dash/src/random.cpp

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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
2014-12-13 05:09:33 +01:00
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <random.h>
#include <compat/cpuid.h>
#include <crypto/chacha20.h>
#include <crypto/sha256.h>
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <crypto/sha512.h>
#include <support/cleanse.h>
#ifdef WIN32
Backport 11651 (#3358) * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (ryanofsky) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/*.cpp \ src/*.h \ src/bench/*.cpp \ src/bench/*.h \ src/compat/*.cpp \ src/compat/*.h \ src/consensus/*.cpp \ src/consensus/*.h \ src/crypto/*.cpp \ src/crypto/*.h \ src/crypto/ctaes/*.h \ src/policy/*.cpp \ src/policy/*.h \ src/primitives/*.cpp \ src/primitives/*.h \ src/qt/*.cpp \ src/qt/*.h \ src/qt/test/*.cpp \ src/qt/test/*.h \ src/rpc/*.cpp \ src/rpc/*.h \ src/script/*.cpp \ src/script/*.h \ src/support/*.cpp \ src/support/*.h \ src/support/allocators/*.h \ src/test/*.cpp \ src/test/*.h \ src/wallet/*.cpp \ src/wallet/*.h \ src/wallet/test/*.cpp \ src/wallet/test/*.h \ src/zmq/*.cpp \ src/zmq/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * scripted-diff: Replace #include "" with #include <> (Dash Specific) -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- for f in \ src/bls/*.cpp \ src/bls/*.h \ src/evo/*.cpp \ src/evo/*.h \ src/governance/*.cpp \ src/governance/*.h \ src/llmq/*.cpp \ src/llmq/*.h \ src/masternode/*.cpp \ src/masternode/*.h \ src/privatesend/*.cpp \ src/privatesend/*.h do base=${f%/*}/ relbase=${base#src/} sed -i "s:#include \"\(.*\)\"\(.*\):if test -e \$base'\\1'; then echo \"#include <\"\$relbase\"\\1>\\2\"; else echo \"#include <\\1>\\2\"; fi:e" $f done -END VERIFY SCRIPT- Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * build: Remove -I for everything but project root Remove -I from build system for everything but the project root, and built-in dependencies. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/Makefile.test.include * qt: refactor: Use absolute include paths in .ui files * qt: refactor: Changes to make include paths absolute This makes all include paths in the GUI absolute. Many changes are involved as every single source file in src/qt/ assumes to be able to use relative includes. Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> # Conflicts: # src/qt/dash.cpp # src/qt/optionsmodel.cpp # src/qt/test/rpcnestedtests.cpp * test: refactor: Use absolute include paths for test data files * Recommend #include<> syntax in developer notes * refactor: Include obj/build.h instead of build.h * END BACKPORT #11651 Remove trailing whitespace causing travis failure * fix backport 11651 Signed-off-by: Pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * More of 11651 * fix blockchain.cpp Signed-off-by: pasta <pasta@dashboost.org> * Add missing "qt/" in includes * Add missing "test/" in includes * Fix trailing whitespaces Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Yanofsky <russ@yanofsky.org> Co-authored-by: MeshCollider <dobsonsa68@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: UdjinM6 <UdjinM6@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-03-19 23:46:56 +01:00
#include <compat.h> // for Windows API
#include <wincrypt.h>
#endif
#include <logging.h> // for LogPrintf()
Merge #18781: Add templated GetRandDuration<> 0000ea32656833efa3d2ffd9bab66c88c83334f0 test: Add test for GetRandMillis and GetRandMicros (MarcoFalke) fa0e5b89cf742df56c6c8f49fe9b3c54d2970a66 Add templated GetRandomDuration<> (MarcoFalke) Pull request description: A naive implementation of this template is dangerous, because the call site might accidentally omit the template parameter: ```cpp template <typename D> D GetRandDur(const D& duration_max) { return D{GetRand(duration_max.count())}; } BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(util_time_GetRandTime) { std::chrono::seconds rand_hour = GetRandDur(std::chrono::hours{1}); // Want seconds to be in range [0..1hour), but always get zero :(((( BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(rand_hour.count(), 0); } ``` Luckily `std::common_type` is already specialised in the standard lib for `std::chrono::duration` (https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/chrono/duration/common_type). And its effect seem to be that the call site must always specify the template argument explicitly. So instead of implementing the function for each duration type by hand, replace it with a templated version that is safe to use. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: Code review ACK 0000ea32656833efa3d2ffd9bab66c88c83334f0 promag: Code review ACK 0000ea32656833efa3d2ffd9bab66c88c83334f0. jonatack: ACK 0000ea3 thanks for the improved documentation. Code review, built, ran `src/test/test_bitcoin -t random_tests -l test_suite` for the new unit tests, `git diff fa05a4c 0000ea3` since previous review: hebasto: ACK 0000ea32656833efa3d2ffd9bab66c88c83334f0 with non-blocking [nit](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18781#discussion_r424924671). Tree-SHA512: e89d46e31452be6ea14269ecbbb2cdd9ae83b4412cd14dff7d1084283092722a2f847cb501e8054394e4a3eff852f9c87f6d694fd008b3f7e8458cb5a3068af7
2020-05-15 14:58:42 +02:00
#include <randomenv.h>
#include <support/allocators/secure.h>
#include <sync.h> // for Mutex
#include <util/time.h> // for GetTimeMicros()
#include <array>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <thread>
#ifndef WIN32
#include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_GETRANDOM
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) || (defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY_RAND) && defined(MAC_OSX))
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY_RAND) && defined(MAC_OSX)
#include <sys/random.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#endif
[[noreturn]] static void RandFailure()
{
LogPrintf("Failed to read randomness, aborting\n");
std::abort();
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
static inline int64_t GetPerformanceCounter() noexcept
{
// Read the hardware time stamp counter when available.
// See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_Stamp_Counter for more information.
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_X64))
return __rdtsc();
#elif !defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(__i386__)
uint64_t r = 0;
__asm__ volatile ("rdtsc" : "=A"(r)); // Constrain the r variable to the eax:edx pair.
return r;
#elif !defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__amd64__))
uint64_t r1 = 0, r2 = 0;
__asm__ volatile ("rdtsc" : "=a"(r1), "=d"(r2)); // Constrain r1 to rax and r2 to rdx.
return (r2 << 32) | r1;
#else
// Fall back to using C++11 clock (usually microsecond or nanosecond precision)
return std::chrono::high_resolution_clock::now().time_since_epoch().count();
#endif
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETCPUID
static bool g_rdrand_supported = false;
static bool g_rdseed_supported = false;
static constexpr uint32_t CPUID_F1_ECX_RDRAND = 0x40000000;
static constexpr uint32_t CPUID_F7_EBX_RDSEED = 0x00040000;
#ifdef bit_RDRND
static_assert(CPUID_F1_ECX_RDRAND == bit_RDRND, "Unexpected value for bit_RDRND");
#endif
#ifdef bit_RDSEED
static_assert(CPUID_F7_EBX_RDSEED == bit_RDSEED, "Unexpected value for bit_RDSEED");
#endif
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
static void InitHardwareRand()
{
uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
GetCPUID(1, 0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
if (ecx & CPUID_F1_ECX_RDRAND) {
g_rdrand_supported = true;
}
GetCPUID(7, 0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
if (ebx & CPUID_F7_EBX_RDSEED) {
g_rdseed_supported = true;
}
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
static void ReportHardwareRand()
{
// This must be done in a separate function, as InitHardwareRand() may be indirectly called
// from global constructors, before logging is initialized.
if (g_rdseed_supported) {
LogPrintf("Using RdSeed as an additional entropy source\n");
}
if (g_rdrand_supported) {
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
LogPrintf("Using RdRand as an additional entropy source\n");
}
}
/** Read 64 bits of entropy using rdrand.
*
* Must only be called when RdRand is supported.
*/
static uint64_t GetRdRand() noexcept
{
// RdRand may very rarely fail. Invoke it up to 10 times in a loop to reduce this risk.
#ifdef __i386__
uint8_t ok;
// Initialize to 0 to silence a compiler warning that r1 or r2 may be used
// uninitialized. Even if rdrand fails (!ok) it will set the output to 0,
// but there is no way that the compiler could know that.
uint32_t r1 = 0, r2 = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
__asm__ volatile (".byte 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf0; setc %1" : "=a"(r1), "=q"(ok) :: "cc"); // rdrand %eax
if (ok) break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
__asm__ volatile (".byte 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf0; setc %1" : "=a"(r2), "=q"(ok) :: "cc"); // rdrand %eax
if (ok) break;
}
return (((uint64_t)r2) << 32) | r1;
#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__amd64__)
uint8_t ok;
uint64_t r1 = 0; // See above why we initialize to 0.
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
__asm__ volatile (".byte 0x48, 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf0; setc %1" : "=a"(r1), "=q"(ok) :: "cc"); // rdrand %rax
if (ok) break;
}
return r1;
#else
#error "RdRand is only supported on x86 and x86_64"
#endif
}
/** Read 64 bits of entropy using rdseed.
*
* Must only be called when RdSeed is supported.
*/
static uint64_t GetRdSeed() noexcept
{
// RdSeed may fail when the HW RNG is overloaded. Loop indefinitely until enough entropy is gathered,
// but pause after every failure.
#ifdef __i386__
uint8_t ok;
uint32_t r1, r2;
do {
__asm__ volatile (".byte 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf8; setc %1" : "=a"(r1), "=q"(ok) :: "cc"); // rdseed %eax
if (ok) break;
__asm__ volatile ("pause");
} while(true);
do {
__asm__ volatile (".byte 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf8; setc %1" : "=a"(r2), "=q"(ok) :: "cc"); // rdseed %eax
if (ok) break;
__asm__ volatile ("pause");
} while(true);
return (((uint64_t)r2) << 32) | r1;
#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__amd64__)
uint8_t ok;
uint64_t r1;
do {
__asm__ volatile (".byte 0x48, 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf8; setc %1" : "=a"(r1), "=q"(ok) :: "cc"); // rdseed %rax
if (ok) break;
__asm__ volatile ("pause");
} while(true);
return r1;
#else
#error "RdSeed is only supported on x86 and x86_64"
#endif
}
#else
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
/* Access to other hardware random number generators could be added here later,
* assuming it is sufficiently fast (in the order of a few hundred CPU cycles).
* Slower sources should probably be invoked separately, and/or only from
* RandAddPeriodic (which is called once a minute).
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
*/
static void InitHardwareRand() {}
static void ReportHardwareRand() {}
#endif
/** Add 64 bits of entropy gathered from hardware to hasher. Do nothing if not supported. */
static void SeedHardwareFast(CSHA512& hasher) noexcept {
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
if (g_rdrand_supported) {
uint64_t out = GetRdRand();
hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&out, sizeof(out));
return;
}
#endif
}
/** Add 256 bits of entropy gathered from hardware to hasher. Do nothing if not supported. */
static void SeedHardwareSlow(CSHA512& hasher) noexcept {
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
// When we want 256 bits of entropy, prefer RdSeed over RdRand, as it's
// guaranteed to produce independent randomness on every call.
if (g_rdseed_supported) {
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
uint64_t out = GetRdSeed();
hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&out, sizeof(out));
}
return;
}
// When falling back to RdRand, XOR the result of 1024 results.
// This guarantees a reseeding occurs between each.
if (g_rdrand_supported) {
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
uint64_t out = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 1024; ++j) out ^= GetRdRand();
hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&out, sizeof(out));
}
return;
}
#endif
}
/** Use repeated SHA512 to strengthen the randomness in seed32, and feed into hasher. */
static void Strengthen(const unsigned char (&seed)[32], int microseconds, CSHA512& hasher) noexcept
{
CSHA512 inner_hasher;
inner_hasher.Write(seed, sizeof(seed));
// Hash loop
unsigned char buffer[64];
int64_t stop = GetTimeMicros() + microseconds;
do {
for (int i = 0; i < 1000; ++i) {
inner_hasher.Finalize(buffer);
inner_hasher.Reset();
inner_hasher.Write(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
}
// Benchmark operation and feed it into outer hasher.
int64_t perf = GetPerformanceCounter();
hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&perf, sizeof(perf));
} while (GetTimeMicros() < stop);
// Produce output from inner state and feed it to outer hasher.
inner_hasher.Finalize(buffer);
hasher.Write(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
// Try to clean up.
inner_hasher.Reset();
memory_cleanse(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
}
#ifndef WIN32
/** Fallback: get 32 bytes of system entropy from /dev/urandom. The most
* compatible way to get cryptographic randomness on UNIX-ish platforms.
*/
static void GetDevURandom(unsigned char *ent32)
{
int f = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (f == -1) {
RandFailure();
}
int have = 0;
do {
ssize_t n = read(f, ent32 + have, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES - have);
if (n <= 0 || n + have > NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) {
close(f);
RandFailure();
}
have += n;
} while (have < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES);
close(f);
}
#endif
/** Get 32 bytes of system entropy. */
void GetOSRand(unsigned char *ent32)
{
#if defined(WIN32)
HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
int ret = CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, nullptr, nullptr, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT);
if (!ret) {
RandFailure();
}
ret = CryptGenRandom(hProvider, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES, ent32);
if (!ret) {
RandFailure();
}
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_GETRANDOM)
/* Linux. From the getrandom(2) man page:
* "If the urandom source has been initialized, reads of up to 256 bytes
* will always return as many bytes as requested and will not be
* interrupted by signals."
*/
int rv = syscall(SYS_getrandom, ent32, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES, 0);
if (rv != NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) {
if (rv < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) {
/* Fallback for kernel <3.17: the return value will be -1 and errno
* ENOSYS if the syscall is not available, in that case fall back
* to /dev/urandom.
*/
GetDevURandom(ent32);
} else {
RandFailure();
}
}
#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && defined(__OpenBSD__)
/* On OpenBSD this can return up to 256 bytes of entropy, will return an
* error if more are requested.
* The call cannot return less than the requested number of bytes.
getentropy is explicitly limited to openbsd here, as a similar (but not
the same) function may exist on other platforms via glibc.
*/
if (getentropy(ent32, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) != 0) {
RandFailure();
}
// Silence a compiler warning about unused function.
(void)GetDevURandom;
#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY_RAND) && defined(MAC_OSX)
/* getentropy() is available on macOS 10.12 and later.
*/
if (getentropy(ent32, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) != 0) {
RandFailure();
}
// Silence a compiler warning about unused function.
(void)GetDevURandom;
#elif defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND)
/* FreeBSD, NetBSD and similar. It is possible for the call to return less
* bytes than requested, so need to read in a loop.
*/
static int name[2] = {CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND};
int have = 0;
do {
size_t len = NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES - have;
if (sysctl(name, std::size(name), ent32 + have, &len, nullptr, 0) != 0) {
RandFailure();
}
have += len;
} while (have < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES);
// Silence a compiler warning about unused function.
(void)GetDevURandom;
#else
/* Fall back to /dev/urandom if there is no specific method implemented to
* get system entropy for this OS.
*/
GetDevURandom(ent32);
#endif
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
namespace {
class RNGState {
Mutex m_mutex;
/* The RNG state consists of 256 bits of entropy, taken from the output of
* one operation's SHA512 output, and fed as input to the next one.
* Carrying 256 bits of entropy should be sufficient to guarantee
* unpredictability as long as any entropy source was ever unpredictable
* to an attacker. To protect against situations where an attacker might
* observe the RNG's state, fresh entropy is always mixed when
* GetStrongRandBytes is called.
*/
unsigned char m_state[32] GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = {0};
uint64_t m_counter GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = 0;
bool m_strongly_seeded GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = false;
Mutex m_events_mutex;
CSHA256 m_events_hasher GUARDED_BY(m_events_mutex);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
public:
RNGState() noexcept
{
InitHardwareRand();
}
~RNGState()
{
}
void AddEvent(uint32_t event_info) noexcept
{
LOCK(m_events_mutex);
m_events_hasher.Write((const unsigned char *)&event_info, sizeof(event_info));
// Get the low four bytes of the performance counter. This translates to roughly the
// subsecond part.
uint32_t perfcounter = (GetPerformanceCounter() & 0xffffffff);
m_events_hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&perfcounter, sizeof(perfcounter));
}
/**
* Feed (the hash of) all events added through AddEvent() to hasher.
*/
void SeedEvents(CSHA512& hasher) noexcept
{
// We use only SHA256 for the events hashing to get the ASM speedups we have for SHA256,
// since we want it to be fast as network peers may be able to trigger it repeatedly.
LOCK(m_events_mutex);
unsigned char events_hash[32];
m_events_hasher.Finalize(events_hash);
hasher.Write(events_hash, 32);
// Re-initialize the hasher with the finalized state to use later.
m_events_hasher.Reset();
m_events_hasher.Write(events_hash, 32);
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
/** Extract up to 32 bytes of entropy from the RNG state, mixing in new entropy from hasher.
*
* If this function has never been called with strong_seed = true, false is returned.
*/
bool MixExtract(unsigned char* out, size_t num, CSHA512&& hasher, bool strong_seed) noexcept
{
assert(num <= 32);
unsigned char buf[64];
static_assert(sizeof(buf) == CSHA512::OUTPUT_SIZE, "Buffer needs to have hasher's output size");
bool ret;
{
LOCK(m_mutex);
ret = (m_strongly_seeded |= strong_seed);
// Write the current state of the RNG into the hasher
hasher.Write(m_state, 32);
// Write a new counter number into the state
hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&m_counter, sizeof(m_counter));
++m_counter;
// Finalize the hasher
hasher.Finalize(buf);
// Store the last 32 bytes of the hash output as new RNG state.
memcpy(m_state, buf + 32, 32);
}
// If desired, copy (up to) the first 32 bytes of the hash output as output.
if (num) {
assert(out != nullptr);
memcpy(out, buf, num);
}
// Best effort cleanup of internal state
hasher.Reset();
memory_cleanse(buf, 64);
return ret;
}
};
RNGState& GetRNGState() noexcept
{
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// This C++11 idiom relies on the guarantee that static variable are initialized
// on first call, even when multiple parallel calls are permitted.
static std::vector<RNGState, secure_allocator<RNGState>> g_rng(1);
return g_rng[0];
}
}
/* A note on the use of noexcept in the seeding functions below:
*
* None of the RNG code should ever throw any exception.
*/
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
static void SeedTimestamp(CSHA512& hasher) noexcept
{
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
int64_t perfcounter = GetPerformanceCounter();
hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&perfcounter, sizeof(perfcounter));
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
static void SeedFast(CSHA512& hasher) noexcept
{
unsigned char buffer[32];
// Stack pointer to indirectly commit to thread/callstack
const unsigned char* ptr = buffer;
hasher.Write((const unsigned char*)&ptr, sizeof(ptr));
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Hardware randomness is very fast when available; use it always.
SeedHardwareFast(hasher);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// High-precision timestamp
SeedTimestamp(hasher);
}
static void SeedSlow(CSHA512& hasher, RNGState& rng) noexcept
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
{
unsigned char buffer[32];
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Everything that the 'fast' seeder includes
SeedFast(hasher);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// OS randomness
GetOSRand(buffer);
hasher.Write(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
// Add the events hasher into the mix
rng.SeedEvents(hasher);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// High-precision timestamp.
//
// Note that we also commit to a timestamp in the Fast seeder, so we indirectly commit to a
// benchmark of all the entropy gathering sources in this function).
SeedTimestamp(hasher);
}
/** Extract entropy from rng, strengthen it, and feed it into hasher. */
static void SeedStrengthen(CSHA512& hasher, RNGState& rng, int microseconds) noexcept
{
// Generate 32 bytes of entropy from the RNG, and a copy of the entropy already in hasher.
unsigned char strengthen_seed[32];
rng.MixExtract(strengthen_seed, sizeof(strengthen_seed), CSHA512(hasher), false);
// Strengthen the seed, and feed it into hasher.
Strengthen(strengthen_seed, microseconds, hasher);
}
static void SeedPeriodic(CSHA512& hasher, RNGState& rng) noexcept
{
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Everything that the 'fast' seeder includes
SeedFast(hasher);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// High-precision timestamp
SeedTimestamp(hasher);
// Add the events hasher into the mix
rng.SeedEvents(hasher);
// Dynamic environment data (performance monitoring, ...)
auto old_size = hasher.Size();
RandAddDynamicEnv(hasher);
LogPrint(BCLog::RANDOM, "Feeding %i bytes of dynamic environment data into RNG\n", hasher.Size() - old_size);
// Strengthen for 10 ms
SeedStrengthen(hasher, rng, 10000);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
}
static void SeedStartup(CSHA512& hasher, RNGState& rng) noexcept
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
{
// Gather 256 bits of hardware randomness, if available
SeedHardwareSlow(hasher);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Everything that the 'slow' seeder includes.
SeedSlow(hasher, rng);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Dynamic environment data (performance monitoring, ...)
auto old_size = hasher.Size();
RandAddDynamicEnv(hasher);
// Static environment data
RandAddStaticEnv(hasher);
LogPrint(BCLog::RANDOM, "Feeding %i bytes of environment data into RNG\n", hasher.Size() - old_size);
// Strengthen for 100 ms
SeedStrengthen(hasher, rng, 100000);
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
enum class RNGLevel {
FAST, //!< Automatically called by GetRandBytes
SLOW, //!< Automatically called by GetStrongRandBytes
PERIODIC, //!< Called by RandAddPeriodic()
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
};
static void ProcRand(unsigned char* out, int num, RNGLevel level) noexcept
{
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Make sure the RNG is initialized first (as all Seed* function possibly need hwrand to be available).
RNGState& rng = GetRNGState();
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
assert(num <= 32);
CSHA512 hasher;
switch (level) {
case RNGLevel::FAST:
SeedFast(hasher);
break;
case RNGLevel::SLOW:
SeedSlow(hasher, rng);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
break;
case RNGLevel::PERIODIC:
SeedPeriodic(hasher, rng);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
break;
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Combine with and update state
if (!rng.MixExtract(out, num, std::move(hasher), false)) {
// On the first invocation, also seed with SeedStartup().
CSHA512 startup_hasher;
SeedStartup(startup_hasher, rng);
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
rng.MixExtract(out, num, std::move(startup_hasher), true);
}
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
void GetRandBytes(unsigned char* buf, int num) noexcept { ProcRand(buf, num, RNGLevel::FAST); }
void GetStrongRandBytes(unsigned char* buf, int num) noexcept { ProcRand(buf, num, RNGLevel::SLOW); }
void RandAddPeriodic() noexcept { ProcRand(nullptr, 0, RNGLevel::PERIODIC); }
void RandAddEvent(const uint32_t event_info) noexcept { GetRNGState().AddEvent(event_info); }
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
bool g_mock_deterministic_tests{false};
uint64_t GetRand(uint64_t nMax) noexcept
{
return FastRandomContext(g_mock_deterministic_tests).randrange(nMax);
}
int GetRandInt(int nMax) noexcept
{
return GetRand(nMax);
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
uint256 GetRandHash() noexcept
{
uint256 hash;
GetRandBytes((unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash));
return hash;
}
2019-01-09 07:30:19 +01:00
bool GetRandBool(double rate)
{
if (rate == 0.0) {
return false;
}
const uint64_t v = 100000000;
uint64_t r = GetRand(v + 1);
return r <= v * rate;
}
void FastRandomContext::RandomSeed()
{
uint256 seed = GetRandHash();
rng.SetKey(MakeByteSpan(seed));
requires_seed = false;
}
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
uint256 FastRandomContext::rand256() noexcept
{
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#26153: Reduce wasted pseudorandom bytes in ChaCha20 + various improvements 511aa4f1c7508f15cab8d7e58007900ad6fd3d5d Add unit test for ChaCha20's new caching (Pieter Wuille) fb243d25f754da8f01793b41e2d225b917f3e5d7 Improve test vectors for ChaCha20 (Pieter Wuille) 93aee8bbdad808b7009279b67470d496cc26b936 Inline ChaCha20 32-byte specific constants (Pieter Wuille) 62ec713961ade7b58e90c905395558a41e8a59f0 Only support 32-byte keys in ChaCha20{,Aligned} (Pieter Wuille) f21994a02e1cc46d41995581b54222abc655be93 Use ChaCha20Aligned in MuHash3072 code (Pieter Wuille) 5d16f757639e2cc6e81db6e07bc1d5dd74abca6c Use ChaCha20 caching in FastRandomContext (Pieter Wuille) 38eaece67b1bc37b2f502348c5d7537480a34346 Add fuzz test for testing that ChaCha20 works as a stream (Pieter Wuille) 5f05b27841af0bed1b6e7de5f46ffe33e5919e4d Add xoroshiro128++ PRNG (Martin Leitner-Ankerl) 12ff72476ac0dbf8add736ad3fb5fad2eeab156c Make unrestricted ChaCha20 cipher not waste keystream bytes (Pieter Wuille) 6babf402130a8f3ef3058594750aeaa50b8f5044 Rename ChaCha20::Seek -> Seek64 to clarify multiple of 64 (Pieter Wuille) e37bcaa0a6dbb334ab6e817efcb609ccee6edc39 Split ChaCha20 into aligned/unaligned variants (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This is an alternative to #25354 (by my benchmarking, somewhat faster), subsumes #25712, and adds additional test vectors. It separates the multiple-of-64-bytes-only "core" logic (which becomes simpler) from a layer around which performs caching/slicing to support arbitrary byte amounts. Both have their uses (in particular, the MuHash3072 code can benefit from multiple-of-64-bytes assumptions), plus the separation results in more readable code. Also, since FastRandomContext effectively had its own (more naive) caching on top of ChaCha20, that can be dropped in favor of ChaCha20's new built-in caching. I thought about rebasing #25712 on top of this, but the changes before are fairly extensive, so redid it instead. ACKs for top commit: ajtowns: ut reACK 511aa4f1c7508f15cab8d7e58007900ad6fd3d5d dhruv: tACK crACK 511aa4f1c7 Tree-SHA512: 3aa80971322a93e780c75a8d35bd39da3a9ea570fbae4491eaf0c45242f5f670a24a592c50ad870d5fd09b9f88ec06e274e8aa3cefd9561d623c63f7198cf2c7
2023-02-15 15:51:38 +01:00
if (requires_seed) RandomSeed();
uint256 ret;
rng.Keystream(MakeWritableByteSpan(ret));
return ret;
}
template <typename B>
std::vector<B> FastRandomContext::randbytes(size_t len)
{
std::vector<B> ret(len);
fillrand(MakeWritableByteSpan(ret));
return ret;
}
template std::vector<unsigned char> FastRandomContext::randbytes(size_t);
template std::vector<std::byte> FastRandomContext::randbytes(size_t);
void FastRandomContext::fillrand(Span<std::byte> output)
{
if (requires_seed) RandomSeed();
rng.Keystream(output);
}
FastRandomContext::FastRandomContext(const uint256& seed) noexcept : requires_seed(false), rng(MakeByteSpan(seed)), bitbuf_size(0) {}
bool Random_SanityCheck()
{
uint64_t start = GetPerformanceCounter();
/* This does not measure the quality of randomness, but it does test that
* GetOSRand() overwrites all 32 bytes of the output given a maximum
* number of tries.
*/
static const ssize_t MAX_TRIES = 1024;
uint8_t data[NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES];
bool overwritten[NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES] = {}; /* Tracks which bytes have been overwritten at least once */
int num_overwritten;
int tries = 0;
/* Loop until all bytes have been overwritten at least once, or max number tries reached */
do {
memset(data, 0, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES);
GetOSRand(data);
for (int x=0; x < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES; ++x) {
overwritten[x] |= (data[x] != 0);
}
num_overwritten = 0;
for (int x=0; x < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES; ++x) {
if (overwritten[x]) {
num_overwritten += 1;
}
}
tries += 1;
} while (num_overwritten < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES && tries < MAX_TRIES);
if (num_overwritten != NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) return false; /* If this failed, bailed out after too many tries */
// Check that GetPerformanceCounter increases at least during a GetOSRand() call + 1ms sleep.
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(1));
uint64_t stop = GetPerformanceCounter();
if (stop == start) return false;
// We called GetPerformanceCounter. Use it as entropy.
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
CSHA512 to_add;
to_add.Write((const unsigned char*)&start, sizeof(start));
to_add.Write((const unsigned char*)&stop, sizeof(stop));
GetRNGState().MixExtract(nullptr, 0, std::move(to_add), false);
return true;
}
static constexpr std::array<std::byte, ChaCha20::KEYLEN> ZERO_KEY{};
FastRandomContext::FastRandomContext(bool fDeterministic) noexcept : requires_seed(!fDeterministic), rng(ZERO_KEY), bitbuf_size(0)
{
// Note that despite always initializing with ZERO_KEY, requires_seed is set to true if not
// fDeterministic. That means the rng will be reinitialized with a secure random key upon first
// use.
}
Merge #14624: Some simple improvements to the RNG code e414486d56b9f06af7aeb07ce13e3c3780c2b69b Do not permit copying FastRandomContexts (Pieter Wuille) 022cf47dd7ef8f46e32a184e84f94d1e9f3a495c Simplify testing RNG code (Pieter Wuille) fd3e7973ffaaa15ed32e5aeadcb02956849b8fc7 Make unit tests use the insecure_rand_ctx exclusively (Pieter Wuille) 8d98d426116f0178612f14d1874d331042c4c4b7 Bugfix: randbytes should seed when needed (non reachable issue) (Pieter Wuille) 273d02580aa736b7ccea8fce51d90541665fdbd1 Use a FastRandomContext in LimitOrphanTxSize (Pieter Wuille) 3db746beb407f7cdd9cd6a605a195bef1254b4c0 Introduce a Shuffle for FastRandomContext and use it in wallet and coinselection (Pieter Wuille) 8098379be5465f598220e1d6174fc57c56f9da42 Use a local FastRandomContext in a few more places in net (Pieter Wuille) 9695f31d7544778853aa373f0aeed629fa68d85e Make addrman use its local RNG exclusively (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This improves a few minor issues with the RNG code: * Avoid calling `GetRand*()` functions (which currently invoke OpenSSL, later may switch to using our own RNG pool) inside loops in addrman, networking code, `KnapsackSolver`, and `LimitOrphanSize` * Fix a currently unreachable bug in `FastRandomContext::randbytes`. * Make a number of simplifications to the unit tests' randomness code (some tests unnecessarily used their own RNG or the OpenSSL one, instead of using the unit test specific `insecure_rand_ctx`). * As a precaution, make it illegal to copy a `FastRandomContext`. Tree-SHA512: 084c70b533ea68ca7adc0186c39f0b3e0a5c0ae43a12c37286e5d42086e056a8cd026dde61b12c0a296dc80f87fdc87fe303b9e8e6161b460ac2086cf7615f9d
2018-12-13 13:43:12 +01:00
FastRandomContext& FastRandomContext::operator=(FastRandomContext&& from) noexcept
{
requires_seed = from.requires_seed;
rng = from.rng;
bitbuf = from.bitbuf;
bitbuf_size = from.bitbuf_size;
from.requires_seed = true;
from.bitbuf_size = 0;
return *this;
}
void RandomInit()
{
Merge #14955: Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG (#4411) 223de8d94d6522f795ec3c2e7db27469f24aa68c Document RNG design in random.h (Pieter Wuille) f2e60ca98530e0a865ff6c6fd3c5633aec11a515 Use secure allocator for RNG state (Pieter Wuille) cddb31bb0a132afa50b5350196cf26f0064fe3e2 Encapsulate RNGState better (Pieter Wuille) 152146e782d401aa1ce7d989d62306aabc85f22e DRY: Implement GetRand using FastRandomContext::randrange (Pieter Wuille) a1f252eda87356fa329c838a7bf569808489648f Sprinkle some sweet noexcepts over the RNG code (Pieter Wuille) 4ea8e50837a0932b31a241988fd68d6730a2048a Remove hwrand_initialized. (Pieter Wuille) 9d7032e4f066777c97c58b1394884716e213790a Switch all RNG code to the built-in PRNG. (Pieter Wuille) 16e40a8b562ad849a5f5e8b21ceb375e46038243 Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState (Pieter Wuille) 2ccc3d3aa346e96206281a391bc29874cf5ee7f4 Abstract out seeding/extracting entropy into RNGState::MixExtract (Pieter Wuille) aae8b9bf0f4fd2b801ee72cf191588c8b3a67c3c Add thread safety annotations to RNG state (Pieter Wuille) d3f54d1c82b131d817b20cd9daa75f9d3c9475e1 Rename some hardware RNG related functions (Pieter Wuille) 05fde14e3afe6f7156ebb6df6cd0e3ae12635b89 Automatically initialize RNG on first use. (Pieter Wuille) 2d1cc5093949f8ea9487a68724162c8b39035ad8 Don't log RandAddSeedPerfmon details (Pieter Wuille) 6a57ca91da23c6a5d91399ffc7fc09a99b6d4c76 Use FRC::randbytes instead of reading >32 bytes from RNG (Pieter Wuille) Pull request description: This does not remove OpenSSL, but makes our own PRNG the 'main' one; for GetStrongRandBytes, the OpenSSL RNG is still used (indirectly, by feeding its output into our PRNG state). It includes a few policy changes (regarding what entropy is seeded when). Before this PR: * GetRand*: * OpenSSL * GetStrongRand*: * CPU cycle counter * Perfmon data (on Windows, once 10 min) * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * rdrand (if available) * From scheduler when idle: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * At startup: * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep After this PR: * GetRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * GetStrongRand*: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * From scheduler when idle: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter before and after 1ms sleep * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) * At startup: * Stack pointer (which indirectly identifies thread and some call stack information) * rdrand (if available) * CPU cycle counter * /dev/urandom (or equivalent) * OpenSSL * CPU cycle counter again * Perfmon data (on Windows, once every 10 min) The interface of random.h is also simplified, and documentation is added. This implements most of #14623. Tree-SHA512: 0120e19bd4ce80a509b5c180a4f29497d299ce8242e25755880851344b825bc2d64a222bc245e659562fb5463fb7c70fbfcf003616be4dc59d0ed6534f93dd20 Co-authored-by: Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>
2021-09-11 22:52:36 +02:00
// Invoke RNG code to trigger initialization (if not already performed)
ProcRand(nullptr, 0, RNGLevel::FAST);
ReportHardwareRand();
}