMockTime(0);
peerLogic->FinalizeNode(dummyNode1);
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
}
static void AddRandomOutboundPeer(std::vector<CNode *> &vNodes, PeerManager &peerLogic, CConnmanTest* connman)
{
CAddress addr(ip(g_insecure_rand_ctx.randbits(32)), NODE_NONE);
vNodes.emplace_back(new CNode(id++, ServiceFlags(NODE_NETWORK), INVALID_SOCKET, addr, 0, 0, CAddress(), "", /*fInboundIn=*/ false));
CNode &node = *vNodes.back();
node.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
peerLogic.InitializeNode(&node);
node.nVersion = 1;
node.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
connman->AddNode(node);
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(stale_tip_peer_management)
{
const CChainParams& chainparams = Params();
auto connman = std::make_unique<CConnmanTest>(0x1337, 0x1337, *m_node.addrman);
auto peerLogic = PeerManager::make(chainparams, *connman, *m_node.addrman, nullptr, *m_node.scheduler,
*m_node.chainman, *m_node.mempool, m_node.llmq_ctx, false);
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
constexpr int max_outbound_full_relay = MAX_OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY_CONNECTIONS;
CConnman::Options options;
options.nMaxConnections = DEFAULT_MAX_PEER_CONNECTIONS;
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
options.m_max_outbound_full_relay = max_outbound_full_relay;
options.nMaxFeeler = MAX_FEELER_CONNECTIONS;
connman->Init(options);
std::vector<CNode *> vNodes;
// Mock some outbound peers
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
for (int i=0; i<max_outbound_full_relay; ++i) {
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
AddRandomOutboundPeer(vNodes, *peerLogic, connman.get());
}
peerLogic->CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers(consensusParams);
// No nodes should be marked for disconnection while we have no extra peers
for (const CNode *node : vNodes) {
BOOST_CHECK(node->fDisconnect == false);
}
SetMockTime(GetTime() + 3*consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing + 1);
// Now tip should definitely be stale, and we should look for an extra
// outbound peer
peerLogic->CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers(consensusParams);
BOOST_CHECK(connman->GetTryNewOutboundPeer());
// Still no peers should be marked for disconnection
for (const CNode *node : vNodes) {
BOOST_CHECK(node->fDisconnect == false);
}
// If we add one more peer, something should get marked for eviction
// on the next check (since we're mocking the time to be in the future, the
// required time connected check should be satisfied).
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
AddRandomOutboundPeer(vNodes, *peerLogic, connman.get());
peerLogic->CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers(consensusParams);
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
for (int i=0; i<max_outbound_full_relay; ++i) {
BOOST_CHECK(vNodes[i]->fDisconnect == false);
}
// Last added node should get marked for eviction
BOOST_CHECK(vNodes.back()->fDisconnect == true);
vNodes.back()->fDisconnect = false;
// Update the last announced block time for the last
// peer, and check that the next newest node gets evicted.
UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(vNodes.back()->GetId(), GetTime());
peerLogic->CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers(consensusParams);
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
for (int i=0; i<max_outbound_full_relay-1; ++i) {
BOOST_CHECK(vNodes[i]->fDisconnect == false);
}
Merge bitcoin#15759: p2p: Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections (#4862) * Remove unused variable * [refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure * [refactor] Change tx_relay structure to be unique_ptr * Check that tx_relay is initialized before access * Add comment explaining intended use of m_tx_relay * Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).) * Don't relay addr messages to block-relay-only peers We don't want relay of addr messages to leak information about these network links. * doc: improve comments relating to block-relay-only peers * Disconnect peers violating blocks-only mode If we set fRelay=false in our VERSION message, and a peer sends an INV or TX message anyway, disconnect. Since we use fRelay=false to minimize bandwidth, we should not tolerate remaining connected to a peer violating the protocol. * net_processing. Removed comment + fixed formatting * Refactoring net_processing, removed duplicated code * Refactor some bool in a many-arguments function to enum It's made to avoid possible typos with arguments, because some of them have default values and it's very high probability to make a mistake here. * Added UI debug option for Outbound * Fixed data race related to `setInventoryTxToSend`, introduced in `[refactor] Move tx relay state to separate structure` Co-authored-by: Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
2022-06-19 08:02:28 +02:00
BOOST_CHECK(vNodes[max_outbound_full_relay-1]->fDisconnect == true);
BOOST_CHECK(vNodes.back()->fDisconnect == false);
for (const CNode *node : vNodes) {
peerLogic->FinalizeNode(*node);
}
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
connman->ClearNodes();
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_banning)
{
const CChainParams& chainparams = Params();
auto banman = std::make_unique<BanMan>(GetDataDir() / "banlist.dat", nullptr, DEFAULT_MISBEHAVING_BANTIME);
auto connman = std::make_unique<CConnman>(0x1337, 0x1337, *m_node.addrman);
auto peerLogic = PeerManager::make(chainparams, *connman, *m_node.addrman, banman.get(), *m_node.scheduler,
*m_node.chainman, *m_node.mempool, m_node.llmq_ctx, false);
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
banman->ClearBanned();
CAddress addr1(ip(0xa0b0c001), NODE_NONE);
CNode dummyNode1(id++, NODE_NETWORK, INVALID_SOCKET, addr1, 0, 0, CAddress(), "", true);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
dummyNode1.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
peerLogic->InitializeNode(&dummyNode1);
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
dummyNode1.nVersion = 1;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
dummyNode1.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
peerLogic->Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 100); // Should get banned
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode1));
}
BOOST_CHECK(banman->IsDiscouraged(addr1));
BOOST_CHECK(!banman->IsDiscouraged(ip(0xa0b0c001|0x0000ff00))); // Different IP, not banned
CAddress addr2(ip(0xa0b0c002), NODE_NONE);
CNode dummyNode2(id++, NODE_NETWORK, INVALID_SOCKET, addr2, 1, 1, CAddress(), "", true);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
dummyNode2.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
peerLogic->InitializeNode(&dummyNode2);
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
dummyNode2.nVersion = 1;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
dummyNode2.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
peerLogic->Misbehaving(dummyNode2.GetId(), 50);
{
LOCK(dummyNode2.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode2));
}
BOOST_CHECK(!banman->IsDiscouraged(addr2)); // 2 not banned yet...
BOOST_CHECK(banman->IsDiscouraged(addr1)); // ... but 1 still should be
peerLogic->Misbehaving(dummyNode2.GetId(), 50);
{
LOCK(dummyNode2.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode2));
}
BOOST_CHECK(banman->IsDiscouraged(addr2));
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
peerLogic->FinalizeNode(dummyNode1);
peerLogic->FinalizeNode(dummyNode2);
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_banscore)
{
const CChainParams& chainparams = Params();
auto banman = std::make_unique<BanMan>(GetDataDir() / "banlist.dat", nullptr, DEFAULT_MISBEHAVING_BANTIME);
auto connman = std::make_unique<CConnman>(0x1337, 0x1337, *m_node.addrman);
auto peerLogic = PeerManager::make(chainparams, *connman, *m_node.addrman, banman.get(), *m_node.scheduler,
*m_node.chainman, *m_node.mempool, m_node.llmq_ctx, false);
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
banman->ClearBanned();
gArgs.ForceSetArg("-banscore", "111"); // because 11 is my favorite number
CAddress addr1(ip(0xa0b0c001), NODE_NONE);
CNode dummyNode1(id++, NODE_NETWORK, INVALID_SOCKET, addr1, 3, 1, CAddress(), "", true);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
2017-07-27 16:28:05 +02:00
dummyNode1.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
peerLogic->InitializeNode(&dummyNode1);
2013-11-18 01:25:17 +01:00
dummyNode1.nVersion = 1;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
2017-08-17 20:37:22 +02:00
dummyNode1.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
{
peerLogic->Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 100);
}
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode1));
}
BOOST_CHECK(!banman->IsDiscouraged(addr1));
{
peerLogic->Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 10);
}
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode1));
}
BOOST_CHECK(!banman->IsDiscouraged(addr1));
{
peerLogic->Misbehaving(dummyNode1.GetId(), 1);
}
{
LOCK(dummyNode1.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode1));
}
BOOST_CHECK(banman->IsDiscouraged(addr1));
gArgs.ForceSetArg("-banscore", ToString(DEFAULT_BANSCORE_THRESHOLD));
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
2017-10-26 21:53:19 +02:00
peerLogic->FinalizeNode(dummyNode1);
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_bantime)
{
const CChainParams& chainparams = Params();
auto banman = std::make_unique<BanMan>(GetDataDir() / "banlist.dat", nullptr, DEFAULT_MISBEHAVING_BANTIME);
auto connman = std::make_unique<CConnman>(0x1337, 0x1337, *m_node.addrman);
auto peerLogic = PeerManager::make(chainparams, *connman, *m_node.addrman, banman.get(), *m_node.scheduler,
*m_node.chainman, *m_node.mempool, m_node.llmq_ctx, false);
Merge #14605: Return of the Banman 18185b57c32d0a43afeca4c125b9352c692923e9 scripted-diff: batch-recase BanMan variables (Carl Dong) c2e04d37f3841d109c1fe60693f9622e2836cc29 banman: Add, use CBanEntry ctor that takes ban reason (Carl Dong) 1ffa4ce27d4ea6c1067d8984455df97994c7713e banman: reformulate nBanUtil calculation (Carl Dong) daae598feb034f2f56e0b00ecfb4854d693d3641 banman: add thread annotations and mark members const where possible (Cory Fields) 84fc3fbd0304a7d6e660bf783c84bed2dd415141 scripted-diff: batch-rename BanMan members (Cory Fields) af3503d903b1a608cd212e2d74b274103199078c net: move BanMan to its own files (Cory Fields) d0469b2e9386a7a4b268cb9725347e7517acace6 banman: pass in default ban time as a parameter (Cory Fields) 2e56702ecedd83c4b7cb8de9de5c437c8c08e645 banman: pass the banfile path in (Cory Fields) 4c0d961eb0d7825a1e6f8389d7f5545114ee18c6 banman: create and split out banman (Cory Fields) 83c1ea2e5e66b8a83072e3d5ad6a4ced406eb1ba net: split up addresses/ban dumps in preparation for moving them (Cory Fields) 136bd7926c72659dd277a7b795ea17f72e523338 tests: remove member connman/peerLogic in TestingSetup (Cory Fields) 7cc2b9f6786f9bc33853220551eed33ca6b7b7b2 net: Break disconnecting out of Ban() (Cory Fields) Pull request description: **Old English à la Beowulf** ``` Banman wæs bréme --blaéd wíde sprang-- Connmanes eafera Coreum in. aéglaéca léodum forstandan Swá bealdode bearn Connmanes guma gúðum cúð gódum daédum· dréah æfter dóme· nealles druncne slóg ``` **Modern English Translation** ``` Banman was famed --his renown spread wide-- Conman's hier, in Core-land. against the evil creature defend the people Thus he was bold, the son of Connman man famed in war, for good deeds; he led his life for glory, never, having drunk, slew ``` -- With @theuni's blessing, here is Banman, rebased. Original PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11457 -- Followup PRs: 1. Give `CNode` a `Disconnect` method ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248065847)) 2. Add a comment to `std::atomic_bool fDisconnect` in `net.h` that setting this to true will cause the node to be disconnected the next time `DisconnectNodes()` runs ([source](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14605#discussion_r248384309)) Tree-SHA512: 9c207edbf577415c22c9811113e393322d936a843d4ff265186728152a67c057779ac4d4f27b895de9729f7a53e870f828b9ebc8bcdab757520c2aebe1e9be35
2019-01-21 18:45:59 +01:00
banman->ClearBanned();
int64_t nStartTime = GetTime();
SetMockTime(nStartTime); // Overrides future calls to GetTime()
CAddress addr(ip(0xa0b0c001), NODE_NONE);
CNode dummyNode(id++, NODE_NETWORK, INVALID_SOCKET, addr, 4, 4, CAddress(), "", true);
Backport Bitcoin PR#8708: net: have CConnman handle message sending (#1553) * serialization: teach serializers variadics Also add a variadic CDataStream ctor for ease-of-use. * connman is in charge of pushing messages The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit than before. - CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves. This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly turns to spaghetti. - The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock for access to nSendVersion. Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock during the serialization process. - This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed. - -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect they haven't been used in years. * net: switch all callers to connman for pushing messages Drop all of the old stuff. * drop the optimistic write counter hack This is now handled properly in realtime. * net: remove now-unused ssSend and Fuzz * net: construct CNodeStates in place * net: handle version push in InitializeNode
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dummyNode.SetSendVersion(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
peerLogic->InitializeNode(&dummyNode);
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dummyNode.nVersion = 1;
Backport Bitcoin PR#9609: net: fix remaining net assertions (#1575) + Dashify * Dont deserialize nVersion into CNode, should fix #9212 * net: deserialize the entire version message locally This avoids having some vars set if the version negotiation fails. Also copy it all into CNode at the same site. nVersion and fSuccessfullyConnected are set last, as they are the gates for the other vars. Make them atomic for that reason. * net: don't run callbacks on nodes that haven't completed the version handshake Since ForEach* are can be used to send messages to all nodes, the caller may end up sending a message before the version handshake is complete. To limit this, filter out these nodes. While we're at it, may as well filter out disconnected nodes as well. Delete unused methods rather than updating them. * net: Disallow sending messages until the version handshake is complete This is a change in behavior, though it's much more sane now than before. * net: log an error rather than asserting if send version is misused Also cleaned up the comments and moved from the header to the .cpp so that logging headers aren't needed from net.h * Implement conditions for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman. A change making ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods ignore nodes that have not completed initial handshake have been backported from Bitcoin. Unfortunately, some Dash-specific code needs to iterate over all nodes. This change introduces additional condition argument to these methods. This argument is a functional object that should return true for nodes that should be taken into account, not ignored. Two functional objects are provided in CConnman namespace: * FullyConnectedOnly returns true for nodes that have handshake completed, * AllNodes returns true for all nodes. Overloads for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods without condition argument are left for compatibility with non-Dash-specific code. They use FullyConnectedOnly functional object for condition. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv> * Iterate over all nodes in Dash-specific code using AllNodes condition. Use AllNodes functional object as newly introduced condition argument for ForEachNode() and ForNode() methods of CConnman to iterate over all nodes where needed in Dash-specific code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Girko <ol@infoserver.lv>
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dummyNode.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
peerLogic->Misbehaving(dummyNode.GetId(), 100);
{
LOCK(dummyNode.cs_sendProcessing);
BOOST_CHECK(peerLogic->SendMessages(&dummyNode));
}
BOOST_CHECK(banman->IsDiscouraged(addr));
Merge #11490: Disconnect from outbound peers with bad headers chains e065249 Add unit test for outbound peer eviction (Suhas Daftuar) 5a6d00c Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains (Suhas Daftuar) c60fd71 Disconnecting from bad outbound peers in IBD (Suhas Daftuar) Pull request description: The first commit will disconnect an outbound peer that serves us a headers chain with insufficient work while we're in IBD. The second commit introduces a way to disconnect outbound peers whose chains fall out of sync with ours: For a given outbound peer, we check whether their best known block (which is known from the blocks they announce to us) has at least as much work as our tip. If it doesn't, we set a 20 minute timeout, and if we still haven't heard about a block with as much work as our tip had when we set the timeout, then we send a single getheaders message, and wait 2 more minutes. If after two minutes their best known block has insufficient work, we disconnect that peer. We protect 4 of our outbound peers (who provide some "good" headers chains, ie a chain with at least as much work as our tip at some point) from being subject to this logic, to prevent excessive network topology changes as a result of this algorithm, while still ensuring that we have a reasonable number of nodes not known to be on bogus chains. We also don't require our peers to be on the same chain as us, to prevent accidental partitioning of the network in the event of a chain split. Note that if our peers are ever on a more work chain than our tip, then we will download and validate it, and then either reorg to it, or learn of a consensus incompatibility with that peer and disconnect. This PR is designed to protect against peers that are on a less work chain which we may never try to download and validate. Tree-SHA512: 2e0169a1dd8a7fb95980573ac4a201924bffdd724c19afcab5efcef076fdbe1f2cec7dc5f5d7e0a6327216f56d3828884f73642e00c8534b56ec2bb4c854a656
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peerLogic->FinalizeNode(dummyNode);
}
static CTransactionRef RandomOrphan()
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{
std::map<uint256, COrphanTx>::iterator it;
LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans);
it = mapOrphanTransactions.lower_bound(InsecureRand256());
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if (it == mapOrphanTransactions.end())
it = mapOrphanTransactions.begin();
return it->second.tx;
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}
Merge #16878: Fix non-deterministic coverage of test DoS_mapOrphans 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Make test DoS_mapOrphans deterministic (David Reikher) Pull request description: This pull request proposes a solution to make the test `DoS_mapOrphans` in denialofservice_tests.cpp have deterministic coverage. The `RandomOrphan` function in denialofservice_tests.cpp and the implicitly called function `ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax` in pubkey.cpp were causing the non-deterministic test coverage. In the former, if a random orphan was selected the index of which is bigger than the max. orphan index in `mapOrphanTransactions`, the last orphan was returned from `RandomOrphan`. If the random number generated was never large enough, this condition would not be fulfilled and the corresponding branch wouldn't run. The proposed solution is to force one of the 50 dependant orphans to depend on the last orphan in `mapOrphanTransactions` using the newly introduced function `OrphanByIndex` (and passing it a large uint256), forcing this branch to run at least once. In the latter, if values for ECDSA `R` or `S` (or both) had no leading zeros, some code would not be executed. The solution was to find a constant signature that would be comprised of `R` and `S` values with leading zeros and calling `CPubKey::Verify` at the end of the test with this signature forcing this code to always run at least once at the end even if it hadn't throughout the test. To test that the coverage is (at least highly likely) deterministic, I ran `contrib/devtools/test_deterministic_coverage.sh denialofservice_tests/DoS_mapOrphans 1000` and the result was deterministic coverage across 1000 runs. Also - removed denialofservice_tests test entry from the list of non-deterministic tests in the coverage script. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Tree-SHA512: 987eb1f94b80d5bec4d4944e91ef43b9b8603055750362d4b4665b7f011be27045808aa9f4c6ccf8ae009b61405f9a1b8671d65a843c3328e5b8acce1f1c00a6
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static void MakeNewKeyWithFastRandomContext(CKey& key)
{
std::vector<unsigned char> keydata;
keydata = g_insecure_rand_ctx.randbytes(32);
key.Set(keydata.data(), keydata.data() + keydata.size(), /*fCompressedIn*/ true);
assert(key.IsValid());
}
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(DoS_mapOrphans)
{
Merge #16878: Fix non-deterministic coverage of test DoS_mapOrphans 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Make test DoS_mapOrphans deterministic (David Reikher) Pull request description: This pull request proposes a solution to make the test `DoS_mapOrphans` in denialofservice_tests.cpp have deterministic coverage. The `RandomOrphan` function in denialofservice_tests.cpp and the implicitly called function `ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax` in pubkey.cpp were causing the non-deterministic test coverage. In the former, if a random orphan was selected the index of which is bigger than the max. orphan index in `mapOrphanTransactions`, the last orphan was returned from `RandomOrphan`. If the random number generated was never large enough, this condition would not be fulfilled and the corresponding branch wouldn't run. The proposed solution is to force one of the 50 dependant orphans to depend on the last orphan in `mapOrphanTransactions` using the newly introduced function `OrphanByIndex` (and passing it a large uint256), forcing this branch to run at least once. In the latter, if values for ECDSA `R` or `S` (or both) had no leading zeros, some code would not be executed. The solution was to find a constant signature that would be comprised of `R` and `S` values with leading zeros and calling `CPubKey::Verify` at the end of the test with this signature forcing this code to always run at least once at the end even if it hadn't throughout the test. To test that the coverage is (at least highly likely) deterministic, I ran `contrib/devtools/test_deterministic_coverage.sh denialofservice_tests/DoS_mapOrphans 1000` and the result was deterministic coverage across 1000 runs. Also - removed denialofservice_tests test entry from the list of non-deterministic tests in the coverage script. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Tree-SHA512: 987eb1f94b80d5bec4d4944e91ef43b9b8603055750362d4b4665b7f011be27045808aa9f4c6ccf8ae009b61405f9a1b8671d65a843c3328e5b8acce1f1c00a6
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// This test had non-deterministic coverage due to
// randomly selected seeds.
// This seed is chosen so that all branches of the function
// ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax are executed during this test.
// Specifically branches that run only when an ECDSA
// signature's R and S values have leading zeros.
g_insecure_rand_ctx = FastRandomContext(ArithToUint256(arith_uint256(33)));
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CKey key;
Merge #16878: Fix non-deterministic coverage of test DoS_mapOrphans 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Make test DoS_mapOrphans deterministic (David Reikher) Pull request description: This pull request proposes a solution to make the test `DoS_mapOrphans` in denialofservice_tests.cpp have deterministic coverage. The `RandomOrphan` function in denialofservice_tests.cpp and the implicitly called function `ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax` in pubkey.cpp were causing the non-deterministic test coverage. In the former, if a random orphan was selected the index of which is bigger than the max. orphan index in `mapOrphanTransactions`, the last orphan was returned from `RandomOrphan`. If the random number generated was never large enough, this condition would not be fulfilled and the corresponding branch wouldn't run. The proposed solution is to force one of the 50 dependant orphans to depend on the last orphan in `mapOrphanTransactions` using the newly introduced function `OrphanByIndex` (and passing it a large uint256), forcing this branch to run at least once. In the latter, if values for ECDSA `R` or `S` (or both) had no leading zeros, some code would not be executed. The solution was to find a constant signature that would be comprised of `R` and `S` values with leading zeros and calling `CPubKey::Verify` at the end of the test with this signature forcing this code to always run at least once at the end even if it hadn't throughout the test. To test that the coverage is (at least highly likely) deterministic, I ran `contrib/devtools/test_deterministic_coverage.sh denialofservice_tests/DoS_mapOrphans 1000` and the result was deterministic coverage across 1000 runs. Also - removed denialofservice_tests test entry from the list of non-deterministic tests in the coverage script. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK 4455949d6f0218b40d33d7fe6de6555f8f62192f Tree-SHA512: 987eb1f94b80d5bec4d4944e91ef43b9b8603055750362d4b4665b7f011be27045808aa9f4c6ccf8ae009b61405f9a1b8671d65a843c3328e5b8acce1f1c00a6
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MakeNewKeyWithFastRandomContext(key);
FillableSigningProvider keystore;
BOOST_CHECK(keystore.AddKey(key));
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// 50 orphan transactions:
for (int i = 0; i < 50; i++)
{
CMutableTransaction tx;
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tx.vin.resize(1);
tx.vin[0].prevout.n = 0;
tx.vin[0].prevout.hash = InsecureRand256();
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tx.vin[0].scriptSig << OP_1;
tx.vout.resize(1);
tx.vout[0].nValue = 1*CENT;
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = GetScriptForDestination(PKHash(key.GetPubKey()));
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AddOrphanTx(MakeTransactionRef(tx), i);
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}
// ... and 50 that depend on other orphans:
for (int i = 0; i < 50; i++)
{
CTransactionRef txPrev = RandomOrphan();
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CMutableTransaction tx;
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tx.vin.resize(1);
tx.vin[0].prevout.n = 0;
tx.vin[0].prevout.hash = txPrev->GetHash();
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tx.vout.resize(1);
tx.vout[0].nValue = 1*CENT;
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = GetScriptForDestination(PKHash(key.GetPubKey()));
BOOST_CHECK(SignSignature(keystore, *txPrev, tx, 0, SIGHASH_ALL));
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AddOrphanTx(MakeTransactionRef(tx), i);
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}
// This really-big orphan should be ignored:
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
CTransactionRef txPrev = RandomOrphan();
CMutableTransaction tx;
tx.vout.resize(1);
tx.vout[0].nValue = 1*CENT;
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = GetScriptForDestination(PKHash(key.GetPubKey()));
tx.vin.resize(2777);
for (unsigned int j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++)
{
tx.vin[j].prevout.n = j;
tx.vin[j].prevout.hash = txPrev->GetHash();
}
BOOST_CHECK(SignSignature(keystore, *txPrev, tx, 0, SIGHASH_ALL));
// Re-use same signature for other inputs
// (they don't have to be valid for this test)
for (unsigned int j = 1; j < tx.vin.size(); j++)
tx.vin[j].scriptSig = tx.vin[0].scriptSig;
BOOST_CHECK(!AddOrphanTx(MakeTransactionRef(tx), i));
}
LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans);
// Test EraseOrphansFor:
for (NodeId i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
size_t sizeBefore = mapOrphanTransactions.size();
EraseOrphansFor(i);
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.size() < sizeBefore);
}
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// Test LimitOrphanTxSize() function:
LimitOrphanTxSize(40);
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.size() <= 40);
LimitOrphanTxSize(10);
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.size() <= 10);
LimitOrphanTxSize(0);
BOOST_CHECK(mapOrphanTransactions.empty());
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()